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This dissertation assesses the UK’s commitment to human protection from mass violence 
and atrocity crimes in the context of its transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 2020. 
A transitional foreign policy is defined in relation to changes in the UK’s geopolitical 
interests, policies, and international engagements, which is examined between 1997 and 
2020. It is shaped by the adaptation of successive governments to the UK’s post-war 
relative hard power decline, the UK’s membership, leadership, and influence in 
multilateral organisations, and the UK’s position within the evolving international order. 
A transitional foreign policy has implications for the nature of the UK’s commitment to 
human protection as successive governments attempt to strategize the UK’s international 
relations, including the relationship between its many foreign policy interests and values.  
The dissertation argues that there has been a sustained change in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 2015 
based around a liberal internationalist approach to protecting populations from mass 
violence and atrocity crimes. However, from 2016 to 2020 this commitment to human 
protection has been in tension with the UK’s other geopolitical and economic interests 
such as international trade, which is part of a broader difficulty in defining the UK’s place 
in the world in the 21st century. Brexit in particular has renewed attention amongst 
academics and policymakers to the UK’s relative international power decline. In turn, 
successive governments have reasserted the UK’s post-Brexit role in the world as a 
‘Global Britain’, with economic and geopolitical relations at the core of this approach.  
These arguments are evidenced by an analysis of 1,055 primary documentary 
materials, semi-structured interviews, and secondary scholarship. The dissertation utilises 
theory on foreign policy change to develop an original analytical framework to assess 
sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign 
policy, which is applied to the crises in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Libya, Syria, Myanmar, 
and Yemen. This dissertation contributes to research on UK foreign policy and human 
protection, assessments of foreign policy change, and UK leadership and influence amid 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
“Twenty years ago we would not have been fighting in Kosovo. We would 
have turned our backs on it. The fact that we are engaged is the result of a wide 
range of changes - the end of the Cold War; changing technology; the spread 
of democracy. But it is bigger than that. I believe the world has changed in a 
more fundamental way.” 
                        Tony Blair, Doctrine of the International Community speech, 1999  
 
From humanitarian crises to Brexit, governments in the United Kingdom (UK) are 
continuously shaping, adapting, and responding to changes in its foreign policy. Yet a 
constant feature in the foreign policy of successive governments is that the UK is and will 
remain a significant actor in international relations capable of demonstrating its 
credentials for global leadership. Whether through alliances with other states, 
membership of international organisations, or promoting a ‘Global Britain’, UK 
governments have challenged longstanding debates on the UK’s post-war relative 
international decline (Gamble, 1994; Bernstein, 2004; McCourt, 2014; Gaskarth, 2016; 
Oppermann et al., 2020). 
A defining feature of these government efforts to assert the UK’s global role is a 
defence of the post-1945 rules-based international order and the protection of liberal 
values at its foundations, including freedom, democracy, and human rights (Wright, 2020, 
pp.40-41). Part of the UK’s defence of these liberal values has been its willingness in 
some cases to protect populations from mass violence and atrocity crimes in the post-
Cold War era, which has characterised important elements of the UK’s foreign policy 
(Ralph, 2014a, p.4). This includes instances of inaction or a delayed response in Rwanda 
(1994) and Bosnia (1995) and direct coercive action in crises such as Kosovo (1999), 
Sierra Leone (2000), Libya (2011), and Syria (2015, 2018). The UK’s willingness to 
protect populations from mass violence and atrocity crimes in the post-Cold War era is 
most notable following the election of the New Labour government in 1997 and its 
commitment to an internationalist foreign policy based on a concern for domestic and 
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international human protection (Blair, 1999a; Blair, 1999b; Blair, 2009; Blair, 2011; 
Cook, 1998).
1  
Throughout the period between 1997 and 2020 however, UK governments have 
been contributing to human protection whilst grappling with the challenges of a broader 
transitional foreign policy. Throughout this thesis, a transitional foreign policy is defined 
in relation to changes in the UK’s geopolitical interests, policies, and international 
engagements, with a focus on the period between 1997 and 2020. It is during this period 
where several important transitions occurred in the UK’s foreign policy, including a shift 
from a traditional conservative approach to foreign policy to an internationalist position 
under the Labour Party, the acceleration of globalisation and pressure on an active UK 
role in the world, the emergence of international threats including terrorism and Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD), the sovereignty-intervention dilemma and the humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the intervention in Iraq in 2003, and Brexit. 
  Changes in the UK’s geopolitical interests are principally conceptualised in two 
main ways. The first is the discourse and material reality of globalisation, especially 
government perceptions of the globalised nature of national security threats including 
from WMD and international terrorism. The second is the UK’s geopolitical and 
economic relations with other states, which includes the overlap with situations involving 
human protection crises. A transitional foreign policy is also shaped by the adaptation of 
successive governments to the UK’s post-war relative hard power decline, the UK’s 
membership, leadership, and influence in core multilateral organisations, and the UK’s 
position within the evolving international order. A transitional foreign policy in turn has 
implications for the UK’s commitment to human protection as successive governments 
attempt to strategize the UK’s international relations, and in particular, the relationship 
between its foreign policy interests and its values. This includes the UK’s geopolitical 
interests, particularly in protecting national security, and economic interests such as trade, 
alongside upholding a commitment to liberal values of freedom, democracy, and human 
rights protection. A transitional foreign policy is expressed by changing patterns of policy 




1  ‘New Labour’ refers to the brand of politics under the leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown between 1997 and 2010. It was originally coined in the party’s 1997 manifesto New 
Labour because Britain deserves better (see Dale, 2003). 
2  See chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of the analytical framework used to assess the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy.  
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As chapter 4 and 5 will show, the initial stages of a transitional foreign policy 
precede 1997 with regards to how the previous Conservative government engaged with 
human protection as part of the Conservative foreign policy tradition, which is distinct 
from the internationalist stance of the New Labour government that succeeded the 
Conservatives in 1997. From 1997, a transitional foreign policy is evident in several 
important ways, including New Labour’s appeal to an internationalist foreign policy amid 
accelerating globalisation, the rise of international threats in the form of international 
terrorism and WMD, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, the human protection crisis in 
Kosovo, and domestic and international debates on the relationship between sovereignty 
and humanitarian intervention.  
A renewed scrutiny of the UK’s global ‘role’ following the decision to leave the 
European Union (EU) in 2016, the changing balance of international power between 
states, and a broader crisis in international human protection (Bellamy, 2020), 
encapsulates some of the fundamental challenges facing UK governments as they adapt 
to a transitional foreign policy. A transitional UK foreign policy thus exposes a 
fundamental puzzle between the UK’s commitment to international human protection, its 
changing international power position relative to other states, and the geopolitical and 
economic pressures of defining a post-Brexit place in the world which conveys with 
confidence the UK’s ambitions for leadership and influence in the evolving international 
order.  
The remainder of this chapter addresses the contextual foundations of the thesis, 
including the background, research puzzle, the research structure, and its core arguments 
and original contributions.  
 
1.1 Background: Domestic and international changes on human protection   
In 1997, the newly elected Labour government immediately focused its attention on 
defining “a new role” in the world for the UK (McCourt, 2011, p.36). This was shaped 
by Tony Blair’s dismissal of isolationism and in its place an emphasis on the UK as a 
capable international leader (Blair 1997 cited in Blair 1997 cited in McCourt, 2011, p.36). 
This formed a central pillar of the New Labour government’s overarching commitment 
to an internationalist foreign policy based on the idea that the national is interconnected 
with the international (Cook, 1999; Kitchen and Vickers, 2013).  
Whilst the Labour Party has historically appealed to an internationalist foreign 
policy (Cook, 1999, p.894; Dunne, 2004), an important element of the post-1997 New 
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Labour government was the prominence of domestic and international human rights 
protection (Cook, 1997). Blair (1999a) articulated this commitment through challenging 
conventional norms of state sovereignty in instances of mass atrocity crimes. Wheeler 
and Dunne (1998, p.850) suggest that New Labour’s approach during the party’s first 
term in office represented an important change in UK foreign policy. In particular, Blair 
and Cook’s promotion of human rights and the ethical dimension provided a framework 
to now assess the UK’s commitment to human protection (Dunne and Wheeler, 2001, 
p.184).  
It is equally important to understand New Labour’s commitment to human 
protection in the broader context of international debates on the relationship between 
sovereignty and humanitarian intervention (Deng et al., 1996; Wheeler, 2000; Badescu, 
2011; Peltner, 2017). In the aftermath of the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia in 1994 
and 1995, international debates focused on the sovereign responsibility of states to protect 
their own populations from mass atrocity crimes (Deng et al., 1996; Wheeler, 2003, p.37; 
Badescu, 2011, pp.1-2). One outcome of these debates was the emergence of 
humanitarian intervention based on the idea of states intervening by force into another 
state without its consent for human protection purposes (Welsh, 2003, p.3; Wheeler, 
2003, p.37).  
Following disputes over the legality of humanitarian intervention, human 
protection debates evolved into creation of various other international human protection 
norms (Nasu, 2012, p.128; Jones, 2017, p.145). The first is the protection of civilians 
(PoC) which focuses exclusively on armed conflict (Popovski, 2011; Breakey, 2012; 
Hultman, 2012; Keating, 2017). The second is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which 
addresses the four atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
ethnic cleansing, and is further guided by the three pillars of a state’s responsibility to 
protect its own population, international assistance and capacity building, and timely and 
decisive action (UN General Assembly, 2005, p.30; UN General Assembly, 2009b, pp.1-
2). The third is atrocity prevention, which is concerned with the preventative mechanisms 
to halt mass atrocities before they occur (Bellamy, 2011, p.2; Straus, 2016, pp.131-148).  
This thesis therefore applies the concept of human protection throughout as an 
umbrella term for the R2P, PoC, atrocity prevention, and humanitarian intervention.
3 
 
3  For conceptual discussions on the concept of human protection see: Bellamy, A.J. 2016. The 
humanisation of security? Towards an International Human Protection Regime. European 
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Whilst acknowledging some important differences between these norms, this thesis is 
concerned with the UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign 
policy, rather than on the debates about the relationship and compatibility between them.
4
 
Instead, this conceptualisation of human protection is intended to capture the multifaceted 
ways in which the UK communicates and practices its commitment to protect populations 
from mass violence and atrocity crimes. 
 
1.2 The research puzzle  
As a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and a state in 
principle committed to international human rights protection, the UK appears ideally 
placed to contribute to the protection of populations from mass violence and atrocity 
crimes. However as the opening section of this introduction suggested, between 1997 and 
2020 the UK’s commitment to human protection has occurred amid the challenges posed 
by a transitional foreign policy, and in particular, its impact on the efforts of governments 





Journal of International Security. 1(1), pp.102-118. Hunt, C.T. 2016. African Regionalism & 
Human Protection Norms: An Overview. Global Responsibility to Protect. 8(2-3), pp.201-
226, Kurtz, G. and Rotmann, P. 2016. The Evolution of Norms of Protection: Major Powers 
Debate the Responsibility to Protect. Global Society. 30(1), pp.3-20. Murithi, T. 2016. The 
African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur: The Limits of Human Protection and Mass Atrocities 
Prevention. Global Responsibility to Protect. 8(2-3), pp.227-248. 
4  For debates on the relationship between R2P, PoC, and humanitarian intervention see: 
Breakey, H., Francis, A., Popovski, V., Sampford, C., Smith, M.G., Thakur, R. and Evans, G. 
2012. Enhancing Protection Capacity: Policy Guide to the Responsibility to Protect and the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. [Online]. Brisbane: Griffith University. [Accessed: 
26 June 2018]. Available from: 
https://i.unu.edu/media/unu.edu/publication/31142/R2P_POC_Policy_Guide.pdf; Nasu, H. 
2012. Peacekeeping, civilian protection mandates and the responsibility to protect. In: Francis, 
A., et al. eds. Norms of protection: Responsibility to protect, protection of civilians and their 
interaction.  New York: United Nations University Press, pp.117-133, Sampford, C. Ibid.A 
tale of two norms. In: Francis, A., et al. eds., pp.98-116. Shesterinina, A. 2016. Responsibility 
to Protect and UN Peacekeeping: A Challenge of Particularized Protection. AP R2P Brief. 
6(4), pp.pp.1-7. Thakur, R. 2016. The Responsibility to Protect at 15. International Affairs. 
92(2), pp.415-434. Williams, P. 2016. The R2P, Protection of Civilians, and UN Peacekeeping 
Operations. In: Bellamy, A. and Dunne, T. eds. The Oxford handbook of the responsibility to 
protect.  Oxford Oxford University Press. Rhoads, E.P. and Welsh, J. 2019. Close cousins in 
protection: the evolution of two norms. International Affairs. 95(3), pp.597-617. Hunt, C.T. 
2019. Analyzing the Co-Evolution of the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of 
Civilians in UN Peace Operations. International Peacekeeping. 26(5), pp.630-659. 
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1.2.1 Relative decline, Brexit and the crisis in the UK’s global role 
There is significant debate on the UK’s relative hard power decline in the post-1945 era 
of international relations (Acheson, 1962 quoted in Brinkley, 1990, p.599; Gamble, 1994; 
English and Kenny, 1999; Bernstein, 2004; Pumberton, 2004; Harvey, 2011; Morris, 
2011; McCourt, 2014; Gaskarth, 2016; Gill and Oates, 2017; Rogers, 2017; Ogden, 2020; 
Oppermann et al., 2020). Scholars have supported this assessment through evidence of 
the UK’s economic performance in terms of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
purchasing power (Pumberton, 2004; Ogden, 2020), its military spending, size, and 
capabilities for deployment relative to other states (Harvey, 2011; Gaskarth, 2016; Ogden, 
2020), and changes in its membership of international organisations, especially in the 
context of Brexit (Gill and Oates, 2017; Gifkins et al., 2019a). 
Despite this post-war relative decline, the UK retains an important global role 
through its economic power, defence capabilities especially in the form of its nuclear 
deterrent, soft power influence, and its permanent seat on the UN Security Council 
(Bernstein, 2004; Morris, 2011; Hill and Beadle, 2014; McCourt, 2014; MacDonald, 
2018; Gifkins et al., 2019a; Niblett, 2021). This is why it is essential to understand the 
UK’s decline as relative rather than absolute because states such as the United States (US) 
and China have witnessed a significant growth in their economic and military power 
relative to the UK. Yet the UK has also grown in economic terms, but just not to the 
extent of other powers such as the US and China.  
  Brexit has once again drawn attention to academic and policy debates on the 
UK’s relative decline because the UK’s alliance with Europe has been one important 
pillar of its global role since joining the Common Market in 1973 (Dee and Smith, 2017). 
As a result, the decision to leave “has forced an unusually raw and in-depth interrogation 
of the UK’s twenty-first century place and function” (Turner, 2019, p.732). Gill and Oates 
(2017, p.3) regard Brexit as an opportunity for the UK to reassess its international 
engagements. Yet in an attempt to reorientate the UK’s foreign policy following its 
departure from the EU, policymakers have promoted various national role conceptions 
which has “only increased uncertainty” about the post-Brexit role the UK intends to 
pursue in terms of its core international alliances and foreign policy interests (Oppermann 
et al., 2020, p.133). This has led some to argue that there is a “role crisis” in UK foreign 
policy due to the ambiguity surrounding its post-Brexit international position (Beasley et 
al., 2018). The emergence of Global Britain in 2016 is the most visible attempt by UK 
governments to adapt to Brexit by reasserting the UK’s ambitions for a global leadership 
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role (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2016a).
5 However, Global Britain’s message is 
equally confusing because an important part of the UK’s global approach was its 
membership of the EU (Niblett, 2021, p.6).  
 
1.2.2 The crisis of liberal international order 
The UK’s transitional foreign policy is also evident beyond the EU. Scholars argue that 
the post-1945 liberal international order is in crisis, whilst the emergence of other powers 
is leading to an evolving pluralist world order (Ikenberry, 2018a; Paris, 2019; Acharya 
and Plesch, 2020; Babic, 2020; Lee et al., 2020).
6
 A concern amongst academics is that 
the emergence of a pluralist world order may lead to states contesting some of the ideas 
that embody the liberal international order, including human protection norms (Newman, 
2013b; Newman, 2016; Newman and Zala, 2018). For instance, Hopgood (2015, p.9) has 
argued that the world is “on the verge of the imminent decay of the Global Human Rights 
Regime”. This perspective is based on the emergence of powers which appeal to a 
pluralist conception of state sovereignty alongside the argument that the US is in decline 
as the hegemon of the post-1945 liberal international order (Hopgood, 2015, p.13). An 
evolving pluralist world order thus places additional significance on the UK’s attempts to 
uphold its foreign policy commitment to liberal values on the domestic and international 
protection of human rights. 
 
1.2.3 A crisis in international human protection  
Another compelling reason why the UK’s commitment to human protection remains 
critical are the number of human protection crises in the 21st century. Writing on the 15th 
anniversary of the R2P, Bellamy (2020) argued that there is a “global crisis of protection” 
characterised by mass atrocities being committed by “states of good standing and even 
some champions of human protection”. In June 2021, the Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect listed 18 countries currently experiencing or at risk of mass 
atrocity crimes, which includes the superpower of China (Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, 2021b). This shows the serious challenges still facing 
international human protection in the 21st century, in addition to the broader pressure on 
the UK’s international values and interests in protecting populations from mass atrocities 
 
5  Herein FCO.  
6  See chapter 2 for a review of the distinction between international and world order.  
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on the one hand, and pursuing post-Brexit trade deals with countries such as China on the 
other.  
 These issues generate a significant puzzle in UK foreign policy in terms of the 
relationship between the UK’s commitment to human protection and its transitional 
foreign policy. This includes how governments and policymakers strategize the UK’s 
international relations in the context of a transitional foreign policy, and in turn, the 
implications of this strategizing for the nature of the UK’s contributions to human 
protection. 
 
1.3 Thesis aim and objectives  
This thesis aims to investigate the relationship between the UK’s commitment to human 
protection and its transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 2020.  
The thesis objectives are: 
1. The development and application of an analytical framework to assess changes to the 
UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy between 1997 
and 2020. 
2. Using this framework to hypothesise and test three scenarios of the relationship 
between the UK’s place in the world and sustained changes in its commitment to 
human protection.  
3. The development and classification of a quantitative and qualitative dataset to 
examine sustained changes to the UK’s commitment to human protection in a 
transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 2020. 
4. Synthesising findings on the relationship between the UK’s place in the world and its 
commitment to human protection between 1997 and 2020.  
 
1.4 Research questions  
The following theoretical and empirical questions and sub-questions are addressed 
throughout this thesis in order to fulfil the research aim and objectives:  
1. Theoretical: What is the relationship between the UK’s commitment to human 
protection and its transitional foreign policy?  
a. Sub-question: To what extent does this reflect broader theoretical research on 
foreign policy change? 
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2. Empirical: Have adjustments in the UK’s place in the world between 1997 and 2020 
translated into sustained changes in its foreign policy rhetoric and action on human 
protection?  
a. Sub-question: What are the main continuities and changes in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection between 1997 and 2020?  
The core theoretical research question captures the focus of this thesis on the relationship 
between the UK’s commitment to human protection and its transitional foreign policy 
between 1997 and 2020. To restate the definition provided earlier in this introduction, a 
transitional foreign policy is defined in relation to changes in the UK’s geopolitical 
interests, policies, and international engagements between 1997 and 2020. It is shaped by 
the adaptation of successive governments to the UK’s post-war relative hard power 
decline, the UK’s membership, leadership, and influence in core multilateral 
organisations, and the UK’s position within the evolving international order. The UK’s 
transitional foreign policy in turn has significant implications for its commitment to 
human protection in rhetoric and action because governments attempt to strategize the 
nature of the UK’s place in the world. 
This strategizing includes addressing the relationship between the UK’s 
geopolitical and economic interests on the one hand, and its commitment to liberal values 
of freedom, democracy, and international human rights protection on the other. A 
transitional foreign policy is expressed by changing patterns of policy behaviour, 
changing administrative apparatus, and elite UK political rhetoric. This relationship 
between the UK’s commitment to human protection and its transitional foreign policy is 
specifically assessed through the development and application of an analytical framework 
in chapter 3. This framework draws on theoretical research on foreign policy change, 
which will contribute to addressing the sub-theoretical research question on how the 
thesis contributes to broadening theoretical research on foreign policy change.  
 This core relationship between the UK’s commitment to human protection and its 
transitional foreign policy is then addressed empirically. The empirical research question 
focuses on an assessment of the relationship between changes in the UK’s place in the 
world and in its commitment to human protection. The UK’s place in the world is 
conceptualised according to a transitional foreign policy in being shaped by the adaptation 
of successive governments to the UK’s post-war relative decline, the UK’s membership, 
leadership, and influence in multilateral organisations, and the UK’s position within the 
evolving international order. Sustained changes in the UK’s foreign policy are assessed 
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according to the same analytical framework developed in chapter 3. This empirical 
question thus draws on the core thesis themes of the UK’s commitment to human 
protection, UK leadership and influence on human protection, and the UK’s place in the 
world amid debates on Brexit and the UK’s post-war relative international decline. This 
empirical focus is supplemented by the sub-question on the continuities and changes in 
the UK’s commitment to human protection between 1997 and 2020. Together, these 
questions will address the aim and objectives of this thesis. 
 
1.5 Research hypothesis: Three scenarios of change on human protection 
In order to further address the aim and objectives, this thesis proposes to test a hypothesis 
based on the outcome of three possible scenarios of UK foreign policy change on human 
protection as part of a transitional foreign policy. These three scenarios aim to capture the 
fundamental ways in which the relationship between the UK’s place in the world and its 
commitment to human protection is expressed in its foreign policy, which in turn helps 
to address the empirical research questions.  
Gaskarth’s (2014) research on strategizing the UK’s international engagements 
through role theory is used to conceptualise these three scenarios because it neatly 
captures the different approaches that policymakers may pursue in order to define the 
UK’s place in the world. The foundation of role theory is that a country’s international 
engagements are a product “of the expectations that emerge about the appropriate 
behavior” of that country (McCourt, 2014, p.1). The UK’s role in the world is not simply 
constructed by domestic policymakers and applied to the international, but rather its 
construction is a product of the interconnection between domestic and international 
expectations of the UK’s place in the world (McCourt, 2011; Gaskarth, 2014; Oppermann 
et al., 2020). The outcome of this conceptualisation of the UK’s international 
engagements is a specific “role orientation” for UK foreign policy, which is formed “by 
making choices from a range of more specific national role conceptions” (Gaskarth, 2014, 
p.563).  
These national role conceptions are vast. For instance, Gaskarth (2014, p.565) lists 
seven role conceptions for the orientation of an “influential actor in the international 
system”, which range from a “reliable ally” to a “human rights defender”. These role 
conceptions are subsequently performed through various foreign policy outputs, such as 
the UK’s membership of multilateral organisations as a means of performing its 
conception of a human rights defender, or its intelligence sharing and defence relationship 
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with the US as performing the role conception of a reliable ally. Together the performance 
of these role conceptions in foreign policy form the UK’s role orientation in international 
relations. Gaskarth’s (2014) research  is thus an analytically useful lens to conceptualise 
the following three scenarios on the relationship between changes in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection and its transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 
2020.  
 
1.5.1 Scenario one: A trading partner  
This role orientation is based on the idea of promoting and pursuing the national self-
interest through a prioritisation of the UK’s geopolitical and economic interests in 
international trade. Brexit in particular has led to significant attention from policymakers 
on the UK’s national interest in a Global Britain (FCO, 2016a; Prime Minister's Office, 
2020c). Whilst an isolationist role orientation is contrary to the UK’s conventional foreign 
policy outlook (Gaskarth, 2014, p.568), the role orientation of a trade partner proposes 
that events such as Brexit will lead the UK towards a more inward-looking and self-
interested foreign policy in terms of securing its geopolitical and economic interests. 
However, to secure these interests the UK will have to continue playing an important role 
as a partner and ally with other international actors. Some relevant role conceptions 
include being a reliable ally and economic partner, which are principally performed 
through bilateral trade deals, economic agreements, and reductions in Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA) as the UK allocates funds directly to its core economic 
interests.  
 This scenario for the UK’s role orientation has significant implications for its 
commitment to human protection. This is because an integral element of being a global 
partner is to trade with countries around the world, some of which have poor human rights 
records. In turn, this places the relationship between the UK’s commitment to the defence 
of human protection and the pursuit of trade deals under intense scrutiny. The UK’s arms 
trade industry is another example which exposes the fundamental contradictions in the 
commitment of successive UK governments to upholding human protection, while 
simultaneously producing and licensing significant arms transfers to other countries 
(Wickham-Jones, 2000, p.10; de Moraes, 2018). This scenario therefore suggests that the 
UK’s geopolitical and economic interests are prioritised, particularly on the basis of the 




1.5.2 Scenario two: A pragmatic liberal internationalist  
Pragmatic internationalism is the idea that the UK will continue to pursue an outward-
looking foreign policy based on the interconnection between the domestic and the 
international interest (Vickers, 2004a, p.197). A core component of this approach is a 
commitment to international human rights protection and the UK’s willingness to 
intervene in other sovereign states in order to protect populations from mass violence and 
atrocity crimes. The pragmatic element of this scenario captures the relationship between 
the UK’s attempts to maintain global influence and leadership on human protection in the 
post-war era (Daddow, 2019a, p.6), but equally being realistic about the UK’s relative 
decline as a hard military power which limits its capacity to militarily intervene in every 
situation involving humanitarian suffering.  
This role orientation is thus most attuned to that of an “opportunist-
interventionist”, which is defined by Gaskarth (2014, p.577) as “those who seek to exploit 
current disruptions in the international system to advance liberal ideas about human 
rights, democracy and good governance, even at the expense of existing frameworks of 
international law”. This emphasis on advancing liberal ideas is a clear point of departure 
from scenario one in placing greater emphasis on human rights protection. The relevant 
role conceptions for a pragmatic liberal internationalist include being a “reliable ally”, 
“military power”, “global leader” and “beacon of democracy”, and are performed through 
diplomacy within multilateral institutions, relationships with other states, and military 
intervention (Gaskarth, 2014, p.578). These role performances have important 
implications for human protection because they demonstrate the willingness of the UK to 
intervene in other sovereign states to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes, even 
if such action is beyond the conventional channels of international law.  
This scenario of a pragmatic internationalist power is not to imply that liberal 
values alone will dictate the UK’s foreign policy, but that human rights and democracy 
for example, would form an important part of the equation in the UK’s political and 
economic relations with other states. This may include drawing attention to human rights 
abuses, condemning abuses, and requiring certain human rights standards as part of trade 
negotiations.  
 
1.5.3 Scenario three: A global soft power leader and influencer  
The third scenario is based on the UK’s aspirations to retain an important place in the 
world amid a relative decline in its hard power. In this scenario, the UK aims to lead and 
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influence on human protection through its role within the post-1945 rules-based 
international order. This role orientation is most comparable with being an “influential 
actor in the international system” (Gaskarth, 2014, p.565). This is because it recognises 
that the UK is no longer able to exert its hard power capabilities in a similar manner to a 
superpower, but that it is still able to utilise its experience and influence in the 
international system to shape and lead on international issues through its soft power. 
Some relevant role conceptions include upholding international law, defending human 
rights, being an “aid superpower”, democracy promoter, and a “reliable ally” (Gaskarth, 
2014, p.565). These role conceptions are subsequently performed through actions such 
alliances with the US and other European states, increased levels of defence spending, 
diplomacy through multilateral institutions, and maintaining the UK’s 0.7% commitment 
to ODA (Gaskarth, 2014, p.565).  
 This thesis conceptualises this scenario as being largely orientated around the use 
of soft power influence and leadership, which the UK is able to utilise through its existing 
multilateral networks and its contributions to ODA. For example, the UK’s membership 
of the UN Security Council provides an advantageous position for the UK to demonstrate 
international leadership and influence by being part of an exclusive group of five states 
with veto powers (Hughes, 2017, p.467; Gifkins et al., 2019a, p.1350; Wright, 2020, 
p.40). Whilst the UK has not used its veto powers since 1989 (Security Council Report, 
2015, p.3), it can still draw on its diplomatic experience and expertise of leading on 
human protection through the practice of penholding on human protection resolutions 
(Ralph and Gifkins, 2017, p.642; Gifkins et al., 2019a, p.1350). Similarly, the UK has 
been able to draw on its substantial contributions to ODA as a demonstration of its 
leadership and influence on development initiatives, especially post-2010 (Lightfoot et 
al., 2017, p.519). These aspects enable the UK to lead on human protection in spite of its 
relative hard power decline through taking advantage of its remaining soft power 
capabilities in its membership of international organisations and significant ODA 
capacity.  
 Whilst these three scenarios have some overlap in their role conceptions, the 
fundamental orientation and performance of each one is essentially different from the 
other. For instance, a reliable ally is an important role conception of scenario one and 
two, but the orientation and performances of the respective scenarios have completely 
different implications for defining the UK’s place in the world and the nature of its 
commitment to human protection. For example, scenario one of being a trading partner 
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may impact on the UK’s commitment to human protection when this involves alliances 
with countries which have poor human rights records, whilst scenario two of being a 
pragmatic internationalist suggests that the UK will place core liberal values, including 
international human protection, as a central pillar of UK foreign policy. The way each 
scenario is expressed is thus essential for assessing sustained change in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 2020.  
 
1.5.4 Research hypothesis 
Based on the three scenarios of the UK’s commitment to human protection in a 
transitional foreign policy, the hypothesis assesses whether the UK’s awareness of its 
changing position in the world between 1997 and 2020 led to sustained changes in its 
rhetoric and action towards a strengthened commitment to human protection. 
 This proposes to analyse whether the UK’s commitment to human protection in a 
transitional foreign policy supports either the scenario of a pragmatic liberal 
internationalist or a global soft power leader and influencer on human protection. The 
concept of transitional foreign policy is captured in the hypothesis by the UK’s changing 
position in the world. This is because the UK’s changing position in the world is shaped 
by how successive governments have adapted to the UK’s post-war relative international 
decline, the UK’s membership, leadership, and influence in multilateral institutions, and 
the UK’s position within the evolving international order. Chapter 3 develops an 
analytical framework in order to assess sustained changes in the UK’s rhetoric and action 
on human protection, which will be used as the analytical framework to test the hypothesis 
throughout the empirical chapters.  
 
1.6 Arguments  
The central argument of this dissertation is that the way successive governments 
conceptualise the UK’s place in the world is fundamental for determining the nature of 
its commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy. More specifically, it 
argues that the pragmatic liberal internationalist foreign policy of the post-1997 New 
Labour government laid the foundations for sustained changes in the UK’s foreign policy 
rhetoric and action on human protection between 1997 and 2015. Upon entering office, 
the New Labour government seized the opportunity to recast the UK’s place in the world 
amid increasing globalisation and the pressure on state sovereignty following mass 
violence and atrocity crimes in the 1990s. The New Labour government responded to 
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these changes in the international environment by dismissing UK isolationism and decline 
and directing UK foreign policy towards an appeal to liberal internationalism and its 
component norms and values of freedom, democracy promotion, the international rule of 
law, and human rights protection. It later expressed this commitment to human protection 
through its contribution to the military interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and Sierra Leone 
in 2000. 
 The Conservative-led Coalition government attempted to repackage the pragmatic 
liberal internationalism of New Labour through its doctrine of liberal conservatism 
between 2010 and 2015. Despite this shift, it is argued that New Labour’s pragmatic 
internationalism has remained a core underlying feature of successive government 
approaches to human protection until 2015. Informed by this pragmatic liberal 
internationalism, the post-2010 Conservative-led Coalition government has continued to 
challenge the idea of UK decline and argue that it retains an important place on the 
international stage. The Coalition government largely achieved this through drawing on 
similar resources and national role conceptions as the New Labour government, such as 
international alliances and coalitions on humanitarian intervention, being a military 
power, and demonstrating rhetorical leadership and influence on human protection. The 
Coalition government subsequently performed this commitment to human protection in 
action through contributing to the military intervention in Libya in 2011 and its 
unsuccessful attempt to intervene in Syria in 2013.   
 In contrast to the sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection 
between 1997 and 2015, the dissertation argues that UK’s place in the world is in a state 
of flux following Brexit. It is argued that there is limited evidence of a consensus in 
domestic and international environments on the UK’s post-Brexit place in the world, 
aside from the significance attached to securing its geopolitical and economic interests as 
part of a ‘Global Britain’. Brexit is therefore a particularly damaging aspect of the UK’s 
transitional foreign policy because of the absence of a coherent worldview and how this 
translates into the UK’s present and future contributions to human protection. In 
particular, the UK’s post-2015 geopolitical interests, policies, and international 
engagements reveal tensions in the relationship between its geopolitical and economic 
interests and the protection of liberal values, especially human rights. This is evident in 
practice through the UK’s response to the Rohingya humanitarian crisis in Myanmar 
(2016-2017) and the civil war in Yemen (2015-2020). Both crises expose a tension in the 
relationship between the UK’s foreign policy interests and its values. The tension in 
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Myanmar is primarily between democracy promotion and the protection of the Rohingya 
from mass atrocities, whilst in Yemen it is between the UK’s economic and geopolitical 
interests with coalition forces and addressing the serious humanitarian crisis. These 
examples therefore show the challenges facing the UK’s commitment to human 
protection in a transitional foreign policy as governments grapple with protecting the 
UK’s various foreign policy interests and values. 
 
1.7 Contributions  
This thesis makes original contributions to three bodies of scholarship on UK foreign 
policy and human protection, foreign policy change, and former great power leadership 
and influence in international relations from the perspective of the UK. These three 
original contributions of this thesis are at the heart of the relationship between the 
theoretical and the empirical study of UK foreign policy and international human 
protection.  
 The first contribution is to scholarship on UK foreign policy and international 
human protection. There is already a wealth of existing research on UK foreign policy 
and human protection both from the perspective of human rights more broadly (Beech 
and Munce, 2019) and that which has a specific focus on the R2P and humanitarian 
intervention (Daddow, 2013; Daddow and Schnapper, 2013; Beech and Oliver, 2014; 
2015; Ralph, 2014a; Peltner, 2017; Butchard, 2020). The original contribution of the 
thesis to these debates lies in the analysis of the UK’s ‘transitional foreign policy’. As 
outlined earlier in this introduction, a transitional foreign policy is defined according to 
changes in the UK’s place in the world between 1997 and 2020. This thesis thus assesses 
the UK’s commitment to human protection in the context of this transitional foreign 
policy, which includes testing the nature of this relationship according to the three 
scenarios of sustained UK foreign policy change on human protection.  
This analysis of changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection in a 
transitional foreign policy is an important contribution to the research fields of UK foreign 
policy and human protection. This is because there has yet been a detailed assessment of 
the relationship between UK foreign policy, human protection, and the UK’s place in the 
world, and in particular, long-term changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection 
in a transitional foreign policy. This is despite the impact that changes in the UK’s relative 
international power position, its membership of multilateral organisations, and shifts in 
the global balance of power have on the UK’s subsequent approach to international 
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human protection. This especially includes the extent of its hard military capabilities, 
diplomatic strength, soft power reach, and economic capacity to contribute to the 
protection of populations from mass violence and atrocity crimes, whilst simultaneously 
securing its own domestic security and stability.  
The second contribution of this thesis is to broaden theoretical and empirical 
research on why the foreign policy of a state changes and how to identify and assess this 
change. As a sub-field of foreign policy analysis, there is a wealth of theoretical and 
empirical research examining foreign policy change (see chapter 3). This body of research 
includes examining the domestic and international sources of foreign policy change, the 
reasons why change occurs, and the structures and agents which influence change (Smith, 
1981; Levy, 1994; Stein, 1994; Kaarbo, 1997; Hermann and Hagan, 1998; Hermann et 
al, 2001; Carlsnaes, 1993; 2002; Hudson, 2005; Doeser and Eidenfalk, 2013; Brazys et 
al, 2017).  
This thesis provides an important contribution to this research on foreign policy 
change at two interconnected levels. The first is through its analysis of UK foreign policy 
change on human protection in a transitional foreign policy. As defined throughout this 
chapter, a transitional foreign policy incorporates an analysis of both structures and agents 
according to how successive governments adapt to the UK’s relative international decline, 
changes in its membership of international organisations, and changes in the UK’s 
position within the evolving international order. As the previous paragraph suggests, this 
thesis argues that a transitional foreign policy has significant implications for the UK’s 
commitment to human protection as governments strategize the UK’s place in the world.  
The second level of this contribution is the development of a novel framework to 
assess sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional 
foreign policy between 1997 and 2020. As will be shown in chapter 3, there lacks a 
sufficient framework to assess foreign policy change that can be applied to an analysis of 
UK foreign policy on human protection. This is despite the development of frameworks 
which aim to examine foreign policy change (Hermann, 1990; Holsti, 1998; Gustavsson, 
1999; Welch, 2005). To address this gap, this thesis uses a framework created specifically 
for this research based on the relationship between rhetoric and action with the aim of 
capturing the full extent of sustained UK foreign policy change on human protection. 
The third contribution is an assessment of the leadership and influence of former 
‘great powers’ in international relations. Using the UK as its case study, this thesis 
conceptualises the UK as a former great power in the sense that its hard capabilities have 
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declined relative to other states in the post-war era, but that it continues to exert global 
leadership and influence on human protection. This is an important contribution amid the 
wealth of post-war academic and policy debates on the UK’s relative hard power decline 
and the alternative sources of UK power on the world stage (Acheson, 1962 quoted in 
Brinkley, 1990, p.599; Gamble, 1994; English and Kenny, 1999; Bernstein, 2004; 
Pumberton, 2004; Harvey, 2011; Morris, 2011; McCourt, 2014; Gaskarth, 2016; Gill and 
Oates, 2017; Rogers, 2017; Ogden, 2020; Oppermann et al., 2020). Since the UK’s 
decision to leave the EU in 2016, the Foreign Affairs Committee has launched six inquires 
related to the UK’s place in the world, including the implications of Brexit for the UK’s 
world role, the UK’s influence at the UN, Global Britain, R2P and humanitarian 
intervention, and the future of the UK’s international policy (Foreign Affairs Committee, 
2016a; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018e; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018c; Foreign 
Affairs Committee, 2018b; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018a; Foreign Affairs 
Committee, 2020). Alongside this, the UK government published its Integrated Review 
into the UK’s place in the world in March 2021, which is a major document outlining the 
UK’s foreign policy strategy for the next 10 years (HM Government, 2021). This thesis 
is thus a timely contribution to research on the UK’s commitment to human protection in 
what it defines as being a transitional foreign policy.  
 
1.8 Thesis structure  
The thesis is structured around seven chapters. Chapter 2 reviews existing theoretical and 
empirical scholarship on the core thesis themes in order to present the original 
contributions of the thesis. Chapter 3 then details the theoretical framework and 
methodological approach of the thesis. This includes developing an original framework 
to assess sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional 
foreign policy in order to fulfil the stated research aim and objectives. The methodology 
part of chapter 3 details the combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques which 
are used as part of a triangulation of data from semi-structured interviews, primary 
documentary material, and secondary scholarship.  
 Chapter 4 establishes the empirical groundwork for the remainder of the thesis 
through addressing the background on New Labour’s liberal internationalist commitment 
to human protection from 1997 to 2010. It is the first chapter to apply the analytical 
framework for assessing sustained change in the UK’s commitment to human protection 
in a transitional foreign policy. In doing so, chapter 4 makes an important contribution to 
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fulfilling the aim and objectives of the research, answering the two theoretical and 
empirical research questions, and beginning to test the research hypothesis. To support 
this contribution, the chapter analyses two examples of the UK’s commitment to human 
protection in action according to the UK’s interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and Sierra 
Leone in 2000.  
 Chapter 5 and 6 build on the foundations of chapter 4 in analysing the relationship 
between the UK’s commitment to human protection and its transitional foreign policy 
between 2010-2015 (chapter 5) and 2015-2020 (chapter 6). These chapters are 
fundamental to supporting the argument of this dissertation that sustained changes have 
occurred in the UK’s commitment to human protection since 1997. This is supported 
through an assessment of elite political rhetoric on human protection alongside four 
empirical examples of Libya, Syria, Myanmar, and Yemen. As with chapter 4, chapter 5 
and 6 contribute significantly to addressing the aim and objectives of the thesis, as well 
answering the theoretical and empirical research questions, and continuing to test the 
hypothesis.  
 Chapter 7 brings the analysis of chapters 4 to 6 together to assess the relationship 
between the UK’s place in the world and its commitment to human protection in a 
transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 2020. It argues that between 1997 and 2015, 
successive governments remained consistently committed to a broadly liberal 
internationalist commitment to human protection based on protecting core liberal values 
on human rights and democracy. However, the post-2015 period of UK foreign policy 
reveals a tension between the UK’s geopolitical and economic interests and its 
commitment to liberal values, which is part of a broader difficulty in defining the UK’s 
place in the world.  
 Chapter 8 concludes with the main findings and contributions of the thesis, and 
tests whether the hypothesis holds that the UK strengthened its commitment to human 








Chapter 2 - World order and liberal internationalism: Transition, the 
UK’s place in the world, and its commitment to human protection  
 
This chapter identifies the original contributions of the thesis by reviewing academic 
scholarship on world order and liberal internationalism, shifts in the global balance of 
power between states, and the UK’s place in the world and commitment to human 
protection. The premise of this chapter is that understanding the UK’s place in the world 
and its commitment to human protection is incomplete without examining the broader 
international context in which UK foreign policy is practiced. This is because the very 
notion of the UK’s place in the world is not only shaped by domestic governments, but 
equally the broader distribution of power between states in the international system.  
For these reasons, this chapter reviews four main bodies of scholarship. First, it 
begins with broader debates on the nature of world order and the emergence of liberal 
internationalism in the post-1945 era of international relations. This leads to the second 
section on liberal internationalism, the UK’s role in the world, and its internationalist 
commitment to human protection. Having reviewed research on the relationship between 
the domestic and the international in the UK’s commitment to human protection, the third 
section engages with literature on the crisis and transition of the post-1945 liberal 
international order and its implications for human protection. The final section then 
reviews research on the components of the UK’s transitional foreign policy in preparation 
for the remainder of the thesis. 
 Following the review of existing academic scholarship, the chapter outlines three 
main theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis. To briefly summarise, its first 
contribution relates to research on UK foreign policy and human protection through a 
specific focus on the UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign 
policy. There is considerable discussion on the UK’s commitment to human protection, 
the UK’s post-war relative power decline, Brexit, and Global Britain, but a gap in the 
research on the relationship between these changes in a transitional foreign policy and the 
impact on the UK’s commitment to human protection more specifically. Second, it 
contributes to broadening theoretical and empirical research on foreign policy change 
using the case of the UK’s commitment to human protection as part of a transitional 
foreign policy.  Thirdly, this chapter shows how debates on a transitional world order, 
liberal internationalism, and the implications for human protection, relies heavily on the 
21st century superpowers of the US and China. As a result, the leadership and influence 
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of ‘former great’ powers on human protection has been neglected. This dissertation uses 
the UK as an example of the leadership and influence that it exercises on human 
protection in spite of a post-war relative hard power decline. This shows that even if it is 
generally accepted that the UK is suffering from a sustained period of relative 
international decline, this is far from absolute and has not prevented the UK from making 
some significant contributions to international human protection.  
 
2.1 World order and liberal internationalism  
It is difficult to fully understand the UK’s place in the world without identifying the nature 
of the world it exists and operates in. This section therefore reviews scholarship on the 
notion of international and world order, which it finds are both contested concepts in 
academic scholarship. The post-war liberal hegemony of the US is the clearest 
manifestation of international order, whilst the concept of world order is concerned with 
relations between states that go beyond the US-led international order. However, the 
overwhelming focus of debates on the US and China means that non-superpowers are 
often neglected in this literature. This is despite debates on international and world order 
being essential for locating and understanding the UK’s place in the world and its 
subsequent commitment to human protection between 1997 and 2020.  
 
2.1.1 Defining international and world order  
Conceptualising world order is no straightforward task because even the concept of order 
is ambiguous. Lascurettes (2020, p.7) suggests order constitutes a system “where a 
common set of rules is observed by a majority of that system’s polities”. According to 
this definition, order requires the two components of rules and then actors to agree on and 
follow these rules. By extension, the concept of world order is inherently contested by 
scholars due to its socially constructed nature (Hall and Paul, 1999; Bull, 2002; Hurrell, 
2007; Kissinger, 2014; Acharya, 2018; Acharya and Plesch, 2020; Lascurettes, 2020). As 
a consequence, world order is defined in various ways. Hall and Paul (1999, p.2) define 
world order as encompassing ideas “about how social, political, and economic systems 
are and ought to be structured”. World order thus combines both the reality of what is 
said to exist and the normative on what should exist.  
 Acharya and Plesch (2020, p.227) outline a more expansive definition of world 
order as “the broad interplay of power distribution, ideas, institutions, and interactions 
that characterize a significant portion of the world at a given time”. Similar to the 
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perspective of Lascurettes (2020), a critical aspect is the role of actors in the construction 
of the ideas and institutions that form a world order. The approach of Acharya and Plesch 
(2020) is broadly reflective of Hedley Bull’s work in the Anarchical Society, with world 
order defined as “those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the 
elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole.” (Bull, 2002, p.19, 
emphasis added). Bull (2002) understands world order as an overarching organisation of 
human interactions, which captures the world in its entirety, rather than the differences 
which may exist within a world order (Kissinger, 2014, p.9; Acharya, 2018, p.11).   
 What emerges from this conceptualisation of world order is the need to distinguish 
it from international order (Bull, 2002; Kissinger, 2014; Acharya, 2018; Acharya and 
Plesch, 2020). This is because according to Bull (2002, p.19), “international order is order 
among states”. Building on this, Kissinger (2014, p.9) and Acharya (2018, p.11) make a 
fundamental distinction between international and world order. Whilst the premise of 
world order is “applicable to the entire world”, international order applies “to a substantial 
part of the globe – larger enough to affect the balance of power” (Kissinger, 2014, p.9). 
Similarly, Acharya (2018, p.11) argues that international order is characterised by “the 
role of a hegemonic power, or a select group of established powers and the institutions 
they have created and dominated”. Instead of a universal world order then, it is 
acknowledged that the post-1945 order is more reflective of an international order in 
being “largely limited to a group of like-minded states centred on the Atlantic littoral” 
(Nye, 2017, p.12).  
 According to Newman (2013b, p.239), “international order concerns the norms 
and institutions that characterise the international system, constituted most importantly 
by the behavior of states, legal principles, regimes, and the exercise of power”. This 
definition neatly captures how international order is a combination of ideas, norms, 
institutional design and material power, which together, form an order (Philips, 2011; 
Goh, 2013; Reus-Smit, 2017). The institutions in question are further split into primary 
institutions related to the foundations of international order, and secondary institutions, 
which help govern that order (Newman and Zala, 2018, p.872). These perspectives are 
valuable for conceptualising the post-1945 order as being international rather than 
universal in scope (Newman, 2013b; Kissinger, 2014; Acharya, 2018; Acharya and 
Plesch, 2020).   
Accordingly, this thesis draws on the notion of international order to capture the 
broader international context in which UK foreign policy on human protection has 
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operated from 1997 to 2020. More specifically, the type of order in question is the liberal 
international order which has dominated post-Cold War academic debates on the nature 
of order between states (Ikenberry, 2009; 2018b; Dunne and McDonald, 2013; Acharya, 
2018; Acharya and Plesch, 2020; Cooley and Nexon, 2020; de Graaff et al., 2020; Lee et 
al., 2020). What makes this international order characteristically liberal is the hegemonic 
dominance of the US and its subsequent liberal norms, ideas, power, and institutions that 
govern this order (Ikenberry, 2009, p.72). This includes the founding of liberal institutions 
such as the UN, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and norms and 
ideas on freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (Ikenberry, 2018a, p.17; 
de Graaff et al., 2020, p.192; Lee et al., 2020, p.52; Nuruzzaman, 2020, p.54).  
 
2.1.2 Liberal internationalism: Sovereignty and humanitarian intervention 
Liberal internationalism captures the ideas, norms, and institutions that constitute the US-
led liberal international order. Although frequently referenced in academic debates, 
Dunne and McDonald (2013, p.7) argue that the concept of liberal internationalism 
requires further theoretical development. As with world order, liberal internationalism is 
a broad field lacking a single universal theoretical standpoint (Ikenberry, 2009, p.72; 
Dunne and McDonald, 2013, p.7). According to Ikenberry (2009, p.71), liberal 
internationalism has evolved in three stages, the first being liberal internationalism 1.0 
which existed during the pre-WW2 Woodrow Wilson era of international relations; the 
second being liberal internationalism 2.0 during the post-WW2 period; and the third being 
liberal internationalism 3.0 based on the “post-hegemonic” period of liberal international 
order.  
Of particular relevance for this thesis is liberal internationalism 2.0 because it 
captures the period of UK foreign policy between 1997 and 2020. This stage of liberal 
internationalism is based on a form of “modified sovereignty” (Ikenberry, 2009, p.73); 
which is reflected in the conditional emphasis placed on state sovereignty (Bohm, 2018). 
Jahn (2018, p.143) argues that this liberal internationalist emphasis on conditional 
sovereignty “aim to spread all three core dimensions of liberal norms” on democracy, 
justice, and humanitarian intervention. It is this latter concern with humanitarian 
intervention which attracts particular academic, legal, and policy attention given “there 
remains significant divisions among sovereign states and within global public opinion as 
to the appropriate response to governments engaging in widespread atrocity crimes” 
(Dunne and McDonald, 2013, p.2).  
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For instance, Ralph (2014b, p.7) suggests that this relationship between liberal 
internationalism and humanitarian intervention exposes “internal tensions in the liberal 
internationalist position”. This is because the liberal internationalist commitment to the 
rule of law on one hand, and human rights protection on the other, is particularly 
challenging when protecting human rights may invoke humanitarian intervention which 
is legally contentious (Ralph, 2014b, p.7).  Ralph’s (2014b, p.7) perspective thus draws 
attention to the idea that the goals of liberal internationalism are not necessarily 
harmonious when it comes to the rule of law and humanitarian intervention. Ralph 
(2014b) also examines liberal internationalism in UK foreign policy, which is largely 
neglected in the existing research on liberal international order. It therefore provides an 
important starting point for analysing the UK’s liberal internationalist commitment to 
human protection as part of a transitional foreign policy.   
 
2.2 Liberal internationalism and the UK’s place in the world 
Whilst the existing literature on international and world order neglects the role of powers 
which have suffered from a relative decline, the scholarship provides an important 
foundation for understanding the nature of the world in which UK foreign policy is shaped 
and practiced. This section therefore reviews research on the UK’s place in the world, 
UK leadership attempts as a liberal internationalist power, and the relationship with the 
UK’s commitment to human protection. The review finds a wealth of research on both 
the UK’s role in the world and its commitment to human protection, but not on the 
connections between these two bodies of literature which reveals a contribution of this 
thesis.  
 
2.2.1 The UK’s place in the world 
The UK’s place in the world has received notable academic attention (Gamble, 1994; 
Bernstein, 2004; McCourt, 2011; McCourt, 2014; Gaskarth, 2014; Hill, 2016; 
Oppermann et al., 2020). In particular, scholars have drawn widely on the sub-field of 
foreign policy analysis of role theory. The seminal work in role theory is Holsti’s (1970, 
p.239) idea of national role conceptions which relate to how a state interprets its own role 
in international relations. As Oppermann et al. (2020, p.135) suggest, the basis of role 
theory is “a theatrical metaphor, seeing states in the international arena – like actors on a 
stage – playing roles that follow certain scripts”. These roles and their performance are 
not only shaped by a state’s own perspective of its role, but also the expectations of other 
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states, which captures the interplay between the domestic and international in the 
construction of a state’s place in the world (McCourt, 2012, p.34; 2014, p.1; Oppermann, 
Beasley and Kaarbo, 2020, p.135). In theory then, a state is presented with some limited 
choices in the international role it can play, which is further constrained by what others 
expect of it.  
 An important work on role theory in UK foreign policy is McCourt’s (2014) 
Britain and world power since 1945. McCourt (2014, p.1)  argues “that state action in 
international politics is fundamentally role-based”. These roles are socially constructed 
through the agency of governments and policymakers with the outcome determining the 
role of a state in international relations. The strength of this argument lies in the 
recognition of the domestic and international sources which together construct a state’s 
role in the world. McCourt (2014, p.2) argues that since 1945 the UK has been a “residual 
great power” (emphasis in original) where despite the acceleration of its relative material 
decline, “policymakers have nonetheless viewed their state as continuing to have a 
prominent part to play in world politics”. This perspective is reinforced by its membership 
of core multilateral institutions of the post-war international order, such as the UN 
Security Council.   
 McCourt (2011, pp.33-34) however, contests the concept of a ‘role’ because it 
works “to dissolve discussion about British foreign policy in clichés and sound-bites”. 
Rather than providing freedom of choice, “future choices for UK foreign policy are 
usually collapsed into a limited number of seemingly fundamental choices” (McCourt, 
2011, p.34). For example, in strategizing the UK’s role in the world, Gaskarth (2014, 
p.561) shows how the concept of roles assumes that a state only has limited number of 
options which are influenced by history and international relations. The result is that the 
UK has played several roles in the post-war period, such as “bridge, pivotal power, beacon 
of democracy or reliable ally of the United States” (Gaskarth, 2014, p.561). This may 
explain why successive governments have promoted the UK’s ‘role’ as a significant 
international power amid debates on its post-war relative decline. 
 This role theoretical application to UK foreign policy is thus an important body 
of research as it facilitates debate on how the UK’s place in the world is constructed, and 
fundamentally constrained, by the interaction between historic and present domestic and 
international relations. Building on this research, Strong (2019) applies role theory to the 
case of parliamentary debates on whether the UK should have intervened in Syria in 2013. 
The research finds that the government’s position on intervention was challenged through 
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parliamentary contestation over the role that the UK should play in Syria (Strong, 2019, 
p.388). This research is a noteworthy contribution to theoretical scholarship on domestic 
role contestation (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012; Brummer and Thies, 2015), which challenges 
the idea that constructing a national role conception is far from straightforward because 
governments may face opposition from other domestic political actors.  
Returning to the UK’s place in the world, Opperman, Beasley and Kaarbo (2020, 
p.133) again draw on role theory to argue that following the 2016 EU referendum, the 
UK “has projected a disorientated foreign policy containing elements of partially 
incompatible roles” which have not successfully translated into a clear national role 
conception, but rather had the opposite effect of pushing the UK closer to an isolationist 
place in the world. This research therefore shows that the UK’s transitional foreign policy 
is characterised by significant incoherence on its place in the world.  
 This review of notable works on role theory and UK foreign policy shows that is 
it difficult, if not impossible, to detach the domestic construction of the UK’s place in the 
world from international expectations of the role the UK is permitted to play by other 
states. Using this as a starting point, the following three subsections review scholarship 
on the UK’s post-war place in the world through debates on the UK’s post-war relative 
hard power decline and former great power status, government counter-role conceptions 
of the UK as a leader in the liberal international order, and the UK’s liberal internationalist 
commitment to human protection. This review provides the groundwork for determining 
the nature of the UK’s place in the world between 1997 and 2020, the historical influence 
on this construction, and its consequences for the UK’s commitment to human protection. 
These sub-sections will show that existing research has analysed the components of the 
UK’s relative decline, the changes in its post-war power status, and its membership of 
multilateral institutions, but has not examined these aspects together in an analysis of the 
UK’s commitment to human protection.  
 
2.2.2 UK relative decline: From ‘great’ to ‘former great’ power  
It is argued that the UK’s place in the world is in a state of relative decline post-1945 
(Gamble, 1994; Bernstein, 2004; Morris, 2011; Hill, 2016; Rogers, 2017). However, 
some caution against generalising the concept of decline in relation to the UK (Self, 2010, 
p.8). The UK’s nuclear capacity, military capabilities, and economic power, mean that it 
still exerts considerable hard power capabilities, especially through being able to draw on 
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its nuclear arsenal (Bernstein, 2004, p.1; Cargill, 2018, p.2). Others however, argue that 
the UK’s conventional hard military power is equally in decline (Roberts, 2020, p.2). 
As Bernstein (2014, p.1) acknowledges, it is essential that any analysis of the 
UK’s international power decline “must distinguish between relative and absolute 
decline”. The basis of this argument is that “power…is relative not absolute; its sources 
are intangible as well as tangible” (Reynolds, 2013, p.5). This suggests that even if the 
UK’s power declines relative to the growth of other states, this does not necessarily render 
its decline absolute. Whilst Bernstein was writing back in 2004, their argument still has 
relevance for analysing the UK’s place in the world amid a relative hard power decline. 
The concept of relative decline recognises that the UK retains a role on the international 
stage, but that the nature of this role is fundamentally different to what it once was because 
the UK is no longer a superpower in the league of the US and China.  
This has led some to argue that the UK’s relative international position is more 
reflective of a middle power (Rachman, 2018; Murray and Brainson, 2019; Paris, 2019). 
However, what constitutes a middle power is also widely debated in the literature (Higgott 
and Cooper, 1990; Chapnick, 1999; Jordaan, 2003; Behringer, 2005; Beeson, 2011; 
Patience, 2014; Robertson, 2017; Karim, 2018). The reason for these debate is because 
the notion of a middle power is ambiguous (Chapnick, 1999, p.73; Cooper, 2011, p.323; 
Patience, 2014, p.210; Robertson, 2017, p.335). According to Chapnick (1999, p.73), the 
referent object of middle power analysis is the state “which is neither a great nor a small 
power” and is thus relative to these two positions. Using a similar definition, Jordaan 
(2003, p.165-166) distinguishes middle powers further through two categories of 
traditional and emerging. Traditional middle powers mainly rose to prominence in the 
Cold War era and are a core part of the global economy, but are unable to fundamentally 
“shape global outcomes in any direct manner” (Jordaan, 2003, pp.168-169). Oosterveld 
and Torossian (2018) equally adopt the concept of established middle powers to refer to 
those states in international order which lack the capacity to shape it alone.  
Some suggest the UK’s material resources and capacity to influence international 
relations resemble a middle power state (Rachman, 2018; Murray and Brainson, 2019, 
p.1435; Paris, 2019, p.2). In regards to Brexit, Murray and Brainson (2019, p.1435) 
suggest that even with its membership of the UN Security Council in the background, 
“the price of exit from the EU is a reduction in London’s capacity to influence events 
beyond the UK’s borders, and that the country has become a middle power”. This 
perspective defines the UK’s middle power status according to a decline in its ability to 
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influence as a result of its departure from a central multilateral institution. However, this 
assessment is largely based on the notion of declining influence, which opens the 
opportunity to dispute this argument on the basis of the UK’s other capabilities in 
leadership, diplomacy, and its remaining hard power for example. 
Some therefore argue that it is vital to scrutinise the benchmark used to determine 
the UK’s place in the world. Morris (2011, p.331) argues that the UK has declined quite 
considerably if judged against the status of other superpowers such as the US, but that 
comparisons such as this overestimates the extent of the UK’s relative decline given the 
sheer scale of US power and dominance of international order. From this perspective, the 
UK still retains elements of a great power through its powerful economic position 
measured in terms of GDP, soft power capabilities, and its permanent membership of the 
UN Security Council (Morris, 2011, pp.331-333). In a similar vein, it is argued that the 
UK’s UN Security Council membership, defence and aid budget, and contributions to 
interventions in Kosovo, Libya, and Syria mean that the UK “remains much more than a 
middle power” but is not a superpower  (Chalmers, 2015, p.2). In an comparative analysis 
of the UK and France, Hill (2016, p.394) suggests that both countries “are in limbo” 
regarding their place in the world because the UK and France are “neither ‘great powers’ 
in the nineteenth-century sense nor average states of the middling rank”.  
As the literature in the next sub-section shows, UK governments do not openly 
endorse the notion of the UK as a middle power. Brexit is one important factor influencing 
this rejection of a middle power status because the government sees it as an opportunity 
to project the UK’s post-Brexit global role (Murray and Brainson, 2019, p.1435). The 
significance of these domestic perspectives is that “within government the idea that 
Britain is a great power is prevalent and an influential factor in determining British 
foreign and defence policy” (Morris, 2011, p.326). This is important because the 
government is responsible for the output of UK foreign policy, so an awareness that the 
UK is a great power ultimately impacts on the nature of its international relations.  
 
2.2.3 UK internationalism: A counter to relative decline 
As the literature in the previous sub-section shows, there is the perspective that a relative 
international hard power decline does not mean a reduced place in the world for the UK 
(Niblett, 2010; Harvey, 2011; Morris, 2011; Chalmers, 2015; Hill, 2016; Rogers, 2017). 
Niblett (2010, p.2) argues that the UK “possesses strengths that give it the potential to 
influence the international context in ways that advance its national interests” by drawing 
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on its existing political, economic, diplomatic, institutional, and military capabilities. An 
example of this perspective is the literature on the UK’s commitment to liberal 
internationalism. The literature suggests that liberal internationalism has witnessed 
somewhat of a resurgence as a vision for UK foreign policy following the election of the 
New Labour government under the leadership of Tony Blair (Williams, 2005; Vickers, 
2011; Kitchen and Vickers, 2013; Ralph, 2014b).  
 The basis of the UK’s liberal internationalist foreign policy is the connection 
between the domestic and the international in which “the stability of any one state and 
the peace and stability of the international system as a whole are inexorably linked” 
(Vickers, 2011, p.17). This is the idea that the UK’s national interest is inherently linked 
to international relations and that securing it means ensuring stability beyond borders 
(Kitchen and Vickers, 2013, p.300). William’s (2005, p.7) suggests that the UK’s liberal 
internationalist approach has four key aspects of multilateralism, an alliance with the US 
according to “Atlanticism”, neoliberal economics, and “moralism” based on an “explicit 
rejection of realpolitik” (emphasis in original). By fleshing out the core components of 
the UK’s liberal internationalist foreign policy, Williams (2005) identifies some 
consistent aspects which form the UK’s place in the world since 1945. This centres on 
Atlanticism and the UK’s efforts to stand by the US as the dominant hegemonic power of 
liberal international order. A more significant finding for this thesis is the moralism of 
the UK’s liberal internationalist worldview because of its relationship with liberal values 
such as human rights protection.  
Although the literature does not explicitly discuss the relationship between the 
UK’s liberal internationalist commitment to human protection and its credentials for 
leadership in the liberal international order, it does identify important ways in which the 
UK has demonstrated its leadership and influence as part of its liberal internationalist 
foreign policy. This has been typified by the UK’s position within the liberal international 
order which has enabled it to retain leadership and influence in spite of its relative decline 
more broadly. The vast literature on UK foreign policy shows that it has managed to 
demonstrate its place in the world through its membership and contribution to numerous 
political and economic institutions of the liberal international order, such as the UN 
Security Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Group of 8 (G8), 
and the EU (Gaskarth, 2013; Hill and Beadle, 2014; Dee and Smith, 2017; Hughes, 2017). 
In particular, the UN Security Council is interpreted as an important avenue for UK 
leadership and influence. For Hughes (2017, p.467), the UK’s permanent seat forms part 
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of “the self-perception of the British political and military establishment that the UK 
remains a world power” in being part of an exclusive group of five states with the power 
of a veto.   
The literature shows that the UK has conveyed its awareness of this exclusive 
position at the UN through its role within the organisation (Dee and Smith, 2017, p.528). 
In particular, Gifkins et al. (2019a) suggest that the UK has drawn on considerable soft 
power capabilities to demonstrate its leadership and influence on the UN Security 
Council. Both perspectives are important contributions to research on UK foreign policy 
in advancing a nuanced understanding of the UK’s place in the world and how it retains 
influence and leadership beyond hard power. The scholarship in this section shows how 
UK governments have attempted to adapt to a transitional foreign policy through drawing 
on the liberal internationalist sources of the existing US-led liberal international order. 
When faced with relative hard power decline, the UK has adopted a leadership role whilst 
being conscious that it is no longer a ‘great power’ which dominates international order. 
 
2.2.4 The UK’s liberal internationalist commitment to human protection 
The literature in the previous sub-section shows that the UK retains a leadership role 
within institutions of liberal international order. However, existing scholarship is yet to 
analyse UK leadership in relation to the UK’s commitment to human protection in a 
transitional foreign policy. This sub-section thus identifies existing notable works on the 
UK’s commitment to human protection in order to identify this gap.  
 
2.2.5 The UK and humanitarian intervention 
In order to understand the literature on the UK’s commitment to humanitarian 
intervention, it is important to address the broader historical context. In Saving Strangers 
Wheeler (2000, p.2) outlines a fundamental dilemma in international relations between 
protecting populations from mass atrocity crimes on the one hand, and the protection of 
state sovereignty and non-interference on the other. Drawing on the English School of 
International Relations theory, Wheeler (2000, p.53) argues for a “solidarist theory of 
humanitarian intervention” based on the cosmopolitan notion of common humanity. Later 
building on this work, Wheeler (2003, p.30) argues that a norm of humanitarian 
intervention is emerging. This is because whilst sovereignty “remains the dominant 
legitimating principle” of international order, it is no longer absolute in the face of mass 
atrocities (Wheeler, 2003, p.38). Although this norm of humanitarian intervention has not 
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reached fruition, Wheeler’s (2000; 2003) research is notable for introducing a core debate 
on the relationship between Westphalia sovereignty and the protection of populations 
from mass violence and atrocity crimes.   
 Peltner (2017, p.745) explains this change in the relationship between state 
sovereignty and humanitarian intervention in UK foreign policy through the case study 
of the New Labour government. Following an initial reluctance to draw on humanitarian 
intervention in Rwanda, Angola, and Bosnia, the UK showed increasing support for 
humanitarian intervention beginning with the 1999 intervention in Kosovo (Peltner, 2017, 
pp.750-751). Peltner (2017, pp.753-754) explains this shift in UK foreign policy 
according to a change in government, the increasing attention attached to human 
protection at the international level following Rwanda and Bosnia, and the emergence of 
new human protection norms, such as the R2P. Peltner (2017) thus shows that change has 
occurred in the UK’s commitment to human protection. However, this research falls short 
of examining the relationship between the UK’s commitment to humanitarian 
intervention and its place in the world as part of a transitional foreign policy.  
 A similar theme is present in the literature on the UK’s commitment to 
humanitarian intervention, which primarily focuses on legal debates. Jahn (2013, p.3) 
notes how despite the pursuit of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, this has not 
facilitated the creation of a norm of humanitarian intervention. Similarly, Williams (2004, 
p.926) acknowledges the UK’s willingness to draw on humanitarian intervention as a 
justification for action despite it lacking the necessary international legal mechanisms. As 
a result, the UK is interpreted as endorsing the idea of a doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, despite its questionable legal grounding (Buys and Garwood-Gowers, 2019, 
p.17; Butchard, 2020, p.22).   
 Beyond the legality of humanitarian intervention, the literature implicitly draws 
attention to changes that have occurred in the UK’s commitment to human protection 
beyond New Labour  (Daddow, 2013; Beech and Oliver, 2014; Oliver, 2015; Beech and 
Munce, 2019). Daddow and Schnapper (2013) compare the UK’s commitment to human 
protection in the foreign policy of the Tony Blair and David Cameron governments. They 
argue that despite the distinct differences between a Labour and a Conservative foreign 
policy, there is a striking similarity in their approach to humanitarian intervention since 
the Blair years (Daddow and Schnapper, 2013, p.333). Accounting for this is the 
underlying commitment to “bounded liberalism” in UK foreign policy, which entails a 
“scepticism of grand schemes to remake the world; instinctive Atlanticism; security 
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through collective international endeavour; and anti-appeasement sentiment” (Daddow 
and Schnapper, 2013, p.333). It is plausible to argue that bounded liberalism reflects the 
liberal internationalism that has shaped the UK’s approach to the world since at least 
1997. Daddow and Schnapper (2013) thus challenge the idea that the Conservative-led 
coalition government presented a significant shift in their foreign policy outlook, but 
rather followed a similar underlying approach to the UK’s place in the world and the 
nature of its commitment to human protection as a result.  
 Similarly, Beech and Oliver (2014, p.105) argue that Cameron’s approach to 
human protection as Prime Minster is markedly similar to Tony Blair’s. They argue that 
despite changes in foreign policy from the previous New Labour government, the UK’s 
commitment to humanitarian intervention has remained largely unchanged (Beech and 
Oliver, 2014, p.105). In supporting this assessment, Oliver (2015, p.112) argues that “the 
Conservative party leadership have become considerably more pro-interventionist” 
compared with previous Conservative administrations. Oliver (2015, p.144) supports this 
argument through the examples of the intervention in Libya (2011) and arguments in 
favour of intervention in Syria (2013). This leads to the conclusion that humanitarian 
intervention has become an entrenched aspect of UK foreign policy on human protection 
(Oliver, 2014, p.116).  
In analysing the Conservative government’s commitment to human rights more 
broadly, Beech and Munce (2019, pp.119-120) suggest that “humanitarian intervention is 
now an established facet of Britain’s global role” and is “rooted in Cameron’s beliefs in 
Britain as a responsible power”. These perspectives show that what started as an idea on 
the conditional nature of sovereignty in instances of mass violence and atrocity crimes in 
the 1990s has now become a core element of the UK’s commitment to human protection. 
Whilst these perspectives engage less with the role of a transitional foreign policy in this 
change, they evidence a shift that has occurred in the UK’s commitment to human 
protection since 1997 and how this approach has been internalised by successive 
governments. 
 
2.2.6 The UK’s commitment to R2P 
The R2P reflects another way in which the UK has pursued its foreign policy commitment 
to human protection. As Gaskarth (2013, p.6) notes, the R2P’s evolution on the world 
stage was influenced in part by the UK’s earlier advocacy on humanitarian intervention. 
As Badescu (2011, p.4) argues, the R2P is born out of the dilemma between protecting 
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state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention to protect humans from mass violence. 
Whilst humanitarian intervention lacks legal consensus, the R2P is built on a respect for 
international law in requiring authorisation from the UN Security Council for the use of 
force without host state consent (Badescu, 2011, p.4).  
It has since been argued by Crossley (2018, p.415) that the R2P “has successfully 
replaced humanitarian intervention in international discourse”. However, this is far from 
true in the case of the UK. Ralph (2014a, p.22) suggests that R2P has become “equated 
in UK foreign policy discourse with humanitarian intervention”. The UK’s role in the 
eventual endorsement of the R2P at the 2005 UN World Summit is acknowledged, but it 
is argued that the UK’s support hinged on the idea that it complemented, and arguably 
provided some legitimacy, for its existing commitment to humanitarian intervention 
(Brockmeier et al., 2014a, p.431). These perspectives are important contributions to this 
thesis in identifying changes that have occurred in UK foreign policy rhetoric and action 
on human protection since 1997, which centre on this relationship between state 
sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. Despite the R2P introducing a framework for 
intervention which has legal grounding in international law, the research in this section 
shows that the UK has still opted for a rhetorical commitment to humanitarian 
intervention to justify some of its foreign policy actions on human protection.  
 
2.3  The transition of liberal international order 
This section reviews the academic debates which suggest that liberal international order 
is in transition as part of a broader crisis in liberal internationalism (Cox, 2012; Hurrell, 
2013; Acharya, 2014; 2018; Acharya and Plesch, 2020; Terhalle, 2015; Stuenkel, 2016; 
Ikenberry, 2018a; Andersen, 2019; Paris, 2019; Babic, 2020; Cooley and Nexon, 2020; 
Lascurettes, 2020; Lee et al., 2020; Nuruzzaman, 2020). The literature reviewed shows 
that this potential transition of power away from the liberal model of international order 
has significant implications for human protection as shifting power balances suggest a 
resurgence of a pluralist conception of order based on a respect for state sovereignty and 
non-intervention (Newman, 2013b; Hofmann, 2015; Hopgood, 2015; Kappel, 2015; 
Petrasek, 2019; Newman and Stefan, 2020). It is therefore essential to conceptualise the 
UK’s transitional foreign policy in the context of these broader changes occurring in 
liberal international order because of the implications for human protection.  
 The literature on a transitional international order begins with the argument that 
the existing US-led liberal international order is increasingly under challenge from what 
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are commonly labelled as the non-Western BRICS powers consisting of Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa (Hurrell, 2013; Terhalle, 2015). For Hurrell (2013, p.190) 
a transitional international order is characterised by changes in the balance of power 
between the post-1945 US-led liberal international order and non-Western powers. 
Similarly, Newman and Zala (2018, p.872) suggest that a transition from the existing US-
led international order “might be a consequence of a sustained shift in the perceived 
distribution of power, especially with a pattern of rising and falling powers”. Newman 
and Zala’s (2018) perspective is important because it recognises how a transition of 
international order has been a sustained process over time as power has diffused to other 
states beyond the hegemonic dominance of the US.  
 The literature also questions the defining features of a transitional international 
order. Terhalle (2015, p.7) argues that it centres on the relationship between the great 
powers of the US and China and their differing perspectives on order. The outcome of 
these differences is “a new process of order transition understood as system-relevant 
changes in the main practices pertaining to the nature of world order’s governance” 
(Terhalle, 2015, p.7). This perspective suggests that changes in the balance of power 
between Western and non-Western powers has generated contestation of the basic 
governing principles of the US-led liberal international order. Similarly, in Post-Western 
World, Stuenkel (2016, pp.10-11) outlines “the constructive role” of rising powers in the 
present and future international order. Stuenkel (2016, p.11) thus argues that rising 
powers are more likely to work within the existing order as “they will seek to change the 
hierarchy in the system to obtain hegemonic privileges”. Non-Western powers are thus 
not viewed as potentially spoiling world order (Schweller, 2011), but rather their aim is 
to enhance their position within the existing one (Nuruzzaman, 2020, pp.52-53). These 
more nuanced perspectives support the argument that rising powers are challenging “who 
is setting and overseeing the rules of the game rather than the content of the rules 
themselves and the kind of order that they underpin” (Newman and Zala, 2018, p.871). 
 The issue, Acharya (2018, p.2) argues, is that International Relations theory has 
largely neglected “contestations, variations, and constructions of order-building ideas and 
institutions”. As a result, the agency of non-Western powers in the original construction 
of what became the liberal international order is often overlooked. An evolving 
international order thus represents a change from the dominance of an hegemonic power 
towards “a more pluralistic or multiplex world order” with power and agency distributed 
and shared among a range of Western and non-Western powers (Acharya, 2018, pp.2-3). 
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This is because material power and dominance is not the only source of international 
order, but also requires legitimacy (Reus-Smit, 2017, p.853). Reus-Smit (2017) suggests 
that legitimacy cannot simply be attained through using material power alone, but is also 
dependent on being able to peacefully bring a diverse group of states together. To achieve 
this, states may well establish some common values, rules, norms, and institutions that 
both allow for cooperation, while helping to sustain order by aiming to resolve any 
conflicts between states (Philips, 2011, p.5). In this sense, a transitional international 
order is a more inclusive entity than the post-war US-led international order (Acharya and 
Plesch, 2020, p.229; Cooley and Nexon, 2020, p.11; Lee et al, 2020, p.53). These 
perspectives are an important contribution to academic debates on international order and 
its transition through challenging the idea that there is a strict dichotomy between the 
existing international order and a new world order. Rather, they show that a transitional 
international order is not characterised by a complete breakdown of the existing one, but 
rather changes to the norms, institutions, and leadership of the existing one.  
 The review of the literature in this section so far risks assuming that the transition 
of international order is a one-way process with existing Western powers being passive. 
However, literature suggests that Western powers are playing an important role in the 
demise of the liberal international order (Ikenberry, 2010; 2018; Ikenberry et al., 2018; 
de Jonquières, 2017; de Graaff and van Apeldoorn, 2018; Jahn, 2018; Paris, 2019; Babic, 
2020). According to Ikenberry (2010, p.511), the US is facing a crisis in its leadership of 
the liberal international order. This crisis has been intensified by domestic political 
developments, such as the former election of Donald Trump as President and their 
emphasis on “America First”, which includes questioning the benefits of being a 
significant contributor to liberal international organisations, such as NATO and the UN 
(Paris, 2019, pp.2-3). Similarly, De Jonquières (2017, p.552) examines whether the most 
serious challenge to the liberal international order are Western states themselves by 
drawing on the notable examples of former President Trump’s approach to international 
relations and developments in other states such as Brexit. Whilst it is not entirely clear 
whether these changes will have profound long-term impacts, these academic 
perspectives reveal a concern that the existing liberal international order is unstable, 
which is being somewhat accelerated by the existing powers of this order, such as the US 
and UK. 
 A similar line of argument is adopted in a 2018 special issue on liberal 
internationalism in theory and practice which debated the challenges facing liberal 
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internationalism in the twenty-first century. Again, Brexit and former President Trump 
are regarded as being reflections of “a sense of deep crisis in the United States-led liberal 
international order” (Ikenberry, Parmar and Stokes, 2018, p.1). In fact, Ikenberry (2018, 
p.7) appears to have revised his 2010 stance in arguing that a crisis in international order 
is deeper than merely an emphasis on the US. That said, Ikenberry (2018, p.17) suggests 
that any changes in power dynamics are “simply a gradual diffusion of power away from 
the west”. Significantly, China’s rise is interpreted as being relatively peaceful in the 
sense of not challenging the existing order per se or breaking away from it (Ikenberry, 
2018, p.23). For Smith (2012, p.186), this is primarily due to a range of constraints that 
China faces, including the importance of domestic politics and managing broader regional 
dynamics. Similarly, de Graaff and van Apeldoorn’s (2018, p.130) analysis of US-
Chinese relations finds that a co-existence between these powers seems the most likely 
outcome at present, especially since states like China “do not yet observe a wholesale 
replacement of America’s post-Cold War globalist and liberal engagement”. Although de 
Graaff and van Apeldoorn’s (2018) argument is speculative in using a combination of 
existing and historical US-Chinese relations, it questions the narrative of rising powers as 
completely challenging and/or dismantling liberal internationalism, although still 
pointing to the possibility of a broader transition occurring between Western and non-
Western states.  
Following these contributions, Jahn (2018, p.44) argues for an investigation into 
liberal internationalism beyond the decline of US hegemony and Western powers more 
broadly. Jahn suggests that a crisis of liberal internationalism reflects a deeper problem 
with the international implementation of domestic liberal ideas and principles. This 
argument is supported through interrogating the liberal domestic-international distinction 
whereby achieving domestic liberal values at the international level may lead to inherent 
flaws, particularly if this involves liberal-led interventions into other sovereign states to 
implement these values (Jahn, 2018, p.59). Jahn (2018) thus shifts the debate away from 
an immediate concern with a crisis of liberal internationalism and US hegemony to 
identifying a fundamental issue with the principles upon which a liberal internationalist 
order is practiced.   
Similar to Jahn (2018), Duncombe and Dunne (2018, p.31) argue for greater nuance in 
analysing the perceived crisis of liberal internationalism through the example of 
interventionism. They argue that humanitarianism reveals the core tensions in the existing 
liberal international order based on its implications for other core norms, such as 
37 
 
sovereign integrity and non-interference (Duncombe and Dunne, 2018, p.35). Using the 
Syrian civil war as an example, Duncombe and Dunne (2018) identify its implications for 
liberal organisations, such as the UN, where there appears to be deep divisions between 
the liberal-Western powers on the UN Security Council (US, France and the UK) and 
non-Western powers (China and Russia) which have adopted a stricter stance on 
humanitarianism (Duncombe and Dunne, 2018, p.37). Although Duncombe and Dunne 
(2018, p.41) conclude that “liberal world order is in a state of flux”, they caution against 
the idea of a complete decay of the existing order. 
 
2.3.1 Pluralism and the resurgence of sovereignty  
Writing on the EU’s engagement with the R2P in a transitional international order, 
Newman and Stefan (2020, p.481) suggest that the EU operates “in an increasingly 
pluralistic normative world”. If pluralism is interpreted according to Acharya’s (2018) 
idea of a more diverse world of powers and ideas, then it has important implications for 
debates on state sovereignty. Commenting on the rise of the BRICS powers in 
international relations, Laïdi (2012, p.615) argues that they “form a coalition of sovereign 
state defenders”. This attachment to state sovereignty suggests that the BRICS aim to 
retain their right to non-interference. Similarly, Kappel (2015, p.8) suggests that the 
BRICS are “the most vocal proponents of the notions of sovereignty and non-
interference”. Although these arguments are challenged by examples such as Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea in 2014, Laïdi (2012) and Kappel (2015) address a fundamental 
issue with the relationship between liberal internationalist ideas pertaining to international 
intervention and non-Western perspectives on the protection of state sovereignty.  
 In the endtimes of human rights Hopgood (2015, p.9) argues that international 
human rights are in decline. The elements of this decline stem partly from the US, but 
also the rise of the BRICS and the subsequent emergence of a “neo-Westphalian” era of 
protecting state sovereignty (Hopgood, 2015, p.13). However, Petrasek (2019, p.104) 
counters this argument on the decline of human rights for two main reasons. First, the 
relationship between human rights and liberal internationalism assumes that human rights 
are principally a liberal exercise dependent on the liberal international order for their 
implementation, which Petrasek (2019, p.104) argues is not the case. Second, Petrasek 
(2019, p.106) suggests that the US as conventional leader of the liberal international order 
has pursued a very inconsistent and selective approach to human protection which shows 
its “conditional commitment to global human rights” (Petrasek, 2019, p.106). Whilst 
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providing an important qualification on the idea that human rights are in decline, Petrasek 
is speaking on human rights more broadly, rather than specifically on human protection 
from mass violence and atrocity crimes.  
 The clearest example of this debate between sovereignty and intervention to 
protect populations from mass violence is the R2P. In engaging with these debate at 
length, Newman (2013, p.236) argues that “some of the controversies associated with 
R2P are indicative of broader tensions in international politics related to world order, in 
particular regarding norms”. The task for the R2P does not relate to persuading states to 
protect populations from atrocity crimes, but instead navigating the tensions inherent in 
different understandings of international order between largely Western and non-Western 
states on sovereignty and human protection (Newman, 2013, p.242). Rather than arguing 
that the BRICS dismiss the R2P outright, Newman (2013) shows how the core normative 
tensions surrounds R2P’s third pillar on non-consensual military intervention. This 
perspective is shared widely in the R2P literature (Morris, 2013; Thakur, 2013; Fiott, 
2014; Paris, 2014; Stuenkel, 2014; Hofmann, 2015; Hehir, 2017).  
 Stuenkel (2014, p.3) argues that the BRICS largely embrace R2P’s pillar I and 
pillar II, but contest non-consensual intervention under pillar III on the basis of its 
implications for the protection of state sovereignty. Hofmann (2015, p.298) suggests that 
the “norm contestation around R2P is partially grounded in unresolved conflicts between 
different fundamental norms” of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. The 2011 
intervention in Libya is a frequent illustration of this debate where R2P was originally 
proclaimed as being an important element in NATO’s decision to intervene to protect the 
Libyan population (Evans, 2011; Bellamy, 2013, p.19). Despite arguments that R2P in 
fact had considerably less impact on the decision by the UN Security Council to authorise 
action (Davidson, 2013; Morris, 2013, pp.1272-1274), it is argued that R2P’s linkages to 
the action taken in Libya had a profound impact on the norm following the 
implementation of pillar III and the subsequent removal of the Gaddafi regime (Morris, 
2013). 
Morris (2013, p.1279) thus concludes that “a realignment of global power in 
favour of those normatively predisposed towards sovereign rather than individual rights 
is likely…to augur badly for R2P”. This point raises questions about a state’s engagement 
with human protection in a transitional world order, particularly if such a shift involves a 
move towards those rising powers advocating for a pluralist interpretation of state 
sovereignty. That said, following the 2011 intervention in Libya, Brazil proposed its own 
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framework for addressing the controversy surrounding the use of R2P’s pillar III through 
responsibility while protecting (RwP). At the time, Brazil’s engagement with the R2P 
through RwP was interpreted as evidence of non-western norm entrepreneurship on 
human protection (Stuenkel, 2013; Tourinho et al., 2016; Stefan, 2017). However the 
Brazilian government abandoned the initiative soon after it was proposed, which ended a 
notable moment of constructive contestation of the R2P from a member of the BRICS.  
The review of scholarship in this section reveals the complex international 
environment in which the UK practices its foreign policy and the challenges for its 
commitment to human protection. However, the lack of research on non-superpower 
states shows the urgent need to analyse their role and leadership in the international order, 
and in particular, their commitment to human protection amid the arguments of an 
emerging pluralist world order and a decline in international human rights.      
 
2.4 The UK’s transitional foreign policy 
The pre-occupation with the rise and fall of superpowers means that other states which 
once held the status of a great power, but have since declined, are often overlooked. 
Literature has drawn attention to the challenges that the UK is facing as a result of a 
transitional foreign policy (Beasley et al., 2018; Glencross and McCourt, 2018; Daddow, 
2019a; Gifkins et al., 2019b; Jarvis et al., 2019; Oppermann et al., 2020). It is argued that 
“Brexit has generated a ‘role crisis’ for the UK with tensions between the UK’s 
conception of its own roles in the world and the expectations of other actors on the 
international stage” (Beasley et al, 2018). Brexit raises significant questions about the 
role the UK intends to adopt as its foreign policy transitions (Beasley et al, 2018). 
According to Glencross and McCourt (2018, p.583), Brexit has generated a fundamental 
“status anxiety regarding the nature of the UK’s interactions with the international 
system”. Similar to the arguments of Beasley et al (2018) and Oppermann et al (2020), 
Glencross and McCourt (2018, p.585) argue that this status anxiety is compounded by the 
fact that the nature of Brexit also “unsettles other countries’ expectations about the UK’s 
role in the world”. 
 Critically, these issues have broader implications for the UK’s status and role 
within some of the core institutions of international order. Gifkins et al. (2019a, pp.1353-
1354) find that Brexit has intensified “the perception among other states that the UK is in 
decline”. The consequences of these perceptions are evident in the UN Security Council, 
where the UK faces increased pressure to demonstrate its continued relevance, especially 
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as a permanent member (Gifkins et al., 2019a, pp.1350-1351). According to a Foreign 
Affairs Committee report on Global Britain, “the time is right to take stock of the UK’s 
role in the world, not only in the light of domestic developments but also in light of long-
term changes in the international system and global balance of power” (Foreign Affairs 
Committee, 2018a).  
The government has attempted to respond to the challenges facing its place in the 
world through the promotion of a ‘Global Britain’. The notion of Global Britain is 
primarily a means of demonstrating that Brexit does not signal the UK’s intention to step 
back on the international stage, but rather intends to play an even more global role 
(Glencross and McCourt, 2018; Hill, 2018; Daddow, 2019a). However, the academic 
literature has already identified significant limitations with Global Britain. Daddow 
(2019b) argues that Global Britain is “lacking a firm basis in policy achievements and an 
even less development narrative” on the UK’s post-Brexit world role. Similarly, Gifkins 
et al. (2019b, p.8) found that Global Britain is ambiguous, which in turn has made “it 
more difficult for the UK to project clarity of purpose abroad”. Amid its changing place 
in the world, the literature suggests that the UK has proved largely unsuccessful so far in 
establishing a clear post-Brexit strategic vision for its foreign policy. 
This thesis aims to capture these attempts by successive governments to readjust 
the UK’s place in the world as part of a transitional foreign policy through the case of its 
commitment to human protection. An area of research which brings attention to this is 
Gaskarth’s (2016) study of the 2013 parliamentary vote on intervention in Syria. Gaskarth 
(2016, pp.719-720) finds that the labelling of the event as a “fiasco” was a useful means 
of “avoiding the trauma of Britain’s decline”. This places the vote on intervention in Syria 
within the broader context of the challenges facing the UK’s place in the world amid its 
relative hard power decline. This is an important contribution in combining debates on 
the UK’s place in the world with the constraints on its ability to exert military force in 
order to protect populations from mass violence and atrocity crimes. This in turn raises 
broader questions about the relationship between adjustments in the UK’s place in the 
world as part of a transitional foreign policy and its subsequent commitment to human 
protection, which this thesis will focus on.  
 
2.5 Chapter conclusion  
This chapter has reviewed academic scholarship at the core of the relationship between 
the domestic and the international in UK foreign policy. At the international level, 
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research on world order, liberal international order, and its transition, has predominantly 
focused on the superpowers of the US and China. As a result, the implications of shifting 
power balances for countries such as the UK are largely overlooked in these debates 
despite the important role that states such as the UK still play in international order.  
 The review of the literature shows that some research has addressed debates on 
the UK’s place in the world amid a transitional foreign policy. This includes the UK’s 
post-war decline in power relative to other states in international relations, significant 
foreign policy events such as Brexit, and attempts by domestic governments to reaffirm 
the UK’s global role through initiatives like Global Britain. However, there is 
significantly less research on the implications of a transitional foreign policy for changes 
in the nature of the UK’s commitment to human protection. This chapter has reviewed a 
wealth of existing scholarship on UK foreign policy towards human protection, in 
addition to international human protection more broadly. This literature shows the central 
role of the UK in international human protection since at least the 1990s and the 
considerable challenges of protecting populations from mass violence and atrocity crimes 
in the 21st century. Yet there has been a lack of analysis so far on the relationship between 
changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection and a transitional foreign policy, 
which this thesis aims to address.  
 In light of these gaps in existing scholarship, this thesis makes three main 
contributions to research on UK foreign policy and human protection, foreign policy 
change, and UK leadership and influence in international relations as a ‘former great 
power’. Firstly, this thesis contributes to research on UK foreign policy on domestic and 
international human protection. The beginning of the thesis timeframe in 1997 marked an 
important era in UK foreign policy on human protection as policymakers continued to 
grapple with domestic and international debates on humanitarian intervention and state 
sovereignty, and the subsequent development of the PoC and R2P. Whilst this chapter 
has reviewed numerous significant contributions to these debates, scholarship so far has 
not addressed in detail the broader relationship between the UK’s commitment to human 
protection and a transitional foreign policy. This includes the implications of changes in 
the UK’s relative international power in the post-war period, changes in its membership 
of the core multilateral organisations of international order, and shifts in the global 
balance of power for the nature of the UK’s contributions to human protection.  
Second, it contributes to research on the leadership and influence of powers which 
have faced a post-war relative international decline in power through the perspective of 
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the UK’s commitment to human protection. This is an important contribution to the fields 
of international order and its transition, liberal internationalism, and human protection 
because there has been a tendency within this research, especially on international order, 
to focus on either superpowers or middle power states. This is at the neglect of states such 
as the UK which does not neatly fall into either category of power status, but yet continues 
to demonstrate considerable leadership and influence on international human protection. 
It is thus critical to analyse the role of states like the UK in the evolving international 
order, including its contributions to addressing the crisis of international human 
protection.  
 The third contribution of the thesis is to broaden theoretical and empirical research 
on why a state changes its foreign policy and how to assess this change. The thesis makes 
this contribution by analysing the relationship between sustained changes in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection and a transitional foreign policy.
7
 It achieves this 
through developing a novel analytical framework to assess sustained UK foreign policy 
change on human protection in a transitional foreign policy. This framework is based on 
an analysis of the relationship between elite political rhetoric and actions in order to 
identity any long-term changing patterns of policy behaviour, changing administrative 
apparatus, and changes in elite UK political discourse. This approach is critical to 
examining how the UK reconciles the changes in its core interests and relationships on 
the one hand, and its commitment to liberal values including human protection on the 
other. This is a particularly timely contribution in the context of Brexit as the UK is 
compelled to negotiate its current and future political and economic partnerships at a time 








7  See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the theoretical and conceptual contributions of the 
thesis to the sub-field of foreign policy analysis on foreign policy change.  
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Chapter 3 - Theoretical framework and methodology   
This chapter details the theoretical framework and methodological approach of the thesis. 
Section 3.1 outlines the theoretical framework of foreign policy change and develops an 
analytical framework to assess sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human 
protection in a transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 2020. Section 3.2 then 
explains the methodological approach based on a triangulation of methods, which 
includes an integrated content analysis of 1,055 primary documentary materials, semi-
structured interviews, and secondary literature. The chapter contributes to addressing the 
aim and objectives of the thesis through developing a framework to assess changes in the 
UK’s commitment to human protection from 1997 to 2020 (objective 1), and the 
development and classification of a quantitative and qualitative dataset to examine the 
UK’s commitment to human protection between 2010 and 2020 (objective 3).  
 
3.1 Theoretical framework: Foreign policy change  
This section outlines the theoretical framework of this thesis on foreign policy change, 
which is defined as a distinct sub-field of foreign policy analysis. The section begins by 
defining the core concepts of policy and foreign policy as used throughout the thesis and 
then proceeds to examine the wealth of scholarship on foreign policy change. The section 
then conceptualises and constructs an analytical framework to assess sustained UK 
foreign policy change on human protection between 1997 and 2020 according to the 
relationship between elite UK government rhetoric and its human protection actions.  
 
3.1.1 Defining UK domestic and foreign policy  
Whilst frequently cited in political, diplomatic, and academic circles, the definition of 
policy is ambiguous. At its most basic, policy has been defined as “a set of principles to 
guide actions to achieve a goal” (British Ecological Society, 2017). This perspective 
suggests that policy acts as a guide in order to reach a particular outcome. On the other 
hand, the UK government’s official website has defined policy as “statements of the 
government’s position, intent or action” (GOV.uk, 2012). This suggests that policy is a 
form of communication, but its precise definition still remains unclear. The UK 
government’s previous conceptualisation of policy-making provides some clarification of 
what constitutes policy. Policy making is defined as “the process by which governments 
translate their political vision into programmes and actions to deliver ‘outcomes’ – 
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desired changes in the real world” (Cabinet Office, 1999, p.15). Policy is therefore the 
product of the government’s ideas and a means of articulating its perspective into 
carefully defined actions. For Green (2014) then, “policy is about obtaining an outcome 
which otherwise would not be obtained but for that policy being in place” (emphasis in 
original). This supports the idea that policy is an output aimed to prescribe actions to 
address a certain issue. There are a number of ways the UK government may practice 
policy, including policy papers, consultations, and dialogue through speeches, statements, 
media interviews, statements, and conferences (Waller et al., 2009, pp.9-11). 








Figure 1. Thesis conceptualisation of UK government policy 
 
This conceptualisation aims to account for the different origins and expressions of UK 
policy. It includes conventional written forms of policy through papers, consultations, 
and dialogue which are often published by the government and parliamentary committees. 
However, figure 1 also incorporates norms and practices which are not necessarily 
documented in the same way as policy papers and parliamentary committees, but may 
still influence the government’s approach on an issue. For instance, the notion that the 
UK should not commit gross human rights violations against its own population is 
represented in policy, but also represents norms and practices in defining “a standard of 
appropriate behavior” that the UK should not violate human rights (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998, p.891). It is thus important to account for unwritten norms and ideas 
because of their overlap and interaction with written policy, particularly in the process of 
initiating the decision to turn an idea or norm into a concrete policy proposal, which may 
then lead to certain government actions according to this policy.  
As with policy, there is ambiguity in the definition of foreign policy. The most 
basic feature of foreign policy is relations between states (Hill, 2003; Beach, 2012, p.3). 







Norms and ideas 
prescribing actions  
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“a set of actions or rules governing the actions of an independent political authority in 
the international environment” (emphasis in original). As with the definition of policy, 
foreign policy concerns actions by different political authorities, which means it is not 
exclusively the domain of states, but rather a range of other political actors, such as 
international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and other individuals and 
groups. Although broad in scope, this thesis conceptualises domestic and foreign policy 
as originating from a combination of written and unwritten sources in domestic and 
international environments which together provide a framework for the UK’s 
international relations with other state and non-state actors.  
 
3.1.2 British foreign policy traditions  
Alongside defining UK foreign policy, it is also important to conceptualise the role and 
significance of traditions when interpreting UK foreign policy, particularly when aiming 
to identify changes over time and shifts from previous administrations. The notion of 
traditions originates from an interpretivist approach to UK domestic policy, which places 
greater emphasis on the role of agency in the construction and practice of policy (Bevir 
and Rhoads, 1999; 2003). Bevir and Rhodes (1999, pp.244-225) define a tradition “as a 
set of theories or narratives and associated practices that people inherent, which provide 
the background against which they form beliefs and perform actions. Traditions are 
contingent, constantly evolving, and necessarily located in a historical context”. This 
approach to traditions therefore draws attention to how the UK government and its policy 
does not exist independently from the past but is fundamentally shaped and influenced by 
it (Bevir and Rhoads, 2003, p.33). This definition by Bevir and Rhoades is also significant 
in recognising that traditions are not simply fixed and “independent of the beliefs and 
actions of individuals” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, p.33), but are liable to change and 
modification over time according to different agents and governments.  
 In comparison to the study of traditions in UK domestic policy, Bevir et al (2013, 
p.163) suggest that the application of an interpretative approach to foreign policy 
traditions has been limited. In a similar manner to earlier research by Bevir and Rhoads 
(1999; 2003), Bevir et al (2013, pp.167-168) emphasise the importance of the historical 
context that has shaped and influenced the approach of UK governments to foreign policy, 
but also that traditions evolve and change because policymakers have agency. Whilst 
there are a number of UK foreign policy traditions, such as conservatism, realism, 
liberalism, and socialism (Bevir et al, 2013, p.167; Gaskarth, 2013, p.200; Daddow and 
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Schnapper, 2013, p.333), this thesis focuses on two particular, and widely acknowledged, 
UK foreign policy traditions of conservatism and internationalism.8 The empirical 
chapters in particular conceptualise and engage at length with these different traditions, 
their evolution, and change and modification by UK foreign policy agents over time. This 
is in order to account for sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection 
between 1997 and 2020 as foreign policy traditions have shifted from traditional 
conservatism and internationalism to liberal internationalism and liberal conservatism. 
The reminder of this section thus focuses on the concept of foreign policy change and 
development of a framework to identify and assess sustained changes in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection as part of a transitional foreign policy.  
 
3.1.3 Conceptualising foreign policy change 
Research on foreign policy change has emerged as a sub-field of foreign policy analysis 
and is concerned with conceptualising and explaining shifts in a state’s external relations. 
The following sub-sections examine theoretical scholarship on foreign policy change, the 
primary debates in the field regarding definitions of change, the role of structures and 
agents, leadership, and learning, and outline a definition and analytical framework to 
assess sustained foreign policy change in the UK’s commitment to human protection 
between 1997 and 2020.  
 The immediate challenge with the concept of foreign policy change is that there 
is no universal agreement on its definition in the theoretical literature. Holsti (1982, ix) 
defines foreign policy change as “the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern 
of external relations”. This perspective suggests that foreign policy change entails a 
substantial reorientation of a state’s foreign policy defined in terms of shifts in the patterns 
of its whole relations, rather than just specific policies (Holsti, 2016, p.104). Similarly, 
Doeser and Eidenfalk (2013, p.402) focus on “major foreign policy change” which is 
more significant and widespread than episodic shifts in a state’s foreign policy 
orientation. Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2014, p.484) define foreign policy change in 
relation to “fundamental changes in the conceptualization of a foreign policy 
 
8  Hall and Rengger (2005); Dodds and Elden (2008); Beech (2011); Beech and Oliver (2014) 
have written extensively on conservative foreign policy traditions, while Vickers (2004; 2011); 
Atkins (2013); Bevir et al (2013) Daddow and Schnapper (2013); Kitchen and Vickers, 2013; 
Ralph (2014) have written at length on liberalism and liberal internationalism in UK foreign 
policy, and Ikenberry (2009; 2011; 2018) and Dunne and McDonald (2013) discuss liberal 
internationalism more broadly beyond UK foreign policy. 
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problem/goal or to the strategic positioning of a country in the international system”. 
According to this definition, change exists on a spectrum from specific policy shifts to 
changes in a state’s foreign policy as a whole. Building on this approach, Blavoukos and 
Bourantonis (2017) conceptualise foreign policy change as “the redirection to a lesser or 
greater extent of a state’s foreign policy” (emphasis in original). Whilst this definition 
provides greater scope in accounting for a range of possible foreign policy changes from 
relatively minor policy adjustments to more substantial shifts, it adds to the challenge of 
conceptualising foreign policy change through its focus on lessor or greater changes. 
However, it does account for how foreign policy change does not necessitate changes in 
a state’s entire foreign policy orientation, which is important for the focus of this thesis 
on human protection as a specific component of the UK’s foreign policy. A more detailed 
definition of foreign policy change is provided by Haesebrouck and Joly (2021, p.5) as 
 
“the replacement of a continuous pattern of action towards external actors 
or the rules guiding such actions with a new continuous pattern or rules 
that pursue different goals and/or use different methods. The latter can be 
the result of a dramatic break with the past or cumulative effect of smaller 
changes. Foreign policy change can be limited to a specific foreign policy 
issue or a bilateral relation, more extensively involving a broader foreign 
policy domain like security or aid policy, or pertain to a simultaneous 
change across different foreign policy domains and relations, amounting 
to a fundamental redirection of the actor’s entire orientation towards world 
affairs.” (Haesebrouck and Joly, 2021b, p.5) 
 
At an abstract level, this suggests that foreign policy change is evident from shifts in the 
foreign policy patterns that are followed by a state. This perspective also conceptualises 
change in relation adjustments in a state’s goals and methods, although it is not clear how 
to identify these changes. This definition also accounts for change in a similar manner to 
Blavoukos and Bourantonis (2017) in that it may involve minor changes or fundamental 
adjustments to a state’s external relations and may also be specific to a policy rather than 
leading to changes in a state’s foreign policy as a whole.  
 Prior to outlining the definition and framework for assessing UK foreign policy 
change in this thesis, the next sub-sections address the different structures, agents, and 
levels of foreign policy change through a focus on the structure and agency debate in 
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foreign policy analysis, leadership and learning, and research on some of the mechanics 
of change.  
 
3.1.4 Structure and agency in foreign policy change 
The emergence of constructivist International Relations theory in the 1980s and 1990s 
generated significant attention on the role, importance, and interplay between structures 
and agents in international relations and foreign policy (Wendt, 1987). In theoretical 
research on foreign policy change, structural perspectives interpret the state as a static 
entity with foreign policy change influenced by the structure of the international system 
(Smith, 1981; Carlsnaes, 2002, p.336-337; Doeser and Eidenfalk, 2013, pp.391-392). 
However, a recognition of the domestic construction of foreign policy change opened up 
space for the role of agency (Kaarbo, 1997; Hermann and Hagan, 1998; Hermann et al., 
2001; Doeser and Eidenfalk, 2013). A focus on agency shifts attention towards individual 
and group decision making and their influence on the foreign policy choices and 
orientation of their state (Gustavsson, 1999, p.84; Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2012; 
Davies and True, 2017).  
Yet research on agency is not an outright rejection of structures of foreign policy 
change on the basis that “human agents and social structures are in a fundamental sense 
interrelated entities, and hence that we cannot fully account for one without invoking the 
other” (Carlsnaes, 1993, p.13). Rather, it is important to acknowledge the previous 
neglect of agency in foreign policy debates and to recognise its analytical importance to 
the study of foreign policy change. This is based on the idea that “all that occurs between 
nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in 
groups” (Hudson, 2005, p.1, emphasis in original). In the UK for example, human 
decision makers include agents operating within domestic governmental and 
parliamentary structures, such as Ministers of State and Members of Parliament (MPs). It 
is these agents which contribute to the creation and promotion of UK foreign policy using 
the structures at their disposal such as the government, media, Parliament, and 
international organisations among many other institutions. 
 
3.1.5 Leadership and foreign policy change  
The emerging focus on agency in foreign policy change also led to a proliferation of 
research on the importance of individual leadership amongst Presidents (Hermann and 
Hermann, 1989; Hermann and Hagan, 1998; Hermann et al., 2001) and Prime Ministers 
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(Kaarbo, 1997; Kaarbo and Hermann, 1998). Hermann and Hermann (1989, p.363) 
identified the role of “predominant leaders” which have the power to control foreign 
policy decision making. Similarly, Hermann et al. (2001, p.84) suggested that individual 
leaders become central decision making agents when they have “power to make the 
choice concerning how a state is going to respond to foreign policy problems”. Through 
an examination of leadership style, Herman et al (2001, pp.118-119) found a variation in 
the outcome of foreign policy change when the process involves “a single, powerful 
individual” with control over foreign policy in comparison to a number of individuals 
competing for the position of a predominant leader. 
In  a similar way to Hermann et al. (2001), Hermann and Hagan (1998) analysed 
the significance of leadership in international decision making. They found that the 
agency of a leader is fundamental in processes of foreign policy change and that a leader’s 
approach to foreign policy stems from “their experiences, goals, beliefs about the world, 
and sensitivity to the political context” they find themselves in (Herman and Hagan, 1998, 
p.126). In this sense, the worldview of a leader may influence subsequent changes in 
foreign policy in order to fulfil their vision. In the next chapter for instance, it is shown 
how Tony Blair’s leadership placed a conscious effort on distancing from his 
predecessors through the promotion of an alternative vision for the UK’s place in the 
world. Leadership is thus another core component for explaining and analysing foreign 
policy change, especially when a government is dominated by a predominant leader with 
an ability to largely dictate the trajectory of their country’s foreign policy output.  
 
3.1.6 Learning and foreign policy change  
Historical context also has an important influence on leadership in foreign policy change. 
Levy (1994, p.283) defines learning as “a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence 
in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the 
observation and interpretation of experience”. Learning is an active process that places 
the agency of leaders at its core. This means that it does not guarantee that foreign policy 
change will occur given the different perspectives and worldviews of leaders (Levy, 1994, 
p.283). This is in addition to broader domestic and international structural constraints 
which may prevent a leader’s ability to initiate change (Levy, 1994, p.290).  
Stein (1994, p.155) provides an empirical illustration of learning amongst foreign 
policy leaders through the case of Gorbachev and the end of the Cold War, which 
represented a considerable deviation from the approach of previous Soviet leaders. Whilst 
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it is important to consider the broader political context that led to the end of the Cold War 
and dismantling of the Soviet Union, Stein’s (1994) research shows that the agency of 
leaders and their willingness to learn from the past are also important in explaining 
foreign policy change. This provides an important contribution to the empirical focus of 
this thesis because the UK’s commitment to human protection between 1997 and 2020 is 
characterised by changes in leadership across the ideological spectrum of UK politics, 
which includes instances of governments attempting to distance their foreign policy from 
the approach of their predecessors.  
 
3.1.7 Push-pull factors and foreign policy change  
The interaction between structures and agents draws attention to the relationship between 
domestic and international environments in foreign policy change. This relationship is 
analysed in research by Brazys et al. (2017) who established a conceptual framework to 
examine the international norms and foreign policy change. The framework suggests that 
foreign policy change on international norms is influenced by a combination of domestic 
and international “push-pull” factors in structures and agents (Brazys et al., 2017, pp.662-
663). Domestic (push) factors include changes in governments, institutions, and lobbying, 
while international (pull) factors include international pressure to adhere to global norms 
and international organisations (Brazys et al., 2017, p.663). This framework has been 
applied to several empirical studies, including the impact of domestic coalition 
governments on foreign policy change (Kaarbo, 2017); foreign policy change of states 
towards the International Criminal Court (Dukalskis, 2017); and changing UK foreign 
policy on humanitarian intervention between 1997 and 2005 (Peltner, 2017). 
This push-pull framework is especially relevant for theorising changes in the 
UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy. This is on the 
basis that shifts in the UK’s commitment to human protection is part of the push-pull 
process of foreign policy change according to structures and agents in both domestic and 
international environments. Domestic push factors may include changes in governments 
and their approach to human protection, pressure from MPs, political parties, and 
lobbying groups for the UK to retain a prominent international position post-Brexit and 
to lead on human protection. International pull factors may include upholding the existing 
rules-based international order through the promotion of human rights protection, 
retaining influence and leadership in institutions to underscore the UK’s aspirations for 
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global leadership, and pressure from international organisations for states to act in order 
to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes. 
This push-pull framework is therefore timely considering the proliferation of 
debates on the UK’s place in the world (Niblett, 2010; Harvey, 2011; Gaskarth, 2014; 
McCourt, 2014; Hill, 2016); Brexit, the promotion of Global Britain, and the emphasis 
on retaining UK influence and leadership on the world stage (Foreign Affairs Committee, 
2018a; Gifkins et al., 2019b; Seely and Rogers, 2019). This is in addition to the crises in 
Syria (Momani and Hakak, 2016; Ralph et al., 2017), Yemen (Buys and Garwood-
Gowers, 2019; French, 2019; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2020; 
Guterres, 2019), and Myanmar (UNA-UK, 2018a; Staunton, 2017; Staunton and Ralph, 
2020). Together, these issues reveal the relationship between the domestic and the 
international in the UK’s commitment to human protection and the challenges posed by 
a transitional foreign policy.  
 
3.1.8 The causes and mechanics of foreign policy change 
The literature on structure and agency, leadership, learning, and pull-pull factors 
demonstrate the different influences on foreign policy change. A core puzzle which 
remains for any study of foreign policy change is to assess how, when, and why it occurs, 
the extent, and the primary indicators of change. There is a wealth of literature which 
aims to address the causes and mechanisms of foreign policy change. Gustavsson (1999, 
p.83) examines three interrelated factors, including the role of structures, leadership, and 
the notion of a crisis which encourages a state to redirect its foreign policy. Welch (2005, 
p.8) argues that foreign policy change is most likely when a state’s existing approach is 
resulting in “continued painful losses”. In a similar approach, Walsh (2006, pp.490-491) 
focuses on the relationship between the components of policy failure and policy change 
to explain why UK security policy changed during the Cold War due to the failure of the 
UK’s policy approach. These three perspectives are therefore similar in that the cause of 
change is when the existing approach of a state is no longer viable as it is either incurring 
a loss or there is some form of domestic or international crisis which necessitates change. 
Although this research is helpful for identifying some of the causes that lead to foreign 
policy change, there lacks an operationalisation of change particularly in terms of its 
extent and timeframe.  
As Kleistra and Mayer (2001, p.397) suggest, the challenge for analysing foreign 
policy change is not the causes (the independent variable), but rather what is changing 
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and the degree to which it is changing (the dependent variable). For example, Holsti 
(1998, p.3; 2004, p.6) argues that conventional approaches to International Relations 
theory have failed to identify “how we can distinguish minor change from fundamental 
change, trends from transformations, and growth or decline” (emphasis in original). 
Hermann (1990, p.5) suggests that there are levels of change from the more minor to “the 
redirection of the actor’s entire orientation toward world affairs”. This latter focus on a 
state’s entire reorientation is a more significant form of foreign policy change in that it 
accounts for a state’s foreign policy as a whole (Holsti, 2016, p.104). In their research on 
foreign policy change during the Donald Trump Presidency, Ashbee and Hurst (2020, 
p.5) are also concerned with more fundamental foreign policy shifts in the form of 
“transformational change”. However, there lacks a more specific framework that allows 
for an assessment of the extent of change over time and its significance.  
In order to account for why change occurs in international relations, its nature, 
and its extent, Holsti (2004, pp.8-11) suggests there are three main markers of change 
identified as trends, major events, and “significant social/technological innovations”. 
These markers of change are supplemented by different conceptions of change, including 
the notion of change as a replacement, as something added or taken away from existing 
foreign policy, a change in complexity, transformation, and change as replacing outdated 
“behaviors, practices, ideas, norms, and rules” (Holsti, 2004, pp.13-17). This provides 
further support to the complexity of the concept of foreign policy change and may well 
contribute to explaining why there is a lack of a “general theoretical framework of 
change” (Haesebrouck and Joly, 2021a, p.482). This is because there are numerous 
causes, markers, and conceptions of change which differ according to the state, actors, 
time period, and the policies which may change from a single to more profound shift in a 
state’s orientation. For this reason, the next sub-section outlines a theory and definition 
of change to be utilised in this thesis and develops an analytical framework to specifically 
assess sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection between 1997 and 
2020.   
 
3.1.9 Theory of change and analytical framework for assessing sustained UK foreign 
policy change on human protection  
Throughout this thesis, sustained change is defined as a shift in the UK’s foreign policy 
goals and/or methods on human protection which endures over time in the approaches of 
successive governments and is continually shaped, maintained, and reinforced by a 
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combination of UK government rhetoric – what is said by elite political agents in 
government –  and its actions – the means and methods of protection in practice. Sustained 
change is distinct from minor or episodic shifts in UK foreign policy since it is assessed 
according to changes in the rhetoric and actions of successive governments across the 
ideological spectrum of domestic UK politics. This is in order to evidence that UK foreign 
policy change on human protection is lasting rather than simply replaced when a 
government leaves office. In line with the approach of existing research on foreign policy 
change (Walsh, 2006; Welch, 2005; Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2014), this definition is 
concerned with changes in a specific policy area and timeframe, which in this case is 
human protection from atrocity crimes between 1997 and 2020.  
 In order to demonstrate and assess sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to 
human protection, the concept of sustained change is operationalised by accounting for 
the different levels of foreign policy change according to the international, domestic, and 
individual and group, the different actors initiating change, and the significance of this 
change(Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2014). By utilising the relationship between 
government rhetoric – what foreign policy actors within government say – and actions – 
the means and methods used to fulfil the UK’s commitment to human protection – the 
analytical framework identifies when sustained changes occur using two primary 
indicators.  
The first is a change in a particular foreign policy goal and/or method on human 
protection or the predominance of new or alternative foreign policy goals. For example, 
a shift from human rights being one aspect of UK foreign policy to it becoming a central 
component of the UK’s external relations. This indicator can be identified both in the 
rhetoric of core foreign policy agents, including the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, 
and UK foreign policy ambassadors, such as through frequent rhetorical references to the 
concept of human rights in foreign policy speeches and in relation to specific 
humanitarian crises, and also the way in which this language is expressed in foreign policy 
speeches and statements, such as suggesting that human rights are central to UK foreign 
policy which is then sustained in the rhetoric and policy of successive governments. A 
shift in a foreign policy goal and/or method on human protection can also be identified in 
the UK’s actions such as committing to the protection of human rights through a direct 




The second indicator in identifying a sustained change in the UK’s commitment 
to human protection is when a change in goals and/or methods is maintained, and possibly 
built upon, by successive governments across the ideological spectrum, such as a 
Conservative government adopting the approach of a previous Labour government. This 
is an especially important indicator since the two main political parties which have a 
realistic prospect of winning an election under the existing electoral system may hold 
fundamentally different foreign policy ideas and traditions, such as internationalist and 
conservative. The framework operates on the assumption that a sustained change has 
occurred when a goal and/or method is maintained by at least one successive government 
for its duration in office since this provides sufficient time for a government to adjust its 
foreign policy on human protection away from its predecessor. If at least one successive 
government maintains and builds on the initial change of their predecessors by 
incorporating it in their foreign policy rhetoric and actions, this will provide further 
evidence of the significance of the sustained change that has occurred. For instance, if a 
government decides to make humanitarian intervention a more predominant aspect of its 
foreign policy rhetoric and actions, and this is approach is similarly maintained and 
practiced in the foreign policy of their successors, this supports the evaluation that this 
shift towards humanitarian intervention is a significant sustained change, especially amid 
the vast debate on the legality of humanitarian intervention.  
The analytical framework recognises that sustained UK foreign policy change on 
human protection occurs due to changes at three levels as identified in Haesebrouck and 
Joly’s (2021, pp.487-488) review of literature on foreign policy change. The first is the 
international level (Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2014, p.488), such as the emergence and 
promotion of new norms, major international events which require a change in the UK’s 
approach to human protection, or the emergence of new or existing humanitarian crises 
which require an immediate response from states. The second is domestic level changes, 
including changes in government and the promotion of new and/or alternative foreign 
policy goals on human protection. The third is changes at the group and individual level, 
including predominant government actors such as the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary and policy entrepreneurship (see: Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2014, p.488)  . 
This allows the thesis to evaluate the multifaceted sources of sustained UK foreign policy 
change on human protection rather than drawing the conclusion that change only 
originates from one level or that UK policymakers are passive receivers of foreign policy 
change. The remainder of this sub-section outlines the definitions and relationship 
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between rhetoric and action as an empirical assessment of sustained changes in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy. 
As discussed in this section, the framework for identifying and assessing sustained 
UK foreign policy change on human protection consists of two components. The first is 
an assessment of UK government rhetoric as expressed in speeches, statements, media 
interviews, government news reports, conferences, policy documents, and reports. The 
second is government action which is identified according to both coercive and non-
coercive international interventions, advocacy and entrepreneurship, policy, and financial 
support and humanitarian assistance. Some research has analysed the relationship 
between rhetoric and action, but this has relied on the assumption that the reader fully 
understands the relationship in the absence of any clear definitional parameters (Mayer, 
2008). The framework developed in this begins on the basis that rhetoric and action are 
largely ambiguous concepts which need to be conceptualised in the context of UK foreign 
policy on human protection in order to have any analytical value.  
Whilst precise definitions of rhetoric vary in the literature, there is some common 
ground on both the object of rhetoric in terms of written, visual, and oral communication, 
and the aims and objectives of rhetoric in persuading an audience (Reisigl, 2008; Toye, 
2013; Andrews, 2014; Jones, 2018). Toye (2013, p.2) for example describes rhetoric as 
“the art of persuasion” aimed at convincing an audience through the use of spoken 
language, written texts, and visual demonstrations. However, Krebs and Jackson (2007) 
have challenged the idea of rhetoric as persuasion because it is inherently difficult to 
quantify and qualify motives, as well as measure the outcome of whether an audience was 
persuaded by the use of government rhetoric.  
For this reason, the framework for assessing UK foreign policy change on human 
protection utilises rhetoric in its most basic sense as incorporating “all speech acts – 
whether they are oral or written” (Krebs and Jackson, 2007, p.36). It is not the goal of the 
framework to examine if an audience is persuaded by UK foreign policy speeches on 
human protection, but rather to identify references to human protection, the context of 
these references, and access any sustained changes in this rhetoric over time. The 
rhetorical component of the framework is thus concerned exclusively with written and 
oral political communication from elite UK foreign policy agents. This group is selected 
due to their central role in forming and communicating government foreign policy on 
human protection to domestic and international audiences. 
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This focus on elite UK foreign policy agents is also informed by the wealth of 
research on the importance of political leaders in the creation, decision making, and 
direction of foreign policy (Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Hermann et al., 2001; Hermann 
and Hagan, 1998). Elite UK foreign policy agents are thus defined as those operating in 
high government office, which includes the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, and 
government Ministers, alongside UK representatives at the United Nations in New York 
and Geneva, which express government foreign policy in relation to human protection 
and specific international crises. The assessment of elite political rhetoric also includes 
communications from parliamentarians because of their role in creating, scrutinising, and 
passing UK foreign policy, as well as their increasingly significant influence on human 
protection decision making as shown by the government’s defeat by MPs on whether to 
intervene in Syria in 2013 (Strong, 2015; 2018; 2019; Gaskarth, 2016; Bew and Elefteriu, 
2017).  
A challenge of focusing on the rhetoric of UK foreign policy elites is that they 
often operate in a time-limited position. For example, during the period of analysis 
between 1997 and 2020, the UK had five different Prime Ministers and nine Foreign 
Secretaries alone, in addition to a considerable turnover of MPs and changes in the 
composition of Parliament. That said, changes in governments, Prime Ministers, and 
Foreign Secretaries does not necessarily hinder the analysis of elite political 
communication in this thesis. In fact, a turnover of elite agents in high government office 
has advantages for assessing sustained UK foreign policy change on human protection. 
For instance, if a change in government is not proceeded by a shift in UK foreign policy 
rhetoric and action on human protection, then this would provide evidence that sustained 
change has occurred over time and across governments. The opposite is also true if a new 
government enters office and then changes UK foreign policy on human protection.  
Another challenge with assessing the rhetoric of elite UK foreign policy agents is 
whether such rhetoric is genuine (Chandler, 2003). It is one thing to rhetorically say that 
your country is fully committed to human protection and then another to translate this 
into action. For instance, speaking on the issue of chemical weapons in Syria, former US 
President Barack Obama suggested that “a red line for us [US] is we start seeing a whole 
bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized…and that there would be 
enormous consequences if we start seeing movement on the chemical weapons front” 
(The White House, 2012). Following the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria in 
2013, Obama’s rhetoric on the red line did not translate into enormous consequences, 
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such as an immediate intervention. This case shows how there is no guarantee that what 
is said in elite political rhetoric is translated into what is done in practice.  
A further issue is the negative connotations associated with UK political rhetoric. 
The very concept of rhetoric can be used as a means to criticise inaction by disconnecting 
words from practice. Rhetoric can equally be used to distance from previous actions. 
According to O’Shaughnessy (2014, p.25), “rhetoric gives permission to politicians to be 
evasive, to avoid a direct responsibility for the consequences of action by wrapping 
policies in a cling-film of ambiguity”.  Yet the question of whether rhetoric is genuine is 
at the core of the assessment of sustained UK foreign policy change on human protection. 
This is because if rhetoric on human protection is not matched by practical actions, then 
logically this raises questions about the seriousness of the government’s commitment to 
human protection. The framework used in this thesis accepts that rhetoric may well be 
portrayed and utilised in a negative light, but this is again precisely why it assesses 




Figure 2. The four indicators of UK foreign policy action 
 
As figure 2 shows, action is assessed according to the four indicators of policy, funding 
and humanitarian aid, coercive and non-coercive intervention, and advocacy and 
 
9  See section 3.2.5.1. for a discussion of the methodological approach to assessing the rhetoric 















entrepreneurship. The first indicator of policy is defined and assessed according to figure 
1 on written and unwritten forms of policy. The written forms of policy include policy 
papers, consultations, and dialogue among elite UK foreign policy agents. Unwritten 
policy refers to norms and ideas that prescribe actions, such as normative ideas that states 
should protect their own populations from mass atrocity crimes. Whilst policy is 
expressed through rhetoric, the actual substance of the output is aimed at influencing and 
changing actions towards a specific issue. For instance, if elite UK foreign policy agents 
argued that peacekeeping was a core means of achieving long-term sustainable peace and 
developed a policy paper on this, its actions would be translated through its contributions 
of peacekeeping troops, technical assistance, and financial support for UN missions.  
The second indicator of funding and humanitarian aid refers to the considerable 
UK monetary and logistical support provided in human protection crises. This indictor is 
assessed according to bilateral and multilateral aid, equipment and infrastructure 
development, and retaining the UK’s 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) pledge to 
ODA. As the empirical chapters in this thesis show, the UK government has pledged 
significant financial contributions to human protection crises, including Libya, Syria, 
Yemen, and Myanmar. These financial pledges are thus an important indicator on whether 
elite political rhetoric has been translated into tangible actions. The third indicator for 
assessing UK government action on human protection is its contribution to humanitarian 
crises through forms of coercive and non-coercive intervention. This includes actions 
across the spectrum of intervention, such non-coercive early warning, the deployment of 
peacekeepers and technical assistance, humanitarian aid, and atrocity and conflict 
prevention, and coercive measures, such as the use of force through deploying troops, 
military intervention and equipment supplies, and air and drone strikes. There is some 
important overlap with the second indicator on funding and humanitarian aid because 
both are forms of intervention by the UK on the ground.  
The fourth indicator of action is advocacy and entrepreneurship. This indicator is 
broad in scope in order to capture the different ways the UK may lead and influence on 
international human protection. This includes raising awareness and drawing attention to 
human protection crises, including through its membership of the UN Security Council, 
and more specifically, its penholding on thematic agendas and cases concerning human 
protection, leading on the creation of human protection agendas, and leading international 
debate on human protection. Each of these four indicators of action are intentionally broad 
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in order to capture the various ways the UK translates its rhetorical commitments to 
human protection in action and to assess any sustained changes.  
The advantage of this framework is its applicability across time in order to provide 
a consistent assessment of any sustained changes in action. It is equally important to note 
the limitations of this framework. It is a subjective interpretation of rhetoric and action, 
both in terms of the selection of materials and the focus of the analysis. That said, by 
carrying out an extensive integrated content analysis of primary and secondary materials, 
the research has a high degree of research and analytical rigour.
10
 In addition, the 
assessment of change may be liable to contestation since this is one interpretation of the 
concept. Yet the framework is broad in scope in order to ensure that it is as methodical 
and evidence-based as possible. Finally, this framework is focused on a particular policy 
and country, which has its own very specific institutional context. This assessment of 
sustained foreign policy change is thus not necessarily generalisable across different 
country and policy contexts, especially given the different theoretical debates on what 
constitutes foreign policy change (Alden and Aran, 2012). However, the basic definitions 
and assessments of rhetoric and action may provide broader insights into how to assess 
changes in a state’s foreign policy towards certain issues and some of the potential lessons 
learned from this approach. 
This sub-section has outlined the definition of sustained foreign policy change in 
this thesis as well as an original framework to assess such sustained changes in UK foreign 
policy on human protection. This framework is specific to an assessment of the UK’s 
foreign policy on human protection between 1997 and 2020 and therefore does not suggest 
that it is a solution to the challenge of assessing foreign policy change more generally 
which has been a debate for decades. Rather, it aims to provide an original framework for 
one potential method for assessing foreign policy change, which may well be applicable 
to other cases, but is beyond the scope of this immediate thesis. 
 
3.2 Methodology  
This section details the methodological approach to address the research aim, objectives, 
questions, and hypothesis. It begins by briefly outlining the ontological and 
 
10  See section 3.2.4 of the methodology for a detailed discussion of the approach to content 
analysis in this thesis.  
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epistemological foundations of the thesis and is followed by the research strategy and a 
discussion of the methods of data collection and analysis.  
 
3.2.1 Ontological, epistemological, and methodological approach   
The approach of this thesis is influenced by prior beliefs about what exists in the world 
(ontology), our knowledge of it (epistemology), and how to obtain this knowledge 
(methodology) (Hay, 2002, p.63; Bryman, 2004, p.3; Pierce, 2008, p.17; Lamont, 2015, 
p.24). This thesis draws primarily on an interpretivist approach to social scientific 
research, which is informed by interpreting the meanings actors give to concepts, norms, 
and ideas (Bryman, 2016, p.375), while recognising the subjective role of the researcher 
in the process of collecting, interpreting, and analysing data. Concepts of foreign policy, 
human protection, and foreign policy change are socially constructed by agents, and thus, 
are potentially interpreted differently according to the agent in question, such as the Prime 
Minister, Foreign Secretary, Members of Parliament (MPs), scholars, or the wider public.  
 Similarly, foreign policy traditions of conservatism and internationalism are part 
of this interpretivist approach to research. As outlined in section 3.1.2, scholarship on 
foreign policy traditions places agents at the forefront of its analysis. According to Bevir 
et al (2013, p.167), an interpretivist approach considers “individuals not as the passive 
supports of institutions or discourses but as agents who can modify inherited norms and 
languages for reasons of their own”. This shows how agents such as policymakers can 
adapt to evolving foreign policy traditions based on the circumstances of domestic and 
foreign policy at the time, and that foreign policy traditions are not fixed (Bevir et al, 
2013, p.168). The empirical focus of the thesis therefore engages with foreign policy 
traditions in the form of conservatism and internationalism and shows how these 
traditions have evolved, changed, and been modified by agents as the domestic and 
international context has evolved (Vickers, 2004; 2011; Atkins, 2013; Daddow and 
Schnapper, 2013; Gaskarth, 2013; Beech, 2011; Beech and Oliver, 2014, Ralph, 2014b). 
The theoretical framework on sustained UK foreign policy change is also informed 
by certain ontological, epistemological, and methodological foundations. Analysing 
foreign policy change involves interpreting the role of structures and agents in both 
domestic and international settings, which may influence UK foreign policy change 
towards human protection. This is in addition to selecting particular materials in order to 
analyse changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection. For these reasons, it is 
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essential that the research and analysis in this thesis is based on a rigorous methodology, 
which is outlined in the following sub-sections.  
 
3.2.2 Research approach and methods  
This thesis adopts a mixed methods approach through combining quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques. It combines primary documentary materials, secondary 
documents, and interview material for a high degree of analytical rigour through 
triangulation (see figure 3). The approach to triangulation is important for examining 
issues from different analytical perspectives, for cross-comparing findings and increasing 
validity, enhancing reliability, and revealing any additional research findings that another 
method may have overlooked (Lilleker, 2003, pp.211-212; Lamont, 2015, p.114; 











Figure 3. The triangulation of research methods 
 
3.2.3 Primary data collection and analysis 
Primary data is “original, unedited and first-hand” material (Pierce, 2008, p.80). In order 
to assess the rhetoric of elite UK foreign policy agents on human protection, the thesis 
collected 1,055 primary documentary materials speeches, statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports (figure 4). In accordance with the framework on sustained 
change, these materials focus exclusively on elite political communication from the Prime 
Minister, Foreign Secretary, government ministers, and UK foreign policy diplomats, 
ambassadors and representatives. This is alongside speeches and statements by MPs and 














Figure 4. Sources of primary material 
 
The first batch of 23 primary documents were collected for chapter 4 through online 
archival research of speeches by Tony Blair, Robin Cook, Jack Straw, Margaret Beckett, 
Gordon Brown, David Miliband, and speeches, statements, media interviews, and 
government news reports from UK representatives at the UN. The collection of this 
material was challenging in the absence of a single database which hosted all of this 
speech material, which is explained by the fact that earlier speeches between 1997 and 
2001 were not digitised on a specific government platform. These materials were 
therefore sourced through a combination of keyword searches on UK foreign policy 
speeches between 1997 and 2010, their identification in existing secondary materials, and 
through page-by-page searches using the online National Archives website and United 
Nations online meeting records. The keyword searches focused on foreign policy 
speeches defining New Labour’s vision for the UK’s place in the world and its 
commitment to international human protection, including Robin Cook’s mission 
statement and Tony Blair’s doctrine of the international community, the crises in Kosovo 
and Sierra Leone, the ethical dimension, international development, and human 
protection, including the R2P and PoC.  
 The second batch of 355 documents were collected for chapter 5 through detailed 
speeches, statements, media interviews, and government news reports by David Cameron, 
William Hague, Nick Clegg, Philip Hammond, David Lidington, Alistair Burt, Justine 
Greening, Tobias Ellwood, and UK representatives at the UN: Sir Mark Lyall Grant, 
Jeremy Browne, and Dame Karen Pierce between 11 May 2010 to 6 May 2015. These 
primary documents were sourced through page-by-page searches on the news and 




















the online National Archives. The searches identified materials relevant to the 
overarching thesis themes and the direct focus of chapter 5, including key foreign policy 
speeches defining the UK’s place in the world, its influence and leadership on the crises 
in Libya and Syria, and references to freedom, democracy, and human rights, the R2P 
and PoC, and initial references to the emerging crisis in Myanmar in preparation for 
chapter 6. Material which was not directly relevant to these themes were excluded from 
the findings in order to prevent analysing thousands of unnecessary materials. The same 
searches were applied to parliamentary debates during the same period using the online 
Hansard debate database for both the House of Lords and the House of Commons. 
 The third batch of 700 documents were collected for chapter 6 using the same 
approach as chapter 5, but with the timeframe adjusted to between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. This part of the research gathered speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government news reports from David Cameron, Theresa May, Boris 
Johnson, Philip Hammond, Jeremy Hunt, Dominic Raab, Priti Patel, Penny Mordaunt, 
and UK representatives at the UN: Jonathan Allen, Matthew Rycroft, Dame Karen Pierce, 
Dame Barbara Woodward. The searches identified the same themes as chapter 5, but with 
an addition of the crises in Yemen and Myanmar and the exclusion of Libya. The 
inclusion of the crises in Yemen and Myanmar and the continuing crisis in Syria explain 
the significant increase in the number of primary documents in comparison to the period 
between 2010 and 2015. These materials were again gathered from page-by-page 
searches on the news and communications section of the FCO website until 21 August 
2020 when any new speeches, statements, media interviews, and government news 
reports were hosted by the new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office 
(FCDO) website following the merging of the FCO and the Department for International 
Development in August 2020. This is in addition to keyword searches of debates in both 
the House of Lords and House of Commons using the online Hansard search database.  
 Alongside these materials, a combination of government reports, policy 
documents, committee inquiry reports, and UN documents were collected from the Prime 
Minister’s Office, FCO, FCDO, Parliament UK, the UN, and the Security Council Report 
websites. These searches again focused on the core themes as identified throughout 
chapters 4-7 and provided important evidence of the UK’s foreign policy commitment to 
human protection in action. This is because government policy documents detail the 
output of government and parliamentary deliberations on UK foreign policy with the 
intention of detailing subsequent actions. In addition, reports from parliamentary 
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committee inquiries are essential for scrutinising the government’s approach to specific 
foreign policy issues and receiving an official response from the government in order to 
further explain, and often defend, its policy position on a given issue.  
A limitation with collecting primary documentary material from government 
speeches, statements, media interviews, and government news reports are the “secrecy 
and access issues” in elite political communication (Daddow, 2015, p.305). Due to a lack 
of access to inner government circles, it is difficult to fully understand the policy making 
process in private and the motivations underlying the government’s approach to foreign 
policy. However, analysing the wealth of primary data collected for this research provides 
some important insights into the foreign policy approach of successive governments 
based on patterns in their rhetorical statements and subsequent actions, such as a 
consistent reference to particular concepts over time. This allows for an examination of 
any changes over time in order to find out whether there has been a sustained change in 
UK government rhetoric and action on human protection. In collecting this primary data, 
it is also recognised that this is interpretative material and may contain some bias since it 
is “produced by human beings acting in particular circumstances and within the 
constraints of particular social, historical or administrative conditions” (Finnegan, 2006, 
p.144). This is why triangulation is important in order to draw out any similarities and 
differences across the material to enhance the validity of the research.  
 
3.2.4 A fully integrated content analysis of primary data   
An integrated content analysis was conducted in order to analyse the 1,055 primary 
documentary materials. Content analysis is a method “for analysing the content of 
communications” (Burnham et al., 2008, p.259). The aim of a content analysis is to 
analyse data methodically to identify key themes and patterns related to set research 
questions (Bryman, 2016, p.562; Schreier, 2012, p.1; Pashakhanlou, 2017, p.449). 
Content analysis is often separated into quantitative and qualitative forms. Yet this 
dichotomy risks creating the assumption that quantitative and qualitative methods must 
remain separate in the process of collecting, coding, and analysing data. Alternatively, 
Pashakhanlou (2017, p.453) proposes a “fully integrated content analysis” in international 
relations research, which combines both quantitative and qualitative and computer-
assisted and manual coding methods. This is on the basis that focusing on one method 
alone leads to an incomplete content analysis in limiting its boundaries from the outset, 
which may overlook the strengths of alternative methods (Pashakhanlou, 2017, p.453). 
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For instance, qualitative content analysis is primarily concerned with interpreting the 
content of data, such as the meanings contained within the text (Burnham et al., 2008, 
p.259; Schreier, 2012, p.1; Bryman, 2016, p.563). Conversely, quantitative content 
analysis focuses on the idea of producing “more objective, reliable, and replicable 
findings” through quantifying the data using numbers, figures, and statistical analysis 
(Pashakhanlou, 2017, p.453).  
 Both quantitative and qualitative content analysis have their own unique strengths 
and limitations. A fully integrated content analysis proposes to use quantitative and 
qualitative approaches as a whole in order to fully code and analyse the data 
(Pashakhanlou, 2017, p.453). The advantage of a fully integrated content analysis for this 
thesis is that it “is suitable for the analysis of both manifest and latent meaning” 
(Pashakhanlou, 2017, p.454). An integrated content analysis allows for an analysis of 
what is said in the primary text through counting the frequency of particular words or 
phrases (quantitative), as well as interpreting the broader context in which these words or 
phrases are used (qualitative). This approach enriches the research through adopting a 
more complete analysis of the primary data. For example, computer software can be used 
to conduct word frequency searches to establish how many times a particular word or 
phrase is used in the primary data and then quantify the numbers. It can be equally 
deployed as a qualitative method through locating the use of these words within the 
broader text of a foreign policy speech.  
Using computer-assisted software alongside this combination of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches also significantly enhances the reliability of the analysis. This is 
important because a core limitation of content analysis is data reliability. Reliability 
issues exist for several reasons, including issues and mistakes with coding, mistakes in 
the code book or unclear rules and guidance on the chosen coding methods, particularly 
as data is being interpreted by the researcher (Krippendorff, 2009, p.350). By conducting 
a fully-integrated analysis, each part followed several logical steps in order to ensure the 
results and analysis were both reliable and rigorous. The first of these steps was the 
development of a codebook, which details all the relevant information with regards to the 
codes and sub-codes used to categorise the data (see appendix 2). In addition, a process 
of double-coding was used, which involved repeating the codebook on more than one 
occasion in order identify any missing data, as well as seeing if similar or the same results 
were obtained. This in turn provides a strong indication of the reliability of the content 
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analysis used in the research. For these reasons, a fully integrated content analysis was 
used to code and analyse the 1,055 primary documentary materials.   
To prepare for the fully-integrated analysis, several steps were followed according 
to Manheim et al. (2008). Manheim et al. (2008, pp.181-185) identify three primary stages 
of conducting a content analysis, which includes (1) identifying the population from 
which you will be analysing the communications of; (2) deciding on the unit of analysis; 
(3) using computer-based content analysis techniques. Firstly, the population of this 
research was taken from politicians, namely, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, 
Ministers, and UK diplomats and representatives, and MPs since these were identified as 
the elite UK foreign policy agents for this research. Secondly, the unit of analysis 
concerned speeches, statements, media interviews, and government news reports given 
that these official channels of information and communication provided sufficient 
literature for the analysis in addition to helping to address the core research questions and 
hypothesis.  
Finally, NVivo software was used to code the material in preparation for analysis. 
By code, this is referring to “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a 
summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of 
language-based or visual data” (Saldaña, 2016, 4). For example, human protection may 
be used to capture a range of language on this issue, such as war crimes, genocide, human 
rights violations and so on. Codes therefore provide a useful means to capture key 
research themes and to organise a wide-range of words under one coding hierarchy (figure 
5).    
 
3.2.5 Computer-assisted content analysis using NVivo 
NVivo software was used in order to conduct a content analysis for chapter’s 5-7. There 
are several advantages of using NVivo for carrying out this research. Firstly, computer-
assisted software provides “unrivalled reliability” (Pashakhanlou, 2017, p.553). A content 
analysis was traditionally undertaken manually which relied heavily on human input in 
categorising and preparing data for analysis. Conversely, a computer-assisted approach 
can significantly strengthen reliability because “machines do not suffer from individual 
idiosyncrasies and human errors rooted in fatigue, loss of concentration, or the like” 
(Pashakhanlou, 2017, p.450).  
Secondly, using computer-assisted software supports the process of categorising 
and coding primary data in preparation for analysis. With 1,055 primary materials, NVivo 
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was critical for organising and managing this large quantity of material. Whilst NVivo is 
no substitute for data analysis, a significant advantage of the software is that it allows for 
improved management and categorisation of the research data by displaying it in an 
organised way. In chapter 6, for instance, the research results found 700 primary materials 
with NVivo providing a useful platform through which to neatly organise, visualise, and 
code the data. Using software in this way “ensures that the user is working more 
methodically, more thoroughly, more attentively” by incorporating and coding all the 
available data (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013, p.3). Finally, the usability of the software also 
made it straightforward to identify key research themes as the coding progressed ensuring 
that potentially important data was not overlooked.   
  
3.2.5.1 NVivo coding cycle 1 
The content analysis was uniform throughout the thesis. To enhance the reliability and 
validity of the data, two coding cycles were used in NVivo. During the first coding cycle, 
several different methods were applied. Firstly, provisional coding was used as a means 
to establish several foundational (primary) codes based on the research questions, 
hypothesis, and the initial findings at the beginning of the content analysis (Saldana, 2015, 
p.168). This included codes such as “Global” “leadership”, “influence”, “human rights” 
and “democracy” among many others (see appendix 2). Provisional coding was a useful 
starting point for managing and coding the wealth of primary data. Secondly, each 
primary code was supported by several sub-codes (see appendix 2).
11
 This method 
resulted in several code hierarchies with each primary code having several sub-codes in 
order to capture the nuances of the primary data (Saldana, 2015, p.91).12 As figure 5 
shows, under the liberal conservative code (node), there were several sub-codes (child-
nodes), such as “human rights”, “democracy”, and “freedom”. Using this approach 
ensured that the data analysis accounted for the main components of the government’s 
definition of liberal conservatism.  
 
11  In NVivo, primary codes are known as “nodes” and sub-codes as “child nodes”.   











Figure 5. Example coding hierarchy 
 
Descriptive coding was the final method used in the first coding cycle. Descriptive coding 
is where key words or phrases are coded from a piece of text which conformed to the 
primary or sub-codes (Saldana, 2015, p.102). Descriptive coding was supported through 
simultaneous coding or “splitting”, which identifies several codes in the same piece of 
text (Saldana, 2015, p.24). For example, when coding a Prime Ministerial speech on 
foreign policy there is often a considerable amount of detail and several sub-sections in 
each speech, which may cover different primary and sub-themes. NVivo in turn provides 
a significant advantage for splitting data since the user is able to code several pieces of 
the same text and conveniently place these under the separate primary or sub-codes, while 
maintaining the overall organisation of the coding structure.  
 
3.2.5.2 NVivo coding cycle 2 and the codebook 
Following the first cycle, a process of second cycle coding was undertaken to further 
strengthen the reliability and validity of the content analysis. Second cycle coding is 
helpful for identifying any new material that may have been missed during the first coding 
cycle. Each primary code and sub-code was then logged in a comprehensive codebook 
(see appendix 2). The codebook is critical for both the reliability and validity of the 
content analysis by providing instructions on how to repeat the coding process to achieve 
the same results. For this reason, the codebook contains detailed information on the code 
description, its inclusion and exclusion criteria, and an example of the code drawn from 
the existing materials that were used in the content analysis. By using this integrated 
content analysis, the thesis aims to generate rigorous and original research findings that 












3.2.6 Addressing the research questions and testing the hypothesis 
The computer-assisted content analysis provided a significant contribution to addressing 
the theoretical and empirical research questions and hypothesis according to the core 
research themes. For example, the UK’s place in the world was coded according to 
keyword searches on concepts and phrases, such as “global role”, “decline”, and “Global 
Britain”. This enabled phrases from the research questions and hypothesis, such as “place 
in the world” and “Global Britain” to be fully articulated and addressed through the 
integrated content analysis. Conducting keyword searches on these concepts also revealed 
the broader context in which they were mentioned in order to then provide a detailed 
qualitative analysis of the relationship between the UK’s commitment to human 
protection and its changing place in the world as part of a transitional foreign policy.  
 The computer-assisted integrated content analysis also contributed to the 
assessment of sustained UK foreign policy change towards human protection by 
comparing the rhetoric and actions of UK governments over time. This primary data also 
contributed to assessing sustained UK foreign policy change on human protection through 
detailing several human protection crises that the UK contributed to between 1997 and 
2020. This data provided important insights into the translation of government rhetoric 
into action, the differences between cases, and the assessment of whether this contributed 
to sustained changes in both the rhetoric and actions of the UK on human protection.   
 
3.2.7 Data collection and analysis: Secondary materials  
Complementing primary data are secondary materials which are “second-hand, edited and 
interpreted” (Pierce, 2008, p.80). Secondary materials were collected from several 
sources, including peer-reviewed journal articles, academic books, and reports from non-
governmental organisations. The collection of these secondary materials was split into 
three broad bodies of literature to examine the UK’s commitment to human protection. 
This included (1) theoretical literature on international order, liberal internationalism, and 
foreign policy change; (2) empirical literature on UK foreign policy and its place in the 
world; and (3) specific literature on the UK’s commitment to human protection.  
This approach ensured that the secondary material was focused specifically on 
supplementing the primary data and interview material in order to address the research 
questions and hypothesis. The literature on foreign policy change, world order, and liberal 
internationalism contributed to addressing the theoretical research question: what is the 
relationship between the UK’s commitment to human protection and its transitional 
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foreign policy? While also providing important theoretical and empirical context for the 
hypothesis to assess whether the UK’s awareness of its changing position in the world 
between 1997 and 2020 led to sustained changes in its rhetoric and action towards a 
strengthened commitment to human protection.  
The two other bodies of research on UK foreign policy, its place in the world, and 
its commitment to human protection provided an important foundation for assessing 
sustained UK foreign policy change on human protection, particularly in action. It 
enabled the thesis to chart important developments in UK foreign policy, such as the 
transition from a liberal internationalist foreign policy outlook under the Blair and Brown 
governments to the liberal conservative outlook of the Cameron and May governments. 
It is suggested in chapters 4, 5 and 6 that these changes in the foreign policy outlook of 
these different governments impacted on the construction and conceptualisation of the 
UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy. These insights 
provided an important contribution to addressing the second research and sub-research 
questions: have adjustments in the UK’s place in the world between 1997 and 2020 
translated into sustained changes in its foreign policy rhetoric and action on human 
protection? What are the main continuities and changes in the UK’s framing of its 
commitment to human protection between 1997 and 2020? This emphasis on the changing 
foreign policy outlook of governments also had important implications for the analysis of 
the research hypothesis by recognising how different governments were aware of, and 
responded to, the UK’s changing position in the world and its relationship with sustained 
changes in the UK government’s rhetoric and action on human protection.  
Each body of literature was collected using keyword searches in relation to the 
core thesis themes, such as human protection, foreign policy change, world order, liberal 
internationalism, UK leadership, UK influence, and the UK’s commitment to human 
protection among others. Whilst acknowledging that there is inevitably some overlap in 
this literature, the advantage of splitting the research into three core bodies of scholarship 
is ensuring a degree of research rigour through searching the core thesis themes. As this 
literature provides an interpretation of events, there is awareness of the bias contained in 
this material and thus the need to triangulate with other methods.  
 
3.2.8 Semi-structured interviews  
Primary and secondary data analysis is combined with material from 11 elite semi-
structured interviews (see appendix 1). By elites, this research is broadly referring to those 
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“who hold, or have held, a privileged position in society and, as such…are likely to have 
had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the public” (Richards, 
1996, p.199). This broad definition provided the necessary scope to interview individuals 
relevant to the research. Semi-structured interviews were chosen due to the degree of 
flexibility in discussing the key themes and allowing interviewees to elaborate on these 
responses (Bryman, 2016, p.466-467). This was an important advantage during the 
interview process since it provided scope to explore issues beyond the immediate question 
by asking participants to elaborate on their response.  
The interviews provided data from a cross-section of actors, while also taking into 
considerations the logistics of the research, issues with access, and factoring in time taken 
in transcribing and analysing the material. The interview topics corresponded with the 
core research themes on the UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional 
foreign policy, which includes UK leadership, influence, its contribution to specific 
protection crises in Libya, Myanmar, Syria, and Yemen, development assistance, and the 
UK’s place in the world. The strength of using semi-structured interviews was that they 
allowed for the flexibility that may be required in instances when the researcher is faced 
with issues of party politics, representativeness of views, question avoidance, and power 
relations. For instance, it allowed the researcher to change the subject or probe deeper 
into the issues being discussed without losing focus of the interview topics.  
The interviews were thus an important means of assessing the interpretations of 
actors involved on some of the key issues covered in this thesis. This approach was 
supported through using a combination of purposive and snowball sampling techniques 
to identify participants. Purposive sampling is based on identifying participants “in a 
strategic way” to fulfil the core aims, hypothesis, and research questions (Bryman, 2016, 
p.408), while snowball sampling involves requesting recommendations from existing 
participants. Throughout the interview process, participants were selected on the basis of 
their experience of the issues contained in the research. These techniques were invaluable 
for the research in identifying participants that would have otherwise not been approached 
to participate in the research.  
These interviews were another crucial element of the triangulation process. It 
enabled the ideas put forward in primary and secondary materials to be further validated 
through interviews with elites. In this sense, the combination of interviews, primary data, 
and secondary documents provides important validation of the arguments in this thesis 
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through drawing on, and comparing, different research techniques in order to substantiate 
the findings and develop arguments and conclusions from this.   
A challenge with these interviews was the accessibility of officials, which is 
widely acknowledged in the literature (Richards, 1996; Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; 
Harvey, 2010; Bryman, 2016). For this research, the issue of access was due to a 
combination of factors, including gaining sufficient responses from interview requests, 
participants having the available time, and reaching individuals especially in government 
office that were difficult to reach. One way of trying to limit issues with accessibility was 
communicating with potential interviewees in advance to begin building rapport and 
discussing their availability. Snowball sampling helped to build a broad list of other 
potential interviewees and/or relevant lines of contact the researcher might not have 
initially considered.  
 
3.2.9 Interview ethics  
Several key steps were followed in preparing and conducting the elite semi-structured 
interviews (Halperin and Heath, 2017, pp.162-163). First, each interviewee was provided 
with a detailed information sheet regarding the research aims and objectives, as well as 
explaining why the interviewee had been chosen to participate in the research, and that 
their responses would be anonymous. Once interviewees agreed to their participation in 
the research, they were once again informed about research anonymity and agreed that 
any personal details would remain fully confidential, while their responses would be 
anonymised in order to protect their identity in the research. The decision was made to 
anonymise the interviews for two reasons. The first was working on the assumption that 
elites would be more willing to participate in the research if this was on a confidential 
basis to prevent any potential risks from the information they provided. Second, 
anonymising the interviews allowed for greater depth into the topics because interviewees 
knew that no direct quotes would be attributed to them in the thesis. For these reasons, 
any reference to the interview material will be anonymised in numerical form in order of 
the dates that the interviews were conducted, so interview 1, interview 2, interview 3 and 







3.3 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the theoretical and methodological foundations of the thesis. 
It provides the starting point for addressing the research aim of investigating the 
relationship between the UK’s commitment to human protection and its transitional 
foreign policy between 1997 and 2020 by outlining the analytical framework which will 
be used to assess this relationship throughout the following empirical chapters. The 
chapter also contributes to addressing the first thesis objective because it developed a 
framework to assess changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection from 1997 to 
2020, in addition to objective three of creating a quantitative and qualitative dataset to 
examine the UK’s commitment to human protection between 2010 and 2020. The 
remainder of the thesis applies this framework in order to empirically assess sustained 
changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy 
between 1997 and 2020 in order to fulfil the research aim, objectives, answer the research 


















Chapter 4 - New Labour’s liberal internationalist commitment to 
human protection in rhetoric and action, 1997-2010    
  
“As the world grows smaller, national interests and global interests are 
converging. The International community is moving towards the principle that 
when crimes are committed against humanity, it is in the interests of the whole 
of humanity to deal with them.”  
                         Robin Cook, Speech on Guiding Humanitarian Intervention (2000a) 
 
By the mid-1990s, UN member states were confronted with a recent history of mass 
atrocities committed in Rwanda in 1994 and Bosnia in 1995. In response, the UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan (1997-2006), called on the international community to 
agree on more effective ways to protect populations from mass violence and atrocity 
crimes (United Nations, 1999). This period also coincided with changes in UK domestic 
and foreign policy following the election of a Labour government in 1997 led by the new 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair. In foreign policy terms, New Labour was characterised as a 
break from past Conservative and Labour governments, as well as a rejection of UK 
international isolationism (Blair, 1999a; The Labour Party in Dale, 2000, p.381). Prior to 
entering office, the Party’s manifesto committed “to restore Britain’s pride and influence 
as a leading force for good in the world” (The Labour Party in Dale, 2000, pp.381-382). 
Once in office, New Labour placed human rights as a central feature of its internationalist 
vision for UK foreign policy (Cook, 1997; Blair, 1999a). 
Beginning with this rhetorical commitment to human rights, this chapter traces 
the UK’s commitment to human protection in rhetoric and action during New Labour’s 
time in office between 1997 and 2010. New Labour is an analytically significant starting 
point for several reasons. First, Tony Blair and his Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, openly 
communicated New Labour’s internationalist foreign policy as something distinct from 
their Conservative predecessors. In the backdrop of the crisis in Kosovo in 1999, Blair 
(1999a) argued that the international community should no longer allow absolute 
sovereignty to act as a shield to prevent intervention when a state is committing mass 
atrocities against its population. This idea was also proposed during a period of 
international soul-searching more broadly in which the UN was attempting to address the 
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impasse on non-intervention among states, the absolute protection of state sovereignty, 
and political will in the face of mass atrocities.  
Second, the government’s promotion of human rights could be seen at that time 
“as a major change in the rhetoric of foreign policy” (Gaskarth, 2006, p.51). Under Robin 
Cook (1997-2001), the government made human rights an important domestic and foreign 
policy concern, which was continued under his successors. Third, New Labour entered 
office amid decades of debate on the UK’s relative hard power decline on the international 
stage (Acheson, 1962 cited in Brinkley, 1990; Gamble, 1994; English and Kenny, 1999). 
However, New Labour were also confronted with an increasingly globalised world in the 
post-Cold War era. The UK’s response was led by Tony and centred on reasserting the 
UK’s leadership on the international stage through the pursuit of an outward-facing 
internationalist foreign policy. This period starting from 1997 is therefore where the focus 
on a transitional foreign policy begins in this thesis. This is because successive 
governments attempted to adapt to the UK’s changing role in the world amid its post-war 
relative international decline, articulated the UK’s leadership and influence in multilateral 
organisations, and revealed the UK’s position in the post-war international order. In terms 
of human protection, this internationalist approach was translated into UK foreign policy 
practice during its interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and Sierra Leone in 2000.  
The central argument of this chapter is that New Labour’s commitment to a liberal 
internationalist foreign policy laid the foundations for sustained changes in the UK’s 
rhetoric and actions on human protection between 1997 and 2020. Rhetorically, the New 
Labour governments between 1997 and 2010 placed notable emphasis on the protection 
of international human rights, condemned mass violence and atrocities in Kosovo and 
Sierra Leone, contributed to the evolution and endorsement of the R2P, and proposed 
criteria to guide humanitarian interventions. These sustained changes in rhetoric were 
also translated into government actions on human protection according to the four 
indicators of foreign policy action. This includes policy on humanitarian intervention and 
R2P, coercive interventions in Kosovo and Sierra Leone, and international advocacy and 
entrepreneurship on humanitarian intervention and international human protection more 
broadly. This commitment to liberal internationalism marked an important departure from 
the conservative tradition in foreign policy, particularly with regards to the UK’s rhetoric 
and action on humanitarian intervention and human protection more broadly.  
To support this argument, sustained changes in New Labour’s foreign policy on 
human protection are assessed according to rhetoric and action. As shown in chapter 3, 
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these two categories of sustained change capture both what is said and what is done in 
UK foreign policy. This relationship is important because it recognises that rhetorical 
commitments may not be sufficient alone to constitute sustained UK foreign policy 
change without some form of action. Moreover, translating rhetoric into action is an 
important manifestation of how a policy is articulated and whether this deviates from the 
original commitment in terms of its application. This assessment of sustained UK foreign 
policy change on human protection is supported by evidence in primary and secondary 
materials, including 23 archival speeches and statements from Prime Ministers (Tony 
Blair and Gordon Brown) and Foreign Secretaries (Robin Cook, Jack Straw, Margaret 
Beckett, and David Miliband), UK diplomats, UK government reports and policy 
documents, and expert analysis from academic scholarship.   
The chapter is split into five sections. The first examines the brief historical 
context of human protection in Rwanda in 1994 and Bosnia in 1995 in order to argue that 
the UK’s response to these crises had a critical influence on New Labour’s response to 
Kosovo in 1999. The second section shifts the focus to New Labour’s period in office and 
examines the liberal internationalist underpinnings of its approach to foreign policy, 
human protection, and the UK’s place in a globalised world. New Labour’s rhetorical 
commitment to human protection is examined through the ethical dimension, the 
prioritisation of human rights, and Blair’s doctrine of the international community, and 
in practice using the examples of Kosovo in 1999 and Sierra Leone in 2000.
13
 The third 
and fourth sections analyse New Labour’s liberal internationalism post-2001, which 
includes humanitarian intervention, debates over the Iraq war, and the broader 
international context following the endorsement of the R2P in 2005. The final section 
examines the UK’s commitment to human protection during the Gordon Brown 
government between 2007 and 2010. The chapter concludes with its contributions to the 
thesis and discusses the implications of its findings for the following empirical analysis.  
This chapter is a significant contribution to the empirical assessment of the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy. This is because it begins 
to analyse the New Labour government’s commitment to human protection in a 
 
13  This chapter does not assume that humanitarian concerns alone were the decisive factor when 
identifying humanitarian justifications for action. Rather, the emphasis on humanitarianism in 
elite political communication fulfils the primary focus of this thesis in assessing the UK’s 




transitional foreign policy. In doing so, it identifies and analyses several important 
transitions in the UK’s foreign policy between 1997 and 2020, including a shift from a 
traditional conservative foreign policy outlook to a liberal internationalist one, the 
acceleration of globalisation and the importance of the UK playing an active rather than 
isolationist role in the world, the emergence of global threats particularly international 
terrorism and WMD, the relationship between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention 
especially in the aftermath of Rwanda and Bosnia, the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo in 
1999, and the decision to intervene in Iraq in 2003.  
 
4.1 UK foreign policy on human protection in Rwanda and Bosnia   
An analysis of New Labour’s commitment to human protection requires first an 
understanding of how their Conservative predecessors engaged with the same foreign 
policy issue and the broader international context at that time (Schreiner, 2008; Daddow, 
2009; Gaskarth, 2013). The Conservative government’s engagement with human 
protection under the leadership of John Major (1990-1997) was characterised in particular 
by the crises in Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1995). On Rwanda, Melvern and Williams 
(2004, p.2) argue that John Major’s government “adopted policies that helped facilitate 
and prolong” the genocide committed against the Tutsi, Twa, and moderate Hutu. The 
UK’s response was therefore deemed ineffectual in carrying out its responsibility to 
protect the population of Rwanda as part of the Genocide Convention (Gaskarth, 2013, 
p.107). It is important to note that the UK was not alone in failing to prevent the Rwandan 
genocide, with Kofi Annan acknowledging how “the whole international 
community…failed to honour that obligation [under the Genocide Convention]” (United 
Nations, 1999). 
A year later, the UK and international community were faced with another 
humanitarian crisis unfolding in Bosnia (1995), the result of which led to 20,000 people 
being killed in what were meant to be UN safe areas in Srebrenica. In the Secretary 
General’s subsequent report, Kofi Annan reflected on his “deepest regret and remorse” 
that the UN and its Member States “failed to do our part to help save the people of 
Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass murder” (UN General Assembly, 1999b, 
p.111). As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the UK’s response to Bosnia 
was again criticised (Schreiner, 2008; Gaskarth, 2013). The UK “was seen as an 
obstructive actor in attempts to confront human rights abuses aggressively” (Gaskarth, 
2013, p.107). This criticism is not exclusive to the Major administration, since the 
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opposition Labour party also failed to pressure the government to adopt a more decisive 
response to the conflict (Schreiner, 2008, p.190; McCourt, 2013, p.250). Although the 
UK did eventually intervene in Bosnia, this was deemed a delayed response to a crisis 
that had been ongoing for a period of time prior to the UK’s involvement (Peltner, 2017, 
p.751).  
The UK’s approach to Rwanda and Bosnia was therefore an important element of 
New Labour’s own foreign policy on human protection, and its commitment to liberal 
internationalism more broadly, which is explained by both domestic and international 
factors. Domestically, the Conservative tradition continued to have an important role in 
the UK’s approach to foreign affairs. The conservative tradition has been described as 
“cautious prudence” (Hall and Rengger, 2005, p.72) and sceptical (Bevir et al., 2013, 
p.167) particularly of interventions in other sovereign states which extends beyond the 
national interest. This emphasis on a cautious, prudent, and sceptical approach to foreign 
policy, especially on interventions which fall outside the UK’s national self-interest is 
thus the conceptualisation used to refer to the conservative tradition throughout this 
thesis. An analysis of the Conservative tradition in UK foreign policy requires nuance 
because firstly, the conservative tradition was based on an active engagement with the 
world in the post-war era (Beech, 2011, p.357), and second, it is not an outright rejection 
of international interventions, but rather being cautious about actions which are not 
perceived by policymakers as being in the immediate national interest of the UK, such as 
protecting national security (Dodds and Elden, 2008, pp.348-349).  
Whilst the Major government eventually acted in Bosnia, its approach in the lead 
up to action received notable attention in literature on UK foreign policy (Simms, 2002; 
Dodds and Elden, 2008; Beech, 2011; Beech and Oliver, 2014; Daddow and Schnapper, 
2013; Gaskarth, 2013; Peltner, 2017). For instance, the UK’s response to Bosnia was seen 
as “one example of Conservative government hesitance (alongside other European 
governments) with regard to providing a more robust form of humanitarian intervention” 
(Dodds and Elden, 2008, p.349). Simms (2002) goes further in arguing that “political 
leaders became afflicted by a particularly disabling form of conservative pessimism” 
regarding a military response to Bosnia. Although the Major governments response is 
strongly called into question on Bosnia, there was not consensus on this approach with 




However, as the next sections in this chapter argue, the New Labour government 
sought to break away from the UK’s response to Bosnia and Rwanda and recast the UK’s 
foreign policy on human protection, which more broadly entailed a significant shift from 
traditional conservatism. Following the UK’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, Cook 
(2000b) argued that “if our predecessors in Government had acted as decisively to stop 
him [Milosevic] in the past decade then we would have never seen the tragedy of 
Kosovo”. Cook’s perspective captures the nature of changes that occurred in UK foreign 
policy rhetoric under the New Labour government on human protection, which was 
characterised first and foremost by distancing themselves from previous Conservative 
foreign policy traditions.  
Internationally, the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia generated significant scrutiny 
over the relationship between sovereignty and human protection (Peltner, 2017). The UN 
and its Member States debated sovereignty and protection in earnest leading to the 
eventual creation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS, 2001, p.8) and its adoption of “sovereignty as responsibility” as earlier coined by 
Deng et al. (1996) and Cohen (Cohen, 1991 quoted in Cohen and Deng, 2016, p.80). 
Domestic changes and their impact on UK foreign policy, alongside this emerging 
international debate on the relationship between sovereignty and responsibility, are thus 
essential to understanding the changes that occurred in the UK’s commitment to human 
protection under the New Labour government (1997-2020) and form the basis of the 
remainder of this chapter.  
 
4.2 New Labour’s liberal internationalist foreign policy, 1997 
Following its 1997 election victory, the New Labour government immediately set to work 
on establishing its vision for the UK’s place in the world (McCourt, 2011, p.36). In one 
of his earliest foreign policy addresses as Prime Minister, Tony Blair dismissed an 
isolationist approach to international relations in favour of “a Britain confident of its place 
in the world, sure of itself, able to negotiate with the world and provide leadership in the 
world” (Blair, 1997 quoted in McCourt, 2011). Whilst Blair made no explicit reference 
to the UK’s post-war relative international decline, it was this emphasis on rejecting 
isolationism which came closest to acknowledging that the UK needed to maintain an 
active and influential place in the world. Instead, New Labour wanted to make “British 
presence in the world felt” (Blair, 1999b). Blair (2000) acknowledged that “there is a new 
world order like it or not, and we need to decide our place in it”.  
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An essential part of this conception of a new world order is the role and 
importance of globalisation (Atkins, 2013, p.179). Globalisation broadly refers to “a 
process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization 
of social relations and transactions…generating transcontinental or interregional flows 
and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power” (Held et al., 1999, p.16). 
Globalisation therefore draws attention to the global nature of relations between states 
and non-state actors and the role of cross-cutting issues which are no longer necessarily 
confined to the borders of one state. This perspective on globalisation is captured in 
Blair’s (1999a) doctrine of the international community in which he suggests that 
globalisation is not merely “just economic – it is also a political and security 
phenomenon” and because “problems become global….so the search for solutions 
becomes global too”. This interpretation is important because globalisation is not only 
seen as significant, but is also perceived as giving way to fundamental challenges in terms 
of what Blair (1999a) defined as global problems in which previous domestic issues 
become global in nature. 
As part of Blair’s vision for the UK’s role in this new world order, he identified 
the UK’s place in this world as a “pivotal power” (Blair, 1999 quoted in BBC, 1999; 
Blair, 2000). According to Blair, the UK should “use the strengths of our history to build 
our future not as a superpower but as a pivotal power, as a power that is at the crux of the 
alliances and international politics which shape the world and its future” (Blair, 1999 
quoted in BBC, 1999, emphasis added). This quote accepts that the UK no longer has the 
power status it once did, which hints at the UK’s post-war decline, but also the importance 
of building and maintaining strong alliances in a new globalisation world order. A pivotal 
power thus suggests that the UK remains a fundamental international actor able to draw 
on alliances and institutions of the post-war US-led international order (Blair, 1999 in 
BBC, 1999). An essential part of this pivotal power role was internationalism with Blair 
(1999a) declaring that “we are all internationalists now”.  
Internationalism has historically been a foundational principle of the Labour 
Party’s foreign policy (Vickers, 2004a, p.193; Atkins, 2013, p.176). At its most basic, it 
“is the desire to transcend national boundaries in order to find solutions to international 
issues” (Vickers, 2004a, p.193). This definition shows that internationalism is broad and 
accompanied by various strands (Atkins, 2013, pp.176-177). New Labour in particular 
appealed to “a form of liberal internationalism that states should work in the international 
interest as well as the national interest” (Kitchen and Vickers, 2013, p.300). This approach 
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accepts the liberal idea of an anarchical international system in which cooperation 
between states is possible (Vickers, 2004a, p.194), and essential, due to globalisation. For 
example, Cook (1999) suggested that New Labour “recognise [that] globalisation 
demands a new internationalism. And our internationalism recognises that we cannot 
deliver our domestic programme working alone in the world”. As a result, Blair (2000) 
suggested that “it is necessary to make the case for engagement not isolation as the basis 
of British foreign policy in the 21st Century”.  
Of particular relevance for this chapter is New Labour’s commitment to liberal 
internationalism. The immediate difficulty with liberal internationalism is that it has 
lacked development in both theory and practice (Dunne and McDonald, 2013, p.7). The 
essence of liberal internationalism is that “democracy and human rights should be 
reflected externally and pursued in relations with other states” (Vickers, 2004a, p.194). 
Similarly, Ralph (2014, p.5) conceptualises liberal internationalism as an approach to 
foreign policy which “accepts the universal applicability of substantive liberal values, 
such as human rights protection and democracy promotion, and also transposes the 
procedural norms of democratic deliberation to the international level”. This thesis 
therefore adopts the conceptualisations of liberal internationalism according to Vickers 
(2004a) and Ralph (2014) as this captures the core themes of New Labour’s foreign policy 
commitment to human protection as addressed throughout this chapter, especially human 
rights and humanitarian intervention.  
Underlying this stance on democracy and human rights protection is that the UK 
must “demonstrate moral leadership” in the pursuit of these international interests 
(Kitchen and Vickers, 2013). For Cook (1999), New Labour’s “internationalism 
recognises that rights belong to the people not to their governments. We ignored 
Milosevic when he tried to tell us that atrocities were an internal matter. Gross breaches 
of humanitarian law are the business of all humanity”. In drawing on the humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo as an example (see section 4.2.4), Cook supported New Labour’s 
liberal internationalist stance of moral leadership and a conviction to protect populations 
from atrocity crimes. What emerged from this perspective was a change in the UK’s 
orientation based on a commitment to “advance liberal ideas about human rights, 
democracy and good governance” (Gaskarth, 2014, p.577). It is this liberal 
internationalist engagement with human rights that forms the basis of the UK’s 




However, as this chapter will show, liberal internationalism may expose 
fundamental disagreements among policymakers in the Labour Party. According to 
Kitchen and Vickers (2013, p.304), there is a tension in Labour’s traditional 
internationalism regarding the issue of militarism and whether to use force against another 
sovereign state. In turn, they suggest that Blair’s doctrine of the international community 
can be seen as “a new iteration in the tradition of the wing of the party most comfortable 
with the use of force” (Kitchen and Vickers, 2013, p.304). As such, the election of New 
Labour did not bring an end to this debate between militarism and anti-militarism, but 
rather shifted the focus of the government more in the direction of the former. In 
particular, Atkins (2013, p.188) finds that “Blair and his supporters rejected the formal 
multilateralism traditionally associated with internationalism in favour of a more ad hoc 
approach, while maintaining a commitment to strong international organisations”. The 
difference between these two primary strands of Labour’s internationalist tradition may 
thus lead to differences in the perspective of policymakers on foreign interventions, an 
issue which is returned to later in this chapter in the discussion of the Iraq intervention.  
Any explanation of New Labour’s appeal to liberal internationalism on human 
protection is incomplete without an appreciation of the broader context of international 
relations at the time. This is because the sources of liberal internationalism extend well 
beyond the UK and have deep historical roots in the post-war period (Ikenberry, 2009). 
The most relevant of these is the second form of internationalism outlined by Ikenberry 
(2009, p.71) based on the post-1945 liberal hegemony of the US. Part of this form of 
internationalism is an “unfolding human rights and responsibility to protect revolution” 
(Ikenberry, 2009, p.79). It is this context where New Labour’s commitment to human 
protection in a liberal internationalist foreign policy is most evident, and thus, is the 
crucial starting point for analysing sustained changes in UK rhetoric and action on human 
protection. For this reason, the remaining focus of this chapter is on New Labour’s 
leadership and commitment to human protection in a liberal internationalist foreign policy 
through a focus on the ethical dimension, the prioritisation of human rights, Blair’s 
doctrine of the international community and the UK’s commitment to human protection 
in Kosovo (1999) and Sierra Leone (2000).  
 
4.2.1 The ethical dimension  
Robin Cook’s (1997) assertion that UK “foreign policy must have an ethical dimension” 
is one of the most recognisable aspects of New Labour’s early foreign policy. While 
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vague on the articulation of the ethical dimension in action, at a rhetorical level it was a 
noticeable attempt to distance New Labour’s foreign policy from that of its Conservative 
predecessors (Williams, 2002, pp.54-55; Honeyman, 2017, p.46). Whilst broader ethical 
considerations in foreign policy did not simply begin with the Labour Party post-1997, 
Cook’s introduction of the ethical dimension does bring attention to the idea that their 
predecessors did not attach as much significance to ethics as they might have done. 
According to Wheeler and Dunne (1998, p.850), New Labour’s ethical dimension 
displayed elements of a “marked shift in the content and conduct of British foreign 
policy”. Although this assessment was written during the very early stages of the ethical 
dimension, Wheeler and Dunne (1998) capture the surprise announcement that a New 
Labour government intended to incorporate an ethical aspect into their foreign policy.  
Whilst the influence of the ethical dimension on changes in UK foreign policy is 
disputed (Chandler, 2003), it did open more rhetorical space for ethical considerations in 
foreign policy (Williams, 2002, p.63). Alongside this, the ethical dimension was one 
important means of evidencing the UK’s commitment to human protection (Mumford and 
Selck, 2010, p.295). In particular, it captured the moralism in New Labour’s commitment 
to liberal internationalism, especially the interconnection of the domestic and 
international interest (Atkins, 2014, p.182). The ambiguity which surrounded the ethical 
dimension does imply a lack of understanding on the complexity of what it meant for UK 
foreign policy, but that said, it signalled Robin Cook’s intent as Foreign Secretary to 
implement New Labour’s stated commitment to a liberal internationalist foreign policy 
in which human protection concerns would form a central pillar.  
Yet a downfall of the ethical dimension from the beginning was the lack of clarity 
in its message. Immediately, the ethical dimension was confused with an ethical foreign 
policy, with the latter becoming the means of judging New Labour’s approach (Williams, 
2002, p.57; Vickers, 2011, p.164). Vickers (2011, p.164) argues that this 
misinterpretation had consequences since it heightened “expectations for change” and 
provided a means to wrongly evaluate and critique New Labour’s foreign policy, which 
was “much to Blair’s annoyance” in identifying a potential weakness in his government’s 
foreign policy. An example of this misinterpretation of the ethical dimension was what 
Wheeler and Dunne (2004, p.17) term the “arms trade/ethical foreign policy dilemma”. 
What was now interpreted as an ethical foreign policy was under attack for the failure to 
withdraw arms licenses granted under the Major government (Vickers, 2011, p.166). The 
dilemma for the New Labour government was that the ethical dimension was announced 
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at a time when the value of the UK arms industry was substantial at around £5 billion per 
year in 2000 (Wickham-Jones, 2000, p.10). This apparent commitment to the 
continuation of granting arms licenses was thus seen as unethical (Cooper, 2000), as well 
as evidencing the “organized hypocrisy” of the commitment to ethics in foreign policy 
whilst still selling arms (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010).  
Whilst Cook attempted to address these criticisms through legislation such as the 
Export Control Act 2002, it is argued that two years earlier, “the UK had reverted to being 
a major exporter of weapons to autocracies” (de Moraes, 2018, p.494). With the ethical 
dimension at least, the attempts to translate the government’s rhetoric fell flat in action 
where New Labour largely continued the trajectory of their predecessors on trading in 
arms (Williams, 2004, p.921). On arms licenses, the ethical dimension revealed a 
contradiction in the relationship between the national and international interest in a liberal 
internationalist foreign policy. It created a potential trade-off between promoting the 
ethical dimension of its foreign policy and promoting its domestic interests with regards 
to protecting jobs and economic prosperity. For example, the UK was criticised for shying 
away from China’s human rights record during talks thereby raising questions about 
whether “the government’s ethical dimension was subordinate to commercial concerns” 
(Wickham-Jones, 2000, p.25). China is not an isolated case, with arms sales to several 
other countries continuing during New Labour’s time in office, including with Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Sri Lanka (Smith and Light, 2001, p.2; 
Vickers, 2004b, p.259). Indonesia in particular revealed a critical flaw between New 
Labour’s rhetorical commitment to an ethical dimension by continuing to sell arms to 
Indonesia during the conflict in East Timor (Dunne and Wheeler, 2001, p.175; Wheeler 
and Dunne, 2004, p.17). These limitations raise questions about whether a pursuit of an 
ethical dimension is possible due to systematic constraints deeply entrenched in UK 
foreign policy, such as the primary pursuit of political and economy interests in relations 
with other states. The ethical dimension thus arguably formed “a new global idealpolitik” 
(Heins, 2007, p.52, emphasis in original) in which the ethical dimension might appear 
well-intentioned rhetorically, but with serious limitations in action.  
 
4.2.2 Prioritising human rights in UK foreign policy  
A much less controversial aspect of New Labour’s liberal internationalism was its 
commitment to human rights. This is because human rights in foreign and domestic policy 
existed well before New Labour. However, human rights received much more significant 
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foreign policy attention under the guidance of Robin Cook (Vickers, 2011, p.164). In his 
foreign policy mission statement as Foreign Secretary, Cook (1997) outlined his intention 
to “put human rights at the heart of our [New Labour] foreign policy”. This commitment 
to human rights gradually became a core element of New Labour’s liberal internationalist 
approach of combining the national and the international interest on human protection. 
Cook (1999) openly dismissed the idea “that human rights in other countries is none of 
our business”. Rather, he argued “robustly that British national interests are promoted, 
not hindered, by a commitment to human rights” (Cook, 2002). Three years after his 
mission statement, Cook (2000b) reflected that the New Labour government had “put 
human rights at the heart of our foreign policy”. According to Gaskarth (2006, p.51) 
Cook’s emphasis on the centrality of human rights “really can be seen as a major change 
in the rhetoric of foreign policy”. Throughout Cook’s tenure as Foreign Secretary, he 
devoted consistent attention to the primacy of human rights, which was not substituted at 
the expense of other liberal internationalist principles such as democracy and therefore 
helped to galvanise the idea that human rights were a significant concern of a New Labour 
foreign policy (Gaskarth, 2006, p.52-55).  
 Cook’s strong rhetorical commitment to human rights had important implications 
for a more specific focus on human protection from mass atrocity crimes. Writing on the 
role of human rights in foreign policy, Cook (2002, p.50) argued that “no one can claim 
any longer that massive violations of humanitarian law or crimes against humanity are 
solely an internal matter”. Whilst acknowledging the “real dilemma for an organisation 
created to protect national sovereignty”, Cook (2002, p.51) argued that the UN cannot 
simply stand back and allow mass atrocities to occur. This underlined his conviction that 
“it is far better to prevent genocide than to punish the perpetrators after the grisly evidence 
and mass graves are discovered” (Cook, 2000a). As evidenced later in this chapter shows, 
these ideas were translated through the UK’s interventions in Kosovo (1999) and Sierra 
Leone (2000), which demonstrated New Labour’s commitment to turn its rhetoric on 
human protection into tangible action. This rhetorical commitment to human rights under 
Cook was further entrenched through its contribution to international justice by 
supporting the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was another 
central pillar of bringing those committing mass atrocities to account (Cook in UN 





4.2.3 The Blair doctrine of a liberal internationalist foreign policy   
The clearest illustration of New Labour’s rhetorical commitment to human protection was 
Tony Blair’s doctrine of the international community. Blair’s articulation of the doctrine, 
which coincided with the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, was crucial for outlining his 
“view of the world and the role that Britain should play within it” (Vickers, 2011, p.168). 
It was “a manifesto for a proactive, muscular approach to international politics” (Dyson, 
2009, p.61) based on UK leadership. According to Blair, the world was transitioning 
towards globalisation, which gave rise to new challenges and responsibilities for the 
international community (Blair, 1999a). It was Blair’s conviction that foreign policy in 
this new globalised world order can incorporate both a national and international interest 
underpinned by an appeal to protecting liberal values including human rights (Blair, 
1999a).  
In order to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes, Blair defended a notion 
of humanitarian intervention into other sovereign states since “acts of genocide can never 
be a purely internal matter” (Blair, 1999a). Blair was attempting to reframe international 
debates on state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention by outlining the broader 
responsibility of the international community not to simply stand by when faced with 
genocide. Later reflecting on the doctrine, Blair argued that it “sought to justify 
intervention, including if necessary military intervention, not only when a nation’s 
interests are directly engaged; but also where there exists humanitarian crisis or gross 
oppression of a civilian population” (Blair, 2009, p.5). This supports the liberal 
internationalist defence of the projection of domestic human rights on to the international 
stage and the morality of foreign policy (Kitchen and Vickers, 2013, p.304), in addition 
to the idea that the UK is potentially willing to forgo its immediate interests and protect 
populations threatened by atrocity crimes (Blair, 2011, p.248). This perspective on the 
relationship between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention marked the beginning of 
a significant period of sustained change that occurred in the UK’s commitment to human 
protection in rhetoric and action from 1999-2020, which was influenced by changes in 
both domestic politics and on the international stage more broadly following the crises in 
Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo.  
 
4.2.4 Rhetoric and action on human protection in Kosovo, 1999 
The 1999 humanitarian crisis in Kosovo was the first time Tony Blair’s liberal 
internationalist stance on human protection was articulated in action. Prior to the North 
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Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the New Labour 
government constructed a clear rhetorical case for humanitarian intervention. Speaking at 
the UN General Assembly, Blair outlined the imperative of humanitarian support for 
refugees in Kosovo to thwart an anticipated “humanitarian disaster” (UN General 
Assembly, 1998, p.30). In condemning alleged atrocities in Kosovo, Cook subsequently 
argued that this “should be of concern to all members of humanity” (Hansard HC Deb., 
19 October 1998). From the outset, Cook was attempting to identify the international 
community’s clear responsibility to prevent mass atrocity crimes in Kosovo through 
drawing on a moral appeal to common humanity.  
The failure to prevent an escalation of the mass atrocities in Kosovo led to a more 
assertive stance from the UK. In highlighting “ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, and mass 
murder” in Kosovo (Blair, 1999b), Tony Blair began the process of attempting to persuade 
the international community to intervene in Kosovo on the grounds of human protection. 
In his doctrine of the international community speech, Blair argued that Kosovo was “a 
just war, based not on territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic 
cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed” (Blair, 1999a). Similarly, Blair 
justified the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo as being “for the sake of humanity and for 
the sake of the future safety of our region and the world” (Blair, 1999b). He further argued 
that “the murder, rape and terror that he [Milosevic] has visited on innocent people – 
provides ample justification for military action” (Hansard HC Deb., 13 April 1999).  
Blair and Cook were thus adamant throughout in justifying UK foreign policy in 
Kosovo as legitimate based on claims for human protection from ethnic cleansing 
(Hansard HC Deb., 26 May 1999; Hansard HC Deb., 18 January 1999; Hansard HC Deb., 
19 April 1999; Hansard HC Deb., 8 October 2001; Bair, 2011, p.228). By constructing a 
rhetorical case for intervention on the basis of humanitarian concerns and common 
humanity, Blair again revealed his liberal internationalist belief that national interests 
could be reconciled with an international interest in upholding liberal values, including 
human protection. Significantly, Blair identified an explicit relationship between 
protecting populations from mass violence, and at the same time, protecting the future 
security and stability of Europe. It is through this relationship that the national and 
international interest in Blair’s liberal internationalist approach to human protection is 
most evident.  
Blair’s belief in the connection between the UK’s national interests and the 
international interest was also central to the government’s rhetoric in the aftermath of 
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NATO’s airstrikes in Kosovo (Hansard HC Deb., 24 March 1999). On a visit to Kosovo, 
Blair (1999c) argued that NATO “fought this conflict for a cause and that cause was 
justice”. Cook argued that the UK and NATO “were left with no other way of preventing 
the…humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe” (Hansard HC Deb., 25 March 
1999). According to Cook (1999), “what prompted us to intervene…was our values - 
freedom, justice, compassion - basic human decency”. Drawing on a similar concern for 
the UK’s humanitarian values was Blair’s view that “ours is a battle to protect and 
strengthen the values and freedoms we hold most dear. On our doorstep no civilised 
country could stand by and watch such brutality without acting” (Blair, 1999d). In Blair 
and Cook’s justifications for the UK’s contribution to the NATO-led intervention in 
Kosovo, there is a sustained rhetorical commitment to implement fundamental liberal 
internationalist principles in action, especially on human protection from mass atrocity 
crimes. Both the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary thus appealed to the core values in 
Ikenberry’s (2009) second form internationalism in the post-war era with regards to the 
fundamental protection of human rights.  
However, New Labour’s approach to Kosovo revealed a serious tension within 
liberal internationalism on the use of force in another sovereign territory (Dunne and 
Wheeler, 2001, pp.176-177). According to the UK’s permanent representative to the UN, 
Sir Greenstock,  
 
“The action being taken is legal. It is justified as an exceptional measure to 
prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe…Every means short of 
force has been tried to avert this situation. In these circumstances, and as an 
exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, 
military intervention is legally justifiable.” (UN Security Council, 1999, 
p.12) 
 
The UK’s legal stance was contrary to the prevailing opinion that the NATO-led 
intervention was illegal without the appropriate consent of international law (The 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p.4). The UK’s position 
reflected the notion that “UN Security Council authorization, while desirable, is not 
necessary for the collective use of force for so-called humanitarian intervention” 
(Williams, 2004, p.926). The UK’s commitment to what was viewed by the Independent 
Kosovo Commission as an illegal intervention was the hallmark of this emerging appeal 
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to humanitarian intervention as a proposed legal basis for action in UK foreign policy. 
This is because “when faced with a choice between strict adherence to legal rules or 
breaking them to protect human rights, they [the New Labour government] opted for the 
latter” (Wheeler and Owen, 2007, pp.96-97).  
 This position was reinforced by Robin Cook’s guiding humanitarian intervention 
speech, which outlined the importance of preventing atrocity crimes, while setting out 
“the conceptual and legal basis for intervention” (Cook, 2000a). Cook outlined six 
principles to guide future humanitarian interventions, including: (1) an immediate 
emphasis on prevention (2) force as a “last resort”; (3) the primary responsibility of a state 
to protect its people; (4) the responsibility of the international community to prevent mass 
atrocities; (5) using proportionate force; and (6) that such force should be conducted by a 
coalition of actors (Cook, 2000a). 
Yet, the UK’s position on humanitarian intervention shows a more fundamental 
clash between the core features of adopting a liberal internationalist stance, in particular, 
the relationship between protecting human rights and upholding the rule of law (Ralph, 
2014b, pp.3-4). Upholding the rule of law logically means respecting international law, 
but in the case of Kosovo, countries such as the UK argued strongly in favour of 
humanitarian intervention even at the expense of being granted the necessary legal 
permission. Although Sir Greenstock attempted to frame the intervention as legal, the UK 
was, and remains, very much in the minority in this regard.
14
 The UK’s stance on Kosovo 
therefore revealed a significant dilemma “of how to balance the norms articulated in the 
UN Charter with the defence and promotion of substantive liberal values” (Ralph, 2014b, 
p.9). This thesis argues that Kosovo is the beginning of a sustained change in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in rhetoric and action that has been fundamentally 
shaped through this commitment to humanitarian intervention. The clear tension in the 
relationship between the core values of the UK’s liberal internationalist approach have 
persisted throughout successive governments, which have continued to appeal to 
humanitarian intervention as a legal basis for action, despite the lack of evidence and legal 
consensus that a customary international law of humanitarian intervention exists 




14  The UK’s legal position on humanitarian intervention is further discussed in chapters 5 and 6.  
15  See chapters 5 and 6 for a detailed analysis of the Conservative-led coalition government’s 
use of humanitarian intervention to justify intervention in Syria in both 2013 and 2018.  
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The UK’s commitment to human protection in both rhetoric and action in Kosovo 
represented a striking departure from the previous foreign policy stance under the 
Conservative government and Labour opposition Party on Rwanda and Bosnia. Cook 
(2000b) was well aware of this in outlining his “regret…that the last Tory government 
wasted years in Bosnia refusing to stand up to ethnic cleansing”; and that “if our 
predecessors in Government had acted as decisively to stop him in the past decade then 
we would never have seen the tragedy of Kosovo” (Cook, 1999). Cook was attempting to 
create clear ground between the old Conservative and Labour governments and New 
Labour on foreign policy. Similarly, Blair acknowledged that “there were many who said 
we should stand aside, that we shouldn’t get involved in other people’s quarrels”, but that 
he was “in no doubt that had we not taken the action we did in the spring of last year, 
Milosevic would still be there and we would be faced with mounting instability in South 
Eastern Europe” (Blair, 2000).  
With the crisis in Kosovo having roots long before New Labour’s election, Blair 
and Cook evidenced the significance of learning in foreign policy change (Levy, 1994; 
Stein, 1994). Whilst appreciating the broader complexity of the crisis in Kosovo, in 
condemning the previous government’s approach to Bosnia, Blair and Cook arguably 
attempted to redress this through humanitarian intervention. For instance,  
 
“Blair felt that the situation in Kosovo carried the potential to spiral into one 
comparable with Bosnia in the mid-1990s, and the lesson he took from that 
war…was that the humanitarian intervention had been well intentioned but 
inadequate, and should have been supported by greater military weight.” 
(Phythian, 2007, p.120) 
 
The historical context of UK foreign policy and international relations is thus significant 
for analysing sustained UK foreign policy change on human protection. This thesis argues 
that the New Labour government entering office in 1997 was the beginning of a sustained 
rhetorical shift in the UK’s commitment to human protection. As discussed earlier, the 
New Labour government articulated a new direction for the UK’s place in a globalised 
world based a liberal internationalist commitment to human rights protection. For Peltner 
(2017, p.746), New Labour’s rise to power presented a “domestic push factor” in UK 
foreign policy change. As Prime Minister, Tony Blair set to work in articulating his belief 
in the UK’s credentials for international leadership on human protection. This conviction 
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for UK leadership was evident from the fact that he was the only leader “pushing 
forcefully for an invasion of Kosovo to halt Serbian ethnic cleansing operations” among 
NATO members (Dyson, 2009, p.47). This includes “serious and sustained lobbying” of 
the US President Bill Clinton who was initially reluctant to engage militarily in Kosovo 
(Dyson, 2009, p.51). This in turn hampered Blair’s aspirations for action given the role of 
the US as a major military power and the hegemon of the liberal international order 
(McCourt, 2013, pp.255-259). Although it is difficult to isolate the main trigger of the 
NATO-led intervention, the scholarship shows that Blair did have some influence on the 
process of foreign policy change towards human protection in Kosovo.  
That said, no analysis of sustained change in the UK’s commitment to human 
protection is complete without understanding the broader international context which 
influenced the UK’s position and response to Kosovo. According to McCourt (2013, 
pp.249-250), the international response to Kosovo was influenced by a change that had 
occurred following the decision from the US to lead during the response to Bosnia in 1995. 
The US as the hegemon of the post-1945 liberal world order was thus crucial element of 
the UK’s support for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. McCourt (2013, p.258) argues 
that Atlanticism was especially significant for action without UN Security Council 
authorisation given US leadership of international order. This goes someway to explaining 
why Blair had to place considerable effort into persuading President Clinton of the case 
for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in order for the NATO-led intervention to 
happen. Despite this, it is acknowledged that Blair was not simply acting as a mouthpiece 
of the US on Kosovo and that his “commitment to the NATO campaign was genuine and 
not forced upon him from Washington” (McCourt, 2013, p.259). 
The UK’s contribution to the intervention in Kosovo was thus one significant 
illustration of the willingness to match a rhetorical commitment to human protection with 
tangible action. It evidenced the UK’s willingness to engage in an intervention even at the 
expense of the appropriate legal channels of international law. There was some debate 
over whether the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo received “implicit authorisation”, 
particularly in the aftermath of the intervention (Simma, 1999; The Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p.173). As noted earlier in this section, the 
NATO-led intervention in Kosovo was not granted explicit authorisation from the UN 
Security Council through a Chapter VII resolution, with the subsequent action then 
drawing attention to whether the authorisation was a more implicit one. However, it has 
been argued that “to endow the NATO campaign with an aura of legality on the basis of 
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“implicit” authorization to use force by the UNSC seems an undesirable precedent” (The 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p.173). This is especially 
because the implicit authorisation argument may work to reinforce the use of the UN 
Security Council’s veto powers if states become concerned that any form of authorisation 
may lead to “expensive subsequent interpretations” of UN Security Council resolutions 
(The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000, p.173).  
Beyond debates on legal authorisation, the UK’s approach to Kosovo embodied a 
liberal internationalist commitment to the fusion of the national and international interest 
in order to protect human rights (Vickers, 2011, p.168). For Blair 
 
“Kosovo marked a shift in his thinking. His doctrine of the international 
community heralded a liberal internationalist approach which saw Britain as 
a leading player in an international community that had common interests 
and values and which required intervention and engagement. This was a 
more ambitious view of Britain's role in the world, and of Blair's role as a 
global statesman.” (Vickers, 2011, p.180) 
 
The intervention in Kosovo was therefore closely tied with Blair’s vision for the UK’s 
liberal internationalist place in the world, where the UK would seek to protect liberal 
values. The outcome of this approach was the emergence of an international commitment 
to humanitarian intervention, and the UK’s belief that there was a customary law of 
humanitarian intervention in the event that conventional legal channels, such as the UN 
Security Council, were blocked. This commitment to humanitarian intervention is 
recurrent theme throughout this thesis and illustrates a sustained change because of the 
way it has continued to influence the foreign policy of successive governments on human 
protection crises. 
 
4.2.5 Rhetoric and action on human protection in Sierra Leone, 2000 
Following the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) attempts to seize power from 
President Ahmad Kabbah in 2000 (Fanthorpe, 2003, p.53), the UK was faced with the 
prospect of a military intervention in its former colony of Sierra Leone. With suggestions 
that Freetown was about to fall to RUF rebels, the UK deployed approximately 700 troops 
and military support with the immediate aim of protecting UK nationals (Kampfner, 2003, 
p.70). After fulfilling this objective, the Blair government decided that UK troops would 
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remain in Sierra Leone to try and stabilise the country in order to reinstall the government, 
which included instances of directly countering the RUF by force (Kampfner, 2003, p.71). 
This is despite arguments that the UK had no real immediate strategic interests in Sierra 
Leone (Williams, 2001, p.154; Pickering, 2009, p.23). 
A primary justification for the UK’s intervention in Sierra Leone beyond the 
protection of its nationals was humanitarianism based on evidence of civilian atrocities 
committed by the RUF (Fanthrope, 2003, p.53). For Williams (2001, p.155), an important 
motivation for the UK’s intervention was therefore “the humanitarian impulse to ‘do 
something’”. This includes implementing Robin Cook’s ethical dimension on the basis 
of the atrocities being committed against civilians (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2001, 
p.252; Seldon, 2008; Harris, 2013, p.109). Reflecting these arguments, Cook (2000) 
suggested that the UK intervened in Sierra Leone “out of simple human decency”. 
Similarly, Blair (2000) argued that the UK should “do what we can to save African 
nationals from barbarism and dictatorship and be proud of it”. Commenting on the 
intervention six years later, Blair underlined Sierra Leone as an example of an “effective 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes” (Hansard HC Deb., 28 November 2006). 
In the backdrop of the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo a year earlier, the UK’s action 
in Sierra Leone had “confirmed the UK’s willingness to assume responsibility to 
intervene militarily for humanitarian reasons” (Coates and Krieger, 2004, p.153). The 
UK’s intervention was therefore interpreted as being consistent with Tony Blair’s 
doctrine of the international community with regards to protecting populations from mass 
atrocity crimes (Porteous, 2005; Dorman, 2009). This humanitarian argument is 
particularly persuasive considering the UK’s willingness to deploy hundreds of troops 
and engaging with the RUF in order to maintain stability in Freetown (Kampfner, 2003, 
p.71).  
Yet, there is some caution in relying on humanitarian factors as the only 
explanation for the UK’s intervention in Sierra Leone (Kargbo, 2006, p.304). Alongside 
humanitarian concerns, Kampfner (2003, p.349) identifies the UK’s “colonial burden” to 
intervene to protect its former colony. Others point to the UK’s aspirations to retain 
broader political influence in sub-Saharan Africa, where Sierra Leone is deemed “a pawn 
in the historic Franco-British rivalry” on the basis that France at the time was seeking to 
“spread their influence in diamond-rich Sierra Leone” (Shaw, 2010, p.278). The 
plausibility of these two motivations are questionable, since the UK could have chosen to 
intervene militarily years earlier, such as when President Kabbah was overthrown in 
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1997. The third alternative motivation for the UK’s intervention was resorting UN 
credibility in peacekeeping (Ero, 2001, p.56; Williams, 2001). Sierra Leone revealed the 
challenges facing UN peacekeeping on the back of Bosnia and Rwanda (Ero, 2001; 
Connaughton, 2002, p.84; Pickering, 2009, p.28). This motive is persuasive since the UN 
mission was struggling prior to the UK’s involvement in Sierra Leone (Kampfner, 2003, 
p.69).  
Although the UK’s intervention in Sierra Leone was not exclusively about ethics 
and humanitarian concerns alone, it formed a core element of the UK’s justification for 
its intervention. While Cook (2000a) and Blair’s (2000) humanitarian justifications for 
action drew on very simplistic narratives of the UK as a saviour, the underlying 
commitment to liberal internationalism in New Labour’s foreign policy is evident in 
Sierra Leone. Again, Cook and Blair made the interconnection between the national and 
international interest to argue that the intervention in Sierra Leone is about upholding the 
UK’s liberal principles of human rights protection and democracy, with the UK taking a 
leadership role through its military intervention.  
 
4.2.6 International development 
The final pillar of New Labour’s liberal internationalist commitment and leadership on 
human protection was its contribution to international development through ODA. The 
government’s 1997 White Paper on International Development incorporated its 
commitment to protecting human rights, which were deemed important for its approach 
to international development (HM Government, 1997, p.70). Whilst greeted with initial 
scepticism about the longevity and motivations of the while paper (White, 1998, p.158), 
the New Labour government underlined its commitment to ODA through the creation of 
the new Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997 as well as significant 
budgetary support to demonstrate its rhetorical commitment in action (Honeyman, 2009, 
p.91). According to Vickers (2011, p.179), the New Labour government showed its 
commitment to international development through its leadership role on “dealing with 
poverty, debt, humanitarian crises and conflict prevention”. The New Labour government 
skilfully recognised the interconnection between the morality of ODA contributions and 
the UK’s national interest on the basis that “many of the world’s biggest challenges…are 
caused or exacerbated by global poverty and inequality” (The Labour Party, 2001, p.40). 




 Although the government is less explicit on the humanitarian impact of 
international development, the emphasis on poverty reduction and preventing conflict are 
integral to stability and preventing future outbreaks of mass violence and atrocity crimes. 
According to the UN framework of analysis for atrocity crimes, one risk factor of atrocity 
crimes is “economic instability caused by acute poverty” (United Nations, 2014, p.10). 
Even though it is important to acknowledge the complexity of poverty reduction, by 
aiming to reduce poverty through contributions to international development, the UK is 
also contributing to reducing the risk of future mass atrocity crimes. The UK’s approach 
to international development is thus another way New Labour established the foundations 
for a broader commitment to human protection in rhetoric and action, which has remained 
part of the foreign policy of successive governments.  
 
4.3 Liberal internationalism and the Iraq war, 2001-2005 
Robin Cook’s replacement as Foreign Secretary following New Labour’s 2001 election 
victory marked the disappearance of the ethical dimension from UK foreign policy 
rhetoric. Although this “did not suddenly render UK foreign policy an ethics-free zone” 
(Williams, 2005, p.31), there is a sense that the ethical dimension was Cook’s rather than 
Blair’s policy (Vickers, 2011, p.164). Blair was much more concerned with promoting 
his doctrine of the international community as part of his liberal internationalist foreign 
policy. The appointment of Jack Straw as Robin Cook’s replacement as Foreign Secretary 
heralded a return back to Blair’s attempts to define the UK’s place as an important 
international actor (Williams, 2002, p.54). Rhetorically, Straw removed any reference to 
the ethical dimension, but the liberal internationalist underpinnings of UK foreign policy 
were still present on the basis that “our party’s commitment to internationalism means we 
are best placed to confront the challenges of our complex, interdependent world” (Straw, 
2003).  
The New Labour government also continued to connect the national and 
international interest since “it is a guiding principle of UK foreign policy that to promote 
our national interests and values we need to be active and engaged around the world” 
(FCO, 2003b, p.1). Blair (2002) for instance intended to “advocate an enlightened self-
interest that puts fighting for our values right at the heart of the policies necessary to 
protect our nations”. New Labour’s foreign policy post-2000 thus retained its focus on 
the promotion and protection of international human rights. The government’s vision for 
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the connection between the national and international interest on human rights was 
captured by its 2003 annual report on human rights which suggested that  
 
“The UK Government’s view is that the promotion and protection of human 
rights is both self-evidently morally right and firmly in our national interest. 
There is an increasingly clear link between respect for human rights, the rule 
of law and democratic norms on the one hand, and stability, prosperity and 
progress on the other.” (FCO, 2003a, p.15) 
 
This extract is significant in identifying New Labour’s conception that human rights, the 
rule of law, and democracy are fundamentally interconnected in its foreign policy. It is 
also notable that human rights are no longer given the individual primacy they received 
under Cook, which at the time, was perceived as an important indicator of the Foreign 
Secretary’s rhetorical commitment to human rights (Gaskarth, 2006, p.51). That said, 
human rights were still given a greater profile under New Labour since 1997 (Gaskarth, 
2006, p.55).    
 The government’s commitment to humanitarian intervention is one aspect of 
human protection which has been consistent with a sustained change in UK foreign policy 
rhetoric and action. Since the 1999 intervention in Kosovo, the New Labour government 
has sought to further clarify the relationship between state sovereignty and international 
human protection. For example, the Blair government outlined a policy paper on 
international action in response to humanitarian crises, which built on Cook’s (2000a) 
principles for humanitarian intervention. The paper reinforced the UN Security Council’s 
role and responsibility for the prevention and response to mass atrocity crimes and 
established the conditions for the use of force (FCO cited in Marston, 2001, p.696). These 
conditions largely reflected Cook’s six principles with the addition that “if the 
consequences for human suffering of non-action would be worse than those of 
intervention” then this fulfils another pillar in favour of a humanitarian intervention (FCO 
cited in Marston, 2001, p.696). Following these policy commitments, the UK is described 
as “by far, the strongest advocate of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold war era” 
(Butchard, 2020, p.22). According to Butchard (2020, p.22), through the UK’s appeal to 
humanitarian intervention in speeches and policy, the New Labour government acted as 
a “norm-entrepreneur” based on its aim “to build humanitarian intervention into more of 
a doctrine”.  
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It is also significant that the UK has been willing to defend its doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention as reinforcing, rather than violating international law (UN 
General Assembly, 1999a). By this reading, the UK is not exposing tensions in liberal 
internationalist thinking as identified by Ralph (2014b, p.4) on the relationship between 
the rule of law and human rights. That said, as shown throughout this thesis, the UK has 
been largely acting alone in promoting the legality of its doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention. More fundamentally, New Labour’s establishment of a doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention marks the beginning of a sustained change that has occurred in 
the UK’s commitment to human protection in rhetoric and action between 1997 and 2020. 
As examined in chapter 5 and chapter 6, successive UK governments have continued to 
draw explicitly on this doctrine of humanitarian intervention as a basis for intervening in 
another sovereign state without a Chapter VII resolution from the UN Security Council 
or under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Underlying this doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention is the liberal internationalist vision first espoused by New Labour in UK 
foreign policy according to the promotion of domestic and international human rights 
protection. 
Beyond humanitarian intervention is the broader international geopolitical context 
of New Labour’s liberal internationalist foreign policy with regards to the globalisation 
of security threats, particularly international terrorism and WMD. These global threats 
and the importance of cooperating with other states to address them is especially pertinent 
in the post-9/11 era. The UK’s decision to join the US-coalition’s intervention in Iraq in 
2003 and the subsequent outbreak of war has received significant and widespread 
academic attention (Bluth, 2004; Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers, 2007; Ralph, 2011; 
Deudney and Ikenberry, 2017; Porter, 2018). At a theoretical level, scholars are divided 
over whether the Iraq war was a product of a realist or liberal approach to international 
relations. Deudney and Ikenberry (2017, pp.7) argue that the suggestion that the Iraq war 
was influenced by liberalism is deceptive. In suggesting that “most liberal 
internationalists opposed the war”, they argue that the war was “the result of the pursuit 
of American hegemonic primacy”, which reflects a realist rather than liberal position. 
Conversely, Porter (2018, p.334) contests the perspective of Deudney and Ikenberry 
(2017) in arguing that “liberals and liberalism were deeply implicated in the decision to 
strike Iraq”.  
At an empirical level, there are debates on the reasoning behind the UK’s decision 
to join the US-led coalition, the role of Blair’s doctrine of the international community, 
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and the subsequent tensions between strands of the Labour Party’s internationalist 
tradition. According to Bluth (2004, p.875), the foundations of Blair’s decision to support 
the US in going to war in Iraq was a concern for maintaining his conception of an 
international order based on support and respect for international norms and the UN, 
which required the support of the US as the hegemon of the post-1945 liberal international 
order. Similarly, Ralph (2011, p.309) suggests that there was a concern that the “United 
States would ignore the multilateral institutions of the post-1945 liberal order and thereby 
threaten Blair’s efforts to cultivate the idea of community at the international level”, 
alongside the threat of international terrorism, especially post-9/11.  
Even if the UK’s decision to intervene in Iraq was principally driven by these 
motivations to uphold the international order and its institutions amid US unilateralism, 
the UK’s contribution subsequently led to significant debate and division in government, 
which exposed specific tensions in New Labour’s commitment to liberal internationalism 
regarding the role of multilateralism and collective action on the use of force. This was 
visible following the resignation of the former UK Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, in the 
lead up to the war citing the lack of domestic support and international agreement on the 
intervention in Iraq (BBC, 2003). As the intervention unfolded, the UK’s Secretary for 
International Community, Clare Short, announced their resignation primarily because 
assurances about “the need for a UN mandate to establish the legitimate Iraqi government 
have been breached” (Short in The Guardian, 2003). This demonstrates a tension between 
the Labour Party’s internationalist position and New Labour’s liberal internationalist 
approach. This is because traditional internationalists within the Labour Party, such as 
Cook, argued that action outside multilateral institutions such as the UN could undermine 
the role of these institutions (Atkins, 2013, p.180). Thus, it is not a case of Cook outright 
rejecting intervention in Iraq (Vickers and Kennedy, 2007, p.206), but rather about 
maintaining the internationalist tradition of upholding multilateralism and international 
institutions, including in situations involving the use of force. 
The UK’s decision to contribute to the US-led coalition in Iraq thus shows the 
tension between the Labour Party’s internationalist tradition and the liberal 
internationalist approach pursed by the Blair government, which demonstrated a 
willingness to utilise “ad hoc coalitions in situations where multilateralism based on 
formal organisations was ruled out” (Atkins, 2013, p.181). However, this modified view 
places it at odds with the tradition of internationalism in UK foreign policy where 
collectivism and multilateralism is at the heart of this tradition, which is shown in the 
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debate and resignations from both Cook and Short, the former of which was Foreign 
Secretary during the NATO-led operation in Kosovo in 1999. Whilst the Kosovo 
intervention was without authorisation from a UN resolution, it was based on a strong 
multilateral response from NATO member states. The Iraq intervention shows how New 
Labour’s commitment to liberal internationalism is far from a harmonious approach to 
foreign policy when action is contrary to multilateralism.  
The globalisation of security threats and the Iraq War also reveal the broader 
geopolitical context of New Labour’s internationalist foreign policy. Whilst the UK’s 
commitment to the intervention in Kosovo was characterised by a human protection 
response, the Iraq War shifted the focus of intervention into another state in the face of 
perceived threats posed by WMD and its impact on domestic and international security. 
This demonstrates how changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection are part of 
a broader push-pull domestic and international context in which governments are required 
to respond to a range of foreign policy challenges in a globalised world, including 
international terrorism and threats from WMD.   
 
4.4 The international context of human protection, 2005-2007 
As discussed in introduction to this thesis, the UK’s doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
emerged from the dilemma in the relationship between respecting state sovereignty and 
protecting human populations from mass atrocity crimes. Whilst the UK’s proposed 
solution was humanitarian intervention, the UN and its Member States promoted the idea 
of a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The R2P is distinct from humanitarian intervention in 
requiring a Chapter VII resolution from the UN Security Council for non-consensual 
intervention into another sovereign state under its pillar III mechanism (UN General 
Assembly, 2005, p.30; UN General Assembly, 2009b, p.22). Although evidence points to 
UK support for the R2P in speeches prior to its endorsement by UN Member States, there 
remained a division between the UN’s and UK’s position over use of force without prior 
state consent and international legal authorisation. In his 1999 address to the UN, Robin 
Cook emphasised the “shared responsibility” of the international community “to act when 
we are confronted with genocide, mass displacement of people or major breaches of 
humanitarian law” (UN General Assembly, 1999a, p.35). Similarly, Straw (2004) 
supported conditional sovereignty because “where those responsibilities are manifestly 
ignored, neglected or abused, the international community need to intervene”.  
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 The UK endorsed the R2P at the 2005 World Summit as on paper it reinforced 
many of New Labour’s liberal internationalist commitments to human rights since 
entering office in 1997. Commenting on R2P’s endorsement, Straw suggested that “if we 
follow through on the responsibility to protect, then never again will genocide, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity be allowed to take place under our noses with 
nothing done.” (United Nations General Assembly, 2005, p.27) . This positive sentiment 
on the prospects for R2P was shared by Straw’s successor, Margaret Beckett, who 
continued to reflect on the importance of protecting populations from atrocity crimes 
(Beckett, 2006). Speaking on behalf of the UK at the UN General Assembly in 2009, 
Lord Malloch-Brown also referenced “an R2P culture” focusing on embedding the 
prevention of atrocity crimes in the work of the UN (UN General Assembly, 2009a, p.7).  
Whilst the endorsement of the R2P in 2005 appeared to signal an important change 
in international rhetoric and action on the relationship between state sovereignty and 
human protection, it still did not fit comfortably with the UK’s doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention. As Daddow (2009, p.559) rightly argues, to endorse an idea does not compel 
a state to necessarily implement it in its own foreign policy. It is questionable whether 
any state would rhetorically deny a basic commitment to protecting their population from 
atrocity crimes. However, endorsing the R2P did not say that states must enforce it since 
it is a normative, rather than a legal framework. According to Welsh (2019, p.54), the 
R2P “was deliberately institutionalized….as a political, rather than legal principle” 
(emphasis in original). This was because Member States did not want to become 
embroiled in further legal commitments under international humanitarian law (Welsh, 
2019, p.54).  
Instead of fundamentally redefining the UK’s commitment to human protection, 
it is argued that the UK’s endorsement of the R2P was a continuation of its liberal 
internationalist commitment to human protection. In particular, the UK was “seeking 
international confirmation of R2P as a political signal to mobilise and enable international 
(military) action in the face of mass atrocities, according to their traditions of…liberal 
interventionism” (Brockmeier et al., 2014b, p.437-438, emphasis in original). This 
suggests that the UK’s endorsement of the R2P was instrumentally driven in providing a 
framework to continue the pursuit of humanitarian intervention in its foreign policy. The 
emergence of R2P thus echoed the UK’s commitment to a liberal internationalist 
approach to human protection, but there remained a significant gap between the UK and 
UN concerning the legality of the use of force. This gap is something which has remained 
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in UK foreign policy under successive governments, as chapters 5 and 6 will illustrate in 
the context of the crisis in Syria.  
 
4.5 The Gordon Brown years, 2007-2010  
On becoming Prime Minister, Gordon Brown inherited a New Labour foreign policy 
portfolio with a rich recent history on human protection. Whilst Brown did not comment 
much on foreign policy as Prime Minister (Vickers, 2011, p.185) his government still 
provided some important rhetorical indicators of their understanding of liberal 
internationalism and how it applied to human protection. Brown outlined his approach to 
foreign policy as being based on “hard-headed internationalism”, which recognised the 
importance of a globalised world and the need to intervene where necessary “to give 
expression of our shared interests and shared values” (Brown, 2007a). In this sense, 
Brown embodied a similar liberal internationalist perspective to Blair’s in underlining the 
significance of globalisation, in addition to the merging of the national and international 
interest in the pursuit of New Labour’s view of playing an active and important 
international role. 
On human protection, it is suggested that the Brown doctrine of foreign policy 
“sought to recast the philosophy underpinning interventionism” (Lunn et al., 2008, p.47) 
by recognising that coercive force alone is not the only, nor even the most desirable, 
option for human protection. However, this did not translate into the removal of New 
Labour’s doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The Brown government continued to use 
humanitarian intervention rhetoric as the UK’s approach to human protection. In his 2008 
reinventing humanitarian intervention speech, Gordon Brown detailed the UK’s 
approach to implementing the R2P, which he suggested was influenced by the 1999 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo (Brown, 2008). In outlining that “in practice, the 
UK has been a strong supporter of the Responsibility to Protect within the UN”, Brown 
revealed a broader interpretation of the R2P beyond the use of force (Brown, 2008). 
However, as the title of the speech suggests, underlying this commitment to the R2P was 
the UK government’s continued preference for humanitarian intervention, which the 
Brown government had not removed from UK foreign policy rhetoric. 
Rather, UK foreign policy on human protection under Brown was characteristic 
of the approach adopted primarily under Robin Cook. As Foreign Secretary, David 
Miliband (2008b) defended liberal internationalism as the UK’s foreign policy doctrine. 
He argued that a lot of Blair’s Doctrine of the International Community “remains valid”, 
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but that it requires a rethink based on prioritising prevention (Miliband, 2008). Miliband 
did not dismiss humanitarian intervention, but advocated for a much earlier response, 
which could potentially save more lives and prevent a full-scale outbreak of war. On R2P, 
Miliband similarly suggested that the UK must “improve our capacity to prevent the 
emergence of conflict” (UN General Assembly, 2007, p.47).  
As for the UK’s place in the world, Miliband (2008a) argued that UK “must resist 
the arguments on both the left and right to retreat into a world of realpolitik”. Rhetorically 
then, the Gordon Brown years are further evidence of sustained changes in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection. Underlying this commitment is a continued appeal to 
a liberal internationalist perspective on the UK’s place in the world, which mirrors Blair’s 
approach to UK foreign policy on human protection. The only slight difference between 
the Blair and Brown governments on human protection is the greater emphasis on 
prevention over immediate humanitarian intervention. However, it is important to 
acknowledge the broader international context on the prevention of atrocity crimes as the 
response to Kenya generated greater attention on the preventative aspects of R2P 
(Miliband, 2008b). Moreover, humanitarian intervention remained part of New Labour’s 
foreign policy rhetoric under the Gordon Brown government, which is important evidence 
that the UK had not fundamentally altered its stance on the pursuit of human protection 
through its doctrine of humanitarian intervention.  
A limitation for examining the extent of this sustained change is that Brown’s 
government did not contribute to any humanitarian interventions. That said, as the next 
chapter shows the Conservative-led Coalition government’s decision to continue using 
humanitarian intervention as legal justification for action in Syria is even stronger 
evidence of a sustained change that has occurred in UK foreign policy rhetoric and action 
on human protection. Despite attempting to distance from liberal internationalism, the 
Conservative-led coalition government has used the exact same rhetoric on humanitarian 
intervention as Tony Blair did on Kosovo in 1999. It is therefore argued that the foreign 
policy of successive governments is underpinned by a commitment to liberal 
internationalist values, including human rights protection, as a basis for an outward-
looking and active foreign policy.  
 
4.6 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has provided the empirical foundations for assessing the UK’s commitment 
to human protection in a transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 2020. This includes 
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using the analytical framework developed in chapter 3 in order to assess sustained UK 
foreign policy change in rhetoric and action on human protection. The chapter presents 
three main findings. The first is that New Labour’s commitment to liberal 
internationalism was an important change in the UK’s international relations as part of a 
transitional foreign policy. The chapter argued this approach to a liberal internationalist 
foreign policy was a product of the government’s fundamental recognition of 
globalisation in a new world order, as well as rejection of international isolationism amid 
the decades of attention on the UK’s relative international decline. Rather, Blair attempted 
to assert the UK’s place in the world as a pivotal power in order to demonstrate its 
continued credentials for international leadership and influence in a globalised world, 
especially in its relationship with the US and Europe.  
Second, New Labour’s commitment to liberal internationalism was significant in 
distancing the government from their predecessors, especially on human protection. New 
Labour came to power in the backdrop of the international community’s inaction in 
Rwanda in 1994 and the mass atrocities committed with impunity in Bosnia a year later 
in 1995. On entering office New Labour immediately set to work on changing the basic 
principles of the UK’s foreign policy interests and values, which led to a gradual change 
in the UK’s commitment to human protection in both rhetoric and action and marked an 
important departure from the conservative tradition, especially regarding the UK’s 
conception of its national interest. Rhetorically, New Labour placed liberal values at the 
centre of its internationalist foreign policy, including human rights. This was articulated 
in the government’s foreign policy rhetoric on human protection in condemning mass 
violence in Kosovo and Sierra Leone, promoting the ethical dimension up until 2001, 
questioning the premise of absolute sovereignty in the face of mass atrocities, proposing 
criteria in order to guide humanitarian intervention post-Kosovo, and contributing to 
international debate on the R2P at the international level. Some of this rhetoric was 
subsequently translated into government actions through its contributions to the coercive 
interventions in Kosovo and Sierra Leone, both of which had a core humanitarian 
component and continued the UK’s advocacy and entrepreneurship on humanitarian 
intervention.  
Third sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection between 
1997 and 2020 requires an analysis of the interaction between the national and the 
international context of the UK’s foreign policy. New Labour’s electoral victory and the 
Party’s subsequent commitment to liberal internationalism while in power is one 
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important factor which initiated a sustained change in the UK’s foreign policy on human 
protection from 1997. However, the international context at the time is just as significant 
amid globalisation and the idea that sovereignty entailed the responsibility of a state to 
protect its population (Deng et al., 1996). New Labour was thus able to articulate a vision 
for its foreign policy based on a willingness to take the lead on vital issues, including 
human protection, which appeared to fit with changes in international relations at that 
time on the relationship between state sovereignty and human protection.  
However, the challenges of globalisation in relation to international terrorism and 
WMD had an important impact on New Labour’s perception of its geopolitical interests, 
especially in relation to protecting the UK and international security and building 
alliances in order to address the threats posed by terrorism and WMD. This was illustrated 
by the Iraq war, which generated intense domestic and international debate on the US-led 
coalition’s commitment to intervention. Some of the literature highlighted how the UK’s 
decision to join the US-coalition showed the challenges of fulfilling Blair’s doctrine of 
the international community, especially the attempts to maintain a collective international 
order in a globalised world (Bluth, 2004; Ralph, 2011). However, domestically the 
intervention exposed some tension in liberal internationalism, particularly on the issues 
of multilateralism and collective intervention. The Iraq war and broader debates over 
liberal internationalism and the use of force thus reveals the fluid nature of international 
relations in a globalised world and the changing role of the UK’s geopolitical interests as 
part of domestic and international push-pull factors in foreign policy. This shows how 
sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection do not exist 
independently of other geopolitical interests such as countering terrorism and the WMD 
in the post-9/11 era as part of addressing broader challenges amid globalisation.  
As the next two empirical chapters show, these findings are a significant 
contribution to the assessment of sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human 
protection in a transitional foreign policy. This is because in spite of the attempts by 
successive governments to distance from elements of New Labour’s foreign policy on 
intervention, a commitment to the protection of core liberal internationalist values has 
remained central to UK foreign policy between 2010 and 2020. This leads to the argument 
that sustained changes have occurred in the UK’s commitment to human protection in a 
transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 2020, which is presented in the evidence 




Chapter 5 – A liberal conservative approach to human protection, 2010-
2015      
“Of course I recognise that many have long been committed to non-
intervention. But my argument is that where action is necessary, legal and 
right, to fail to act is to fail those who need our help.” 
        David Cameron, Speech to the UN General Assembly (FCO, 2011k) 
 
The formation of a Conservative-led Coalition in the spring of 2010 marked the end of 
over a decade of New Labour governments. As the new Conservative Prime Minister, 
David Cameron immediately set to work on implementing a vision for UK foreign policy 
founded on liberal conservatism. According to Cameron, a liberal conservative foreign 
policy was committed to similar liberal principles as their New Labour predecessors on 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, but cautious about simply imposing these 
principles from the outside by recognising the complexity of the world that exists 
(Cameron, 2006; Cameron, 2019, pp.145-146). In this sense, liberal conservatism was the 
Conservative-led Coalition’s approach to distancing UK foreign policy from the 
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan that had arguably tarnished New Labour’s foreign 
policy under Blair (Cameron, 2006; Cameron, 2019, p.146; Hague, 2006).  
This chapter builds on chapter 4 through continuing the empirical analysis of the 
relationship between the UK’s commitment to human protection and its transitional 
foreign policy between 2010 and 2015. The chapter continues to define a transitional 
foreign policy in relation to changes in the UK’s geopolitical interests, policies and 
international engagements between 1997 and 2020. It is shaped by the adaptation of 
successive governments to the UK’s post-war relative hard power decline, the UK’s 
membership, leadership, and influence in core multilateral organisations, and the UK’s 
position within the evolving international order, and is expressed by changing patterns of 
policy behaviour, changing administrative apparatus, and elite UK political rhetoric. 
The central argument of this chapter is that in spite of the shift to liberal 
conservatism, the core liberal values espoused by New Labour remained at the forefront 
of the Conservative-led Coalition’s foreign policy on human protection. Throughout the 
period between 2010 and 2015, UK political elites rhetorically supported the protection 
of core international liberal values on freedom, democracy, and human rights, which were 
brought to the forefront of UK foreign policy amid the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 and 
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subsequent human protection crises in Libya and Syria. In Syria in particular, the 
government showed its willingness to bypass conventional legal channels of a Chapter 
VII resolution through advocating for humanitarian intervention. This chapter argues that 
the period between 2010 and 2015 therefore presents evidence of sustained changes in 
the UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy.   
To support this argument, this chapter draws extensively on a triangulation of 
primary and secondary materials from a combination of 355 speeches, statements, and 
media interviews from the Prime Minister, David Cameron, and Foreign Secretaries 
William Hague and Philip Hammond, and UK diplomats and representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 to 6 May 2015, government reports and policy documents, 
parliamentary debates, semi-structured interviews, and secondary literature. Foreign 
policy speeches from central government focus overwhelmingly on the Conservative 
Party because it controlled coalition foreign policy, which was evident throughout the 
process of data collection (Honeyman, 2017, p.43; Beech and Munce, 2019, p.117). The 
chapter uses the same assessment of sustained foreign policy change as established in 
chapter 3 and initially applied in chapter 4, which distinguishes episodic adjustments in 
UK foreign policy on human protection from sustained changes which are defined as 
shifts in the UK’s foreign policy goals and/or methods on human protection which endure 
over time in the approach of successive governments and is continually shaped, 
maintained, and reinforced by a combination of UK government rhetoric - what is said 
by elite political agents in government - and its actions – the means and methods of 
protection in practice. The latter is assessed through the four indicators of foreign policy 
action in chapter 3: policy, funding and humanitarian aid, coercive and non-coercive 
intervention, and advocacy and entrepreneurship.   
The chapter is split into three main sections. Section one addresses the foundations 
of the relationship between the UK’s commitment to human protection and its place in 
the world according to the government’s liberal conservative approach to foreign policy. 
Sections two and three then assess the relationship between the UK’s commitment to 
human protection and its transitional foreign policy through an analysis of the crises in 
Libya in 2011 and Syria from 2011. The chapter concludes with its findings, 
contributions, and their implications for the research aim, objectives, questions and 
hypothesis.  
This chapter makes three contributions to the thesis. The first is to the relationship 
between the UK’s commitment to human protection and its transitional foreign policy. In 
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particular, it addresses the research aim and objectives 2 and 3 by applying the framework 
developed in chapter 3 in order to assess sustained changes in the UK’s rhetoric and action 
on human protection. Its second contribution is the analysis of the UK’s leadership and 
influence on human protection in international relations in light of its relative 
international hard power decline. The third contribution is providing a wealth of empirical 
evidence between 2010 and 2015 in order to test the research hypothesis on whether 
adjustments in the UK’s place in the world between 1997 and 2020 led to sustained 
changes in the UK’s rhetoric and action towards a strengthened commitment to human 
protection.  
 
5.1 A liberal conservative foreign policy doctrine and human protection 
David Cameron’s idea of a liberal conservative foreign policy began as leader of the 
opposition. In a speech to the British American Project in 2006, he declared that “I am a 
liberal conservative, rather than a neo-conservative. Liberal - because I support the aim 
of spreading freedom and democracy, and support humanitarian intervention. 
Conservative - because I recognise the complexities of human nature, and am sceptical 
of grand schemes to remake the world” (Cameron, 2006). This initial idea increasingly 
became the foreign policy blueprint of a future Cameron government following the 2010 
manifesto commitment that the Party’s “approach to foreign affairs will be based on 
liberal conservative principles” (Conservative Party, 2010, p.109). This commitment was 
reaffirmed following the election of the Coalition government in 2010. In a speech 
detailing the foreign policy framework of the Coalition, the newly appointed 
Conservative Foreign Secretary, William Hague, conceptualised liberal conservatism 
according to “a belief in freedom, human rights and democracy with a scepticism of 
utopian schemes to remake the world” (Hague, 2010b). According to Daddow and 
Schnapper (2013, p.331), this commitment to liberal conservatism is an articulation of 
“bounded liberalism” which aims to strike a balance between progress in human nature 
and a realistic perspective on the nature of the world that exists.  
 Whilst liberal conservatism may appear an articulation of the Conservative 
tradition pre-dating New Labour, especially with the emphasis on a scepticism of attempts 
to remake the world, there are important differences which support the argument in this 
chapter that liberal internationalism remains an underlying feature of a liberal 
conservative approach to human protection. According to Dodds and Eldon (2008, 
p.359), the David Cameron government have adopted a similar approach to Tony Blair’s 
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New Labour governments based on “a form of idealism moderated by realism”. This is 
evident in Hague’s (2010b) definition of liberal conservatism in moderating the liberal 
commitment to democracy, human rights, and freedom, with restraint on overt attempts 
to spread these values through military intervention. As a foreign policy tradition then, 
liberal conservatism is faced with a dilemma because “on the one hand it seeks to distance 
itself from traditional conservative policies; on the other to temper the more aggressive 
neo-conservatism of the Bush administration” (Dodds and Eldon, 2008, pp.359-360). 
This can be seen again in the liberal side of liberal conservatism as distancing from 
conservative traditions, and the conservative side in being cautious about attempts to 
remake the world.  
 A significant difference between conservative traditions and liberal conservatism 
is shown in UK foreign policy on human protection, and specifically humanitarian 
intervention. The liberal conservative approach to humanitarian intervention has been 
shaped in part from debates over the UK’s response to Bosnia during the Major 
government which witnessed the initial emergence of a Conservative position on 
humanitarian intervention (Beech and Oliver, 2014, p.107). Whilst it is argued that liberal 
conservatism emphasises the need to move beyond a narrowly defined self-interest in 
foreign policy to one which recognises the importance of humanitarian protection, it is 
slightly different from New Labour’s liberal internationalist approach in terms of the 
government appearing “less willing to use robust rhetoric and they are likely to employ a 
more cautious approach” (Beech, 2011, p.360). However, it is also argued that “the 
Conservative Party of today is more open to humanitarian intervention than ever before”, 
and that “the issue of humanitarian intervention marks a significant discontinuity” with 
conservative traditions in foreign policy (Beech and Oliver, 2014, pp.103-105). Although 
the Major government tentatively embraced human protection through the government’s 
eventual action in Bosnia, the lack of a robust immediate humanitarian response draws 
an important difference with the liberal internationalist approach of the New Labour 
government, which as this chapter will argue, has continued during the Cameron 
government under the guise of liberal conservatism.   
This combination of liberal and conservative in foreign policy is essential for 
locating and understanding the government’s perspective of the UK’s place in the world 
between 2010 and 2015, and by extension, its relationship with the government’s 
commitment to human protection. Based on evidence from primary and secondary 
material, this chapter argues that there are two important sources which shaped the 
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government’s view of the UK’s place in the world and its subsequent commitment to 
human protection. These sources are learning lessons from previous foreign policy 
interventions under New Labour and an awareness of the UK’s relative international 
decline and the government’s attempts to assert the UK’s credentials for international 
leadership. 
 
5.1.1 Foreign policy Learning: The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq  
The first significant challenge of the government’s liberal conservative foreign policy was 
how to address New Labour’s legacy (Daddow, 2013, p.113; Daddow and Schnapper, 
2013, p.346; Gilmore, 2014, p.111; Honeyman, 2017, p.59). The New Labour 
government’s commitment to the international War on Terror and the subsequent fallout 
in the aftermath of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq had overshadowed the earlier 
humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and Sierra Leone (Wheeler, 2000; Krisch, 2002; 
Schmitt, 2004; Chinkin, 2012). Liberal Conservatism was an ideal opportunity for the 
Cameron government to pursue a clean break from the past without losing its commitment 
to the core liberal values that had guided the foreign policy of their predecessors. Cameron 
had arguably triggered this process whilst in opposition in suggesting that a Conservative 
government “should replace the doctrine of liberal interventionism…with the doctrine of 
liberal conservatism” (Cameron, 2007). Once in office, the government sought to 
rhetorically distance itself from New Labour in its foreign policy rhetoric (figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Government rhetoric on learning from the past, 2010-2015 








Figure 6 presents the results from a content analysis of 355 speeches, statements, 
government news reports, and media interviews between 2010 and 2015. From keyword 
searches on Iraq, Afghanistan and learn, the results identified 30 references to each 
concept by government ministers and representatives.
16 A closer examination of this data 
shows that New Labour’s interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the need to learn 
from them, were a prominent feature of the UK’s rhetoric on its liberal conservative 
foreign policy. In an annual address at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, Cameron (2010) 
mentioned Afghanistan as a reason why “as a new government, we should learn the lesson 
[of the intervention] and make changes”. Equally, in a speech to the UN Security Council, 
Cameron (2014) acknowledged that “it is absolutely right that we should learn lessons 
from the past, especially of what happened in Iraq a decade ago”. By consistently 
emphasising rhetoric such as learn the lessons and the past, the government was 
attempting to establish clear ground with the foreign policy of their predecessors on these 
intervention. Daddow (2013, p.117) uses the example of the “Blair’s wars thesis” to 
emphasise how the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are directly attached to Tony Blair rather 
than a specific government. This serves an important purpose in allowing successive 
governments to detach themselves from the foreign policy of their predecessors.  
 There is a similarity in Cameron’s rhetoric on learning from the past to the 
findings in chapter 4 on Blair and Cook’s attempts to recast New Labour’s foreign policy 
following the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia. On both occasions, there is evidence of 
a clear attempt to distance foreign policy from previous governments on the basis of 
learning. This supports the theoretical framework on foreign policy change in which 
agents try and learn from mistakes made in the past and thus change their foreign policy 
orientation (Levy, 1994; Stein, 1994). The significance of this is that the Blair and 
Cameron government’s show that foreign policy learning is an ongoing process and 
reveals how governments draw on their predecessors in order to readjust their foreign 





16  Following keyword searches on Afghanistan, Iraq, and learn/learning/learned in NVivo, a 
qualitative content analysis was conducted in order to include only relevant results in figure 6. 
See appendix 2 for full details of the inclusion and exclusion criteria for these three codes.  
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5.1.2 Countering relative decline in a transitional foreign policy   
This rhetoric on learning from past foreign policy interventions is closely intertwined 
with the government’s liberal conservative view of the UK’s place in the world. Writing 
on his time as Prime Minister, David Cameron suggested that “it was clear to me, 
alongside our economic rescue, reassuring Britain’s global status would be one of our 
biggest missions in government” (Cameron, 2019, p.145). Just as New Labour had aimed 
to counter the UK’s relative decline by rejecting isolationism, the post-2010 government 
faced similar pressures. From keyword searches on speeches addressing the UK’s place 
in the world, figure 7 reveals the government’s focus on the UK’s relative decline, which 
accounted for 68% of references in comparison to 32% on the UK’s global role.17 
 
Figure 7. Government rhetoric on the UK's global role, 2010-2015 
Source: Gov.uk and Digital National Archives 
 
From a qualitative content analysis of 355 speeches, statements, media interviews, and 
government news reports between 2010 and 2015, it is clear that the Conservative-led 
Coalition government was well aware of debates on the UK’s relative decline in making 
26 references to the concept in comparison to 12 on global. Critically, an analysis of the 
 
17  Following keyword searches on decline and global in NVivo, a qualitative content analysis 
was conducted in order to include only relevant results in figure 7. See appendix 2 for full 






content of this primary documentary material showed how both Cameron and Hague were 
attempting to dispel any notion of UK decline on the world stage. In the early stages of 
his tenure as Prime Minister, Cameron (2010) recognised that “there are some who say 
Britain is embarked on an inevitable path of decline”. He also acknowledged arguments 
that the UK had a choice between “sink or swim. Do or decline” in its foreign policy 
(Cameron, 2012b). Cameron (2019, p.144) later wrote that he “didn’t accept the idea that 
Britain was facing inevitable relative decline”. This was evident in the government’s 
counter perspective of the UK’s place in the world, especially under the leadership of 
William Hague. The basis of Hague’s approach was that “we [the UK] do not need to 
accept sleepwalking into decline” (Hague, 2013a). Rather “our vision for Britain in the 
world is of a nation committed to an international, global role” (Hague, 2013a). At the 
centre of this argument was the government’s promotion of the UK’s influence whether 
through international organisations or on promoting democracy and human rights 
protection (Cameron, 2010; FCO, 2013a; Hague, 2010a).  
 Whilst attempting to supress the idea of the UK’s relative international decline as 
a global power, Hague (2013a) did acknowledge that UK foreign policy was being 
practiced “in a challenging period of global transition”. The government recognised that 
the rise of non-Western-liberal powers made it paramount that the UK continued to 
uphold the principles of the existing liberal international order. For Hague (2010b), 
retaining a global role “is an indispensable part of the British character” citing examples 
as far back as Britain’s role in the campaign to end the slave trade, the end of the Cold 
War, and its contributions to international development. It is the government’s awareness 
of debates on the UK’s relative decline and a transitional international order that in turn 
generated its counter perspective that the UK is and will remain an essential actor on the 
international stage through drawing on the historical narrative of the UK being a global 
power.  
This approach to conceptualising the UK’s place in the world is strikingly similar 
to the rhetoric of Tony Blair and Robin Cook in the previous chapter in which countering 
the idea of the UK’s relative decline was at the core of the New Labour government’s 
promotion of the UK as a leading actor in the liberal international order. These similarities 
across governments show that the UK’s place in the world is at the forefront of the minds 
of successive Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries. The fact that these governments 
have placed constant rhetorical emphasis on the importance of the UK’s international 
role, and felt the need to explicitly downplay the notion of its decline, does evidence an 
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awareness that the UK’s place in the world is changing, and potentially declining, which 
requires efforts to counter this. The remainder of the thesis shows the significant role that 
this awareness has had on successive UK government commitments to human protection.  
 
5.1.3 Fusing democracy, human rights, and the national interest 
Identifying the components of a liberal conservative foreign policy from 2010 to 2015 is 
important for understanding whether sustained changes have occurred in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection. This is because it shows the relative role and 
importance of human rights, and by extension, the government’s narrower commitment 
to human protection in its foreign policy. Keyword searches were thus conducted on the 
concepts of freedom, human rights, and democracy according to definition of liberal 
conservatism by Hague (2010b). The content analysis also included the UK’s reference 
to the national interest, which frequently featured in its foreign policy rhetoric and 
captured important linkages with the liberal conservative commitment to freedom, 
democracy, and human rights.  
The results of word frequency searches on democracy, freedom, and human rights 
supported Hague’s (2010b) perspective on the components of a liberal conservative 
foreign policy having featured amongst the most referenced concepts in the dataset of 355 
speeches.
18 Figure 8 presents the findings from keyword searches on each concept.  
 
Figure 8. Government liberal conservative rhetoric, 2010-2015 
Source: Gov.uk and Digital National Archives 
 
 
18  Freedom, democracy, and human rights featured as the most frequently used words in the 355 
speeches alongside more general references to concepts of world, Britain, foreign, policy, 











From the 381 references to the four concepts in total, figure 9 shows that democracy 
accounted for 22%, freedom 15%, and the national interest 13%. The most significant 
finding was that human rights accounted for 50% of the total with 148 references in 
speeches, statements, media interviews, and government news reports covering 
government ministers and representatives. On entering office, William Hague outlined 
the government’s “pledge to put consistent support for human rights at the heart of our 
foreign policy” (Hague, 2011). Rhetorically at least, the 191 references to human rights 
in figure 8 evidences this commitment to human rights. Furthermore, this focus on human 
rights at the heart of UK foreign policy recycles the same commitment made in Cook’s 
foreign policy mission statement in 1997, and thus, shows some continuation of the 
sustained change that has occurred at a rhetorical level on openly positioning human 
rights as an essential element of the UK’s foreign policy.  
 













An important difference with New Labour’s first term in office is the increasing fusion 
between human rights and democracy, which the Conservative-led Coalition government 
sees as complementary in a liberal conservative foreign policy. This is presented in 
government rhetoric, including Hague’s suggestion that the UK “support democracy, 
human rights and economic freedom” (FCO, 2011i). Whilst Gaskarth (2006, p.51) argued 
that Cook’s exclusive emphasis on human rights was evidence of a rhetorical change, the 





Democracy Freedom Human rights National interest
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9 illustrate, human rights are still mentioned much more in government rhetoric than 
freedom and democracy put together, alongside the annual publications of the FCO’s 
Human Rights and Democracy reports. This emphasis on human rights in particular is 
evidence of a sustained change in the UK’s commitment to human protection more 
broadly, which began in earnest in 1997 and has remained a consistent theme of UK 
foreign policy despite a change in government and a reorientation to liberal conservatism.  
 Whilst the national interest is not explicitly part of Hague’s (2010b) 
conceptualisation of a liberal conservative foreign policy, the content analysis of 
government speeches, statements, media interviews, and government news reports 
showed frequent references to it. The issue with the concept of the national interest is that 
it is not abundantly clear what it means. This is because the national interest “is a social 
construct, one in which state policy-makers have an instrumental role” (Gilmore, 2014, 
p.542). Through qualitative keyword searches, it was clearer that the UK’s national 
interest between 2010 and 2015 is integrated as part of the government’s liberal 
conservative commitment to democracy, freedom and human rights. The Coalition 
government’s 2010 National Security Strategy suggested that 
 
“Our [UK] national interest requires us to stand up for the values our 
country believes in – the rule of law, democracy, free speech, tolerance and 
human rights. Those are the attributes for which Britain is admired in the 
world and we must continue to advance them, because Britain will be safer 
if our values are upheld and respected in the world.” (HM Government, 
2010, p.4) 
 
The national interest thus performs an important function in being the government’s 
overarching mechanism for its commitment to freedom, democracy, human rights, and 









Figure 10. The domestic-international interest 
 
As figure 10 illustrates, this interpretation of the national interest is firmly based on the 
idea that protecting these components in other countries will ultimately support the short 
and long-term domestic protection of freedom, democracy, and human rights within the 
UK. This approach provides evidence of yet another reorientation of the UK’s place in 
the world since 1997 according to New Labour’s liberal internationalist focus on the 
connection between the national and international interest in UK foreign policy. The post-
2010 government is simply following the same roadmap by framing its foreign policy 
commitments through the ultimate pursuit of the national interest in order to protect first 
and foremost the UK’s own domestic security and stability.  
 
5.1.4 Liberal Conservatism and human protection 
Human protection is a crucial element of a liberal conservative approach to foreign policy 
and its component commitment to the national interest. This is because human protection 
from mass violence and atrocity crimes is part of the government’s broader commitment 
to human rights. If it is generally accepted that some of the roots of mass violence and 
atrocity crimes lie in instability, then upholding human rights and preventing broader 
international instability in the short, medium, and long-term should protect the UK’s own 
domestic security. In this sense, the promotion of the national interest does not necessarily 
come at the expense of a commitment to human protection (Ralph, 2014a, p.14).  
 Prior to entering office, Cameron (2006) commented that “I believe that we should 
be prepared to intervene for humanitarian purposes to secure people from genocide” and 













unsurprising since his speech was made following the endorsement of the R2P by UN 
member states in 2005, and thus reflected the broader international concern with 
protecting populations from atrocity crimes. However, the Conservative Party’s 2010 
manifesto under the leadership of Cameron declared that it “will support humanitarian 
intervention when it is practical and necessary” (Conservative Party, 2010, p.109). In 
office, the government set to work on incorporating this rhetorical commitment to human 
protection through humanitarian intervention in its foreign policy action. The fourth 
edition of the British Defence Doctrine acknowledged that “non-intervention in another 
state’s affairs is a principle of customary international law” but that there were three 
criteria for when a state could militarily intervene without the consent of the host state 
(Ministry of Defence, 2011, pp.1b-1-1b-2). This criteria was based on self-defence 
according to Article 51 of the UN Charter, a UN Security Council Chapter VII resolution, 
and significantly, “to avert an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe” 
(Ministry of Defence, 2011, pp.1b-1-1b-2). The fifth edition of the doctrine published in 
2014 updated this latter criteria “to promote national interests across the entire spectrum 
of military activities, including support to diplomacy, military assistance, humanitarian 
intervention and peacekeeping operations, through to major warfighting” (Ministry of 
Defence, 2014, p.72). Through this doctrine, the government was making the case that the 
UK could intervene militarily without consulting the other appropriate legal channels of 
self-defence or a Chapter VII resolution in situations of humanitarian suffering.  
 This position was echoed in the government’s official response to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee Inquiry on when, why, and how an international intervention may 
occur where the government acknowledged that the UK may use force “for humanitarian 
purposes” (HM Government, 2014). The evidence given by FCO Minister, Hugh 
Robertson, suggested that “nothing has changed with regard to the basis for the 
government’s position [on intervention], which predates 2000” (Robertson quoted in HM 
Government, 2014). This continued commitment supports the argument that 
“humanitarian intervention is now an established facet of Britain’s global role” (Beech 
and Munce, 2019, p.119). Section 5.3 in particular shows how this commitment to 
humanitarian intervention in rhetoric and action evidences a sustained change that has 
occurred in the relationship between human protection and the UK’s role and leadership 
on the international stage since 1997. It is argued that this position is strikingly similar to 
New Labour’s pragmatic liberal internationalist worldview and its subsequent 
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commitment to protecting populations from mass violence and atrocity crimes as part of 
the fusion between the national and international interest.  
 Beyond humanitarian intervention, the liberal conservative commitment to human 
rights is evident in the government’s publication of the first UK strategy on the PoC in 
2011, which aims to match its rhetorical support for human protection with practical steps 
(FCO, 2011l). Similarly, the government endorsed the preventative and assistance 
elements of the R2P (FCO, 2011j, p.64; FCO, 2012j, p.96 ). Together, the PoC, R2P, and 
humanitarian intervention form the central pillars of the government’s overarching 
approach to human protection between 2010 and 2015. The following two sections on 
Libya and Syria continue this analysis of the relationship between the government’s 
liberal conservative view of UK foreign policy, its active place in the world to counter 
domestic perceptions of relative decline, and its resulting commitment to human 
protection.  
 
5.2 A liberal conservative approach to the intervention in Libya, 2011 
Less than a year after officially taking office, the Conservative-led Coalition government 
faced its first major international crisis following mounting regime violence against 
civilians in Libya in 2011. The Arab Spring uprisings that emerged in Egypt in January 
2011 reached Libya by mid-February (Adams, 2016, p.769). A wave of protests in the city 
of Benghazi soon spread around the country, with the government responding through the 
use of force and killing of protestors (Adams, 2016, p.769). Amid the increasing violence 
and instability, the UK government’s initial response was to evacuate its nationals (FCO, 
2011b). As the violence continued to escalate however, the UK led the UN Security 
Council’s response through drafting Resolution 1970. This was followed by the 
government outlining its position on human protection in Libya which was eventually 
pursued through a Chapter VII mandate from the UN Security Council which authorised 
the use of force to protect civilians (UN Security Council, 2011a, p.3). 
 This section focuses specifically on the UK’s response to the crisis in Libya, 
particularly the role of human protection as the Coalition government’s justification for 
action. It shows how human protection was a critical part of the UK’s response alongside 
its broader commitment to the national interest, international leadership, and its view that 
the UK retains an important place in the world. It argues that the connection between these 
aspects of the UK’s response demonstrates the specific relationship between the UK’s 
awareness of its changing place in the world and sustained changes in its commitment to 
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human protection. Whilst the UK’s commitment to human protection and the Chapter VII 
authorisation of force meant that it would automatically contribute to the response, it was 
not compelled to adopt a leadership role. Rather, the UK’s leadership at the UN was part 
of the government’s view that the UK still had a leading and active role to play on the 
international stage.   
 
5.2.1 Liberal conservative human protection rhetoric on Libya  
The condemnation of regime violence against protestors and the subsequent passing of 
resolution 1970 were central to the UK government’s response in Libya. Figure 11 
presents the breakdown of the government’s foreign policy rhetoric on the crisis from a 
content analysis of 355 speeches, statements, media interviews, and government news 
reports covering government ministers and UK representatives at the UN. The results 
show that the government’s rhetoric was shaped according to core liberal conservative 
themes of democracy, human rights, and human protection more broadly in relation to 
Libya. 
 
Figure 11. Government references to the crisis in Libya, 201119 
 
Source: Gov.uk and Digital National Archives 
 
Whilst freedom was mentioned on only one occasion, the results show that democracy 
and human rights were amongst the most frequent references to liberal conservative 
 
19  Following keyword searches in NVivo on human rights, freedom, responsibility to protect, 
protection of civilians/protect civilians/civilian protection, and 
democracy/democratic/democratic within the primary code of Libya. See appendix 2 for full 













principles in the government’s rhetoric on Libya. As figure 12 shows, democracy and 
human rights accounted for 27% and 37% of the total rhetorical references to liberal 
conservative themes on Libya by the government (figure 12). A qualitative content 
analysis of these references presented a high-degree of similarity with the government’s 
general understanding of liberal conservatism based on a commitment to human rights 
and democracy. Cameron (2011c) outlined his aim for a “democratic and inclusive 
Libya”; in addition to his pledge to “support the building blocks of a democratic society” 
(Cameron, 2011a). Similarly, Hague emphasised the importance of a “democratic future” 
for Libya (Cameron, 2011g). This government rhetoric is part of its broader liberal 
conservative belief that democracy is one important element of stability given that in 
Libya it would provide the alternative to Gaddafi’s repressive regime that had generated 
instability in the first place. This approach is thus similar to New Labour’s position on 
Sierra Leone, which brought an end to the conflict and helped protect civilians with the 
ultimate aim of reinstalling what the UK perceived as a legitimate democratic government.  
 















Alongside this commitment to democracy, the UK government’s rhetorical references to 
human rights and human protection more broadly are revealing. The results of keyword 
searches of the government’s speeches on Libya show references to either human rights, 
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to democracy, freedom, human rights, PoC, and R2P in Libya. On human rights, 
government rhetoric highlighted the need to hold those committing “human rights abuses 
in Libya” to account (FCO, 2011f). This includes investigations of human rights abuses 
from the ICC and UN Human Rights Council (FCO, 2011e). On human protection more 
specifically, the results from keyword searches evidence that the PoC was the dominant 
rhetorical framework for the UK’s human protection response. From the outset, Cameron 
was clear that any action in Libya was on the basis of protecting civilians from the Gaddafi 
regime (Hansard HC Deb. 21 March 2011).  
 In comparison, government rhetorical references were limited on the R2P and 
did not mention humanitarian intervention. Accounting for just 5% of references in figure 
12, the R2P was mentioned on just two occasions by the government and its 
representatives, and tellingly, in the aftermath of the intervention. Hague mentioned the 
broader R2P of states in reference to Libya (FCO, 2011a), while Cameron acknowledged 
the UK’s R2P in a House of Commons debate over six months after resolution 1973 
(Hansard HC Deb., 24 October 2011). This suggests that the R2P was not at the forefront 
of the government’s rhetorical justification for human protection in Libya. Similarly, a 
research interview suggested that R2P rhetoric was not part of the immediate response, 
but rather discussed following the intervention.
20 The official government response to the 
Foreign Affairs Committee inquiry into Global Britain and the R2P seven years later 
reinforces this idea. The government stated that “the intervention in Libya was authorised 
by the UN Security Council through resolution 1973 (2011), which has now come to be 
seen as an example of the Responsibility to Protect in action” (HM Government, 2018c, 
emphasis added). The reference to come to be seen is far from a convincing argument that 
the R2P was at the core of the government’s human protection response in 2011.  
 It is plausible to argue that the R2P did not feature predominately in the 
government’s rhetoric due to the role of the PoC, which had already defined the 
international community’s response. However, the next sub-section on Syria argues that 
the government’s lack of attention on the R2P in Libya is indicative of its broader 
prioritisation and commitment to humanitarian intervention, which is significant because 
it exposes a disconnect between the UK’s and international community’s commitment to 
human protection, especially the legality of intervening without consent into another 
sovereign state.    
 
20  Author interview 10.  
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 Humanitarian intervention was absent altogether from the UK’s rhetoric on 
human protection in Libya. However, this does not necessarily signal the government’s 
rejection of humanitarian intervention altogether. Rather, this thesis argues that the main 
explanation for why humanitarian intervention does not feature in government’s human 
protection rhetoric on Libya is because the intervention already had the necessary legal 
authorisation through a Chapter VII resolution. This in turn meant that the intervention 
had met one of the three criteria in the British Defence Doctrine (Ministry of Defence, 
2011, p.1b-1). There was no UN Security Council deadlock on Libya that would have 
compelled the UK to resort to humanitarian intervention nor was the UK required to draw 
on Article 51. As section 5.3. on Syria will show, Libya was thus more of an exception 
than the rule when it came to the government’s rhetorical justification of human protection 
in relation to international crises.  
 
5.2.2 Government action on human protection in Libya 
The UK’s response to the crisis in Libya is a significant example of the government’s 
rhetorical references to human protection being matched with its actions. This is because 
it fulfilled at least three of the four indicators of foreign policy action on human protection 
according to policy, intervention, and funding and humanitarian aid. The following 
section addresses these areas of UK government action on human protection through two 
important stages of the broader international response according to resolutions 1970 and 
1973. These examples show the continuation of a sustained change in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in action based on the government’s awareness of the 
need to continue playing a leading role on the international stage in response to 
humanitarian crises.   
 As Tony Blair did in relation to Kosovo, the post-2010 Cameron-led government 
was similarly quick to assert its credentials for an international leadership role on human 
protection in Libya. Following the withdrawal of UK nationals from Libya, the 
government proceeded to try and address the Libyan regime’s violence against civilians. 
The UK’s first step was to lead as penholder on the drafting of resolution 1970, which 
illustrates its policy action on human protection. The resolution demanded “an immediate 
end to the violence” and underlined that the Libyan government must “respect human 
rights and international humanitarian law, and allow immediate access for international 
human rights monitors” (UN Security Council, 2011a, p.2). This was part of the UK’s 
commitment to the protection of human rights in Libya amid growing concern of violence 
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against civilians (Cameron, 2011f). Adopting such a leadership position allowed the UK 
to outline its own specific terms for human protection in Libya and gain a unanimous 
endorsement for these from Member States (Cameron, 2011f). From the outset, the UK 
was demonstrating its willingness to adopt a central leadership role in international 
response to Libya, particularly through its permanent seat on the UN Security Council.  
 Following the Libyan regime’s failure to end violence against civilians in 
accordance with resolution 1970, Member States returned to the UN to discuss further 
action. For Cameron (2011d), the main issue which warranted immediate action was 
evidence of the Libyan regime’s intention to attack civilians in Benghazi. In response, the 
UK continued its foreign policy action at the UN Security Council through leading on 
resolution 1973. Cameron (2011d) commented that “it is absolutely right that we [the UK] 
played a leading role on the UN Security Council to secure permission for this action”. 
Hague also praised the UK for taking “the lead in drafting the resolution” (FCO, 2011c). 
Resolution 1973 was unanimously endorsed on March 17, 2011 and provided a Chapter 
VII mandate for UN Member States and regional organisations “to take all necessary 
measures…to protect civilians and populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi” (UN Security Council, 2011b, p.3).  
 The UK responded to resolution 1973 through direct military contributions to the 
broader NATO-led intervention, which included 2300 soldiers, “eight warships, a hunter-
killer submarine and 36 aircraft”, with over 3000 missions and 2000 sorties (Cameron, 
2011b). Cameron (2011d) was unequivocal in stating that this direct action was taken in 
response to the threat posed by the Gaddafi regime and its failure to halt mass violence 
against civilians. Beyond the UK government’s direct military contributions in Libya, it 
also provided substantial financial support. The UK contributed over £40 million towards 
stabilisation and reform in Libya post-Gaddafi (FCO, 2011h). In addition, the government 
deployed “an international stabilization response team to Benghazi to advise and assist 
the Council [interim government] on its longer-term needs” (Cameron, 2011g). Alongside 
this, the UK supplied significant equipment to civilians in Libya. This included basic 
living necessities, while also providing broader military equipment, such as armour, and 
supplying humanitarian aid and assistance (Cameron, 2011g). 
 The scale of the UK’s contributions in action and its leadership in drafting 
resolutions 1970 and 1973, provided evidence for Hague’s claim that “Britain has 
continued to take a leading role in international efforts to protect civilians in Libya” (FCO, 
2011g). In particular, the government demonstrated its willingness to translate its liberal 
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conservative rhetoric on human protection into action through the adoption of its 
leadership role on the UN Security Council and through its actions on the ground by 
preventing the Gaddafi regime from committing further violence against civilians. The 
government’s rhetorical commentary on its actions, especially UK leadership, shows how 
it was aware of the importance of leading on the crisis as previous governments had done 
before it, such as in Kosovo and Sierra Leone.   
 
5.2.3 The UK’s place in the world and human protection in Libya 
As argued in the previous two sections, the UK’s commitment to human protection in 
action in Libya demonstrated its ability to adopt a leading role on the international stage, 
especially through drawing on its penholding responsibilities to draft resolutions 1970 and 
1973. Commenting on the situation in Libya, Cameron argued that the UK “will remain 
at the forefront of Europe in leading the response to the crisis” (FCO, 2011b). It is 
plausible to argue that the government recognised the importance of projecting the UK’s 
leadership and remaining military capacity to demonstrate that the UK is fully committed 
to international human rights protection, while simultaneously countering the idea of the 
UK’s relative international decline. In particular, Hague’s rhetorical emphasis on the UK’s 
“leading role” on human protection in Libya (FCO, 2011g), resonates with the notion that 
the UK remains an important international actor with an ability to contribute to addressing 
humanitarian crises. Thus, it is here where the relationship between sustained changes in 
the UK’s commitment to human protection and the government’s awareness of the need 
for the UK to continue playing an important role in international affairs is most evident.  
 A fundamental challenge for the government’s articulation of this relationship 
was to justify the need for intervention in Libya to a domestic audience. It is essential to 
draw on the broader context of UK foreign policy to explain the importance of domestic 
support for the intervention in Libya. At the time of the proposed intervention in 2011, the 
UK government was in the final stages of withdrawing troops from Iraq after over seven 
years of service. To therefore propose the deployment of thousands more troops in another 
international conflict with public support was a significant dilemma for the government. 
Findings from a qualitative content analysis of government foreign policy speeches on the 
intervention in Libya show that making a direct link to the UK’s national interest was thus 
an essential part of making the case for the deployment of more troops.  
 Beyond the immediate intervention in Libya, Hague had made the case that a 
“foreign policy with a conscience is the right thing to do and is in the long term 
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enlightened national interest of our country” (Hague, 2011). This is a similar emphasis to 
the claims made in New Labour’s justification for action in Kosovo through drawing on 
the connection between human protection as a moral concern and the protection of the 
national interest based on the domestic and international relationship in UK foreign policy 
(Blair, 1999b). On Libya, Cameron (2011e) placed significant effort on justifying the 
UK’s intervention by fusing human protection and the national interest. In a statement to 
the House of Commons immediately prior to the deployment of UK forces, Cameron 
stated the following  
 
“Mr Speaker, there are some who question whether Britain really needs to get 
involved at all. Some people have argued that we should leave it to others 
because there isn’t sufficient British national interest at stake. I believe that 
argument is misplaced. If Gaddafi’s attacks on his own people succeed, Libya 
will become once again a pariah state, festering on Europe’s border, a source 
of instability, exporting terror beyond her borders. A state from which literally 
hundreds of thousands of citizens could seek to escape, putting huge pressure 
on us in Europe…I am clear: taking action in Libya, together with our 
international partners, is in our national interest.” (Cameron, 2011e)  
 
Cameron’s speech directly articulates the relationship between the national and the 
international interest in figure 10. This is based on the argument that UK action not only 
protects Libyan civilians in the short, medium, and long-term through protecting them 
against the violent Gaddafi regime, but that it is also helps to protect the interests of UK 
nationals by preventing a potential spread of instability in Europe. To strengthen this case, 
in a speech to UK service personnel, Cameron (2011b) referenced that the UK “are no 
strangers to what Gaddafi was capable of. He murdered the police officer on the street of 
London; he managed to blow up an airliner over the skies of Lockerbie; he gave Semtex 
to the IRA”. Cameron thus drew an immediate relationship between intervention in Libya 
against the Gaddafi regime which had committed acts of violence within the borders of 
the UK.  
 It is also significant that Cameron (2011e) addressed whether Libya was 
“another Iraq”. He drew important distinctions between Iraq and Libya on the basis that 
the intervention in Libya will not involve “an occupation force”, its clear Chapter VII 
mandate, and the backing from Arab states (Cameron, 2011e). This shows how the 
126 
 
government was still learning from the legacy of New Labour’s foreign policy and its 
attempts to distinguish itself from previously controversial interventions, such as Iraq. 
Later reflecting on this subject, Cameron (2019, p.275) acknowledged that “Iraq casts a 
shadow over all foreign policy – every intervention is seen through the prism of its 
failures. But it was Bosnia that was at the forefront of my mind as I discussed with Ed 
Miliband how to respond to the crisis”. This shows the challenge UK governments faced 
in justifying interventions in the backdrop of the Iraq War. It is also an important 
dimension of UK foreign policy change on intervention where the post-2010 government 
was explicitly attempting to distance from previous controversial interventions in order 
to make the case for action. Cameron’s direct reference to the differences between the 
Iraq and Libya interventions is testament to this change in presenting how the government 
had learned from what happened through being clearer on the basis and nature of its 
actions.  
 
5.2.4 Regime change and the national interest  
The UK government has been quick to dismiss any suggestions that regime change was 
an objective from the outset of the intervention (FCO, 2011m).
21
 Yet the government is 
highly unlikely to openly accept that regime change had been a motivation for action from 
the beginning, especially because of the political and diplomatic implications of this. The 
findings from a Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry on the Libya intervention suggested 
that “a intervention to protect civilians drifted into a policy of regime change by military 
means” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016b, p.5). Whilst not an initial target, this suggests 
that regime change was a chance that intervening forces took advantage of following their 
intervention. 
 Giving evidence to the same inquiry, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord David 
Richards, suggested that “at some point regime change, in shorthand, became the accepted 
means of ensuring that the civilian population of Libya would not be threatened into the 
long term, so it became, as I said, an ineluctable change of mission, for me” (Lord 
Richards in Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016c). This statement supports the government’s 
official position that regime change was a fluid part of the intervention as it progressed 
rather than an objective from the beginning. It is possible to draw out the broader role of 
 
21  The suggestion that regime change was an objective from the beginning was also rejected in a 
research interview (author interview 10), which adopted a similar stance to Lord Richards.  
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the national interest in regard to the evidence from Lord Richards, since the view that the 
civilian population of Libya would not be threatened into the long term is part of the same 
government rhetoric on its national interest in Libya. That is, securing the immediate 
protection of civilians against the Gaddafi regime equally contributes to the long-term 
protection and the security of the UK and the international community more broadly. 
 A further issue with the removal of the Gaddafi regime was the ambiguity of 
resolution 1973, which did not specify that regime change would occur, but equally did 
not rule it out (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016b). Although the protection of civilians 
was a clear rhetorical objective of the UK’s intervention in Libya, it is still important to 
consider the role of other motivations for the intervention because of the removal of the 
Gaddafi regime following the NATO-led intervention and its potential consequences for 
future interventions, including in Syria (see section 5.3).  
 To conclude this section, the Libya case shows that there is an important 
connection between the UK’s commitment to human protection and the government’s 
awareness of projecting its perspective that the UK retains its status as a central actor on 
the international stage. This was demonstrated through the UK’s leadership on drafting 
resolutions 1970 and 1973 alongside its military provisions for the NATO-led 
intervention. The UK government was not compelled to lead on the response to Libya, 
which is a further demonstration of its attempts to show that the UK remains an important 
international actor. To achieve this, the UK government’s liberal conservative approach 
to the crisis reflected several role conceptions (ally, military power, global leader) and 
performances (military intervention and diplomacy in multilateral institutions) (Gaskarth, 
2014, p.578), which were consistent with the position of a pragmatic liberal 
internationalist. Whilst liberal conservatism was the government’s attempt to distance 
from the legacy of New Labour’s foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan, the core 
underlying features of its commitment to human protection have remained as strong as the 
period under New Labour government from 1997. This demonstrates a sustained change 
that has occurred in UK foreign policy in which its commitment to human protection since 
New Labour has been strengthened in rhetoric and action during the government’s 
contributions to the Libya intervention in 2011. 
 
5.3 Liberal conservatism and human protection in Syria, 2011-2014  
A month after the outbreak of protests in Libya, the Arab Spring uprisings had spread to 
Syria. Similar to the peaceful protests against the Gaddafi regime in Libya, the protests by 
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Syrian civilians against President Assad’s administration were met with brute force 
(Momani and Hakak, 2016, p.896). What started as protests turned into one of the most 
pressing foreign policy concerns for the remainder of the Conservative-led Coalition 
government and for successive Conservative governments (see chapter 6). This section 
analyses the UK government’s approach to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, with a 
particular focus on the period between 2011 to 2014 which charts the initial outbreak of 
the violence to the government’s parliamentary defeat of its proposal for humanitarian 
intervention in Syria on 29 August 2013 and the aftermath of this decision. The central 
argument is that human protection debates on Syria revealed the government’s preference 
for humanitarian intervention as its legal basis for action, which ultimately proved an 
important aspect of its subsequent downfall in failing to gain authorisation from 
parliamentarians. Whilst prevented from conducting a humanitarian intervention, the UK 
government performed actions on humanitarian assistance that reflected its willingness 
demonstrate human protection leadership beyond direct coercive action.    
 This section first examines the core UK government rhetoric on Syria, which is 
followed by a specific focus on the government’s human protection rhetoric and a 
comparison to its position on Libya in 2011. It then analyses parliamentary debates on the 
government’s approach to human protection in Syria on the basis that parliament had a 
critical role through voting against humanitarian intervention in 2013. This latter focus on 
humanitarian intervention is discussed at length according to the argument that it had a 
significant impact on the decision not to intervene by force in Syria in 2013 based on both 
domestic and international constraints on the UK government’s actions. The section 
finishes with an analysis of the broader themes of the UK’s place in the world, human 
protection, and the national interest in Syria. 
   
5.3.1 Core UK government rhetoric on Syria  
The complexity of the UK’s response to Syria is shown in the range of government 
rhetoric on the crisis. Figure 13 presents the findings from word frequency and keyword 
searches on the government’s rhetoric in 355 speeches, statements, media interviews, and 





22  Following keyword searches in  NVivo on (1) Assad/Asad; (2) Democracy/democratic; (3) 
End violence/end to the violence/ending violence; (5) Transition; and (6) Chemical weapons.  
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Figure 13. Core government rhetoric on Syria, 2011-2014 
 
Source: Gov.uk and Digital National Archives 
 
As figure 13 shows, there are 6 keywords that the UK referred to on the crisis between 
2011 and 2014. Whilst human rights and democracy are reflective of the government’s 
liberal conservative foreign policy, frequent references to transition, end violence, 
chemical weapons, and Assad are part of the UK’s broader response to the crisis. The UK 
government’s initial response was to condemn the violence against protestors through 
drawing on references to “end the violence”, which accounted for 7% of the references to 
the keywords in figure 14 (FCO, 2012c; FCO, 2012f; FCO, 2012h; Hague, 2012).
23
 This 
rhetoric was intertwined with the UK government’s condemnation of human right abuses 
which featured in 17% of the 544 keyword references (figure 14). Hague, for instance, 
commented that the UK “condemn unequivocally the human rights violations and abuses 
committed by all parties, including those by armed rebels” (FCO, 2012i); and the need to 
“deter human rights violations and atrocities” (FCO, 2012b). 
 
 
23  Note: Hague did make reference to a “responsibility to protect demonstrators” FCO. 2011d. 
Foreign Secretary condemns the killing of demonstrators by the Syrian security forces. 
[Online]. [Accessed: 6 Feburary 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-condemns-the-killing-of-
demonstrators-by-the-syrian-security-forces - This was excluded from the findings as it was 
not in reference to R2P, but simply a rhetorical overlap. See appendix 2 for full details of the 















Figure 14. % share of government rhetoric on Syria, 2011-2014 
 
Connected with this rhetoric on ending violence and protecting human rights is another 
predominant aspect of the UK government’s core rhetoric on democracy, Assad, and 
transition. As regime violence against civilians escalated, UK rhetoric shifted from its 
immediate focus on ending violence towards the non-violent removal of the Assad regime 
(FCO, 2012g). To achieve this, Syria would undergo a political transition from the Assad 
regime to an eventual democratic government, hence the important connection between 
the three concepts of Assad (35% of references), transition (15%) and democracy (5%). 
According to Cameron (2012a), “the only way out of Syria’s nightmare is to move forward 
towards political transition”. The outcome was to allow Syrian civilians “to develop their 
vision for a stable, democratic Syria” (FCO, 2012k). According to Ralph et al. (2017, 
p.881), it was during this period that UK “policymakers accepted regime change as 
inevitable”. As the evidence so far shows, the UK government saw the situation in Syria 
as following several steps from a transition of power, an end to violence, and the election 
of a democratic government, which would involve a change in regime from the Assad 
government.  
 
5.3.2 The government’s rhetoric on human protection in Syria  
This optimistic government rhetoric that a democratic transition of power could occur in 
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on a peaceful transition of power from Assad within the broader context of the Arab 
Spring uprisings from 2010.
24
 The UK had already been part of the military intervention 
in Libya that had resulted in the removal of the Gaddafi regime. It is plausible to argue 
that the UK government subsequently had the impression that they could also remove 
another repressive regime from power in Syria following the events in Libya.  
 However, as figure 13 illustrated, chemical weapons in particular had a 
significant role in the complexity of the crisis in Syria in comparison to Libya in 2011. 
The qualitative content analysis of 355 foreign policy speeches on Syria show that 
chemical weapons were the basis of the UK’s commitment to human protection. In 
accounting for 21% of the references in figure 14, chemical weapons were frequently 
mentioned. The UK government’s primary concern was the threat that the stockpiling and 
potential use of these weapons posed for Syrian civilians and broader international peace 
and security. Hague suggested that the “use of chemical weapons would be utterly 
unacceptable” (FCO, 2012a); and called on the UN to launch an investigation into 
“allegations of the use of chemical and biological weapons” (FCO, 2012a). Later writing 
on this issue, Cameron (2019, p.459) suggested that it was the chemical weapons attack 
in Ghouta on 21 August 2013 that triggered the UK’s resort to pushing for a military 
intervention in Syria, particularly because he believed this use of chemical weapons 
crossed Obama’s red line on action.  
 In an interview two days prior to the parliamentary vote on intervention, 
Cameron (2013b) set out his position that “any action we take or others take would have 
to be legal, would have to be proportionate. It would have to be specifically to deter and 
degrade the future use of chemical weapons”. In this sense, Cameron proposed another 
limited intervention like the one in Libya two years earlier. As figure 15 shows, the 
government’s reference to the PoC was consistent with its approach to Libya in remaining 
at the forefront of its human protection rhetoric on Syria (FCO, 2012k; Hague, 2013b; 
Hague, 2013c).  
 
 
24  Author interview 10. 
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Figure 15. Comparing government protection rhetoric on Libya and Syria  
Source: Gov.uk and Digital National Archives 
 
The critical difference with Libya, however, are the 3 government references to 
humanitarian intervention in Syria. Whilst small in number, these references had a 
significant impact on the UK government’s rhetorical framing of the intervention in Syria 
and the presentation of its case to parliament following its recall in August 2013. 
Addressing parliament on 29 August 2013, Cameron noted “that the use of chemical 
weapons is a war crime under customary law and a crime against humanity, and that the 
principle of humanitarian intervention provides a sound legal basis for taking action” 
(Hansard HC Deb., 29 August 2013). Cameron was thus arguing that there is a connection 
between the use of chemical weapons and the humanitarian suffering they inflict, which 
leads to the argument that a humanitarian intervention should be authorised in order to 
remove these weapons, and thus, protect Syrian civilians and the broader international 
community.   
 It is essential to understand the importance of this appeal to humanitarian 
intervention within the broader geopolitical context of Syria. The removal of the Gaddafi 
regime in Libya in 2011 generated controversy among the powers on the UN Security 
Council between the US, UK, France (P3) and Russia and China (P2) (Paris, 2014, p.540; 
Garwood-Gowers, 2016, p.89). When Syria reached the UN Security Council, this divide 
between the positions of the P3 and P2 came to the fore again (Morris, 2013, p.1275). 













“implicitly supported the Assad narrative of terrorists causing insecurity and civilian 
death” (Momani and Hakak, 2016, p.897). This is in addition to Russia’s “strategic, 
geopolitical, economic relations with Assad” (Momani and Hakak, 2016, p.897). Russia 
has subsequently used its veto power on 14 occasions so far on Syria (Security Council 
Report, 2020), which has ultimately prevented direct coercive measures being taken 
against the Assad regime.  
 This broader international dynamic explains the UK’s pursuit of humanitarian 
intervention as its legal basis for action. The government’s official legal position on Syria 
was that  
 
“If action in the Security Council is blocked, the UK would still be 
permitted under international law to take exceptional measures in order to 
alleviate the scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria 
by deterring and disrupting the further use of chemical weapons by the 
Syrian regime. Such a legal basis is available, under the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention” (Prime Minister's Office, 2013).  
 
The government’s legal position thus activated the third principle of the 2011 Defence 
Doctrine that “a limited use of force may be justifiable without the UN Security Council’s 
express authorisation where that is the only means to avert an immediate and 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe” (Ministry of Defence, 2011, pp.1b-1). This 
position on humanitarian intervention was markedly similar to New Labour’s intervention 
in Kosovo in 1999, where Blair adopted the same stance in calling for humanitarian 
intervention outside of the conventional legal channels of self-defence or a Chapter VII 
resolution (Blair, 1999a).  
 
5.3.3 Parliamentary debate on the government’s approach to Syria  
In contrast to the Chapter VII mandated intervention in Libya in 2011, the UK government 
sought permission for its limited humanitarian intervention in Syria from parliament. As 
figure 16 shows, human protection was discussed significantly more in parliament given 
the size of the House of Lords and the House of Commons as well as the open forum for 





Figure 16. Parliamentary rhetoric on human protection in Syria, 2011-2014 
 
Source: Hansard online 
 
The results of keyword searches on parliamentary rhetoric in figure 16 are interesting 
because the PoC hardly features in the rhetoric of parliamentarians compared to 
humanitarian intervention and the R2P. On human protection in Syria then, a significant 
element of debate was the relationship between the R2P and humanitarian intervention. 
The initial position from MPs was that the Syrian regime had failed to uphold its R2P 
(Hansard HC Deb., 29 August 2013). John Baron MP declared that the R2P “could have 
been invoked 100,000 lives ago” (Hansard HC Deb., 29 August 2013); while Lord Hannay 
declared that “inaction would make a complete mockery of the international norm of the 
responsibility to protect” (Hansard HC Deb., 29 August 2013). The fundamental issue 
amongst parliamentarians was the confusion and conflation in the relationship between 
the R2P and humanitarian intervention (Newman, 2013a). Sir Menzies Campbell MP 
commented that on Syria “we turn to what was once called humanitarian intervention and 
now is called responsibility to protect” (Hansard HL Deb., 29 August 2013); and Lord 
Carlile mentioned “the government’s legal advice that the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, or responsibility to protect, as it is sometimes called” (Hansard HL Deb., 29 
August 2013). These MPs were thus unaware that coercive intervention through the R2P 
must have a Chapter VII resolution from the UN Security Council, which is not required 









 Those MPs that recognised this distinction emphasised the legally dubious 
grounding of the government’s position. Conservative MP, Richard Ottaway, suggested 
that “There is no precedent for an intervention in what is essentially a civil war” (Hansard 
HC Deb., 23 May 2013); and later that “Taking sides in what is essentially a civil war has 
no legal precedent and no legal authority” (Hansard HC Deb. 11 July 2013). Labour MP, 
John McDonald, stated that according to humanitarian intervention “It must be 
objectively clear that there is no practical alternative to the use of force if lives are to be 
saved. I do not believe that it has been demonstrated that all practical alternatives have 
been exhausted” (Hansard HC Deb., 29 August 2013). The UK government thus faced 
notable legal challenges to its position on humanitarian intervention, which was 
unconvincing to some MPs. As Newman (2013a) suggests, the UK’s legal position 
“appears to rest upon a customary norm of humanitarian intervention: but this is 
absolutely not generally accepted as a tenant of international law” (emphasis in original). 
Similarly, Ralph (2014a, p.25) acknowledges “a strong moral argument for by-passing 
the Security Council when it fails to authorise measures, including the use of force, that 
are necessary to prevent or end mass atrocity”. Whilst Ralph (2014a, p.25) suggests that 
“for some the UK may be seen to be acting as a ‘norm entrepreneur’” through advancing 
its own legal stance on humanitarian intervention, the UK’s legal position on 
humanitarian intervention remains disputed both domestically and internationally as 
discussed in chapter 4 (Henderson, 2015; Betti, 2020; Butchard, 2020; Kleczkowska, 
2020; Newman, 2021).   
 In the case of Syria, the UK government was adamant of its legal basis for 
intervention, despite its significant legal implications. Yet according to Merle (2005, 
p.62), “humanitarian interventions lack prima facie the legitimacy of international law”. 
Whilst there is a case for intervention without a chapter VII mandate through self-defence 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter, humanitarian interventions without such a basis are 
considered as violating international law. As the previous chapter showed, the most 
notable example was the 1999 NATO-led Intervention in Kosovo without a Chapter VII 
mandate, which was deemed illegal (The Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo, 2000, p.4). Whilst the UK was attempting to strongly commit to human 
protection in the face of mass atrocities in Syria, its continued pursuit of humanitarian 
intervention against prevailing legal opinion risks undermining its claims on the 




5.3.4 The government’s human protection actions in Syria  
Although immediate coercive intervention was prevented in Syria following the 
government’s parliamentary defeat in August 2013, the UK continued to lead on the 
response to the crisis through alternative means, including trying to gain humanitarian 
access in Syria. Cameron (2013a) was “proud…that Britain is leading an international 
effort at the United Nations to secure unfettered humanitarian access inside Syria”. While 
Hague (2013d) was “determined to encourage and lead international efforts to alleviate 
human suffering in Syria and the region”. The UK did illustrate its leadership on Syria 
through its non-coercive intervention in the form of funding and humanitarian aid. The 
UK provided its largest ever humanitarian contribution of £400 million to Syria, which 
was double its previous record at the time (DFID, 2013). This support included £8.5 
million for medical supplies (FCO, 2012e); over £30 million on refugee protection (FCO, 
2013c); and £20 million contribution to various civil society and activist groups in Syria 
(FCO, 2013d).  
 Beyond direct military intervention, the UK was able and willing to demonstrate 
international leadership on Syria through drawing on its aid capacity in order to provide 
human protection. According to Cameron (2019, p.467), Syria was “the great 
humanitarian cause of the decade, and Britain was not found wanting”. A particularly 
important aspect of his later comments on Syria was that “while it is fashionable to talk 
about the UK’s shrunken role in the world – even more so after we lost that Commons 
vote in August 2013 – we cannot underplay the importance of our leadership on these 
other vital things” (Cameron, 2019, p.467 ). Cameron was thus well aware of the broader 
debates that the 2013 parliamentary defeat had generated on the UK’s place in the world, 
especially his reference to the idea of the UK’s relative international decline and the need 
to show that it was still capable of international leadership.  
 
5.3.5 The UK’s place in the world and human protection in Syria 
This concern from Cameron on the implications of the government’s defeat on Syria is 
significant for the broader relationship between the UK’s place in the world and sustained 
changes in its commitment to human protection. As outlined in section 5.1.2, an essential 
aspect of the government’s liberal conservative foreign policy between 2010 and 2015 
was challenging domestic and international perspectives on the UK’s relative decline 
through demonstrating its continued leadership credentials on the international stage. It 
subsequently emphasised this commitment to leadership through its contributions to 
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human protection and humanitarian assistance. When it came to Syria, Cameron’s (2019) 
perspective shows that the government was acutely aware of the importance of the UK’s 
response to human protection in Syria as a demonstration of its broader commitment to 
leadership. For instance, during a Chatham House (2014, p.4) working group meeting on 
the implications of the 2013 parliamentary vote for UK foreign policy, “some argued that 
the government considered military action in Syria in part because of the notion that the 
United Kingdom ought to take such actions, commensurate with its international role as a 
major power”. This is similar to the “great power” role orientation based on the role 
conceptions of being a “military power”, “reliable ally” and “global policeman” through 
the UK’s attempts to intervene in Syria (Gaskarth, 2014, p.590).  
 More fundamentally however, Gaskarth (2016, p.719) argues that the framing of 
the 2013 parliamentary vote as a “fiasco” and debating the political reasons why action 
did not occur “are understandable as ways of avoiding the trauma of Britain’s decline”. 
The government’s defeat brought attention to the relationship between the perspective of 
political elites that the UK should demonstrate its leadership and influence on the 
international stage as a military power, and domestic and international factors, including 
economic challenges, the failure to generate consensus amongst the public on military 
action, and the broader politics of the UN Security Council veto all constraining the UK’s 
ability to militarily intervene (Gaskarth, 2016, pp.730-731). The framing of the vote as a 
fiasco thus enables the UK government to evade having to face these broader challenges 
of a transitional foreign policy, whilst drawing on its non-coercive actions in Syria to 
demonstrate its continued leadership role. Whilst Strong (2015, pp.1138-1139) argues that 
the parliamentary defeat does not signal an end to UK interventions, it shows that “public 
and parliament alike will back military action only if they think it is consistent with a 
fairly conservative account of Britain’s global role, if it looks both necessary and 
justifiable under international law, and if they think it will work”. This perspective further 
supports Gaskarth’s (2016) thesis on the broader implications of the 2013 Syria vote for 
the challenges facing UK foreign policy and its place in the world after the Syria vote. 
 As in Libya, the UK government did attempt to draw on the national interest as a 
defence of its actions in order to generate public and parliamentary approval for action in 
Syria. Chemical weapons were vital in this regard, with the government arguing that these 
weapons posed a significant threat to international peace and security, and more 
specifically, UK security (Hague, 2013b). However, this rhetoric on the national interest 
proved insufficient to gain public and parliamentary approval in the case of Syria. 
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Following the parliamentary defeat, Cameron (2019, p.465) suggests that he, Nick Clegg, 
and George Osbourne were “not wide-eyed liberal interventionists, but people who 
believed a line had been crossed by a chemical-weapons attack. We were militarily, 
legally and morally entitled to respond. But democratically we were not”. However, Syria 
evidenced how UK foreign policy on human protection was in transition as part of the 
increased difficultly in persuading a domestic and international audience on the need to 
military intervene, and the broader view of the UK’s relative international decline as a 
military power (Gaskarth, 2016).  
 
5.4 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the assessment of the relationship between the UK’s 
commitment to human protection and its transitional foreign policy between 2010 and 
2015 through an integrated content analysis of 355 primary materials. Its main finding is 
that adjustments in the UK’s place in the world as part of a transitional foreign policy have 
translated into sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human in rhetoric and action 
since 1997. The first piece of evidence in support of this finding is the Conservative-led 
government’s attachment to a liberal conservative foreign policy as distinct from New 
Labour’s liberal internationalism. The chapter has argued that despite this shift to liberal 
conservatism, its approach to human protection has retained an underlying commitment 
to the same core liberal values championed in the foreign policy of successive New Labour 
government’s between 1997 and 2010.  
 Section 5.1 argued that liberal conservatism was part of David Cameron and 
William Hague’s efforts to learn and distance a Conservative foreign policy from their 
New Labour predecessors following the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. This 
foreign policy distancing occurred while simultaneously attempting to counter the notion 
of the UK’s relative international decline by not ruling out future UK involvements in 
international interventions. However, this chapter finds that this consistent commitment 
to core liberal values in UK foreign policy across the ideological political spectrum is 
evidence of an underlying sustained change that has occurred in the UK’s commitment to 
human protection since 1997 and has continued throughout the period between 2010 and 
2015.  
 An important finding which strengthens the argument that there has been a 
sustained change in the UK’s commitment to human protection from New Labour to the 
Conservative-led Coalition is the implementation of these core liberal values in action 
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during the crises in Libya and Syria. Section 5.2 showed that the UK government’s 
rhetoric and actions on Libya were attuned to a liberal internationalist approach to 
democracy and human rights protection. For example, the UK was central to the drafting 
of resolutions 1970 and 1973, the latter of which authorised all necessary measures to 
protect civilians, in addition to providing military support to the NATO-led operation. The 
government thus largely matched its rhetorical commitment to human protection through 
its practical actions on the UN Security Council, its military capacity through troop and 
equipment supplies, and its financial assistance. The UK government was unequivocal in 
its leadership role on Libya and the demonstration of its status as an important 
international actor on human protection, and military intervention more broadly.  
 In contrast to Libya, the UK’s commitment to human protection in Syria was 
inherently more complex because it did not follow a similar process or lead to a coercive 
intervention despite the government’s efforts. While the Libya intervention was 
authorised through a Chapter VII mandate, Syria lacked the domestic and international 
consensus on intervention amid deadlock on the UN Security Council. This led the 
Cameron government to draw on humanitarian intervention in a similar manner to New 
Labour in Kosovo in 1999. The government argued that it had a clear legal basis for action 
according to humanitarian intervention, which was fundamentally against existing 
customary international law. The difference in Syria in 2013 as compared to Kosovo in 
1999 is that the government sought prior parliamentary approval for action, but its 
subsequent defeat ended any hopes of coercive humanitarian intervention at that time. 
Whilst the UK attempted to recover from the defeat through emphasising its leadership 
beyond coercive intervention, section 5.3 illustrated how the UK government in 2013 was 
at a critical juncture in the relationship between its commitment to human protection and 
attempts to demonstrate its active and important place on the international stage. Unlike 
Kosovo in 1999, the UK was unwilling to bypass the UN Security Council to intervene in 
Syria, which may suggest that the UK government was aware of the relative decline in its 
capacity to act without support from parliament.  
 Beyond the failure to gain the necessary approval to intervene in Syria, the 
government’s willingness to use humanitarian intervention as a legal basis for action is 
evidence of sustained change that has occurred in the UK’s commitment to human 
protection since 1997. The government’s legal justification provided some evidence in 
support of scenario two of a pragmatic liberal internationalist approach in being willing 
to intervene in spite of failing to receive a Chapter VII authorisation for action. The 
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findings in the next chapter reinforce this evidence of a sustained change in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in rhetoric and action through a further legal 
justification of humanitarian intervention in Syria in 2018. This is in addition to a 
sustained change in the UK’s leadership and influence on human protection in a 
transitional foreign policy as successive governments continue to adapt to the UK’s post-
war relative hard power decline, changes in the UK’s membership of multilateral 
organisations, and the UK’s position within the evolving international order. In 
comparison to 1997 to 2015, the next chapter shows how the UK’s commitment to human 
protection, and in particular, the relationship between the UK’s foreign policy interests 
and values are inherently more complicated as policymakers grapple with the challenges 
























Chapter 6 - The Conservative government’s commitment to human 
protection in rhetoric and action, 2015-2020 
       
“[A]fter the military interventionism at the beginning of the century, people 
question the rationale – and indeed legitimacy – of the use of force and 
involving ourselves in crises and conflicts that are not ours. While at the same 
time being repelled by the slaughter in Syria and our failure to end it.”   
          Theresa May, Speech to the UN General Assembly (FCO, 2018m) 
 
The 2015 UK general election returned a Conservative majority government for the first 
time since John Major. However, David Cameron’s tenure lasted little over a year before 
being replaced as Prime Minister by Theresa May following the result of the 2016 EU 
referendum. Theresa May’s appointment marked the beginning of many years of debate 
over Brexit, which came to dominate UK domestic and foreign policy throughout the 
period between 2015 and 2020. In the background, liberal conservatism remained the 
bedrock of the UK’s international outlook, with Theresa May (2018) repeating David 
Cameron’s rhetorical commitment to the liberal values of “respect for human dignity, 
human rights, freedom, democracy and equality”. The government’s rhetorical promotion 
of these values was soon put to the test with the emergence of several humanitarian crises, 
including Myanmar, Syria, and Yemen.  
This chapter continues with the analysis from chapter 5 by focusing on the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy between 2015 and 2020. 
A transitional foreign policy is again defined in relation to changes in the UK’s 
geopolitical interests, policies, and international engagements between 1997 and 2020, 
which is shaped by the adaptation of successive governments to the UK’s post-war 
relative hard power decline, the UK’s membership, leadership, and influence in core 
multilateral organisations, and the UK’s position within the evolving international order.  
A transitional foreign policy is expressed in changing patterns of policy behaviour, 
changing administrative apparatus, and elite UK political rhetoric.  
The UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy is 
therefore analysed through a content analysis of 700 primary documentary materials 
drawn from speeches, statements and debates from government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN, and parliamentarians in both the House of Lords and the House 
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of Commons, with a timeframe between 7 May 2015 and 31 December 2020. This is in 
addition to semi-structured interviews and a wealth of secondary literature from academic 
sources. Sustained change continues to be defined in relation to a shift in the UK’s foreign 
policy goals and/or methods on human protection which endures over time in the 
approach of successive governments and is continually shaped, maintained, and 
reinforced by a combination of UK government rhetoric – what is said by elite political 
agents in government – and its actions – the means and methods of protection in practice. 
The central argument of this chapter is that the period between 2015 and 2020 
provides further evidence of some sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human 
protection in rhetoric and action as part of a transitional foreign policy. The first of these 
changes is the government’s willingness to continue using humanitarian intervention as 
a legal basis for action amid international deadlock on the crisis in Syria. Additionally, 
the government continued to support core liberal values in its foreign policy on human 
rights and democracy, which it attempted to implement in Syria and Myanmar. There is 
also evidence of the government’s adaptation to a transitional foreign policy in attempting 
to lead the international response to the crises in Myanmar and Syria, while being aware 
of the government’s limited capacity for direct military action. This includes drawing on 
alternative avenues for foreign policy action in the form of substantial financial support, 
humanitarian aid, and refugee protection.  
The chapter also argues that there are some significant challenges to the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy between 2015 and 2020. 
The crises in Yemen and Myanmar expose inherent tensions in the relationship between 
the UK government’s domestic and international values and interests. In particular, the 
government’s pursuit of domestic security and prosperity shows some conflict with its 
commitment to international law, human protection, and a defence of the rules-based 
international order. For example, the crisis in Yemen shows a strain between the UK’s 
geopolitical and economic interests in trade and the protection of civilians from mass 
violence and atrocity crimes. This is in addition to issues with the prioritisation of some 
liberal values at the expense of others as shown by the relationship between democracy 
promotion and human rights protection in Myanmar. Domestic interests are integral to 
UK foreign policy, yet the previous New Labour and Coalition governments have 
managed to combine these domestic interests with international liberal values.   
The chapter is split into five main sections. The first addresses the continuation of 
liberal conservatism in UK foreign policy and the government’s commitment to human 
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protection. The second then applies this focus to the first case study on the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in rhetoric and action in Syria between 2015 and 2018. 
Sections three and four address the empirical cases of human protection in Myanmar 
(2016-2017) and Yemen (2015-2020), with the final section then analysing the broader 
significance of the relationship between human protection, trade, and the UK’s place in 
the world in order to conclude on the implications of the chapter for the research aim, 
objectives, research questions, and hypothesis.  
This chapter makes three significant contributions to the thesis. Firstly, it 
continues to apply the analytical framework of sustained foreign policy change to 
empirically assess the UK’s commitment to human protection in its transitional foreign 
policy. This in turn contributes to fulfilling the research aim on the relationship between 
human protection and the UK’s transitional foreign policy, the four research objectives, 
the theoretical and empirical research questions, and continues to provide evidence to test 
the research hypothesis. Secondly, the chapter contributes to research on the leadership 
and influence of the UK as it adapts to its changing place in the world by showing the 
different ways in which the UK has contributed to human protection amid its declining 
military capacity in the post-war era. Thirdly, the chapter shows the complexities which 
face the UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy as 
governments grapple with Brexit and the subsequent need to secure their geopolitical and 
economic interests in the evolving international order, which in turn, places pressure on 
the relationship between foreign policy interests and a commitment to liberal values.  
 
6.1 A liberal conservative foreign policy 
Following the election of a majority Conservative government in 2015, liberal 
conservatism was retained as an underlying feature of UK foreign policy. Using the same 
definition of liberal conservatism as chapter 5 according to freedom, democracy, human 
rights, and the national interest, keyword searches of the 700 primary materials returned 
257 separate references to these concepts in speeches, statements, media interviews, and 
government news reports covering Conservative ministers and representatives between 




Figure 17. Government liberal conservative rhetoric, 2015-2020 
 
Source: Gov.uk 
As figures 17 and 18 show, rhetoric on democracy was frequently mentioned in these 
documents and accounted for 33% of the total 257 references to the four concepts. 
Rhetorical references to democracy remained consistent with the approach of the 
Conservative-led Coalition government, such as emphasising the importance of 
establishing the “building blocks of democracy” as being vital to a country’s stability 
(FCO, 2015f); and supporting a transition to democracy in countries which have been 
under dictatorship (FCO, 2015b; FCO, 2016h; FCO, 2018j). Closely intertwined with this 
commitment to democracy are the liberal conservative values of freedom and human 
rights. Jeremy Hunt for example suggested that “human rights and democracy are 
fundamental to the values the UK champions on the world stage” (FCO, 2019b).  
 


























Democracy Freedom Human rights National interest
145 
 
In particular, the national interest retains a central focus in the UK’s foreign policy. In a 
2017 BBC interview, Theresa May outlined how “the May doctrine of foreign policy is 
that everything we do is in our British national interest” (Theresa May in BBC, 2017a). 
May defined this national interest as building and sustaining strong international relations 
with states in order to form economic partnerships and cooperate to protect against global 
threats (Theresa May in BBC, 2017a). This is the same emphasis on the national interest 
as identified in chapter 5 according to the interconnection between the domestic and the 
international protection of human rights, freedom, and democracy.  
As figures 17 and 18 also show, human rights remained an important feature of 
government rhetoric between 2015 and 2020 in accounting for 48% of the overall total. 
Far from human rights being downgraded in UK foreign policy between 2015 and 2020, 
human rights were firmly part of the foreign policy rhetoric of the post-2015 Conservative 
government and evidenced important consistency with the period during the 
Conservative-led Coalition. It is telling that there was no reference to liberal conservatism 
in keyword searches of the 700 primary materials, which suggests that it has either been 
abandoned by the Theresa May and Johnson governments or that it has simply become 
internalised in a Conservative UK foreign policy. The results from figures 17 and 18 
suggest it is more a case of the latter since the content analysis shows that freedom, 
democracy, human rights, and the national interest still remain core features of the 
rhetoric of a Conservative-led foreign policy between 2015 and 2020.  
 
6.1.1 The Conservatives and human protection, 2015-2020  
The UK’s more specific commitment to human protection is further evidence of the 
government’s continued emphasis on the importance of human rights between 2015 and 
2020. The results from keyword searches on the PoC, R2P, and atrocity prevention, 
evidence some consistency with the Conservative-led Coalition government’s rhetorical 
commitment to human protection. However, the difference with the post-2015 period is 
that the overwhelming majority of references to human protection were made by UK 
foreign policy agents beyond the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.  
Out of the 700 primary materials, the PoC was directly mentioned on 70 occasions 
by government ministers and diplomats.
25
 These actors emphasised that the POC “is a 
 
25  PoC code variations included protecting civilians/protection of civilians/civilian 
protection/protect civilians    
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vital tool in ensuring humanity remains even in the worst of conflict situations” (FCO, 
2019j). Although being mentioned on only 14 occasions, government ministers and 
diplomats underlined the UK’s support for the R2P (FCO, 2016i; FCO, 2016k; FCO, 
2019f). Speaking at the UN General Assembly, UK ambassador Peter Wilson outlined 
that “the United Kingdom has been a strong advocate of responsibility to protect ever 
since the 2005 World Summit” and continues to uphold this commitment (FCO, 2015h). 
In its 2019 policy paper on atrocity prevention, the UK government declared that it 
“remains an active supporter of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect” (FCO, 
2019i). Alongside the PoC and R2P, atrocity prevention also started to receive attention 
in UK rhetoric on protection in the post-2015 period. Whilst it did not feature in UK 
foreign policy rhetoric between 2010 and 2015, atrocity prevention featured in the 
Conservative Party’s Kigali Declaration against Genocide and Identity-Based Violence 
(The Conservative Party, 2017, p.31). Similarly, the 2017 Human Rights and Democracy 
Report outlined the government’s “support for mass atrocity prevention” (FCO, 2018i, 
p.19). This was proceeded by the publication of the government’s 2019 policy paper on 
atrocity prevention, which continued to outline a very similar position to the one 
previously adopted on the R2P in terms of its full rhetorical endorsement (FCO, 2019i).  
Rhetorically at least, human protection thus remained part of UK foreign policy 
with the government and its representatives reinforcing the UK’s commitment to 
protecting populations from mass violence and atrocity crimes. The remainder of this 
chapter focuses on this rhetoric on human protection and its translation into foreign policy 
actions through drawing on the cases of Syria (2015-2018), Myanmar (2016-2017), and 
Yemen (2015-2020).  
 
6.2 UK Rhetoric and action on human protection in Syria, 2015-2018 
Over four years since it started, the civil war in Syria remained central to UK foreign 
policy on human protection from 2015 to 2018. During this period, the UK government 
conducted two limited interventions in Syria, which presented a marked change from the 
parliamentary vote against intervention in 2013. This section focuses on government 
rhetoric and action according to two periods: the first from 2015-2017, and the second in 
2018. It finds that between 2015 and 2017, human protection was part of the 
government’s rhetoric, but that the national interest was the primary rhetorical means 
through which the government justified the use of force against the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS). In 2018, the government used humanitarian intervention as the legal 
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basis for airstrikes against chemical weapons facilities in Syria, which is markedly similar 
to its unsuccessful attempt to intervene on humanitarian grounds in 2013. This shows 
consistently with a sustained change that has occurred since at least 1997 in the UK’s 
willingness to use humanitarian intervention as a basis of its foreign policy action to 
protect populations from atrocity crimes. It is argued that this commitment to 
humanitarian intervention is an element of UK leadership on human protection, despite 
the political and legal contestation over whether states have a right to intervene in other 
sovereign states without a Chapter VII resolution or through self-defence under Article 
51.   
 
6.2.1 Core UK government rhetoric on the Syria crisis, 2015-2017 
As chapter 5 also showed, the government’s rhetoric on the crisis in Syria focused on a 
combination of democracy promotion, human rights protection, an end to the violence, 
and chemical weapons. By comparison however, the period between 2015 and 2017 
presented an important change in government rhetoric on the crisis in Syria. As figure 19 
shows, the government between 2015 and 2017 placed considerable emphasis on 
countering ISIS which had emerged in Syria.
26
 Keyword searches of 700 government 
foreign policy speeches, statements, media interviews, and government news reports 
found 68 references to ISIS in 120 documents. Cameron suggested that ISIS posed an 
additional threat in Syria alongside the Assad regime in declaring that Syrians “now face 
2 enemies at home – Assad and ISIL” (FCO, 2015g). Similarly, Philip Hammond 
identified what he argued were “the twin evils of Assad’s murderous regime and the 
brutality of ISIL” (FCO, 2015e).   
 
 
26  Keyword searches on ISIS also included its variations of ISIL/IS/"Daesh, which were used 




Figure 19. Core UK government rhetoric on the Syria crisis, 2015-2017 
Source: Gov.uk 
 
The government’s rhetoric on Assad was intertwined with an emphasis on the UK’s vision 
of a “transition away from the murderous regime of Assad” (FCO, 2015d). This is a 
similar stance to the rhetorical focus on a transition to democracy during the 
Conservative-led Coalition government between 2011 and 2014 in the previous chapter. 
Beyond ISIS, chemical weapons remained a consistent feature of UK rhetoric across 
governments since 2011. This was because there were further allegations of the use of 
chemical weapons by the Syrian regime throughout this period of the civil war. As 
Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson condemned the use of chemical weapons as “horrific, 
and a breach of international law” (FCO, 2016g). Theresa May argued that the alleged 
use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime meant “we [the international community] 
have a responsibility to stand up, to hold the Syrian regime to account” (FCO, 2017j).  
However, the post-2015 Conservative government faced the same dilemma of 
deadlock in the UN Security Council on Syria, despite the UK arguing in favour of 
accountability for the Syrian regime’s alleged use of chemical weapons (FCO, 2016g; 
FCO, 2017f; FCO, 2017j). In this regard, Boris Johnson mentioned his frustration on 
Syria because “Russia has consistently chosen to cover up for Asad” through using its 
veto power (FCO, 2017c). Whilst only a snapshot of the government’s rhetorical 
references, this focus on Russia’s actions at the UN Security Council is particularly 















draws a clear line between us trying to protect populations from mass violence and 
atrocity crimes (US, UK and France) and them (Russia and Syria), which are preventing 
action. Second, highlighting Russia’s use of the veto draws increasing attention to the 
deadlock in the UN Security Council and that potentially alternative routes for action have 
to be considered. As the two later examples of UK intervention in 2015 and 2018 show, 
the UK had to take actions without the prior authorisation of the UN Security Council 
amid its paralysis on how to resolve the civil war, which shows how this framing of 
Russia’s position on the UN Security Council was critical for the government’s legal 
position on military action in 2015 and 2018.  
 
6.2.2 Government rhetoric on protection in Syria, 2015-2017 
In terms of the UK’s rhetorical commitment to human protection in Syria between 2015 
and 2017, this focused exclusively on the PoC. As figure 20 shows, the PoC was 
mentioned 16 times in the 700 speeches, statements, media interviews, and government 
news reports analysed for chapter 6. Boris Johnson for instance reminded all actors 
involved in the siege of Aleppo to “change course to protect civilians” (FCO, 2016b); that 
the international community’s “first priority [in Syria] must be the protection of civilians” 
(FCO, 2016d); and that actors within Syria should uphold resolution 2328 by protecting 
civilians (FCO, 2016f). Such rhetorical statements remained consistent with the Coalition 
government’s emphasis on the PoC in relation to the crises in Libya in 2011 and Syria in 
2013. As figure 20 shows, the government’s rhetorical focus on the PoC has remained 
consistent when compared to the period between 2011 to 2013, but that the R2P and 
humanitarian intervention were notably absent. 
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It is plausible to explain the absence of references to humanitarian intervention on the 
basis that between 2015 and 2017 it was not required as a legal justification for UK action 
beyond the UN Security Council, which means there was no real added value in 
mentioning it. This is similar to the situation in Libya in 2011, which already commanded 
authorisation through a chapter VII mandate in resolution 1973. On the R2P, the UK’s 
Permanent Representative to the UN, Matthew Rycroft, emphasised that “we [UN 
member states] must redouble our efforts on R2P for their [Syrian civilians] sakes” (FCO, 
2016i). Whilst successive UK Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries primarily focused 
their rhetoric on the terrorist threat posed by ISIS, the alleged atrocities of the Assad 
regime, chemical weapons, and Russia, human protection remained a feature, albeit a 
more limited one in UK government rhetoric on Syria. This finding is important because 
it shows how the UK’s commitment to human protection in Syria is functioning alongside 
a range of other concerns. Whilst the underlying human protection dynamic remains in 
Syria, namely from the threat posed by chemical weapons, ISIS, and the Assad regime, 
the rhetoric of Cameron, May, Hammond, and Johnson, has principally focused on these 
immediate threats as contributing to a broader human protection crisis in Syria.  
 
6.2.3 Parliamentary rhetoric on human protection in Syria, 2015-2017 
Parliament’s engagement with Syria between 2015 and 2017 shows that human protection 
remained an important feature of UK foreign policy rhetoric beyond the government. As 
argued in chapter 5, Parliament’s view on the UK’s commitment to human protection is 
particularly important following its decision to vote against approving military action on 
humanitarian grounds in Syria in 2013. It is an important environment for MPs and 
Members of the House of Lords to scrutinise UK foreign policy on human protection and 
debate the government’s humanitarian response. As figure 21 shows, when compared to 
the government’s rhetorical references to human protection, parliamentarians made direct 
reference to the R2P and PoC much more frequently in debates. These references 
stemmed from the failure to implement the R2P in Syria to its legal basis for action. The 
Shadow Foreign Secretary, Hillary Benn MP, underlined how Syria is what the R2P 
should have been focused on addressing but that “in Syria, no responsibility has been 
taken and nobody has been protected” (Hansard HC De., 9 September 2015). In 
referencing the alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria, Mary Creagh 
MP, suggested that “the UN doctrine of the responsibility to protect allows military 
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intervention to protect civilians from genocide and war crimes by their state and provides 
a valid legal basis for intervention” (Hansard HC Deb., 11 October 2016).  
 
Figure 21. Comparing government and parliamentary rhetoric on Syria 
 
Source: Gov.uk and Hansard online  
As for the PoC, which was mentioned on 41 occasions in both houses, Jo Cox MP, 
mentioned that “our [UK’s] failure to intervene to protect civilians left Assad at liberty to 
escalate both the scale and the ferocity of his attacks on innocent Syrians in a desperate 
attempt to cling to power” (Hansard HC Deb., 12 October 2015). Alison McGovern MP 
suggested that the “Government need an urgent strategy to protect civilians” (Hansard 
HC Deb., 28 November 2016). With both the R2P and PoC, these examples show a 
concern that the UK government and the international community more broadly is not 
discharging its human protection responsibilities in Syria despite the humanitarian crisis.  
Despite the lack of rhetorical references to human protection from the 
government, these findings show that human protection was still being widely referenced 
and debated in regard to the ongoing crisis in Syria between 2015 and 2017 among 
parliamentarians. This is important because of Parliament’s role in the authorisation of 
force post-August 2013 and presents a counter to any suggestion that the lack of direct 
UK government rhetoric on human protection was indicative of a relative decline in the 















6.2.4 Government human protection actions in Syria, 2015-2017 
The UK government indirectly contributed to human protection in Syria in three 
important ways. The first was the decision to extend UK airstrikes against ISIS into Syria 
following Parliamentary approval on 3 December 2015. In contrast to the August 2013 
vote, David Cameron received a strong mandate for action based on limited airstrikes 
against ISIS on the basis of “collective self-defence” under Article 51 (Foreign Affairs 
Committee, 2015, p.3). In justifying the UK’s response, David Cameron argued that 
“ISIL poses a clear threat to our own national security. We should not stand back and let 
others carry the burden and the risks of protecting our country” (Prime Minister's Office, 
2015, p.8). This was a clear appeal to the liberal conservative national interest in which 
the short-term action against ISIS should logically lead to the long-term aim of protecting 
the UK’s domestic security through countering terrorist threats to both Syrian and UK 
civilians.  
The government also had a stronger legal basis for action through Article 51 
(Prime Minister's Office, 2015, p.15). Here, the UK is very specific in its legal 
justification for action because it recognised that any attempts to intervene through the 
channel of a UN Security Council resolution would have been immediately vetoed by 
Russia. Whilst there is no immediate reference to human protection in its legal position 
on the 2015 airstrikes against ISIS, the government had consistently recognised the threat 
that ISIS posed against civilians in Syria (FCO, 2015e; FCO, 2015f). By taking action to 
remove this threat, the UK government logically contributed to protecting the Syrian 
population from further mass violence and atrocity crimes that were being committed by 
ISIS, as well as the broader international community.  
The government’s second indirect action was its contribution to protecting Syrian 
refugees. According to David Cameron, “it is absolutely right that Britain should fulfil its 
moral responsibility to help…refugees” (FCO, 2015i). Such morality derived from the 
humanitarian suffering in Syria, as well as the UK’s historical role in refugee protection 
(FCO, 2015i). The UK’s immediate prioritisation for the protection of Syrian refugees 
was a strategy of containment largely within Syria or neighbouring countries (Gilgan, 
2017, p.367; McGuinness, 2017, p.3).
27 This was supported by “over £1.1 billion in 
humanitarian aid towards the Syrian crisis and neighbouring countries hosting refugees” 
(FCO, 2015a).  
 
27  Author interviews 1 and 2.  
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Gradually, the UK’s policy on containment was supported by efforts to resettle 
refugees within the UK through the creation of the Vulnerable Persons and Vulnerable 
Children’s resettlement schemes (Hough, 2018). The government set a target of resettling 
20,000 Syrian refugees, which had reached 19,353 by February 2020 (Home Office, 
2020). Whilst the acceptance of 20,000 refugees is still not a large number relative to the 
approximately 5.5 million registered Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2020), it is still an 
important contribution to human protection beyond direct coercive action in Syria. So 
while some argue that the UK’s commitment to refugee resettlement “may not be enough 
on the moral scale”, it “may be all that is required by R2P in terms of ‘helping’ to protect 
populations from mass atrocities” (Gilgan, 2017, p.391). The UK government has thus 
been able to translate its human protection rhetoric into practical action in some instances 
through its large financial contributions and resettlement programmes amid the civil war 
in Syria.  
The third government contribution was its financial support to human protection 
efforts on the ground. The UK government founded the Conflict, Security and Stability 
Fund (CSSF) in 2015, which had an original annual budget of £1.26 billion to support the 
government’s response to issues of conflict and stability in states around the world 
(Conflict Stability and Security Fund, 2021). The 2016/17 CSSF annual report outlined 
how the Fund contributed to the training and supply of equipment to the White Helmets 
in Syria which is a humanitarian volunteer group that carries out a significant human 
protection role from searching and rescuing civilians to providing first aid (HM 
Government, 2017, p.6; The White Helmets, 2021). This demonstrates how the UK is 
able to sustain its commitment to human protection in Syria in spite of the deadlock at the 
UN Security Council which prevents a direct response from the UK and others.  
 
6.2.5 Government rhetoric and action on protection in Syria, 2018  
On 14 April 2018, the UK joined a coalition with the US and France in order to carry out 
limited airstrikes on suspected chemical weapons facilities in Syria in response to 
evidence of the use of chemical weapons in Douma a week earlier. Figure 22 presents the 
results of keyword searches on the government’s rhetoric on the 2018 airstrikes in Syria, 
with the primary focus being on the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian 
regime. A week prior to the UK’s contribution to the airstrikes, Theresa May commented 
on the 75 fatalities in Douma, which indicated “that this was a chemical weapons attack” 
(FCO, 2018m). This provided the core humanitarian basis for the UK’s willingness to use 
154 
 
limited coercive force in Syria. For example, following the action, May argued that “we 
[coalition forces] needed to intervene rapidly to alleviate further indiscriminate 
humanitarian suffering” (FCO, 2018o). In this manner, Theresa May emphasised that the 
UK’s intervention needed to be swift, which is significant on the basis that the Prime 
Minister only consulted parliament after the action was taken.  
 
Figure 22. Government rhetorical references to the airstrikes in Syria, 2018 
Source: Gov.uk 
 
It is plausible to argue that through their rhetoric, the Prime Minister was attempting to 
establish a level of legitimacy and legality for the airstrikes by highlighting the significant 
humanitarian consequences of the use of chemical weapons, and thus, the subsequent 
need for action on human protection. At the time of the airstrikes, the UN Security 
Council remained in deadlock on Syria, which means that any attempt from the UK, US, 
or France to propose a resolution in order to intervene by force without the Syrian 
regime’s consent would be automatically vetoed by Russia and China.  
Theresa May later confirmed that the UK had contributed to “military action to 
degrade the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons capability and deter their use” (FCO, 
2018n). The UK’s decision to participate in the airstrikes alongside the US and France is 
significant for this chapter for two main reasons. The first is the Prime Minister’s decision 
to bypass Parliament, with Theresa May only addressing the House of Commons two 















to the need “to alleviate the humanitarian suffering of the Syrian people” (Hansard HC 
Deb., 16 April 2018). This is in comparison to David Cameron’s parliamentary defeat on 
the government’s proposed action to deter the use of chemical weapons in August 2013. 
It is unclear why the UK government acted without prior Parliamentary approval. One 
possible explanation is that the Theresa May government was exerting its executive 
power over Parliament in order to demonstrate that it remains the leader of UK foreign 
policy action and is not required to call upon Parliament for its permission. A more 
plausible reason is the government’s justification for action according to humanitarian 
intervention which Cameron failed to convince Parliament on in 2013.  
This leads to the second reason why the UK’s contribution to the airstrikes in 
Syria is significant. The UK government’s official legal position was that it “is permitted 
under international law, on an exceptional basis, to take measures in order to alleviate 
overwhelming humanitarian suffering. The legal basis for the use of force is humanitarian 
intervention” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2018, emphasis added). This stance on the UK’s 
legal basis for intervention was based on the same three criteria as the proposed action in 
2013: 
 
“(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international 
community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, 
requiring immediate and urgent relief; (ii) it must be objectively clear that 
there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved; 
and (iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to 
the aim of relief of humanitarian suffering and must be strictly limited in 
time and in scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end 
and for no other purpose).” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2018) 
 
According to the government’s legal position, all three criteria had been met in Syria on 
the basis of (i) the extreme humanitarian suffering as a result of the persistent use of 
chemical weapons since 2013, the use of which “constitutes a war crime and a crime 
against humanity”; (ii) the deadlock in the UN Security Council meaning that a legal 
alternative for action was required amid Russia’s consistent use of the veto; and (iii) that 
the airstrikes were limited to specific targets and thus “an exceptional measure on the 
grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2018). 
Despite the 2013 decision against intervention, humanitarian intervention still remained 
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the core basis of the UK’s legal position in situations where the UK was unable to draw 
on Article 51 of collective self-defence or a Chapter VII resolution from the UN Security 
Council. The UK’s legal position on humanitarian intervention in 2018 thus remained 
consistent with the government’s view that there is a third legal avenue available for 
action as per the 2011 and 2014 editions of the UK’s Defence Doctrine.  
Addressing the House of Commons, May argued that on the basis of the legal 
“advice, we agreed that it was not just morally right but legally right to take military 
action, together with our closest allies, to alleviate further humanitarian suffering” 
(Hansard HC Deb., 16 April 2018). May was explicit that “the same three criteria used as 
the legal justification for the UK’s role in the NATO intervention in Kosovo” had been 
used in regard to the airstrikes in 2018 (Hansard HC Deb., 16 April 2018). This supports 
the argument in this chapter that there has been a sustained change in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection since 1997. More specifically, successive governments 
across the ideological spectrum of UK politics have been willing to draw on humanitarian 
intervention to legally justify UK intervention to protect populations from mass violence 
and atrocity crimes. With humanitarian intervention at least, UK foreign policy evidences 
a continuation of the government’s willingness to strengthen its commitment to human 
protection in cases of extreme humanitarian suffering, even amid a deadlocked UN 
Security Council and a lack of legally permissible avenues for action.  
 
6.2.6 Humanitarian intervention and UK leadership in Syria, 2018 
The willingness of successive governments to commit to humanitarian intervention as a 
legal basis for action raises an important point on whether this could be considered an 
aspect of UK leadership on human protection (Ralph, 2014a; Henderson, 2015; Butchard, 
2020). This is the idea that the justification of action on the basis of humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and Syria in both 2013 and 2018, indicates the UK’s 
willingness to challenge the overwhelming legal arguments against unilateral 
humanitarian intervention. This is based on the UK’s conviction that there is such a 
customary international law which states can draw on as an alternative basis to protect 
populations from mass atrocity crimes when the UN Security Council is divided and there 
is no plausible action under Article 51. As identified by the 2018 Foreign Affairs 
Committee Inquiry into the UK government’s response to Syria in 2018, humanitarian 
intervention “is a contested concept in international law” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 
2018c, p.3). The Inquiry further concluded that “there is very little support by states for 
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this legal position” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018c, p.8). However, the UK’s official 
response disagreed with the Inquiry’s conclusion by restating that “humanitarian 
intervention remains a legitimate and lawful basis for intervention” (HM Government, 
2018c). 
 The insistence by successive UK government’s that there is a legal basis for 
humanitarian intervention therefore challenges existing legal opinion. The UK’s position 
also corresponds with some arguments in defence of unilateral humanitarian intervention 
as the “least best alternative” in the face of UN Security Council deadlock (Trahan, 2017). 
This deadlock and the willingness of some states to draw on humanitarian intervention as 
a result has led some to argue in favour of an “improved legal framework” in specific 
instances of the use of chemical and biological weapons (Bell, 2018). Hughes (2018) thus 
suggests that there may be a “potential shift” in legal justifications for unilateral 
humanitarian intervention through appealing to “narrow exceptions” that warrant action, 
including the use of chemical weapons. This is reflective of the UK government’s position 
on airstrikes in Syria, which were justified explicitly on the basis of limited airstrikes to 
protect the Syrian population against the use of chemical weapons (Hansard HC Deb., 16 
April 2018). Rather than UK intervention being illegal, the UK’s Permanent UN 
Representative, Karen Pierce, argued that “it cannot be illegal to use force to prevent the 
killing of such numbers of innocent people” (FCO, 2018l). The government is thus 
drawing on the argument of extreme humanitarian suffering to support its legal claim that 
it should be able to intervene to protect the Syrian population through a humanitarian 
intervention.   
 This supports the argument that “the UK has now unequivocally established itself 
as the norm entrepreneur in the context of humanitarian intervention” (Henderson, 2015, 
p.194, emphasis in original). On successive occasions from Kosovo to Syria, the UK has 
pursued humanitarian intervention despite the “little or no explicit support for the legal 
basis of unilateral humanitarian intervention among the international community” (Buys 
and Garwood-Gowers, 2019, p.20). The UK’s willingness to draw on humanitarian 
intervention in spite of the lack of support from the international community potentially 
shows that it “may be at the forefront of a political and legal shift” (Newman, 2021, p.23). 
This shift is characterised by situations in which the deadlock on the UN Security Council 
leads to an environment in which states are increasingly willing to draw on humanitarian 
intervention beyond the UN Security Council as a basis for action. From this perspective, 
the UK has been able and willing to continue demonstrating its international leadership 
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on human protection as a form of norm entrepreneurship, even to the extent of pursuing 
humanitarian intervention against the opinion of the international community.  
 That said, some legal scholars argue that the UK’s position sets a problematic 
precedent for international law on intervention. Butchard (2020, p.27) acknowledges that 
the deadlock in the UN Security Council “is certainly a warning to the international 
community to find a path that avoids inaction. But this itself does not make an unlawful 
act become legally permissible”. The challenge again for the UK’s position on 
humanitarian intervention is that any notion of an international law cannot depend on the 
UK’s actions alone to become customary (UNA-UK, 2018b). For some, the 2018 
airstrikes are still perceived as “illegal” (Milanovic, 2018). Milanovic (2018) argues that 
“the UK’s humanitarian intervention argument is so bad even on its own terms that it is 
clear why the US and France chose to stay silent - no legal argument is in their view a 
better option that a palpably bad one”. This suggests the UK is far from generating the 
consensus for its legal position on humanitarian intervention amongst other states in the 
international community. Even if the UK is leading on humanitarian intervention, it 
exposes a fundamental tension in its support for a rules-based international order based 
upon a respect for international law (Newman, 2021, p.2).  
A further challenge to the UK’s humanitarian justification for its airstrikes in Syria 
in 2018 is the underlying motivations for its action. It has been argued that the basis of 
the UK’s response was not necessarily humanitarian concerns but rather securing 
“geopolitical objectives” in preventing states producing and using chemical and 
biological weapons (Hughes, 2018). Chinkin and Kaldor (2018) also question the UK’s 
2018 humanitarian intervention in Syria and whether it led to human protection. Prior to 
the airstrikes, states including the UK, US and France were aware of the mass atrocities 
committed against the population in Syria but had failed to intervene in 2013 and had 
only taken limited action in response to the rise of ISIS in 2015. Chinkin and Kaldor 
(2018) thus suggest that “the symbolic character of the air strikes suggest that there was 
never any serious intention to help Syrians. It was a frivolous action aimed at assuring 
public opinion that western leaders are strong” (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2018). Instead of 
human protection leadership, they argue that UK action was more a demonstration of its 
ability to use military force where it deemed necessary. For instance, Theresa May was 
unequivocal that the UK’s action was “absolutely in Britain’s national interest” (FCO, 
2018m) on the basis of preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons and protecting 
Syrian nationals. Whether the UK’s humanitarian motivations for action are convincing, 
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if the intervention did help protect the population from further mass atrocity crimes then 
it could reasonably be considered as contributing to human protection (Wheeler, 2000, 
p.40).  
The legal debates aside, the UK’s leadership in response to the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria was also extended to its diplomacy on chemical weapons, including at 
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The UK took the 
lead in pushing for a special session to be held in order to enhance the powers of the 
OPCW (FCO, 2018c; Wintour, 2018). The resulting agreement increased the powers of 
the OPCW which consists of identifying and investigating those responsible for the use 
of chemical weapons including in Syria. According to the FCO (2018c), the Foreign 
Secretary, Boris Johnson, played an active role in at the special session where he 
“personally lobbied Ministers from 25 countries” as part of the broader 82 states which 
supported the proposal. This is an important demonstration of UK leadership on Syria 
beyond the use of force in which it pursued other methods of action in the form of 
diplomacy to maintain sustained pressure on accountability for the use of chemical 
weapons, including in Syria in April 2018.   
The UK’s rhetoric and action on humanitarian intervention in Syria in 2018 
provides evidence of a sustained change in the UK’s commitment to human protection 
since 1997. Both the David Cameron and Theresa May governments have been willing 
to draw on the same justification for the use of force as used by the Blair government on 
Kosovo in 1999 in order to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes. Despite this 
thesis arguing that liberal conservatism presented an alternative to the liberal 
internationalism of the Blair and Brown governments, Conservative-led governments 
have demonstrated a willingness to follow a similar pursuit of human protection amid 
domestic and international barriers in the form of parliamentary and UN Security Council 
deadlock. This exemplifies a sustained foreign policy change as this commitment to 
humanitarian intervention is not episodic, but has endured in UK foreign policy between 
1997 and 2020 as one example of a strengthened commitment to human protection in 
rhetoric and action.  
 
6.3 UK rhetoric and action on Myanmar, 2016-2017 
In 2015, democratic elections were held in Myanmar (formerly Burma) for the first time 
in decades. Both David Cameron and Philip Hammond welcomed the elections as a 
significant first step in Myanmar’s transition to democracy after decades of military rule 
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(FCO, 2015b; FCO, 2015c). Less than two years later, Myanmar faced international 
condemnation following violence predominantly against Rohingya Muslims residing in 
Rakhine State, which led to a serious humanitarian crisis with over 742,000 refugees 
fleeing the country (UNHCR, 2019). This section focuses specifically on the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in Myanmar following the first reports of atrocity 
crimes committed against the Rohingya on 25 August 2017, which according to the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights at the time, “seems a textbook example of ethnic 
cleansing” (Human Rights Council, 2017).  
Whilst the initial outbreak of mass violence is traced back to 2016, the violence 
and atrocities against the Rohingya is deeply rooted in the history of Myanmar (Haacke, 
2016, p.806). Rohingya Muslins had faced serious discrimination from the state through 
various legislative acts, such as the 1982 citizenship law, which led to groups including 
the Rohingya being excluded from claiming citizenship in Myanmar despite being settled 
for centuries (Haacke, 2016, p.806). The violence against Rohingya Muslims was thus a 
“violent expression of decades long efforts to stigmatise, delegitimise, and dehumanise 
Muslims in the country” (Ferguson, 2017). The UN Human Rights Council (2018a) found 
that the “othering” of the Rohingya had been ongoing for some time in Myanmar as part 
of citizenship legislation. This discrimination and othering reached the point where 
Rohingya Muslims were being attacked (Human Rights Council, 2018a, p.1). The result 
was thousands of deaths and the mass displacement of Rohingya Muslims (UN General 
Assembly, 2018). The subsequent evidence of atrocity crimes committed against the 
Rohingya led to the ICC prosecutor proceeding with an investigation into these crimes in 
2019 (ICC, 2020).  
The UK’s rhetoric on the situation in Myanmar between 2016 and 2017 shows a 
combination of a concern for human rights and democracy. Figure 23 presents the 
findings from keyword searches of foreign policy speeches, statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports from the government and its representatives on Myanmar 
from 2016 to 2017 in 700 primary documents. Their response to the crisis in Myanmar 
was in two stages. The first was during the initial outbreak of violence in which UK 
foreign policy rhetoric on Myanmar was focused on the country’s transition to democracy 
following the election of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2015. Philip Hammond recognised how 
the UK “has actively supported Burma’s transition to democracy” (FCO, 2016h). His 
successor, Boris Johnson, further declared that “the Burmese transition to democracy is 
an historic achievement” and reiterated that the “UK is pleased to have played an 
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important role in bringing about Burma’s emergence from decades of repression and 
isolation” (FCO, 2016e).  
 




However, by 2017 the UK’s rhetoric on Myanmar shifted to the second stage of 
condemning the violence in Rakhine state. Johnson acknowledged that “while Burma has 
undoubtedly made encouraging progress towards democracy in the last few years, the 
situation in Rakhine, the terrible human rights abuses and violence are a stain on the 
country’s reputation” (FCO, 2017e). This change in the UK’s position in 2017 is 
illustrated in figure 23 through the references to the humanitarian situation, human rights, 
the Rohingya, and atrocities. Whilst the only immediate reference to atrocities was made 
by Jeremy Hunt in relation to ensuring “the perpetrators of any atrocities are brought to 
justice” (FCO, 2018k), the government placed greater attention on human rights 
protection and the humanitarian situation. Johnson commented that “Aung Sang Suu Kyi 
is rightly regarded as one of the most inspiring figures of our age but the treatment of the 
Rohingya is alas besmirching the reputation of Burma” (FCO, 2017a). This is in addition 
to calling for accountability for those that had committed human rights violations (FCO, 
2017e; FCO, 2018d; FCO, 2018b). The Foreign Secretary’s response to Myanmar draws 
parallels with the government’s reaction to the violence in Libya and Syria in being 
unequivocal in its condemnation of the Gaddafi and Assad regimes and calling on them 
to end the violence and bring the perpetrators to justice. This element of the UK’s 
rhetorical response to Myanmar is therefore consistent with the UK’s broader position on 
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recognised that mass violence is being committed, reminding the state of its responsibility 
to stop the violence, and calling for justice and accountability for grave human rights 
violations.  
 Whilst Johnson only directly mentioned human protection on one occasion based 
on the responsibility of the “Burmese security forces to protect all civilians” (FCO, 
2017b), other government Ministers were explicit in their belief that atrocities had been 
committed in Myanmar. The Minister of State for Asia and the Pacific, Mark Field, 
suggested that “the government has concluded that the inexcusable violence perpetrated 
on the Rohingya by Burmese military and ethnic Rakhine militia appears to be ethnic 
cleansing” (DFID and FCO, 2017). Similarly, International Development Secretary, 
Penny Mordaunt, later suggested that the crimes committed against Rohingya Muslims 
constituted ethnic cleansing (DFID, 2019b).   
 Despite the UK government’s recognition of atrocity crimes being committed 
against the Rohingya, its subsequent human protection actions have been questioned. It 
is suggested that the UK’s foremost concern with Myanmar’s elections and democratic 
transition overshadowed its focus on the historical discrimination of the Rohingya. For 
instance, a 2017 Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry into the UK’s response to violence 
in Rakhine state concluded that “there was too much focus by the UK and others in recent 
years on supporting the ‘democratic transition’ and not enough on atrocity prevention and 
delivering tough and unwelcome messages to the Burmese Government about the 
Rohingya” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017a, p.3). A particularly telling piece of 
evidence are Mark Field’s comments during the Inquiry. In being questioned about the 
predictability of the violence in Rakhine state and whether on reflection the FCO could 
have responded sooner, his response was the following 
 
“As I say, it is very easy to be wise with hindsight. I think all of us bear 
responsibility. The international community as a whole wanted to see Burma 
coming away from decades of military dictatorship, with Aung San Suu Kyi 
regarded as a leader rather like, as I say, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther 
King: some, in the international community’s view, of unimpeachable ethics 
who alone would be able to lead this” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017).  
 
This statement shows that the UK and international community more broadly had become 
primarily concerned with democracy promotion even to the extent that it potentially 
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impacted on its failure to act sooner to protect the Rohingya. This is also despite the 
argument that a real democratic transition is not actually taking place in Myanmar due to 
the military’s central role and unwillingness to relinquish its power.
28
 The Foreign Affairs 
Committee Inquiry on violence in Rakhine State thus concluded that “as the ‘penholder’ 
on Burma in the UN Security Council, the UK bears some responsibility for failing to turn 
international outrage into tangible action and improvements on the ground” (Foreign 
Affairs Committee, 2017a, p.3). As the penholder in particular, the UK had an important 
leadership position on the crisis in terms of being in charge of drafting the UN Security 
Council’s humanitarian action (Staunton, 2017).  
In response to the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry, the UK 
government acknowledged that “the acts of ethnic cleansing taking place in Burma may 
amount to crimes against humanity” (HM Government, 2018d). However, the government 
also outlined its belief that its “strategy is credible and that we have, through our 
diplomatic activity, set a clear sense of direction” on resolving the crisis (HM 
Government, 2018d). Alongside its rhetorical condemnation of the violence, the UK 
provided significant funding and humanitarian aid to try and address the immediate 
humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. This included £59 million in financial assistance, which 
made the UK “one of the largest bilateral donors to the crisis” (FCO, 2018p). It also 
contributed a further £3 million for northern Rakhine and £8 million towards addressing 
the refugee crisis (HM Government, 2018d). Based on the four indicators of foreign policy 
action, it is plausible to argue that in meeting the indicator of funding and humanitarian 
aid, the UK did contribute to human protection in Myanmar in some way, even if this 
support was limited to financial aid after the atrocities had taken place. Although the 
Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry suggests the UK could have done more through its 
leadership on the UN Security Council, in Myanmar it followed a similar trend to its 
commitment to human protection in action in Libya and Syria through financial 
contributions, including support for refugees.   
Beyond this contribution of funding and humanitarian aid, the UK’s rhetoric and 
action in Myanmar does show an issue with its commitment to human protection from 
mass violence and atrocity crimes, especially when compared to the pursuit of other liberal 
foreign policy values. This section shows that prior to the violence, the UK’s relations 
with Myanmar were about the elections and democratic transition, despite the evidence of 
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historic discrimination against Rohingya Muslims. In the case of Myanmar, the UK’s 
liberal commitment to democracy was initially prioritised, especially since the UK 
government could have also raised the historical and present plight of the Rohingya more 
strongly as part of its diplomatic relations with Myanmar. By not being more forthright in 
its concerns about the protection of Rohingya Muslims and ensuring the Myanmar 
government is held to account, this challenges the research hypothesis that there has been 
a sustained change in UK foreign policy towards a strengthened commitment to human 
protection. This is because the evidence that the UK could have acted sooner and more 
assertively (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017a) does not present a compelling case that 
the UK placed human protection as its foremost concern in Myanmar. A sustained change 
in UK foreign policy towards a strengthened commitment would plausibly entail drawing 
on all of its diplomatic capacity to lead international efforts to address the mass violence, 
which includes, potentially intervening by force. The UK’s response to Myanmar suggests 
that the opposite occurred and that the government, along with the international 
community, could have done more to protect the Rohingya from atrocity crimes. 
 
6.4 Government rhetoric and action on protection in Yemen, 2015-2020 
Along with its response to Myanmar, the UK government encountered another 
humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The Yemen civil war started in march 2015 when rebel 
Houthis seized control of the capital and forced Saudi-backed President, Abdrabbuh 
Mansur Hadi, into exile (House of Lords, 2019, p.4). Saudi Arabia subsequently led a 
coalition of states to regain control of Yemen and reinstate Hadi as President (Buys and 
Garwood-Gowers, 2019, p.2). Whilst the UK is not part of this coalition of states, Theresa 
May made it clear from the outset that the government supported the Saudi-led coalition 
(BBC, 2017a). However, the civil war resulted in “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis” 
(Guterres, 2019), with thousands of civilian casualties (Human Rights Council, 2016; 
2018b; 2019). This section focuses on the UK’s response to the civil war in Yemen and 
the role of its human protection rhetoric and action. It argues that the UK’s commitment 
to human protection in Yemen reveals a tension in its national and international interest 
between promoting and protecting the UK’s domestic security and prosperity and its 
commitment to human protection, with the UK’s arms sales to Saudi Arabia being the 





6.4.1 Core UK government rhetoric on the civil war in Yemen 
According to the FCO’s 2017 Human Rights and Democracy Report, “the UK will 
continue to lead international efforts to end the conflict and restore the legitimate 
Government of Yemen” (FCO, 2018i, p.58). As figure 24 shows, this commitment to end 
the conflict in Yemen became the primary focus of the government’s rhetoric on the civil 
war. This was based on a combination of rhetoric on finding a political solution, achieving 
peace, protecting civilians, and upholding international humanitarian law.  
 
Figure 24. Core UK government rhetoric on the crisis in Yemen, 2015-2020 
Source: Gov.uk 
 
The government’s rhetoric suggested that achieving peace through a political solution 
was the primary means of addressing the humanitarian crisis and ending the civil war 
(FCO, 2016c; FCO, 2017d). The government’s notion of a political solution was to “help 
create the conditions for the legitimate Government to protect the human rights of 
Yemenis” (French, 2019). The legitimate government in this case was one led by the 
Saudi-backed President Hadi. This would secure what Hunt argued was the need for 
“lasting peace” in Yemen (FCO, 2018h). In terms of the UK’s human protection rhetoric, 
the PoC was mentioned by the government on 7 occasions and had important overlap 
with references to the respect for international humanitarian law. While Foreign 
Secretary, Boris Johnson called “on all parties to respect international humanitarian law 
and prioritise the protection of civilians” (FCO, 2018e). Human protection does feature 
in the UK’s rhetoric, but the overwhelming focus is on achieving peace in Yemen through 












6.4.2 The UK’s human protection actions in Yemen  
At the intersection of the government’s rhetorical commitment to address the 
humanitarian situation through a political solution was its approach to human protection 
in action. The primary means of achieving this was through committing substantial 
financial support to address the humanitarian situation. This included a contribution of 
£112 million for 2016/2017 and £205 million for 2017/18 from DFID, which the UK 
government proudly announced as making them “the third-largest humanitarian donor to 
Yemen” (FCO, 2018i, p.58). This humanitarian aid was further increased in 2018, which 
brought the UK’s overall financial contribution to £570 million (FCO, 2019c). Jeremy 
Hunt and Penny Mordaunt announced that the UK would contribute a further £200 
million, which meant that the UK had provided over £700 million to Yemen since 2015 
(FCO, 2019g). Through these actions, the UK maintained its commitment to human 
protection in action through its response to the humanitarian crisis. This is similar to its 
position in Libya, Syria, and Myanmar where beyond its broader diplomatic efforts to end 
the crisis, the UK still provided vital financial assistance in order to contribute to the 
protection of civilians in Yemen.  
 
6.4.3 The UK’s human protection – trade dilemma in Yemen   
As the penholder on Yemen, the UK had primary responsibility and authority to draft 
resolutions detailing the UN Security Council’s response to the crisis. Jeremy Hunt for 
example, described the UK as being in “a unique position, both as pen-holder at the UN 
Security Council and as a key influencer in the region” (FCO, 2018f). In this sense, it was 
a significant opportunity to demonstrate UK leadership on human protection and turn its 
commitment to end the humanitarian crisis into tangible action.  
 Despite this position to influence and lead on the international response to Yemen, 
research interviews suggests progress was initially slow. According to one interview, the 
UK’s position as penholder is best understood according to two stages. In the first stage 
from 2015 to mid-2018, progress was limited in terms of UN Security Council resolutions 
to guide the response of the international community. In the second stage from mid-2018, 
the UK adopted a leadership role more reflective of its position on human protection by 
drafting resolutions and presidential statements.
29
 The interviews suggested that one 
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explanation for this gradual shift towards active UK leadership on the crisis in Yemen 
was the broader geopolitical and economic issues involved in the crisis.
30
 
One relevant aspect of this geopolitical and economic context is the UK’s 
relationship with Saudi Arabia and latter’s involvement in leading coalition forces in 
Yemen. Alongside the UK’s significant humanitarian assistance, evidence suggests that 
the UK has also licensed “at least 4.7bn of arms exports to Saudi Arabia and £860m to its 
coalition partners” since the beginning of the Yemen civil war in 2015 (Full Fact, 2018). 
An International Development Committee on the crisis in Yemen described this dual 
commitment to arms sales and financial assistance as “a paradox of arms and aid” 
(International Development Committee, 2016a, p.28). This is the idea that on the one 
hand, the UK government argues that it is helping to address the humanitarian crisis 
through its financial support to Yemen, especially through humanitarian aid, while on the 
other hand its “arms exports to Saudi Arabia could be undermining the protection of 
civilians and be inconsistent with the UK’s support for the humanitarian response” 
(International Development Committee, 2016a, p.28). This captures the broader human 






Figure 25. The human protection – trade dilemma  
 
The UK is entitled to license and sell arms to other countries and has a history of exporting 
arms to Saudi Arabia since the 1960s according to the Campaign against the Arms Trade 
(CAAT, 2016). The UK has provided approximately £100 billion in arms exports to Saudi 
Arabia since 2010 and during this period was only behind the US as the second largest 
exporter of arms in total (BBC, 2020c). The controversy of this relationship in Yemen 
lies in the suggestion that some of these arms were “used against Yemeni civilians” 
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(House of Lords, 2019, p.19). This places the UK government in a precarious position as 
pen holder on Yemen, a significant financial donor, and an upholder of international 
humanitarian law. During the initial stages of the Yemen civil war, a UK Committee 
Inquiry into the use of UK-manufactured arms in Yemen suggested that 
 
“The UK’s support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, primarily through 
arms sales in the face of evidence of IHL violations, is inconsistent with the 
UK’s global leadership role in the rule of law and international rules-based 
systems. The very rules the UK championed – represented by the Arms 
Trade Treaty – are at risk of unravelling” (Business Innovation and Skills 
and International Development Committees, 2016, p.33). 
 
This showed a potential contradiction in the UK’s commitment to upholding international 
law on the one hand, and its geopolitical and economic interests on the other through 
continuing to supply weapons to Saudi Arabia. The UK has remained consistent in its 
response to these inquires. For example, in response to the 2016 International 
Development Committee on Yemen, the government acknowledged that it had “played a 
leading role in the provision of humanitarian assistance” (International Development 
Committee, 2016b, p.1). In response to its arms exports, the government suggested that 
“it takes its arms export responsibilities very seriously and operates one of the most robust 
arms export control regimes in the world”, and thus, rejected claims “that the Saudi-led 
Coalition is engaged in an indiscriminate bombing campaign” in Yemen (International 
Development Committee, 2016b, p.13). According to Lablanco (2017), the UK has 
placed considerable effort into supporting its continued sale of arms to Saudi Arabia, 
particularly on the basis of having “influence on the buyers’ behaviour”. For example, 
Boris Johnson, argued that if the UK did not sell arms to Saudi Arabia “we would be 
vacating a space that would rapidly be filled by other western countries that would happily 
supply arms with nothing like the same compunctions, criteria or respect for humanitarian 
law” (Hansard, HC Deb., 26 October 2016). However, this claim is refuted because it is 
unlikely that the state which sells arms also has control over their use (CAAT, 2016).  
 The UK government thus remains consistent in its position of continuing to export 
arms in spite of the criticisms levelled against it. As Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond 
argued that the government should continue to export arms to Saudi Arabia, particularly 
because of its economic benefits to the UK (Hammond quoted in Stone, 2015). Similarly, 
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Theresa May commented more broadly on the UK’s close economic relationship with 
Saudi Arabia (FCO, 2017i). On the UK’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, David Cameron 
(2019, p.272) argued that his government “made pragmatic judgements about how best 
to promote our interests and values”, which is based on a combination of interests 
regarding security, the economy, and international peace and stability. However, as 
Gilmore (2014, p.554) argues, this relationship between the UK’s foreign policy interests 
and values is far from harmonious in relation to arms exports. This is because exporting 
arms may well be part of the UK’s national interest in terms of economic prosperity, but 
the use of arms may potentially lead to humanitarian suffering.    
 The UK’s relationship with Saudi Arabia in relation to the civil war in Yemen 
thus exposes a tension between its national interests and its commitment to the protection 
of liberal values. On the one hand, the government has promoted its liberal conservative 
foreign policy on international human rights protection through its considerable level of 
financial assistance. However, on the other hand, the UK has pursued its geopolitical and 
economic national and international interest through its arms exports and maintaining its 
broader regional relationship with Saudi Arabia. The allegations of these weapons being 
used against civilians in Yemen (House of Lords, 2019, p.19), in addition to the limited 
progress on the crisis in the UN Security Council between 2015 and 2018, is problematic 
for its commitment to human protection in rhetoric and action. UK governments have 
been exporting arms for decades, but the situation in Yemen exposes a tension in this 
relationship when the export of such weapons are potentially harming the civilians the 
UK is aiming to protect through its financial contributions to addressing the humanitarian 
crisis.  
As with Myanmar, the UK’s response to the civil war in Yemen does not entirely 
support the research hypothesis that the UK’s changing place in the world between 1997 
and 2020 led to sustained changes in its commitment to human protection in rhetoric and 
action. The UK did contribute significant financial support to the humanitarian crisis, but 
it also continued to export arms to Saudi Arabia. In this context, the UK has appealed 
more to scenario one of the research hypothesis in being a trading partner over scenarios 
two and three. The government has illustrated its prioritisation of trade and geopolitical 
interests in its relationship with Saudi Arabia at the expense of a liberal internationalist 





6.5 Human protection, trade and the UK’s role in the world  
The UK’s approach to the situation in Yemen reveals a challenge in the government’s 
attempt to balance its national and international interest between human rights protection 
and other geopolitical and economic interests. This dilemma in the relationship between 
trade and human protection in Yemen is a microcosm of a broader geopolitical and 
economic dilemma that some suggest the UK is beginning to face in the post-Brexit era. 
In preparation for Brexit, a 2018 Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry on human rights and 
the rule of law in a Global Britain found that post-Brexit, “the Government will have 
conflicting priorities between human rights and other Government policies, especially 
trade deals” and that this may “create short-term conflicts” between the two (Foreign 
Affairs Committee, 2018b, p.16). The Inquiry recommended that “human rights clauses” 
should be part of future trade deals to ensure that the UK upholds its commitment to 
international human rights protection (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018b, p.16). 
Similarly, a Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry into the UK’s relationship with China 
raised concerns of potentially “prioritising economic considerations over other interests, 
values and national security”  (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2019, p.3). Whilst not explicit, 
the values and national security appear to reflect the importance the UK has previously 
attached to human rights and securing the national interest, and thus, a concern that the 
UK government’s commitment to human rights may become less of a priority in 
comparison to negotiating and securing post-Brexit trade deals.  
One research interview suggested that the UK’s membership of the UN Security 
Council post-Brexit would be an important test of its influence on human protection 
issues, especially with its need to also secure trade agreements with other Member 
States.
31
 For example, research by Jarvis et al. (2019) found that at the UN Security 
Council, there are growing “concerns over both the UK’s future material capacity and 
apprehensions around its potential willingness to compromise on its commitment to 
liberal values in the name of trade deals”. The UK is thus faced with the dilemma of 
maintaining its liberal commitment to human protection at the international level, whilst 
simultaneously being under increasing pressure to secure trade agreements.  
It has been reported that “Britain has received demands to roll back its human 
rights standards in exchange for progress on post-Brexit trade deals” (Partington, 2019). 
Similarly, Choukroune (2019) argues that “as the UK goes about making its own post-
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Brexit treaties, it looks like human rights are being abandoned as a result of its weaker 
bargaining power”. This argument is based on the example of a post-Brexit agreement on 
trade signed with South Korea in August 2019, which “fails to cover as much ground as 
the clauses that are now commonplace in EU treaties” (Choukroune, 2019). Indeed, this 
is only one example so it is impossible to generalise more broadly across UK foreign 
policy on trade and human rights.  
The 2019-21 Trade Bill, which aims to establish details of the UK’s post-Brexit 
trade regulations, has generated some domestic contestation on the role of human 
protection in any present and future trade deals. Through amendment 3B, the House of 
Lords proposed a genocide clause, where the UK High Court would be able to determine 
whether a UK trade “agreement represents a state which has committed genocide” (UK 
Parliament, 2021). This is a significant development in the UK’s commitment to human 
protection because it shows domestic attempts to ensure the government’s trade 
agreements with countries, particularly with poor human rights records, are fully 
scrutinised and uphold human protection from mass violence. However, the government’s 
consistent response has argued that the role of the High Court in determining matters of 
genocide “is inappropriate and would carry harmful unintended consequences”. This was 
justified on the basis of the difficulty to prove that a genocide has been committed, and 
that if the Court did not reach a clear verdict on whether genocide had been committed 
by a state it could provide “a huge propaganda win for the country in question, effectively 
allowing that state to claim that it had been cleared by the UK courts” (Hansard HC Deb., 
9 February 2021). This is not the government’s outright rejection that human protection 
considerations should be part of a trade negotiation and agreement, but rather the specific 
details of the amendment and the potential consequences of trying to determine whether 
a state has committed atrocity crimes. As the next chapter shows, this combination of UK 
interests and the potential tensions between them is part of what kind of power the UK is 
and aspires to be at the international level.  
 
6.6 Chapter conclusion  
This chapter contributes to the empirical assessment of sustained changes in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy between 2015 and 2020. 
It argues that there is evidence of some sustained changes that have occurred in the UK’s 
rhetoric and actions on human protection, which is shown in the analysis of 700 primary 
documentary materials. The UK’s contribution to coalition airstrikes in Syria in 2018 
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evidenced a continuation of a sustained change that has occurred in the UK’s rhetoric and 
action on human protection since at least 1997. This is according to the willingness of 
successive governments to justify UK interventions on the basis of humanitarian 
intervention, despite significant contestation over its legal implications. It is particularly 
telling that the UK’s legal justification of humanitarian intervention acknowledged that it 
was the same basis as the New Labour government in Kosovo in 1999. The fact that this 
occurred across governments on different sides of the political spectrum thus adds further 
weight to the argument that the commitment of successive governments to humanitarian 
intervention is evidence of a sustained change in the UK’s rhetoric and action on human 
protection. Although the previous chapter showed the government’s attempts to distance 
from New Labour in relation to Iraq and Afghanistan, this did not necessarily represent a 
shift from the idea of humanitarian intervention. Whilst it is difficult to predict the UK’s 
future involvement in international crises, successive UK governments show signs that 
humanitarian intervention will endure as the UK’s core legal framework for action in the 
absence of Article 51 or a Chapter VII resolution, in addition to its willingness to lead 
internationally in the pursuit of humanitarian intervention without international consensus 
on its legality.  
 In addition to this sustained change towards humanitarian intervention, the UK’s 
financial and humanitarian assistance in Syria, Myanmar, and Yemen presents some 
evidence of the UK government’s adaptability to its changing place in the world amid the 
gradual post-war relative decline in its military capabilities. This was shown in all three 
cases in the backdrop of the lack of political will from the international community to 
intervene militarily in order to prevent mass violence and atrocity crimes. For example, 
the UK continued its attempts to advocate on international human protection in Syria and 
contributed to the protection of refugees, it condemned the violence and human rights 
violations in Myanmar, and it provided substantial levels of financial support to addresses 
the humanitarian crises in Syria, Myanmar, and Yemen. This chapter argues that this is 
consistent with the changes that have occurred in UK foreign policy since 1997, including 
UK leadership and influence on the protection of liberal values such as democracy and 
human rights, drawing on its soft power capabilities to address the roots of humanitarian 
crises through ODA and other forms of bilateral and multilateral aid, and advocating in 
favour of human protection.  
 The chapter also provides evidence of the inherent challenges facing the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy. In particular, the chapter 
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highlights the government’s unsuccessful attempts to reconcile its geopolitical and 
economic interests and its commitment to liberal values in its foreign policy. Whilst this 
chapter does not assume that the UK’s approach to each crisis is informed by human 
protection concerns alone, the crises in Myanmar and Yemen expose a conflict in the 
prioritisation of its multitude of domestic and international interests and values. The UK’s 
rhetoric and action on Myanmar illustrated a combination of democracy promotion and 
human protection from mass violence. However, the analysis of Myanmar shows that the 
government had been prioritising the country’s elections and democratic transition, with 
its response to the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya being largely reactionary than a 
preventative response. As the wealth of evidence from the UN, non-governmental 
organisations, and secondary literature shows, the Rohingya had faced discrimination for 
decades in the lead up to the mass violence and displacement of hundreds of thousands 
of Rohingya in Rakhine State in 2017. On the basis of its relationship with Aung San Suu 
Kyi and its role on the UN Security Council, the UK was in an important international 
position to influence and lead on the situation, such as pressuring the Myanmar 
government to address the deep-rooted discrimination against the Rohingya.  
 The findings from the section on Yemen illustrate a similar pattern in the 
relationship between the UK’s commitment to human protection in rhetoric and action 
alongside other geopolitical and economic interests with regards to its political and 
economic relations with Saudi Arabia. Whilst the evidence shows the UK’s considerable 
financial contributions to alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, it was 
simultaneously continuing its trade relationship with coalition states. The government is 
entitled to export arms to countries around the world, but the issue in Yemen was the 
serious humanitarian situation as a result of the civil war. This chapter has argued that 
this exposes a fundamental human protection and trade dilemma in which the UK 
government has attempted to pursue two irreconcilable interests and values. Yemen is 
thus one noteworthy example of the broader challenges facing the UK’s transitional 
foreign policy in the post-Brexit era in terms of how policymakers protect both the UK’s 
foreign policy interests and protection of liberal values.  
 To draw some initial conclusions on the research hypothesis, the period between 
2015 and 2020 shows a complex interaction of all three scenarios on the relationship 
between the UK’s place in the world as part of a transitional foreign policy and its 
commitment to human protection in rhetoric and action. This includes a trading partner, 
a pragmatic liberal internationalist, and a soft power leader and influencer on human 
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protection. For instance, the UK’s rhetoric and actions in Yemen show elements of a 
trading partner based on the UK’s willingness pursue its economic interests amid 
concerns of its implications for human protection; its rhetoric and actions in Syria 
evidence the scenario of a pragmatic liberal internationalist according to the 
government’s commitment to humanitarian intervention; and there is evidence of the 
UK’s global soft power influence and leadership in Syria, Myanmar, and Yemen 
according to its financial support and instances of leadership.  
The next chapter argues that this complex interaction between these three 
scenarios is indicative of a broader crisis in the UK’s place in the world as part of its 
transitional foreign policy (Beasley et al., 2018; Oppermann et al., 2020). It argues that 
this crisis in turn has significant implications for the UK’s commitment to human 
protection as governments continue to wrestle with protecting the UK’s interests and 
liberal values. This crisis in the UK’s place in the world is compounded by a particularly 
turbulent era of UK foreign policy between 2016 and 2020 in terms of the major foreign 
policy change of Brexit and the high-degree of discontinuity in the core agents of UK 















Chapter 7 - A ‘Global Britain’: The UK’s commitment to human 
protection in a transitional foreign policy, 1997-2020 
       
“I believe that the only way for us to respond to this vast array of challenges 
is to come together and defend the international order that we have worked so 
hard to create and the values by which we stand. For it is the fundamental 
values that we share, values of fairness, justice and human rights, that have 
created the common cause between nations to act together in our shared 
interest and form the multilateral system.”              
            Theresa May, Speech to the UN General Assembly (FCO, 2017j) 
 
Between 1997 and 2020, the foreign policy of successive governments has been based on 
the fundamental notion that the UK is an important and influential international actor. 
This includes maintaining the UK’s position at the forefront of the multilateral institutions 
of the liberal international order, while extending its international influence through 
significant soft power contributions to ODA and its leadership and advocacy on human 
protection at the global level. However, the post-2015 period of UK foreign policy has 
intensified academic and policy debates on the UK’s place in the world following both 
the decision to leave the EU in 2016 and the broader challenges facing the post-war liberal 
international order (Ikenberry, 2018a). In response, the UK government has promoted the 
idea of Global Britain in order to argue that the UK will remain centre stage in its post-
Brexit international relations (FCO, 2017g). Yet others have argued that the UK is facing 
a “role crisis” (Oppermann et al., 2020, p.145) in which governments are struggling to 
present a clear strategy for a post-Brexit foreign policy. 
This chapter brings the overall empirical analysis of the thesis together through 
an assessment of the relationship between the UK’s commitment to human protection and 
its transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 2020. Whilst the previous three empirical  
chapters focused on an assessment of sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to 
human protection, this chapter addresses the broader thesis themes of the UK’s place in 
the world and its international leadership and influence on human protection amid its 
post-war relative decline. Its central argument is that the nature of the UK’s place in the 
world is fundamental for determining its commitment to human protection in rhetoric and 
action. Whether through liberal internationalism or liberal conservatism, the empirical 
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chapters so far have argued that the UK’s commitment to human protection has been 
influenced by the adaptation of successive governments to a transitional foreign policy in 
the form of the UK’s post-war relative hard power decline, changes in its membership, 
leadership, and influence in core multilateral organisations, and the UK’s position within 
the evolving international order.  
However, the post-2015 period of the UK’s foreign policy is in a state of flux as 
policymakers and academics attempt to define the nature of the UK’s post-Brexit 
international engagements. This in turn raises challenges for the nature of the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy as governments attempt 
to balance between its economic and political interests and its liberal values including 
democracy and human rights protection. Despite the challenges facing the post-Brexit era 
of UK foreign policy, this chapter argues that the sustained changes witnessed between 
1997 and 2015 have continued to influence UK foreign policy on human protection 
between 2016 and 2020. In particular, the UK’s considerable capabilities for soft power 
leadership and influence allow the UK to make substantial contributions to international 
human protection in other ways which require less dependence on the use of force and 
significant troop deployments.  
The chapter continues to define sustained change in relation to a shift in the UK’s 
foreign policy goals and/or methods on human protection which endures over time in the 
approach of successive governments and is continually shaped, maintained, and 
reinforced by a combination of UK government rhetoric – what is said by elite political 
agents in government –  and its actions – the means and methods of protection in practice. 
Sustained change is therefore assessed through a content analysis of the 1,055 primary 
documentary materials used throughout the empirical analysis so far, in addition to the 
government’s actions in terms of policy, funding and humanitarian aid, coercive and non-
coercive intervention, and advocacy and entrepreneurship. In addition, the chapter draws 
on findings from semi-structured interviews and expert secondary scholarship. These 
research methods aim to attain a high-level of analytical and research rigour through 
triangulating primary and secondary material in order to cross-examine and validate the 
research findings.  
The chapter is split into two main sections. The first analyses the UK’s changing 
place in the world from 1997 to 2020 according to a transitional foreign policy. This 
includes a focus on the UK’s post-war relative decline and how successive governments 
have attempted to tackle this change, changes in the UK’s membership of multilateral 
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organisations using the example of Brexit, and the UK’s place within the evolving 
international order. The second section focuses on UK’s soft power leadership and 
influence on human protection using the examples of the UN Security Council and ODA. 
The chapter draws on the examples used throughout this thesis on Kosovo (1999), Sierra 
Leone (2000), Libya (2011), Syria (2011-2018), Yemen (2015-2020) and Myanmar 
(2016-2017). 
The chapter finds that adjustments in the UK’s place in the world since 1997 have 
translated into sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection from 1997 
to 2020. It finds that successive governments have tried to adapt to the UK’s accelerating 
post-war relative decline by defending the liberal international rules-based order, and by 
extension, its components of human rights, democracy promotion, and the rule of law. 
However, it also finds that the government’s commitment to Global Britain as a means of 
strategizing the UK’s post-Brexit place in the world suffers from limitations. This is 
because Global Britain is based on a largely ambiguous and superficial historical and 
political narrative aimed at presenting a concrete vision and policy to a domestic audience 
on the UK’s post-Brexit place in the world (Daddow, 2019a; Turner, 2019; Niblett, 2021).  
Beyond Global Britain, the chapter finds that UK’s commitment to human 
protection through multilateral institutions and humanitarian intervention have been 
important elements of the UK’s attempts to underline its credentials to retain both 
leadership and influence in international relations. It is this ability to draw on soft power 
leadership and influence, in spite of a relative decline in hard power, which has formed 
an important part of the efforts from policymakers to promote the UK as an important 
international actor. It is argued that underlying these approaches is a broader appeal to a 
pragmatic foreign policy tradition (Honeyman, 2017; Daddow, 2019), in which UK 
foreign policymakers are aware of the UK’s changing place in the world and the need to 
adjust accordingly. However, this thesis shows how in the case of human protection, this 
pragmatism has given way to sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human 
protection in both its rhetoric and actions.   
This chapter is an important contribution to addressing the theoretical and 
empirical research questions and testing the hypothesis through bringing together the 
assessment of sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection. It also 
contributes to research on UK foreign policy and human protection, the leadership and 
influence of former great powers in the post-war era, and foreign policy change through 




7.1 Brexit, Global Britain, and human protection  
This section analyses adjustments in the UK’s place in the world since 1997. It focuses 
in particular on the post-2015 context of UK foreign policy due to the argument that the 
UK is facing a crisis in its post-Brexit international position (Oppermann et al., 2020). It 
aims to address the core theoretical and empirical research questions, as well contribute 
to testing the thesis hypothesis that the UK’s awareness of its changing position in the 
world between 1997 and 2020 led to sustained changes in its rhetoric and action towards 
a strengthened commitment to human protection. Drawing lessons from role theory in 
UK foreign policy (Gaskarth, 2014; McCourt, 2014; Oppermann et al., 2020), it argues 
that domestic and international perspectives of the UK’s position in the world are essential 
for examining how this translates into sustained changes in its foreign policy commitment 
to human protection in rhetoric and action. This is based on the argument that being aware 
of domestic and international notions of the UK’s relative decline creates pressure for the 
government to demonstrate that the UK retains an important international position. This 
includes drawing on the UK’s influence and leadership in the international response to 
humanitarian crises according to its commitment to the liberal international order. It finds 
that whilst there has been a consistent underlying commitment to liberal internationalism 
on human protection since 1997, the Brexit era of UK foreign policy raises fundamental 
challenges for conceptualising its place in the world and subsequent commitment to 
human protection. This challenge also stems from the limitations of Global Britain as a 
policy for conceptualising the UK’s place in the world because it is orientated more 
towards a domestic audience than an international one, and thus, appears to have no 
significant bearing on international views of the UK as a global actor (Daddow, 2019a; 
Turner, 2019; Niblett, 2021).  
 
7.1.1 Adjusting to post-1945 relative international decline  
An important contribution to conceptualising the UK’s place in the world since 1997 has 
been role theory. As discussed in chapter 2, the theoretical basis of role theory is that a 
state performs its role in the world according to both domestic and international 
perspectives on what is considered appropriate for that state (McCourt, 2011; McCourt, 
2014; Gaskarth, 2014; Oppermann et al., 2020). These perspectives ultimately influence 
the nature of the UK’s foreign policy, especially regarding its relations with other states 
(Gaskarth, 2014, p.561). These subsequent role conceptions are not static and are 
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therefore liable to change over time according to the domestic and international 
environment in which UK foreign policy is created and practiced.  
 An issue for UK foreign policy in the post-1945 era is that these role conceptions 
have undergone fundamental changes amid domestic and international views on the UK’s 
hard power international decline. Whilst the UK retains its nuclear status as one crucial 
component of its hard power (Bernstein, 2004, p.1; Cargill, 2018, p.2), its broader military 
and economic power has declined relative to the growth of other states (Roberts, 2020, 
p.2). The result of this relative hard power decline in the post-1997 period has been 
continuous domestic attempts from the government to convince a domestic audience and 
other states that the UK retains an important international role. As shown in chapter 4, 
Tony Blair argued against UK isolationism in favour of an active global role (Blair, 1997 
quoted in McCourt, 2011, p.36). This was characterised by attempts to cast a leadership 
role for the UK in order to underline its global leadership credentials. 
 The Blair government’s attempts to translate this perspective into its foreign 
policy on human protection was most visible in Robin Cook’s much publicised ethical 
dimension and commitment to human rights (Cook, 1997) and Blair’s (1999) doctrine of 
the international community. According to Hill (2018, p.185), Blair’s approach to foreign 
policy reflected a “sense of moral superiority about both the right and duty to take a 
central role in world politics”. Through this internationalist approach to the UK’s place 
in the world, the New Labour government positioned the UK according to what Gaskarth 
(2014, p.577) terms an “opportunist-interventionist power”. This role is based on a 
combination of implementing liberal internationalist norms such as human protection 
through international interventions (Gaskarth, 2014, p.577). The UK’s intervention in 
Kosovo subsequently “represented a major development in the use of force to promote 
human rights” based on the willingness to exert force against another sovereign nation 
especially without the authorisation for action through conventional channels of 
international law (Gaskarth, 2014, p.577). Blair’s New Labour government was thus able 
to reconcile its liberal internationalist place in the world with a commitment to human 
protection.  
 Whilst the UK’s intervention in Kosovo is not devoid of controversy, chapters 5 
and 6 evidenced how this role conception of an opportunist-interventionist has largely 
influenced the approach of successive governments to conceptualising the UK’s place in 
the world and its commitment to human protection (Daddow and Schnapper, 2013; Beech 
and Oliver, 2014; Oliver, 2015; Beech and Munce, 2019). The Conservative-led Coalition 
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government continued to advance its domestic belief that the UK “can and should play a 
leading role” on the international stage (FCO, 2013a). On human protection, David 
Cameron recognised the need for intervention in instances of mass violence (FCO, 
2011k). Successive UK governments therefore continued a trend of defining and 
defending the UK’s foreign policy commitment to human protection as part of an active 
engagement with the world.    
 
7.1.2 Brexit and the crisis of the UK’s place in the world   
With the UK’s internationalist place in the world being relatively consistent between 1997 
and 2015, the 2016 decision to leave the EU has added a considerable layer of complexity 
to the government’s efforts to promote the idea of the UK as an important international 
actor. Following the resignation of David Cameron in the aftermath of the referendum 
result, the incoming Theresa May government was quick to dispel the notion that Brexit 
inflicts a major blow for domestic and international perspectives of the UK’s position on 
the international stage. The Foreign Secretary was the government’s primary outlet for 
communicating the UK’s intent to remain committed to an active international role. Boris 
Johnson’s first move as Foreign Secretary was to declare that Brexit “emphatically does 
not mean a Britain that turns in on herself” (FCO, 2016a). Similarly, Johnson’s successor, 
Jeremy Hunt, argued that Brexit was “about going global” and “re-engaging this country 
with its global identity” (FCO, 2018q). Instead of signalling decline, “Britain will retain 
all the capabilities of a global power” (FCO, 2019a). These quotes are unsurprising since 
the government is striving to continue promoting its belief that the UK will remain an 
important player in international relations. However, these statements also implicitly 
evidence the government’s acknowledgment that leaving such a significant political and 
economic union opens space both from within and outside the UK to question its 
credentials as an actor in the liberal international order.  
 The government’s attempts to promote the UK as an important actor post-Brexit 
have been subsequently contested by alternative perspectives at a domestic and 
international level. According to the former UK diplomat, Sir Simon Fraser, Brexit 
constitutes a “far-reaching dislocation of our international role and relationships” (Fraser, 
2017). Similar concerns were revealed in research interviews on Brexit and the UK’s 
place in the world. Brexit was perceived as potentially detrimental to the UK’s 
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international reputation in deciding to depart from an important European institution.
32
 
This is because being a member of the EU was interpreted as a fundamental element of 
the UK’s outward-looking foreign policy and that leaving therefore challenged outside 




 Brexit is therefore interpreted by some in the domestic and international sphere as 
drawing greater attention to the UK’s relative international decline (Gill and Oates, 2017; 
Gifkins et al., 2019a; Oppermann et al., 2020). Whilst Brexit is not the only factor that 
has led to the UK’s relative decline, it is seen as one major component quickening this 
process.
34 Similarly, Gifkins et al’s (2019, pp.1353-1354) research on Brexit and the UK’s 
place on the UN Security Council identifies how the decision to leave the EU “took place 
within the context of long-term trends of British decline”. However, a particular issue 
with Brexit is its impact on “the perception among other states that the UK is in decline” 
(Gifkins et al., 2019, pp.1353-1354). By leaving a powerful institution, it is difficult to 
project that this will translate into an even greater place for the UK in the world, since it 
was formerly a member of significant free trade bloc of states (Niblett, 2021). 
 Despite this, some research interviews cautioned against overstating the 
implications of Brexit for the UK’s place in the world. For example, it is important not to 
overlook the UK’s relationship with the EU on important issues, such as international 
security, which will endure in some form post-Brexit.
35
 The UK’s historical role in the 
world was also used to illustrate how it has relied on important relationships in its foreign 
policy that will continue regardless of Brexit.
36 Findings from two further interviews 
suggested that following the UK’s decision to leave the EU, there was a positive sense 
from UK diplomats that this would translate into greater UK engagement and focus at the 
UN given the pressure to retain international leadership and influence post-Brexit.
37 These 
contributions draw attention to the pragmatism and resilience of UK foreign policy amid 
 
32  Author interview 4. 
33 Author interview 6.  
34 Author interview 8. 
35 Author interview 10. 
36 Author interview 6. 
37 Author interviews 7 and 12. 
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challenges to its place in the world, whilst also showing how the UK has other multilateral 
avenues to maintain leadership and influence, such as the UN (see section 7.2).  
 On the other hand, when asked to describe the UK’s place in the world, research 
interviews suggested that this was reduced by Brexit.
38 However, it was suggested in the 
research interviews that the UK still has important capabilities to draw on, especially 
through its membership of the UN Security Council.
39
 The fundamental issue for the 
UK’s commitment to human protection is the broader lack of consensus that these 
perspectives illustrate on the UK’s post-Brexit place in the world. This leads to Beasley 
et al. (2018) and Oppermann et al. (2020, p.145) to argue that UK foreign policy is 
witnessing a “role crisis”. In aiming to construct the UK’s post-Brexit role in the world, 
policymakers have inadvertently “projected a disorientated foreign policy containing 
elements of partially incompatible roles” from allying with the US to leading the 
Commonwealth (Oppermann et al., 2020, p.133). This perspective shows that the 
government has only further complicated the UK’s place in the world by drawing on 
various national role conceptions. By arguing that the nature of the UK’s commitment to 
human protection is a fundamental product of its place in the world, the subsequent lack 
of a clear position on the international stage is a problem for addressing human protection. 
For example, adopting a global foreign policy has implications for human protection if 
this means free trade relationships with states around the world, some of which may 
commit human rights abuses. Conversely, pursuing a foreign policy based on protecting 
the existing rules-based liberal international order may entail following a similar 
approach to New Labour’s liberal internationalism.  
 The interplay between these domestic and international expectations for the UK’s 
place in the world, and the various national role conceptions that have emerged as a result, 
shows the significant influence of broader changes in the external international 
environment on UK foreign policy. As argued throughout this dissertation, UK foreign 
policy increasingly operates in an uncertain international environment characterised by 
the gradual demise of the liberal international order (Ikenberry, 2018a), and the 
emergence of a broader world order with power more diffuse amongst states (Acharya, 
2018). Changes in the global balance of power is an additional pressure on the attempts 
from domestic governments to conceptualise the UK’s place in a world. This is because 
 
38 Author interviews 4 and 8. 
39  Author interviews 9 and 12. 
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it involves engaging with powers which may not so easily conform to the UK’s 
conventional appeal to liberal internationalism defined in terms of democracy promotion 
and human rights protection. A transition in world order entails “changes as states with 
different normative worldviews rise or decline in power and influence” (Newman, 2016, 
p.37). In response, the approach of Theresa May’s government was to “defend the 
international order that we have worked so hard to create and the values by which we 
stand” (FCO, 2017j). This idea of defending the liberal international order was supported 
by Jeremy Hunt’s idea that the UK should act as “an invisible chain that links the world’s 
democracies” (FCO, 2018j; FCO, 2019e). The UK’s immediate response to what 
policymakers viewed as a changing international order was to thus uphold and defend 
their commitment to the post-war liberal international order.  
 
7.1.3 Global Britain: Defining the UK’s post-Brexit global role  
Using Theresa May’s appointment as Prime Minister on July 13, 2016 as a starting point, 
the content analysis of 700 foreign policy speeches, statements, media interviews, and 
government news reports from UK government elites on the nature of UK’s place in the 
world showed an overwhelming focus on Global Britain (figure 26).  
 
























Global Britain Global role
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Global Britain accounted for 82% of the total with 42 direct references from government 
ministers and representatives, while the UK’s global role was mentioned 9 times (18%). 
In comparison to the Cameron government, there was no direct reference to the notion of 
UK decline in the world. Rather, the principle focus was on communicating the idea that 
the UK remained an important actor in spite of Brexit, with Global Britain being central 
to this perspective (FCO, 2016a). 
Beyond the numerical data, the government’s statements on Global Britain 
encompassed many of the same principles of the UK’s liberal internationalist position 
since 1997. The Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, suggested that a Global Britain would 
“be more outward-looking and more engaged with the world than ever before” and 
identified “the need for us to commit ourselves to the peace and prosperity of the world” 
(FCO, 2016a). Theresa May suggested that a core aspect of Global Britain was to “defend 
the rules-based international order against irresponsible states that seek to erode it. To 
support our partners in regions of instability and repelling the threats they face and to 
back their vision for societies and economies that will prosper in the future” (FCO, 
2017g). According to Johnson’s successor, Jeremy Hunt, Global Britain also means 
“leading by example as a force for good in the world” (FCO, 2019d). Finally, the 
government’s official response to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee inquiry on Global 
Britain was to reiterate that it was a “signal of the UK’s intent to maximise our presence, 
influence and impact” (HM Government, 2018b). These statements from the Prime 
Minster and successive Foreign Secretaries suggest that Global Britain is not a radical 
departure from the government’s attempts to conceptualise the UK’s place in the world 
since 1997. This is because it is based on defending the liberal rules-based international 
order, building alliances, and ensuring international peace and security. The following 
sub-sections therefore analyse the implications of Global Britain for defining the UK’s 
post-Brexit place in the world. 
 
7.1.4 Conceptual limitations of Global Britain 
On the surface, the government’s rhetoric suggests that Global Britain is the UK’s vision 
for its post-Brexit role, and yet, it has been beset by serious conceptual limitations. The 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee inquiry on Global Britain concluded that “the only 
thing that is clear about Global Britain is that it is unclear what it means, what it stands 
for or how its success should be measured” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018a, p.5). It 
is telling that this conclusion was reached over a year after Global Britain had first 
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appeared in the government’s foreign policy rhetoric and thus shows the lack of success 
in communicating a clear Global Britain strategy. The academic literature equally finds 
that Global Britain lacks clear definitional boundaries (Turner, 2019, p.728; Boussebaa, 
2020, p.483) and has led to a haphazard conceptualisation of how the government intends 
to express it in practice (Gilmore, 2020, p.26). This lack of domestic clarity also has 
implications for the government’s international projection of Global Britain. In their 
research on Global Britain in the UN, Gifkins et al. (2019b, p.8) found that the lack of 
domestic understanding of Global Britain “has a knock-on effect, making it more difficult 
for the UK to project clarity of purpose abroad”. In this sense, it is plausible to argue that 
Global Britain is yet another component of the UK’s post-Brexit role crisis, with the lack 
of domestic consensus on the UK’s place in the world translating to the international level 
as well. 
 It is also possible to draw important comparisons between the definitional 
limitations of Global Britain and New Labour’s ethical dimension. As argued in chapter 
4, a serious issue with the ethical dimension from the outset was the lack of clear 
parameters, which opened space for others beyond the government to contest and add 
content to the ethical dimension to the point of it being framed as an ethical foreign policy 
(Williams, 2002; Vickers, 2011). The ethical dimension was therefore a lesson in how 
not to communicate a foreign policy without first identifying its basic message. However, 
Global Britain is following a similar path in lacking a clear outline for the UK’s place in 
the world. A compelling example of this is a statement from the International 
Development Secretary, Penny Mordaunt, who suggested “members of the Cabinet are 
scratching our heads and thinking about Global Britain” (DFID, 2019). Giving evidence 
to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee inquiry on Global Britain, Sir Simon Fraser 
suggested that it does not represent anything dramatically different from past attempts to 
define the UK’s world role, but that it provided a blank canvas from which to attach 
meaning according to your stance on the UK’s present and future role in the world (Fraser 
in Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018d).  
 An outcome of this has been the emergence of different connotations of the UK’s 
place in the world according to Global Britain. According to Daddow (2019a, p.6), Global 
Britain represents a continuation of the UK’s foreign policy pragmatism based 
fundamentally on maintaining its place at the “top table” by drawing on its “bilateral and 
multilateral bargaining” power (Daddow, 2019a, p.6). Similarly, Niblett (2021, p.6) 
suggests that Global Britain is about underlining the UK’s credentials for engaging with 
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the world beyond the EU. Even if it is accepted that Global Britain is part of a business-
as-usual pragmatic foreign policy, the reference to Global Britain has been perceived as 
reminiscent of the British Empire. Boussebaa (2020, p.484) argues that Global Britain 
provokes “a nostalgia for the Empire of yesteryear” through its promotion of the UK as a 
global power which has not been the case since empire. Turner (2019, p.727) details a 
more nuanced perspective on Global Britain as being part of “the narrative of empire”. 
From this perspective, Global Britain is a means of national soothing “in anticipation of 
domestic trauma following the loss of EU membership” (Turner, 2019, p.727). This 
perspective suggests that Global Britain is the primary way for the government to show a 
domestic audience that the UK intends to retain its status as an important power following 
Brexit.   
 
7.1.5 Global Britain as a domestic role orientation 
Turner’s (2019, p.728) argument that Global Britain is intended for a domestic audience 
and “was never envisaged as a viable foreign policy programme” is the focus of this 
section. In consulting academic research and interview material, it is argued that Turner’s 
(2019) perspective is the most persuasive account for the limitations of Global Britain in 
defining the UK’s place in the world. It is explained by both the lack of international 
clarity on Global Britain and the increasing importance of public opinion on the UK’s 
place on the international stage.   
Internationally, it was considerably challenging to identify any non-UK 
perspectives on Global Britain. Research by Gifkins et al. (2019b, p.9) found that 
diplomats at the UN “were in agreement that the policy of ‘Global Britain’ was not of 
much relevance or was simply not discussed” and as a result “it was often characterised 
by diplomats as simply a slogan with very little behind it”.
40
 Similar perspectives were 
conveyed in research interviews. When asked about Global Britain, responses suggested 
that it was a brand lacking any serious substance; at risk of becoming an empty idea 
without any serious policy outputs; and generating confusion over its meaning and policy 
implications.
41
 Other responses expressed serious concern with the message of Global 
Britain, since global implies that the UK was in some way not global prior to leaving the 
 
40  Approaches were made to interview participants on non-UK perspectives of Global Britain, 
but without success.   





 The outcome is that the UK’s attempts to generate a consensus on Global Britain 
were judged as being largely unsuccessful so far.
43 This supports the idea that Global 
Britain is a more inward-looking approach to convincing a domestic audience of the UK’s 
post-Brexit role.  
This argument is strengthened by drawing on the importance of UK domestic 
opinion on the UK’s place in the world, which was particularly brought to the surface 
with Brexit. According to Gaskarth (2020, p.31), the government’s parliamentary defeat 
on Syria in 2013 and the 2016 referendum on EU membership, demonstrate the growing 
importance of domestic public opinion on foreign policy. With the 2016 referendum in 
particular, the public voted against the Prime Minister’s position that the UK should 
remain within the EU. This case shows that it is “imperative to align foreign policy with 
public opinion in advance” (Gaskarth, 2020, p.31). As Gilmore (2020, p.27) argues, the 
result of the 2016 EU referendum has led to significant polarisation among the domestic 
public on the UK’s place in the world, principally between an appeal to UK post-Brexit 
sovereignty and an emphasis on maintaining the UK’s existing status in the world. For 
instance, opinion poll research on public attitudes towards the UK’s place in the world 
presented a mixed response according to different roles the UK should play, such as 
operating a foreign policy that is principally concerned with the national interest, a values-
based approach, or a combination of these (Elliot and Gaston, 2019, p.3). In turn, Global 
Britain “appears to be an attempt to provide a unifying narrative, directed at a polarised 
internal audience” to reconcile these different perspectives on the UK’s post-Brexit place 
in the world (Gilmore, 2020, p.28). 
Instead of a coherent foreign policy strategy, Global Britain is concerned with 
addressing the UK’s post-1945 internal “identity crisis” which Brexit has merely brought 
to the surface (Turner, 2019, p.731). Consequently, it is argued that Global Britain  
 
“is an autobiographical narrative about what Britain is and what it envisions 
the world and its actors to be. This is an important distinction, because 
narratives are not simply descriptive and they rarely stand alone; they are 
performative and interconnected, written to construct particular realities and 
shape policy choice. Global Britain provides a narrative of a world of 
 
42  Author interviews 3, 4 and 6. 
43  Author interview 8. 
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opportunity which an entrepreneurial UK is ready to embrace. It does this to 
calm public unease in anticipation of (especially economic) trauma in the 
form of Brexit” (Turner, 2019, p.733) 
 
Global Britain as a narrative is important because it shows its underlying historical 
construction based on domestic and international perspectives and expectations of the 
UK’s role in the world. Brexit has led to a redoubling of the government’s efforts to show 
that the UK wants to retain an important international role. The FCO’s memorandum to 
the Foreign Affairs Select Committee inquiry on Global Britain evidences this attempt to 
construct a post-Brexit domestic narrative through creating a grand vision for the UK as 
“a successful global foreign policy player, and to resist any sense that Britain will be less 
engaged in the world in the next few years” (FCO in Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018a). 
However, there is less detail on how the UK government intends to fulfil its aspirations 
of being a global foreign policy player, which only serves to reinforce Global Britain as 
a domestic narrative.  
 
7.1.6 Human protection and the Integrated Review  
So far, this chapter has argued that the UK’s commitment to human protection between 
1997 and 2020 has been driven by how governments conceptualise the UK’s place in the 
world. Yet the promotion of Global Britain under Theresa May and Boris Johnson has 
lacked substance on the role of human protection. According to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee (2018b, p.3) report on Global Britain, human rights and the rule of law, 
“promoting human rights, the rule of law, and strengthening the rules-based international 
system are essential to the foreign policy of Global Britain”. This commitment to 
upholding human rights, the rule of law, and the rules-based international system is 
particularly important since the foreign policy of successive governments “have been 
shaped around the promotion of liberal values” (Gaskarth, 2020, p.25). This thesis has 
argued that these liberal values, including democracy and international human rights 
protection have been central features of UK foreign policy throughout the period between 
1997 and 2020, but the issue is how these values are conceptualised in the foreign policy 
of a Global Britain and whether there is any fundamental shift in the government’s 
approach.  
 In February 2020, Boris Johnson launched an Integrated Review of the UK’s 
foreign and security policy in an attempt “to define Britain’s place in the world” (Prime 
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Minister's Office, 2020a). There was no mention of Global Britain during the launch and 
lead up to the publication of the Review. Instead, Boris Johnson appealed to similar 
historical ideas on the UK’s place in the world to show that in the post-war era “Britain 
tipped the scales of history and did immense good for the world” (Prime Minister's Office, 
2020b). This was followed by a rallying call that the UK now has “a chance to follow in 
this great tradition, to end the era of retreat, transform our armed forces, bolster our global 
influence, unite and level up across our country, protect our people, and defend the free 
societies in which we fervently believe” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2020b). There is a 
striking similarity between Johnson’s statement and Tony Blair’s emphasis on asserting 
the UK’s place in the world during his own first term in office. As chapter 4 showed, 
Tony Blair openly rejected isolationism and argued that the UK should play a central role 
on the world stage (Blair, 1999a; 1999b; Blair, 1999 quoted in BBC, 1999). Boris 
Johnson’s comments on the Integrated Review are therefore a continuation of asserting 
the UK’s active place in the world, which in turn also attempts to dispel the notion of the 
UK’s relative international decline.  
 The Integrated Review was published in March 2021 and outlined the 
government’s foreign policy strategy for the next 10 years, including an updated strategic 
framework to replace the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. At the core of the 
report was the government’s strategic shift “from defending the status quo within the 
post-Cold War international system to dynamically shaping the post-COVID order” (HM 
Government, 2021, p.21). On the surface, this commitment to shaping the evolving 
international order appears to be a dramatic shift in the UK’s foreign policy strategy. 
However, the government’s proposals for shaping this new order are founded on familiar 
UK foreign policy terrain. For example, the Review states that the UK “will sit at the 
heart of a network of like-minded countries and flexible groupings, committed to 
protecting human rights and upholding global norms” (HM Government, 2021, p.6). The 
Review also details the UK’s “global perspective and global responsibilities” through 
being a member of the core multilateral institutions of international order (HM 
Government, 2021, p.60). This shows that the liberal values that have underpinned UK 
foreign policy from 1997 to 2020 will remain largely the same, including its commitment 
to international human protection, as will the UK’s diplomatic voice in bodies such as the 
UN Security Council. The Review therefore appears to represent a continuation of the 
UK foreign policy pragmatism by recognising that in order to retain an active role on the 
190 
 
world stage, the UK has to keep pace with developments in international relations as the 
global balance of power changes.  
 The challenge for international human protection at the time of writing is how the 
UK balances between its geopolitical and economic interests on the one hand and its 
commitment to human rights on the other. The case of Yemen in chapter 6 exposed the 
inherent tensions in the relationship between the UK’s economic and political interests 
through its trade relationship with Saudi Arabia and its commitment to human protection. 
A similar issue is visible in the UK’s relationship with China and how it addresses its duel 
commitment to upholding human rights but building significant trade ties with a global 
superpower. The Integrated Review partially referenced this challenge in acknowledging 
that  
 
“In the years ahead we will need to manage inevitable tensions and trade-
offs: between our openness and the need to safeguard our people, economy 
and way of life through measures that increase our security and resilience; 
between competing and cooperating with other states, sometimes at the same 
time; and between our short-term commercial interests and our values.” (HM 
Government, 2021, p.17) 
 
This statement leaves much open to interpretation, but the final part of the paragraph in 
particular outlines the possible trade-offs between the UK’s economic interests and its 
values, which the government interprets as being inevitable. However beyond this it is 
unclear how the UK proposes to reconcile the two, particularly in an international 
environment facing significant economic and humanitarian challenges in the aftermath of 
the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the broader crisis in international 
human protection, and the imperative of international trade in the UK’s post-Brexit 
political and economic engagements.  
 
7.1.7 The UK as a hybrid great-middle power  
To conclude this section, it has been shown that there is considerable domestic debate on 
the nature of the UK’s place in the world, which is illustrative of a broader role crisis in 
the post-2015 era of UK foreign policy. Brexit in particular has drawn attention to 
defining the type of power the UK is, in addition to the awareness of the May and Johnson 
governments on the need to promote an active place for the UK on the international stage. 
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The subsequent pursuit of Global Britain shows that the government is refusing any 
notion that the UK is a middle, which is arguably reflective of the broader post-1945 
attempts by successive governments to demonstrate that relative decline is not something 
absolute that renders the UK unable to exert power on the international stage.  
Yet in the pursuit of this approach, the UK’s post-Brexit place in the world is 
fundamentally unclear. The analysis in this section leads to the idea that the UK is in some 
sense a hybrid great-middle power existing on a spectrum between the status of a great 
and middle power. This supports research by Hill (2016, p.394) on the “anomalous 
position” of the UK in international relations in which it is difficult to categorise the type 
of power that it is. The result of this is that the UK remains active on the international 
stage, but is unable to draw on significant hard power capabilities (Hill, 2016, pp.407-
408). In terms of intervention “caution is the watchword on both political and financial 
grounds, while geography acts as a powerful constraint” (Hill, 2016, p.414). The 
Integrated Review adopts a similar approach to previous UK governments since at least 
1997 in aiming to strike a delicate balance between a commitment to core liberal values, 
including democracy and human rights, while also protecting the UK’s geopolitical and 
economic interests as the balance of international power shifts between states.  
 
7.2 UK Leadership and influence on human protection 
This section argues that international leadership and influence have been two fundamental 
sources of the UK’s commitment to human protection as part of its post-1997 place in the 
world. These sources are significant amid a transitional foreign policy because they form 
part of the attempts of successive governments to convey both leadership and influence 
in order to maintain the UK’s place in the world as an important international actor. This 
is achieved through drawing on several sources of soft power leadership and influence, 
including its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, contributions to human 
protection in action, and its considerable support through ODA. These sources have 
gradually translated into a sustained change in the UK’s rhetoric and action on human 
protection beginning in earnest in 1997. With the government increasingly aware of the 
UK’s relative hard power decline, it has attempted to strengthen its commitment to human 
protection through drawing on its existing soft power capabilities.  
These sources of soft power leadership and influence are used to empirically 
support the hypothesis that the UK’s awareness of its changing position in the world 
between 1997 and 2020 led to sustained changes in its rhetoric and action towards a 
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strengthened commitment to human protection. Whilst acknowledging that leadership 
and influence are distinct concepts, both are addressed in tandem in the following sub-
sections on the basis that the UK illustrates leadership and influence together in its human 
protection actions. The first sub-section introduces the conceptualisation of soft power, 
which is then used in following sub-sections to analyse UK leadership and influence on 
human protection through the UN Security Council, contributions to humanitarian crises, 
and ODA.  
 
7.2.1 Conceptualising soft power in UK foreign policy 
Joseph Nye (1990, p.166) originally conceptualised soft power as “when one country gets 
other countries to want what it wants” (emphasis in original). Rather than the use of hard 
power to force compliance, soft power “uses an attraction to shared values, and the 
justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values” (Nye, 2004). 
According to Hill and Beadle (2014, pp.11-12), soft power success comes from two 
sources; the first being the nature of the soft power state itself, such as the ideas, identity, 
and values which constitute its foreign policy; and the second being the ability to convey 
this to other states.  
As argued throughout this thesis, the UK has witnessed a relative hard power 
decline in the post-war period. To use defence as one example, the UK was estimated to 
have spent 4.1% of GDP on defence in 1990, which subsequently decreased to 2.7% in 
1997, 2.5% in 2010 and then to 2.1% in 2018, which is just above NATO’s 2% defence 
spending target (MoD, 2019; Statista, 2020). In 2019, the UK’s provision of armed forces 
was still 10,000 less than the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review’s target of 
144,000 (Dempsey, 2019, p.5). It has been suggested that one reason for this decline is a 
trade-off between maintaining the UK’s nuclear capacity and its other hard power 
capabilities (Roberts, 2020, p.2). Although only one example, it is part of the broader and 
gradual relative decline in the UK’s post-war hard power capabilities. In turn, increasing 
attention has been placed on the UK’s soft power capabilities, which are considered 
important for preserving the UK’s place in the world (McClory, 2010, p.1; House of 
Lords, 2014, p.7). Jeremy Hunt, for instance, called for “a holistic view of British soft 
power and to recognise that it is part of British power and influence” (Hunt cited in House 
of Lords, 2018). 
However, another challenge for the UK are domestic perspectives from former 
government ministers, officials, and academics that the UK’s soft power international 
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influence is also declining (Evans and Steven, 2010; Smith and Laatikainen, 2016; Fraser 
in Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018d; Gifkins et al., 2019a).
44
 Prior to becoming Foreign 
Secretary, Hague (2009) warned “that it will become more difficult over time for Britain 
to exert on world affairs the influence which we are used to”. This was largely in response 
to the changes facing the future stability of the liberal international order amid 
international conflict, terrorism, and changes in the global balance of power. Years later, 
the decision to leave the EU generated a renewed focus on the implications of Brexit for 
UK influence in the world. Hague for example suggested that the UK “will have to 
compensate a bit for the logical loss of influence that we face” (Hague in BBC, 2017b). 
This emphasis on a logical loss frames Brexit as leading to an inevitable decline that the 
UK is unable to halt. Similarly, Sir Simon Fraser (in Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018c) 
argued that the implications of Brexit is “a reduction in our influence and leverage”. In a 
research interview, this loss of UK influence post-Brexit was viewed as being the result 
of leaving a cooperative European institution in a world where maintaining strong and 
close relations with countries was more important than ever.
45  
As the following sub-sections show however, it is important to further analyse 
these arguments that UK soft power influence is in decline. This is because the UN 
Security Council, the UK’s financial contributions to humanitarian crises, and its 
commitment to ODA at the time of writing, evidence crucial areas through which the UK 
has maintained and even enhanced its soft power leadership and influence on human 
protection.  
 
7.2.2 UK Leadership and influence in the UN Security Council 
The UK is “widely considered to be one of the most influential members of the UN” (Dee 
and Smith, 2017, p.528). It has retained a permanent seat on the UN Security Council 
since its formation through the UN Charter in 1945. Over the years, the UK has managed 
to build a reputation through its strong level of institutional experience, competence, and 
expertise (Gifkins et al., 2019a).
46 This combination provides “capital that enables the UK 
to purchase influence” (Gifkins et al., 2019a, p.1350). The UK’s position on the UN 
Security Council is thus an important source of its soft power in building a reputation 
 
44 Author interview 6. 
45 Author interview 6. 
46 Author interview 9. 
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through which it can promote and defend its values of international order, and 
subsequently influence the approach of the UN Security Council. The Security Council 
is an important example of UK soft power leadership and influence on human protection 
for two main reasons. The first is the exclusivity of its membership in being only one of 
five members with a permanent veto power (Gaskarth, 2013, p.90). In fact, research 
interviews suggested that the UK’s permanent membership is increasingly challenging as 
it does not reflect the UK’s current position as an international power.
47
 So whilst the 
UK’s permanent seat provides it with an opportunity to demonstrate soft power leadership 
and influence, equally there is an expectation for the UK to legitimise a role that does not 
support its relative power position (Gegout, 2016; Gifkins et al., 2019b, p.6). The second 
reason why the UN Security Council is an important source of UK soft power influence 
and leadership is its role as penholder on several high-profile protection agendas and 
cases, which allow the UK to lead and influence on the Security Council’s framing of 
protection norms and its response to humanitarian crises, which the following sub-section 
addresses.  
 
7.2.3 Penholding as UK soft power leadership on human protection 
Penholding is a form of agenda-setting power which gives the holder of the pen 
responsibility for leading the drafting of resolutions and statements on the UN Security 
Council (do Monte, 2016, p.675; Ralph and Gifkins, 2017, p.642).
48
 The UK has 
increasingly taken on penholding responsibilities to the point where it “is a dominant and 
effective actor” in this process (Gifkins et al., 2019a, p.1357). The UK’s commitment to 
penholding is further facilitated by the mechanics of the Security Council as the language 
of resolutions and the majority of negotiations are conducted in English, which enables 
the UK to fully articulate its position and draw on its wealth of diplomatic skills and 
expertise (Gifkins et al., 2019a, p.1357). It is suggested that the UK has taken advantage 
of this through the appointment of skilled drafters and negotiators.
49  
  Penholding provides one of the tools for demonstrable UK leadership and 
influence on human protection through the Security Council. As figure 27 shows, the UK 
was the primary penholder on several human protection agendas and county-specific 
 
47 Author interviews 7 and 9. 
48 Author interview 9. 
49 Author interview 11. 
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cases in 2020, which includes Libya, Yemen, the PoC, peacekeeping, and Sudan and 
South Sudan.  
 
Figure 27. UK penholding responsibilities on human protection, 2020 
Source: Security Council Report (2021) 
 
The situation is Yemen is an important illustration of both the strengths and limitations 
of the UK’s influence and leadership on human protection through penholding. As shown 
in the previous chapter, the UK was not initially strong in fulfilling its penholding 
responsibilities on Yemen.
50 The UK’s penholding did lead to some achievements on 
human protection such as drafting a resolution in 2016 in order to end the violence, 
beginning negotiations between both sides of the civil war, and working on providing 
accountability for violations of international law (FCO, 2016j). These contributions 
formed part of the UK’s broader aim to secure a political solution to the conflict (FCO, 
2017h). However, contrary to the UK’s statements on its contributions to Yemen through 
its work on the Security Council, it is argued that following resolution 2216 in 2015, 
action from the UK thereafter was limited until 2018.
51 This limited engagement with 
Yemen is primarily explained according to two factors. The first relates to the complexity 




 The second is the clash between the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and the UK’s 
broader geopolitical and economic interests and relations with coalition states involved 
 
50  Author interviews 7 and 9. 
51 Author interview 9. 
52  Author interview 9. 
UK penholding 
responsibilities 






53 At the time, the UK had been supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia, which 
led to domestic legal challenges against the government (Campaign Against Arms Trade, 
2019).
54 Yemen thus revealed the potential limitations of UK leadership through 
penholding given “tensions between the UK’s role as ‘penholder’ and its substantial trade 
relationship with Saudi Arabia” (Gifkins et al., 2019a, p.1351). This has significant 
implications for the UK’s commitment to human protection through the UN Security 
Council in showing “the difficulty diplomats on the Council face in defending their 
reputation as leaders on humanitarian intervention and human rights issues when the 
requirements of that role clash with the national interest in promoting UK business” 
(Gifkins et al., 2019a, p.1351). As mentioned in the introduction to this section, 
penholding allows leadership and influence over “what is going to be said” (do Monte, 
2016, p.675). This logically allows states to use the pen in a way that furthers promotes 
their national interests.  
 Whilst penholding is an opportunity for UK leadership and influence on human 
protection, it also requires responsibility. The second stage of the UK’s leadership and 
influence on Yemen from 2018 witnessed an important change in the humanitarian 
response to Yemen. One outcome was the adoption of Resolution 2451 in 2018, which 
was “a UK-led resolution to bolster the UN Yemen peace process” (FCO, 2018g). 
Resolution 2451 detailed the Stockholm Agreement based on trying to bring a peaceful 
end to the conflict and humanitarian crisis, as well as reiterating the need to protect 
civilians and allow access for humanitarian support (UN Security Council, 2018, pp.1-2). 
Following this, the UK led on the drafting of resolution 2452 (FCO, 2019c). Resolution 
2452 established the UN Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement in order to fulfil 
the Stockholm Agreement, which was renewed through resolution 2534 (UN Security 
Council, 2019, p.1; UN Security Council, 2020) In this way, the UK was able to leverage 
its penholding responsibilities on Yemen in order to trigger the peace process and begin 
trying bring an end to the humanitarian crisis. This shows how the UK has been able to 
strengthen its commitment to human protection, despite the initial challenges.   
 
53  Author interviews 7 and 9. 
54  CAAT led a successful legal challenge at the UK Court of Appeal in 2019. It deemed that the 
UK government’s weapons supply to Saudi Arabia was “unlawful”. See: Sabbagh, D. and 
McKernan, B. 2019. UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia unlawful, court of appeal declares. The 





 Whilst the UK has managed to establish itself as one of the leading penholders on 
human protection agendas and crises, the Yemen case also shows the downside of holding 
an influential and leading role in this process. With it being argued that “the decline in 
UK influence is palpable” at the UN (Martin cited in Day, 2018), the UK is increasingly 
under pressure to justify its position on the UN Security Council.
55
 This sub-section has 
evidenced one means through which the UK is able to demonstrate its leadership and 
influence on the world stage through its penholding responsibilities on humanitarian 
crises. However, Yemen in particular also reveals an inherent tension between the UK’s 
liberal internationalist commitment to human rights protection on the one hand, and its 
broader foreign policy commitment to securing its domestic prosperity on the other. The 
fundamental dilemma in this relationship is that a prosperous UK economy is arguably 
essential to its ability to continue contributing to multilateral organisations and to 
preventing humanitarian crises on the ground.  
 
7.2.4 UK leadership and influence beyond the Security Council  
As shown in chapter 4, UK leadership on human protection has origins in the post-1997 
New Labour government.
56 Leadership was a core component of New Labour’s 
underlying commitment to a liberal internationalist worldview, which was mostly notably 
illustrated through Tony Blair’s doctrine of international community speech (Holland, 
2013, p.58). The speech outlined Blair’s understanding of the world according to 
globalisation and the increasing erosion of state sovereignty norms in the face of mass 
atrocity crimes (Blair, 1999a). This rhetorical commitment to UK leadership on human 
protection was soon demonstrated in practice through Blair’s advocacy for intervention 
in Kosovo and the subsequent NATO-led operation (Dyson, 2009, p.51).  
Only a year later and the UK was again at the forefront of a human protection 
response in Sierra Leone. Unlike Kosovo, the UK’s intervention in Sierra Leone was 
without NATO support and was thus seen as underlining the UK’s moral commitment 
and leadership on human protection (Williams, 2001, p.155) and was later deemed Blair’s 
 
55  Author interview 9.  
56  The thesis includes examples from 1997 in accordance with the research timeframe (1997-
2020), but does not discount UK leadership on human protection prior to 1997. It also refers 
to UK leadership beyond the UN Security Council so excludes Libya on the basis that this 
response was authorised by the UN Security Council as part of the UK’s leadership on 
resolutions 1970 and 1973. 
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successful war (Dorman, 2009). These interventions in Kosovo and Sierra Leone 
provided the foundations of UK leadership on human protection. It is through leadership 
in particular which connects the UK’s commitment to human protection together with its 
aspirations to remain an important international actor. This is because it enables the UK 
to show its support to protect the core components of the liberal international order, 
including human rights, democracy promotion, and the international rule of law.  
Chapters 5 and 6 showed how the UK also played an important leadership role in 
the international response to the crisis in Syria. While the government was unsuccessful 
in receiving parliamentary approval for action in 2013, it led in the response to Syria in 
2018 through its humanitarian intervention as part of a coalition of forces alongside the 
US and France. This example illustrated the UK’s willingness to intervene by force into 
another sovereign state under the umbrella of humanitarian intervention, even in the 
absence of a customary international law on humanitarian intervention. It has therefore 
been argued that the UK was acting as a norm entrepreneur in being willing to protect 
populations from mass atrocity crimes despite the lack of legal avenues to justify this 
approach.  
 
7.2.5 Leadership and influence on funding and humanitarian assistance   
This sub-section argues that the UK has strengthened its commitment to human protection 
in rhetoric and action through its leadership on financial contributions and humanitarian 
assistance. To support this argument, it draws on examples from Libya (2011), Syria 
(2011-2018), Myanmar (2016-2017), and Yemen (2015-2020).
57 As figure 28 shows, the 









57  Kosovo (1999) and Sierra Leone (2000) are excluded from this analysis as the majority of 
empirical data was collected post-2010.  
199 
 




On Syria, the UK was second in terms of financial contributions of bilateral aid in 2012 
(FCO, 2012d). This support increased substantially in the next 6 years to the point where 
the UK had provided “over £2.71 billion in humanitarian funding” by 2018 (DFID and 
FCO, 2018). This includes contributing a further £450 million “to alleviate extreme 
suffering in Syria”, as well as contributions to supporting refugees within the region 
(DFID, 2018b). Moreover, the UK “have delivered 27 million monthly food rations, 10 
million relief packages, 10 million vaccines against deadly diseases and 12 million 
medical consultations for those in need in Syria.” (DFID and FCO, 2018). In financial 
terms, Syria was the UK’s “largest ever response” to a humanitarian crisis (FCO, 2019h). 
The annual CSSF report outlines how the UK continued to provide financial support for 
the White Helmets, which received £11 million from the CSSF in 2017/18 and made the 
UK the largest financial supporter to the volunteer organisation which operates on the 
ground amid the civil war in order to protect civilians and provide critical assistance (HM 
Government, 2018a, p.19). In addition, the 2018/19 annual CSSF report shows that the 
UK contributed to human protection in action through allocating £35.7 million to areas 
which range from national and local prevention and peacebuilding to Women, Peace and 
Security (HM Government, 2019, p.27).  
 
 












With the UN Security Council in deadlock over its response to Syria, the UK’s financial 
contributions to humanitarian assistance are a considerable demonstration of its 
leadership on human protection. It represents a continuation of the UK’s commitment to 
human protection since 1997, where the UK has been willing to contribute significant 
levels of humanitarian aid beyond direct military engagement. 
Similarly in Yemen, the UK provided £103 million in response to the crisis in 
2017, which made the UK the “fourth largest donor to the Yemen in terms of 
humanitarian aid” (May in BBC, 2017a). Furthermore, the UK announced approximately 
$125 million towards trying to address malnutrition (FCO, 2018a). In 2019, the UK 
government provided another £200 million, which meant an overall contribution of over 
£770 million since the conflict began (DFID and FCO, 2019). In response to the 2017 
crisis in Myanmar, the UK government notes that “through UK leadership and lobbying 
we were able to secure a further £260 million from a range of donors” (DFID and FCO, 
2017). In terms of the UK’s own personal contribution, it provided £12 million, 
particularly towards the prevention of sexual violence (DFID and FCO, 2017). Moreover, 
the UK delivered an addition “£8 million to address the humanitarian suffering of the 
Rohingya” (FCO, 2017a); contributed “£129 million in funding to the refugee crisis” 
(DFID, 2019b); and as of 2019, its contributions total £226 million (DFID, 2019a). 
Despite a perceived relative decline occurring in the UK’s hard military 
capability, these cases illustrate how it has been able to demonstrate leadership on human 
protection through its substantial financial contributions. It is essential to note that 
financial support alone is not necessarily sufficient to justify a significant UK 
commitment to human protection in Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar. However, the UK was 
not compelled to contribute such significant levels of financial support to address 
humanitarian suffering. Its targeted assistance shows that UK leadership on human 
protection does not have to be reduced to direct humanitarian intervention, but can also 
be expressed through a combination of other methods, including financial assistance. It 
is thus important to view these financial contributions as one component of the UK’s 
broader commitment to human protection in its internationalist foreign policy alongside 
its other actions on humanitarian intervention, advocacy, and policy.  
 
7.2.6 The UK’s commitment to ODA  
Following New Labour’s commitment to ODA and the formation of DFID in 1997, 
successive governments have recognised the importance of ODA as a soft power 
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capability to demonstrate UK influence in the world. David Cameron suggested ODA 
was “something we are right to stand up for in the world” (Prime Minister's Office, 2011); 
whilst William Hague suggested that the UK was “proud that we are living up to our 
commitment” (FCO, 2013b). An outcome of this was the 2015 International Development 
Act which legally enshrined the UK’s commitment to spend 0.7% of its GNI on ODA 
(HM Government, 2015). This legal commitment to ODA is seen as “a substantive change 
in policy” since even the New Labour government did not enshrine its ODA commitment 
into law (Heppell et al., 2017, p.907). The scale of the UK’s contribution to ODA has 
thus been described as “a major source of soft power and influence” (Gifkins et al., 2019b, 
p.4). A similar perspective was found in a research interview, with the scale of the UK’s 
commitment to ODA evidencing its global soft power research and influence.
59 This 
commitment to overseas development enables the UK to have influence across the world 
arguably in a way that it is unable to do so through direct military contributions alone 
(Policy Exchange, 2018, p.9).  
The UK’s financial contribution to ODA is substantial with a total spend of £14.5 
billion in 2020 (FCDO, 2021). ODA enables the UK to contribute to short and long-term 
human protection by donating to government efforts such as through the CSSF, with 
conflict prevention and the UK’s crisis response being some of its core objectives (Lunn 
et al., 2020, p.24). ODA also opens an opportunity for the UK to contribute to long-term 
human protection through addressing some of the potential causes of instability and 
conflict, which may lead to mass violence. Whilst a much broader view of human 
protection, logically speaking ODA is a useful means of protecting populations without 
the need for significant military capacity or hard power in the future, and yet, the returns 
are potentially significant for maintaining the UK’s soft power influence on the world 
stage.  
Importantly, the UK is able to link its ODA commitment to the national interest 
(Lightfoot et al., 2017, p.520; Mawdsley, 2017, p.229). As outlined in chapter 5, the 
emergence of liberal conservatism brought with it a renewed attention to justifying 
contributions to human protection through an appeal to the national interest. The 
government argues that preventing instability and conflict overseas in turn contributes to 
the immediate and longer term stability of the UK by reducing outside threats. With ODA, 
the government has framed it as a “shield” to protect countries against issues such as 
 
59  Author interview 6. 
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poverty and instability, which in turn, contribute to the immediate and longer term 
security and stability of the UK (DfID, 2018a).  
However, the UK’s commitment to ODA is not devoid of tension (Henson et al., 
2010, p.3; Seely and Rogers, 2019, p.8). Even though the government can argue that ODA 
is in its national interest, arguments are also made that it is not in the national interest to 
spend significant sums of money outside the UK. Whilst this perspective may overlook 
the specific benefits of ODA for short and long-term UK stability, Lightfoot et al (2017, 
p.517) suggest that the government is struggling to convince the public at large that ODA 
is in the national interest. The concern post-Brexit is that the government will be “less 
committed to foreign aid” (Mawdsley, 2017), particularly with the increased scrutiny on 
government spending.  
The first significant challenge to ODA was Boris Johnson’s decision to officially 
merge DFID and the FCO in 2020 (Prime Minister's Office, 2020c). Whilst both 
institutions remained separate since DFID’s founding in 1997, Johnson argued that the 
merger aimed “to safeguard British interests and values overseas”, whilst suggesting that 
the UK will continue to meet the 0.7% of GNI target (Hansard HC Deb., 16 June 2020). 
However, the merger was immediately interpreted as transition from DFID’s 
conventional development efforts to a focus on securing and protecting the UK’s more 
narrowly defined geopolitical interests (Jennings, 2020). This is significant because 
DFID’s budget was traditionally sizable in comparison to the FCO and other departments 
(Brien, 2020). An implication of merger to protect the UK’s national interests is that 
“considerations over the need in developing nations will likely become a secondary 
consideration to the national interest of a Global Britain” (Honeyman and Lightfoot, 
2020, p.31). 
 In November 2020, the government announced its intention to cut UK’s ODA 
contribution to 0.5% of GNI following pressure on government spending following the 
COVID-19 outbreak (FCDO, 2020). In defence of the government’s position the 
Chancellor, Rishi Sunak, suggested that the UK remained second in ODA contributions 
from the G7 and that the UK would “return to 0.7% when the fiscal situation allows” 
(Sunak, 2020), but with the omission of a more specific timeframe for increasing ODA 
back to 0.7%. This reduction is estimated to the save the treasury £4b billion per year 
(BBC, 2020b). However, to say that the reduction is due largely to the impact of COVID-
19 on the UK economy contradicts the government’s decision to increase defence 
spending during the current parliament as one outcome of the Integrated Review (BBC, 
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2020a). According to Honeyman (2020, p.58), COVID-19 is thus not sufficient alone to 
explain the decision to reduce the UK’s ODA spending because of the broader political 
debates and pressure on the government from the ideological right of the party to cut 
ODA spending.  
Although the UK has reduced its budget, the government continued to underline 
the importance of ODA in the Integrated Review. In particular, ODA is part of the 
government’s foreign policy vision for the next 10 years of “shaping the international 
order of the future” by continuing to contribute to the same areas of ODA as part of its 
2025 Strategic Framework (HM Government, 2021, p.46). This appears to support the 
government’s position that ODA will remain an important element of its foreign policy 
in spite of the temporary reduction in spending. For human protection, this would largely 
entail a similar commitment to that witnessed under the Cameron and May governments 
based on a continued contribution to ODA as a critical means of projecting global soft 
power influence and leadership, in addition to securing the UK’s long-term security.  
 
7.3 Chapter conclusion  
This chapter contributes to the overall analysis of this thesis on the relationship between 
the UK’s commitment to human protection and its transitional foreign policy between 
1997 and 2020. Drawing on a combination of 1,055 primary documentary materials, 
semi-structured interviews, and a wealth of scholarly and policy evidence, it argues that 
the nature of the UK’s place in the world as part of a transitional foreign policy is essential 
for assessing sustained changes in the UK’s rhetoric and action on human protection. 
From the beginning of the thesis timeframe in 1997, successive New Labour and 
Conservative governments have adapted to a transitional foreign policy in their 
commitment to human protection by defending the post-war rules-based international 
order and the component liberal values of human rights protection, democracy promotion, 
and in some cases, the international rule of law.  
This chapter shows that the liberal rules-based international order allows the UK 
to retain a high degree of international leadership and influence through its membership 
of the core multilateral institutions of this post-war order, especially its permanent 
membership of the UN Security Council. This expression of the UK’s soft power 
influence and leadership has been part of a sustained change that has occurred in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection since 1997. In particular, the UK has been able to 
demonstrate its leadership and influence in areas where it has the capacity to excel on, 
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including its diplomatic skills in penholding on humanitarian crisis, advocating on human 
protection, and providing significant targeted financial support to protection crises. This 
chapter thus argues that successive UK governments have been able to adapt to a 
transitional foreign policy through a greater focus on soft power amid a decline in its 
relative hard power capabilities. The UK’s commitment to ODA is another important 
illustration of its significant soft power influence and leadership on human protection. 
Since the New Labour’s White Paper on International Development, both the New Labour 
and Conservative governments have remained committed to ODA contributions, which 
the Cameron government enshrined in law in 2015.  
To return to the findings in chapters 4-6, the assessment of sustained change 
according to the combination of elite political rhetoric in 1,055 primary materials and its 
foreign policy actions show some important consistencies over time in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection. The assessment of UK rhetoric and action showed that 
the first stage of sustained change in the UK’s commitment to human protection was the 
election of the New Labour government in 1997 and the subsequent emphasis by Tony 
Blair and Robin Cook on the promotion and protection of core liberal values on the 
international stage, including human rights. The New Labour government protected these 
liberal values in practice through the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and 
the intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000. Kosovo was a notable moment in the UK’s 
endorsement of humanitarian intervention as an alternative legal basis for action because 
it has remained a feature in the foreign policy of successive governments between 2010 
and 2020 in situations of UN Security Council deadlock on Syria, and even to the point 
where the UK has been described as a norm entrepreneur on humanitarian intervention 
(Butchard, 2020).  
Besides humanitarian intervention, the assessment of sustained changes in the 
UK’s rhetoric and action in chapters 4-6 provides evidence that successive governments 
have adapted to a transitional foreign policy and drawn on other actions short of direct 
military intervention in their commitment to human protection. In particular, New Labour 
under Tony Blair defined the UK’s engagement with the world as that of a pivotal power, 
which on human protection was expressed in the government’s international leadership 
on protection in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, human rights, and contributions to guide the 
criteria for intervention in human protection crises. A similar approach was followed by 
the Coalition government between 2010 and 2015, with the UK taking a lead on the 
drafting of resolutions 1970 and 1973 in Libya, as well as drawing international attention 
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to the crisis in Syria and trying to galvanise international action. The government’s 
actions on Syria did not end with parliamentary defeat in 2013, but continued through 
other means, including non-coercive humanitarian assistance and financial aid.  
It is equally important to acknowledge the limitations of the UK’s commitment to 
human protection in a transitional foreign policy. The findings from chapter 6 in particular 
identified issues with the UK’s diplomacy on Yemen where the evidence suggests that its 
penholding responsibilities were caught up in broader power politics in its relations with 
coalition states. In addition, the UK’s commitment to ODA is increasingly under 
challenge following the decision by the Boris Johnson government to temporarily reduce 
the UK’s ODA contribution to 0.5% of GNI without a timescale of when the government 
intends to return to 0.7%.  
 These challenges to the UK’s commitment to human protection are characteristic 
of the challenging post-Brexit context of UK foreign policy. Brexit in particular has 
revealed a lingering “identity crisis” in the UK’s place in the world (Turner, 2019, p.731). 
The lead up and result of the 2016 referendum has drawn attention to the fundamental 
disagreement among politicians and the public on the future direction of UK foreign 
policy. The subsequent efforts from the Theresa May government to recast the UK’s place 
in the world through Global Britain has proven largely futile. Rather than presenting a 
coherent strategy, the evidence from research interviews, elite political rhetoric, and 
secondary scholarship is that Global Britain is more about reassuring the public on the 
UK’s intentions to play an active global role post-Brexit than about defining the type of 
power the UK intends to be on the world stage.  
Beyond Global Britain, this chapter argues that the UK’s place in the world is 
more reflective of a hybrid great-middle power in which the UK does not sit comfortably 
in a pre-determined category to describe its relative power position. This is because the 
UK no longer retains the hard power capabilities of superpower states such as the US and 
China, but it has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and with it an exclusive 
position in the leadership of the post-1945 international order, as well as boasting a strong 
diplomatic core and soft power influence. This makes the UK’s adaptability to a 
transitional foreign policy even more complex as it balances between its varying relative 
hard and soft power capabilities.  
Returning to the scenarios of sustained UK foreign policy change, between 1997 
and 2015 the UK’s commitment to human protection supported a combination of a 
pragmatic liberal internationalist and a global soft power leader and influencer on human 
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protection. The position of a pragmatic liberal internationalist was shown in the UK’s 
humanitarian interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and attempts to gain parliamentary 
authorisation for intervention in Syria in 2013. In both instances, the New Labour and 
Conservative-led governments demonstrated their willingness to bypass conventional 
channels of international law in pursuit of their commitment to liberal values on human 
rights. The role of a global soft power leader and influencer on human protection was 
evident in the UK’s diplomatic leadership on human protection on the international stage, 
including within the UN. This is in addition to the UK’s substantial contributions of 
financial assistance in humanitarian crises and its ODA.  
However, between 2016 and 2020 the UK’s commitment to human protection in 
a transitional foreign policy has evidenced all three scenarios of a trading partner, a 
pragmatic liberal internationalist, and a global middle power leader and influencer. Whilst 
these scenarios may overlap in action, chapter 6 showed inherent tensions in the 
relationship between a pragmatic liberal internationalist commitment to human protection 
and the position of a trading partner, and thus exposed a more fundamental tension 
between the UK’s economic and political interests and its liberal foreign policy values on 
human rights. In the absence of a coherent foreign policy vision which addresses the 
tensions and contradictions between these different scenarios in the post-Brexit era, the 
government will find it increasingly challenging to balance between its economic and 
political interests and its commitment to human protection.  
Together, these empirical chapters meet the three main original contributions of 
the thesis as outlined in the introduction. First, each empirical chapter contributes to the 
assessment of sustained changes in the UK’s rhetoric and actions on human protection in 
a transitional foreign policy. From the perspective of a transitional foreign policy, this 
thesis contributes to research on foreign policy change, especially the adaptability of 
governments to changes in the UK’s post-war relative international power, changes in the 
UK’s membership of multilateral organisations using the example of Brexit, and changes 
in the UK’s place within the evolving international order as it adjusts to shifts in the 
international balance of power. Second, it contributes to research on UK foreign policy 
towards human protection, its place in the world, and a transitional foreign policy. This 
is a novel analysis since research is yet to analyse these connections in relation to UK 




Finally, it contributes to research on the leadership and influence of former ‘great 
powers’ in international relations through the case study of the UK. Whilst the UK is not 
a superpower it is equally not a middle power according to its membership of the post-
war international order. However, research on the leadership and influence of states has 
tended to focus on either the superpowers, emerging powers, or middle powers at the 
expense of countries such as the UK which does not neatly fall into either of these three 
categories of power status. The next chapter proceeds to discuss these original 






















Chapter 8 - Conclusion  
This thesis has assessed the UK’s commitment to human protection in the context of its 
transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 2020. It has argued that the way successive 
governments since New Labour have conceptualised the UK’s place in the world has been 
critical for determining the nature of the UK’s foreign policy commitment to human 
protection. The concept of a transitional foreign policy has been at the core of this 
argument because it captures the multitude of changes in the UK’s geopolitical interests, 
policies, and international engagements between 1997 and 2020 and its relationship with 
the UK’s commitment to human protection. To revisit the concept, a transitional foreign 
policy is shaped by the adaptation of successive governments to the UK’s post-war 
relative hard power decline, the UK’s membership of multilateral institutions, and the 
UK’s position in the evolving international order. This transitional foreign policy in turn 
has implications for the UK’s commitment to human protection as successive 
governments strategize the nature of the UK’s international relations, including the 
relationship between its primary foreign policy interests in terms of its geopolitical and 
economic relationships with other states, and its liberal values including human rights and 
democracy.  
 The UK’s transitional foreign policy has been assessed throughout this 
dissertation according to changing patterns of policy behaviour, changing administrative 
apparatus, and in elite UK political rhetoric. This includes drawing on an extensive 
integrated content analysis of 1,055 primary documentary materials containing details of 
the government’s rhetoric and actions on human protection, in addition to policy 
documents, committee reports, semi-structured interviews, and a wealth of secondary 
scholarship. This rich empirical evidence shows that successive UK governments since 
New Labour in 1997 have encountered significant foreign policy hurdles from domestic 
and international pressure to maintain an important role in the liberal international order 
amid a post-war relative hard power decline to strategizing the UK’s post-Brexit approach 
to international relations. This is while grappling with an international human protection 
crisis in which mass violence and atrocity crimes are still being committed with impunity 
in the 21st century (Bellamy, 2020).  
  This chapter concludes on the findings and original contributions of the thesis 
and assesses the implications of these for the research hypothesis. It then revisits the 
research methods, and discusses the implications of this dissertation for future research 
209 
 
in the field of foreign policy change, the relationship between the UK’s foreign policy 
interests and values, and a transitional foreign policy.  
 
8.1 Findings, contributions, and the research hypothesis  
This section addresses the main findings, arguments, original contributions, and their 
significance for wider scholarship on foreign policy change, the UK’s transitional foreign 
policy and its relationship with human protection, and the leadership and influence of 
former ‘great powers’ through the case study of the UK. After briefly revisiting how the 
dissertation has addressed the aims and objectives of the research, the section then 
discusses the three main original findings and contributions and their implications for the 
research hypothesis. 
 
8.1.1 Revisiting the research puzzle, aims and objectives  
The original starting point of this thesis was the puzzle of the UK’s membership of the 
post-1945 international order and its commitment to international human protection, but 
the increasing challenges posed by a transitional UK foreign policy. This transitional 
foreign policy has led to the attempts of successive UK governments to adapt to changes 
in its place in the world, its membership of multilateral institutions, shifts in the 
international balance of power, and a crisis in international human protection.  
This thesis therefore aimed to investigate the relationship between the UK’s 
commitment to human protection and this transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 
2020. This aim has been addressed through the four empirical chapters which examined 
how governments have adapted to changes in the UK’s place in the world and the 
subsequent nature of its commitment to human protection. To support this analysis, the 
dissertation fulfilled four objectives. The first three objectives were to develop and apply 
a framework to assess changes to the UK’s commitment to human protection in a 
transitional foreign policy between 1997 and 2020; to use this framework to hypothesise 
and test three scenarios of the relationship between adjustments in the UK’s place in the 
world and changes in its commitment to human protection; and to develop and classify a 
dataset to examine sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human protection. 
These three objectives were achieved in two ways. First, through creating a framework to 
assess sustained change in UK foreign policy rhetoric and action on human protection 
according to a combination of elite political rhetoric in a dataset of 1,055 primary 
documentary materials, and foreign policy practices of policy, coercive and non-coercive 
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intervention, financial support and humanitarian assistance, and advocacy and 
entrepreneurship. Second, this framework was then applied to the foreign policies of 
successive governments on human protection between 1997 and 2020 throughout 
chapters 4 to 7. The fourth objective was to analyse the findings on the relationship 
between the UK’s place in the world and its commitment to human protection between 
1997 and 2020, which was achieved during the empirical chapters and is revisited in the 
following sub-sections.  
 
8.1.2 Findings and original research contributions  
The following sub-sections detail the three main findings and contributions of this thesis. 
To summarise, the first finding is that adjustments in the UK’s place in the world between 
1997 and 2020 have translated into sustained changes in the UK’s foreign policy rhetoric 
and action on human protection in a transitional foreign policy. Second, there is a 
disconnect between the liberal internationalist commitment to human protection by the 
New Labour and Coalition governments between 1997 and 2015 and the period between 
2016 and 2020. This is because the post-2016 period of UK foreign policy has been 
characterised by discontinuity in the UK’s place in the world and its subsequent 
commitment to human protection following the 2016 EU referendum. Third, successive 
UK governments since 1997 have gradually adapted to the UK’s post-war relative hard 
power decline through an appeal to the UK’s global soft power capabilities for leadership 
and influence on human protection. This global soft power approach captures the hybrid 
great-middle power status of the UK in international relations in the post-1997 era, which 
is conceptualised according to the UK’s position within core institutions of the post-1945 
liberal international order while acknowledging the UK’s limited capacity to contribute 
militarily to every humanitarian crisis. This includes the government’s commitment to 
establishing an “integrated approach to government work on conflict and stability”, which 
includes atrocity prevention (HM Government, 2021, p.79), which is integral to 
protecting populations from atrocity crimes. Global soft power means the UK is still able 
to lead and influence on human protection issues and crises, including drawing on its 
diplomacy in the UN Security Council, its funding and humanitarian aid, and ODA 
contributions.  
 These findings contribute to three main bodies of scholarship on UK foreign 
policy and human protection through the analytical lens of a transitional foreign policy; 
to theoretical research on foreign policy change and how to assess this in practice; and to 
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research on ‘former great’ power leadership and influence in international relations using 
the case of the UK and its commitment to human protection. The following sub-sections 
address each of these three findings and contributions in detail prior to assessing the 
research hypothesis.   
 
8.1.3 The UK’s commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy  
The first finding of this dissertation is that adjustments in the UK’s place in the world 
have translated into sustained changes in the UK’s rhetoric and action on human 
protection between 1997 and 2020. The conceptualisation of a transitional foreign policy 
lies at the heart of this finding because it captures the adaptation of successive 
governments to the UK’s post-war relative hard power decline, changes in the UK’s 
membership of multilateral institutions, and the UK’s position in the evolving 
international order. The empirical chapters have found that this transitional UK foreign 
policy in turn has implications for how successive governments commit to human 
protection as they strategize the UK’s international engagements, and in particular, the 
relationship between the UK’s foreign policy interests and liberal values. 
Based on the wealth of evidence utilised in each empirical chapter, this 
dissertation has argued that this relationship between the UK’s place in the world as part 
of a transitional foreign policy and its commitment to human protection is shown in the 
interaction between the domestic and the international in UK foreign policy. This 
argument was first supported in chapter four, which used New Labour’s election in 1997 
as a significant starting point for the analysis of sustained changes in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection for four main reasons. The first was the immediate 
context of the international community’s response to the mass atrocities committed in 
Rwanda in 1994 and Bosnia in 1995, with secondary research showing that the UK 
government was part of a broader failure to protect both populations from mass atrocity 
crimes. The second was the election of the New Labour government in 1997 under the 
leadership of Tony Blair as Prime Minister and Robin Cook as Foreign Secretary. The 
New Labour government attempted to reposition the UK’s place in the world towards a 
pivotal power to account for a combination of maintaining the UK’s international 
alliances, a rejection of UK isolationism, and a recognition of US superpower leadership 
of the post-1945 liberal international order. Third, New Labour came to power at a 
significant moment of international normative debate on the relationship between state 
sovereignty and non-intervention, which accelerated in the aftermath of Rwanda and 
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Bosnia and would eventually lead to the development and practice of the UK’s 
commitment to humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and beyond.  Finally, the election of 
the New Labour government was in the background of the discourse and reality of 
globalisation, which as Blair (1999a) acknowledged, brought a global dimension to 
challenges in international relations. This includes the challenges and threats of conflict, 
instability, terrorism and WMD. In such a globalised world, the New Labour government 
under Blair committed to an outward looking foreign policy.  
Chapter 4 argued that New Labour’s foreign policy was most accurately described 
as liberal internationalist based on a commitment to the domestic and international 
interest and the protection of core liberal values on freedom, human rights, and 
democracy. This appeal to a liberal internationalist foreign policy outlook was 
fundamentally influenced by changes at the international level in the post-war era, which 
led to the ascendance of the US as a hegemon of a liberal international order (McCourt, 
2013; 2014). This US-led liberal international order is built on core liberal principles of 
democracy, freedom, and human rights (Ikenberry, 2009; Cooley and Nexon, 2020). The 
UK’s commitment to liberal internationalism was thus a reflection of the broader 
international normative changes that had occurred in international order. It is New 
Labour’s commitment to liberal internationalism that helps explain the increasing 
rhetorical attention that the UK government placed on human protection in the post-1997 
era. 
 The New Labour government initiated three main sustained changes in the UK’s 
rhetoric and action on human protection in its transitional foreign policy. Firstly, a 
willingness to draw on humanitarian intervention as a legal basis for action in the absence 
of an Article 51 justification or a Chapter VII resolution from the UN Security Council. 
Secondly, a commitment to alternative forms of humanitarian action beyond direct 
coercive measures as an important contribution to the growth of the UK’s soft power 
leadership and influence on human protection. Thirdly, a liberal internationalist 
commitment to the protection of core liberal values, including human protection. Each of 
these findings and their original contributions to scholarship are now addressed in turn.  
The first sustained change in the UK’s rhetoric and action on human protection 
was the UK’s willingness to commit to humanitarian intervention as a legal means of 
protecting a population from mass atrocity crimes in the absence of an Article 51 basis 
for action or a Chapter VII resolution from the UN Security Council. The UK’s clearest 
attempt to outline and defend its approach to humanitarian intervention was Tony Blair’s 
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rhetoric on the doctrine of the international community, which endorsed the idea of 
conditional sovereignty. The doctrine suggested that if a state fails to protect its 
population, then states such as the UK would intervene without the target state’s consent 
in order to prevent mass atrocity crimes. This rhetoric was swiftly translated into action 
with the UK’s contribution to the NATO-led coercive intervention in Kosovo in 1999, 
which both Blair and Cook supported on the basis of protecting the population of Kosovo 
from ethnic cleansing (Blair, 1999a; Blair, 1999b; Blair, 2011; Hansard HC Deb., 13 
April 1999; Hansard HC Deb., 26 May 1999; Hansard HC Deb., 18 January 1999; 
Hansard HC Deb., 19 April 1999; Hansard HC Deb., 8 October 2001). A year later, the 
UK intervened in Sierra Leone, which was also partly justified as a means of preventing 
RUF atrocities and reinstalling President Kabbah (Blair, 2000; Williams, 2001, p.155; 
Hansard HC Deb., 28 November 2006). The UK followed these interventions in Kosovo 
and Sierra Leone by setting the future groundwork for humanitarian intervention. This 
included Robin Cook’s speech on guiding humanitarian intervention which set out criteria 
in order to determine whether the UK should intervene to protect a population from mass 
atrocity crimes, in addition to the FCO’s policy paper on humanitarian intervention  
(Cook, 2000a; FCO cited in Marston, 2001, p.696). 
 The analysis between 2010 and 2020 reveals sustained change in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection with regards to a continued appeal to humanitarian 
intervention as a legal basis for action. Beginning with the Conservative-led Coalition 
government in chapter 5, the UK updated its position on humanitarian intervention in the 
British Defence Doctrine (Ministry of Defence, 2011; 2014). The Coalition government 
subsequently attempted to practice humanitarian intervention in a similar manner to 
Kosovo in 1999 because of UN Security Council deadlock on Syria and the threat posed 
by the use of chemical weapons. Whilst the government’s hopes of humanitarian 
intervention were defeated by Parliament in 2013, in 2018 Theresa May justified UK 
airstrikes against Syrian chemical weapons facilities on the same legal basis of 
humanitarian intervention as used by former governments in 1999 and 2013 (Blair, 
1999a; Prime Minister's Office, 2013; Prime Minister’s Office, 2018). 
 Yet, the thesis equally found that this commitment to humanitarian intervention 
has significant implications for the international development of the R2P, which the UK 
has consistently proclaimed to support (Ralph, 2014a). The foundation of the R2P was to 
address the dilemma between sovereignty and illegal humanitarian intervention, and so 
the UK’s support for humanitarian intervention reveals a tension with its other 
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commitment to the R2P. This findings supports the perspective of Ralph (2014a) that the 
UK’s willingness to keep drawing on the conventional approach to humanitarian 
intervention is at risk of undermining its own commitment to the R2P because of the clear 
legal boundaries between the two. This finding is significant because it shows the UK’s 
readiness to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes even if this is against the 
majority legal opinion of the international community and the R2P.  
 This finding of sustained UK foreign policy change on human protection 
contributes to two main bodies of scholarship. The first is to research on UK foreign 
policy and human protection through its original angle of the relationship between UK 
foreign policy, human protection, and a transitional foreign policy. This body of research 
has placed considerable attention on UK foreign policy and human protection through the 
perspective of human rights, R2P, and humanitarian intervention but has largely focused 
on specific governments, Prime Ministers or Foreign Secretaries (Daddow, 2009; 2013; 
Daddow and Schnapper, 2013; Oliver, 2013; 2015; Beech and Oliver, 2014; Beech and 
Munce, 2019). This thesis brings the analysis of UK foreign policy and human protection 
together across governments in order to identify any sustained changes that have occurred 
over time and their significance. The second contribution is to the wealth of scholarship 
on the UK’s commitment to humanitarian intervention and its implications for legal 
debates on human protection (Krisch, 2002; Henderson, 2015; O'Meara, 2017; Milanovic, 
2018; Buys and Garwood-Gowers, 2019; Butchard, 2020; Betti, 2020; Kleczkowska, 
2020; Newman, 2021). The evidence from this thesis suggests that the UK will continue 
to use humanitarian intervention as its legal justification for action when it is unable to 
draw on Article 51 or when the UN Security Council is deadlocked. Whilst creating legal 
controversy, the UK’s consistent commitment to humanitarian intervention is important 
evidence of a sustained change in its commitment to human protection.  
 The second sustained change initiated by New Labour is the commitment of 
successive governments to human protection by alternative means beyond direct coercive 
action. The first stage in this change was the creation of DFID following the White Paper 
on International Development and the subsequent commitment to ODA. This is alongside 
further financial contributions and equipment supplies to humanitarian crises, as well as 
leading on the international response to crises through the UK’s membership of 
institutions such as the UN Security Council. Both chapter 5 and 6 strengthened this 
evidence of a sustained change through the examples of the UK’s leadership on the 
response to Libya through its penholding on the UN Security Council, and its financial 
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contribution and equipment supplies to the crises in Syria, Myanmar, and Yemen. In 
addition, the Conservative-led Coalition government enshrined the UK’s 0.7% 
commitment to ODA into law through the 2015 International Development Act. This is 
an important finding because it shows one way in which successive UK governments 
have adapted to the UK’s more limited capacity to contribute militarily to all humanitarian 
crises by providing support in other ways, which is equally a demonstration of its 
international leadership and influence in response to humanitarian crises.  
 The third sustained change in UK rhetoric and action on human protection lies in 
the influence of New Labour’s commitment to a liberal internationalist foreign policy as 
defining the UK’s place in the world between 1997 and 2015. As argued earlier in this 
section, New Labour’s liberal internationalism was significant for the UK’s more specific 
commitment to human protection because of the appeal to the values of freedom, 
democracy, and human rights. The evidence from chapter 4 shows that the New Labour 
government explicitly appealed to an internationalist foreign policy as part of their 
rejection of UK isolationism from the world (Blair, 1997 quoted in McCourt, 2011; Blair, 
1999a; 1999b). At the heart of this internationalism was the liberal commitment to the 
protection of human rights, and by extension protecting populations from mass atrocities 
(Cook, 1997; Blair, 1999a; 2000; 2009, p.5; 2011, p.248; Vickers, 2004a, p.193; Atkins, 
2013, p.176; Kitchen and Vickers, 2013, p.300).  
 When the Conservative-led Coalition government succeeded the New Labour 
government, their foreign policy shifted from liberal internationalism to liberal 
conservatism. The early foreign policy rhetoric from both David Cameron and William 
Hague suggested that liberal conservatism was a means of distinguishing from New 
Labour, especially with the addition of a conservative tone in being prudent about the 
world that exists (Cameron, 2006; 2019, pp.145-146). However, the assessment of elite 
political rhetoric in 355 primary documents, in addition to the government’s actions on 
Libya and Syria, showed that this liberal conservative approach to foreign policy did not 
represent any radical departure from the liberal internationalism of their predecessors. In 
fact, the Conservative-led Coalition’s rhetoric and actions on human protection were 
guided by an underlying liberal commitment to the same components of freedom, human 
rights, and democracy. This included a willingness of the government to intervene by 
force on humanitarian grounds in order to protect populations from atrocity crimes, as 
occurred mostly notably in Libya in 2011.  
216 
 
 This chapter also found that David Cameron and William Hague paid particular 
attention to defining the UK’s place in the world, which includes openly dispelling the 
notion that the UK was suffering from an irreversible relative power decline in a 
transitional foreign policy. Yet the findings in chapter 6 supported the argument of 
Gaskarth (2016) that the government’s 2013 parliamentary defeat on intervention in Syria 
masked a broader concern with the UK’s relative international power decline and capacity 
to contribute to direct coercive interventions in the aftermath of Libya in 2011. On the 
occasions when the UK was unable to act through direct military intervention, including 
Syria in 2013, it still provided significant humanitarian assistance rather than 
backtracking on its engagement with the crisis despite its parliamentary defeat.  
However, the thesis found that the post-2016 period of UK foreign policy has been 
inconsistent with the period between 1997 and 2015. Based on the nature of the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in chapters 4 and 5, the expectation in this thesis was 
that the Conservative majority governments under Theresa May and Boris Johnson would 
follow a similar consistent path of sustained change, even despite Brexit and the shift in 
the UK’s international engagements. Yet the post-2016 environment fully exposes the 
challenges posed by a transitional foreign policy for the UK’s commitment to human 
protection as the UK grapples with Brexit and the reorientation of its global role amid a 
crisis of the liberal international order more broadly (Acharya, 2018; Acharya and Plesch, 
2020; Ikenberry, 2018a; Paris, 2019; Babic, 2020; Lee et al., 2020), alongside a crisis in 
international human protection (Hopgood, 2015; Bellamy, 2020). Chapter 7 thus argued 
that this period between 2016 and 2020 was indicative of the broader crisis in defining 
the UK’s post-Brexit place in the world (Beasley et al., 2018; Oppermann et al., 2020). 
Global Britain was manifest of this crisis in representing more of a domestic narrative to 
convince the public, businesses, and policymakers that the UK would retain an important 
global role post-Brexit (Turner, 2019).  
The thesis argued that this transitional foreign policy and the crisis in defining the 
UK’s place in the world has implications for the UK’s commitment to human protection 
as UK governments attempt to strategize the country’s place in the world, which includes 
striking a delicate balance between its foreign policy interests and values. Yet chapter 6 
showed that the UK’s commitment to human protection in the cases of Myanmar and 
Yemen showed an inherent tension between some of the UK’s values and interests, such 
as its commitment to human protection on one hand and its trade relationships on the 
other (See Gilmore, 2014; Gilmore, 2020). In Myanmar, the evidence showed a trade-off 
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between the UK’s commitment to democracy following the election of Aung San Suu 
Kyi and the decades of discrimination against the Rohingya which led to mass atrocity 
crimes being committed in Rakhine State in 2017. Although the UK condemned the 
atrocities, the historical roots of the mass violence were evident in citizenship polices 
enacted decades earlier. In Yemen, the government was committed to human protection 
through its financial assistance, but simultaneously exported arms to coalition forces 
which were alleged to have led to further civilian harm.  
These findings make several original contributions to scholarship on UK foreign 
policy, human protection, the UK’s place in the world, and foreign policy change. Firstly, 
there is a wealth of research on UK foreign policy on human protection from the 
perspectives of R2P, humanitarian intervention, and human rights more broadly 
(Daddow, 2009; 2013; Daddow and Schnapper, 2013; Oliver, 2013; 2015; Beech and 
Oliver, 2014; Beech and Munce, 2019; Ralph, 2014a), but there is yet to be a detailed 
assessment of the relationship between foreign policy, human protection, and the UK’s 
place in the world, and in particular, an assessment of long-term changes in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection in a transitional foreign policy. This is despite the 
impact that changes in the UK’s relative international power status, changes in its 
membership of multilateral organisations, and shifts in the global balance of power have 
on the UK’s subsequent approach to international human protection. This includes the 
nature and extent of its hard military capabilities, diplomatic strength, soft power reach, 
and economic capacity to contribute to human protection whilst simultaneously securing 
its own domestic security and stability. 
Secondly, the findings on the UK’s relative international decline, and attempts to 
conceptualise the UK’s place in the world post-Brexit, contributes to empirical 
scholarship on the UK’s place in the world (Gaskarth, 2014; McCourt, 2011; McCourt, 
2014), and in particular the crisis in the UK’s role post-2016 (Beasley et al., 2018; Turner, 
2019; Oppermann et al., 2020). The thesis also provided further evidence of the 
limitations of Global Britain through drawing on the UK’s commitment to human 
protection.
60
 This includes illustrating the dilemma that an incoherent worldview has for 
the UK’s contributions to protecting populations from mass violence and atrocity crimes. 
Its findings on the relationship between the UK’s place in the world and its commitment 
to human protection support research by Morris (2011) Chalmers (2015) and Hill (2016) 
 
60 Author interviews 2, 4, 6, 8, and 11 revealed the limitations of Global Britain.  
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where the UK is neither strictly a great nor middle power. This led to the idea that the UK 
is a hybrid great-middle power based on a recognition of a relative decline in its 
capabilities, but its ability still lead and influence through its membership of core 
multilateral institutions of international order, particularly the UN Security Council.  
Finally, the findings on sustained UK foreign policy change on human protection 
in a transitional foreign policy contributes to theoretical research on foreign policy 
change. In particular, the role of domestic and international structures and agents in 
processes of foreign policy change (Brazys et al., 2017; Brazys and Panke, 2017; Kaarbo, 
2017; Peltner, 2017), and how governments react to significant foreign policy shifts, such 
as the UK’s exit from the EU. The next sub-section provides further details of these 
theoretical contributions to foreign policy analysis and its sub-field of foreign policy 
change.  
 
8.1.4 An assessment of foreign policy change 
The findings in this thesis on sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human 
protection contribute to broadening theoretical and empirical research on identifying and 
assessing foreign policy change over time. The specific contribution of this thesis to 
literature on foreign policy change is its definition of sustained change and the analytical 
framework used to identify and assess it. Chapter 3 examined a wealth of scholarship in 
the field of foreign policy change, including the different concepts of change at an abstract 
level (Holsti, 1998; 2004; Doeser and Eidenfalk, 2013; Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2014; 
2017; Haesebrouck and Joly, 2021), the role of structure and agency, leadership, and 
learning (Smith, 1981; Holsti, 1982; 1998; Hermann, 1990; Carlsnaes, 1993; 2002; Levy, 
1994; Stein, 1994; Hermann and Hagan, 1998; Gustavsson, 1999; Hermann et al, 2001; 
Welch, 2005; Doeser and Eidenfalk, 2013; Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2014; Blavoukos 
and Bourantonis, 2017; Brazys et al., 2017; Brazys and Panke, 2017; Kaarbo, 2017; 
Peltner, 2017). This is in addition to examining research on some of the causes of foreign 
policy change and how to identify change in a state’s external relations (Gustavsson, 
1999; Welch, 2005; Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2014; Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 
2017; Brazys et al., 2017; Brazys and Panke, 2017; Kaarbo, 2017; Peltner, 2017).  
 Although there is a wealth of literature on foreign policy change, its causes, and 
its definition, chapter three showed that there was no clear framework in these studies to 
neatly apply to an assessment of sustained changes in the UK’s commitment to human 
protection as part of a transitional foreign policy. In turn, this thesis has made a novel 
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contribution to theoretical and empirical research on foreign policy change through its 
specific focus on sustained change in order to define and assess shifts in the UK’s foreign 
policy which occur and endure over time to identify long-term patterns of changing elite 
UK political discourse and foreign policy actions.  
 The starting point for the development of the analytical framework to assess 
change was to conceptualise the concept of change and what constitutes a sustained 
change in UK foreign policy. This approach was informed by earlier research on 
conceptualising foreign policy change (Holsti, 1998; 2004; Doeser and Eidenfalk, 2013; 
Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2014; 2017). This particularly includes Blavoukos and 
Bourantonis’ (2017) work on foreign policy change as encompassing a spectrum of 
changes from minor to more significant and Holsti’s (1998, 2004, 2016) research on the 
distinction between minor and fundamental adjustments in a state’s foreign policy 
behaviour. These perspectives therefore provided the basis of the definition of sustained 
change as a shift in the UK’s foreign policy goals and/or methods on human protection 
which endures over time in the approach of successive governments and is continually 
shaped, maintained, and reinforced by a combination of UK government rhetoric – what 
is said by elite political agents in government – and its actions – the means and methods 
of protection in practice. A distinguishing feature of this conceptualisation is that 
sustained change is distinct from minor or episodic shifts in UK foreign policy since it is 
assessed according to changes in the rhetoric and actions of successive governments 
across the ideological spectrum of domestic UK politics between 1997 and 2020. This is 
in order to evidence that UK foreign policy change on human protection is enduring rather 
than simply replaced when a government leaves office. Through the specific focus on 
human protection, the thesis has contributed further to research which has examined 
foreign policy change in relation to specific policy areas (Walsh, 2006, Brazys et al, 2017; 
Dukalskis, 2017; Kaarbo, 2017; Peltner, 2017). However, it builds on this scholarship 
through its focus on change over time according to the concept of sustained change, which 
in turn is also a contribution to Holsti (1998, 2004, 2016).  
 Throughout the thesis, this definition of change was applied according to two 
main indicators. The first is a sustained change in a specific foreign policy goal and/or 
method on human protection or the predominance of new or alternative foreign policy 
goals. The second is when a change in goals and/or methods is maintained, and built upon, 
by at least one successive government. This change is further strengthened in instances 
where a government is replaced by another on the opposite side of the ideological 
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spectrum, such as a Labour administration being succeeded by a Conservative 
administration. This is because parties across the ideological spectrum may hold 
fundamentally different conceptions regarding the nature and means of contributing to 
human protection as part of UK foreign policy. In order to find evidence of this criteria 
and assess it according to the analytical framework of sustained change, the thesis 
examined a combination of elite UK political rhetoric through an integrated content 
analysis of 1,055 primary documentary materials and an assessment of the UK’s actions 
on human protection according to changes in policy, coercive and non-coercive 
intervention, financial support and humanitarian assistance, and advocacy and 
entrepreneurship. 
 This conceptualisation and criteria for sustained change was applied and met by 
UK governments in a number of ways between 1997 and 2020, which was traced and 
assessed through each empirical chapter. Chapter 4 was the starting point for applying 
and assessing the conceptualisation and criteria for sustained changes in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection. The first change was the emergence of human rights 
as a core component of the UK’s approach to foreign policy (Cook, 1997). Whilst human 
rights have been part of the foreign policy of predecessor governments, chapter 4 argued 
that the change with the New Labour government between 1997 and 2020 was the greater 
emphasis placed on human rights in its foreign policy rhetoric (Gaskarth, 2006). This in 
turn represented the initiation of a sustained change as the emphasis on human rights 
demonstrated the predominance of an alternative foreign policy goal. Chapter 5 and 6 
showed how this initial change was subsequently translated into a sustained change in the 
UK’s commitment to human protection as the Coalition and Conservative governments 
between 2010 and 2020 continued to maintain and build on this commitment to human 
rights in its foreign policy rhetoric. This includes the commitment to the underlying 
foreign policy tradition of liberal conservatism, the publication of the human rights and 
democracy reports which monitored human rights progress, challenges, and steps 
forward, and the rhetoric of UK political elites in relation to protecting human rights in 
crisis situations such as Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar.  
 The second sustained change was the commitment of successive governments to 
humanitarian intervention. Whilst the history of humanitarian intervention pre-dates 1997 
(Newman, 2021), chapter 4 argued that under New Labour – and as a result of the broader 
international context of debates on sovereignty and humanitarian intervention following 
the crises in Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1995) – humanitarian intervention became a 
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predominant focus of UK foreign policy on human protection. This was evident in UK 
government rhetoric, including Blair’s (1999) doctrine of the international community 
speech, the policy paper on humanitarian intervention, and the humanitarian intervention 
in Kosovo. This change in the goals of UK foreign policy under New Labour 
demonstrated a sustained change in being applied in the rhetoric and actions of the 
Coalition and Conservative governments between 2010 and 2018. Rhetorically, the 
Coalition government published the UK defence doctrine, which outlined a willingness 
to draw on humanitarian intervention in the absence of other legal avenues of 
intervention. In practice, the government used humanitarian intervention as its legal basis 
for action in its attempt to intervene militarily in Syria in 2013 (Prime Minister’s Office, 
2013), while the Theresa May government used humanitarian intervention as justification 
for the UK’s contribution to coalition airstrikes on chemical weapons facilities in Syria 
in April 2018 (Prime Minister’s Office, 2018). This in turn met the criteria for a sustained 
change as humanitarian intervention become a predominant foreign policy concern in the 
UK’s foreign policy on human protection during the New Labour government, which was 
maintained and built upon by successive governments across the ideological spectrum 
between 2010 and 2020.  
 The third way that sustained change in the UK’s commitment to human protection 
was met between 1997 and 2020 was the commitment to alternative forms of human 
protection beyond coercive intervention. A notable change in this regard was the 
promotion of international development following New Labour’s creation of DFID, 
which was maintained and built upon by the Conservative-led Coalition government 
through legally enshrining the 0.7% GNI commitment. This shift meets both indicators 
of a sustained change in demonstrating the emergence of a new foreign policy goal 
(indicator one), and its maintenance and development by successive governments 
(indicator two).  
This concept of sustained change and its indicators is thus an important 
contribution the literature which has attempted to account for the extent of change 
(Kleistra and Mayer, 2001; Holsti, 1998; 2004; Ashbee and Hurst, 2020), especially the 
role of more enduring changes in foreign policy as distinct from minor adjustments which 
may occur in time limited circumstances (Holsti, 1998, 2004, 2016). However, the focus 
in this analytical framework is on a specific aspect of foreign policy (human protection) 
in a particular country (the UK), which in turn is not necessarily applicable to all foreign 
policies and country cases. That said, it provides an important contribution to research on 
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foreign policy attempt by aiming to establish and apply a conception and assessment of 
change as something which occurs and is maintained over time in a government’s foreign 
policy rhetoric and actions. 
Alongside the analytical framework on sustained change, the conceptualisation of 
a transitional foreign policy in relation to changes in the UK’s geopolitical interests, 
policies, and international engagements is an essential part of this theoretical contribution 
because it required an analysis of both the structures and agents in UK foreign policy at 
a domestic and international level. The findings showed that the UK’s commitment to 
human protection between 1997 and 2020 was moulded by a combination of push-pull 
domestic and international changes. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the 
election of the New Labour government represented a domestic push factor for foreign 
policy change (Peltner, 2017), which was an important starting point of sustained changes 
in the UK’s commitment to human protection.  
However, this foreign policy change on human protection was equally influenced 
by structural pull factors at the international level, including the shifting normative setting 
following debates on the relationship between sovereignty and non-intervention in the 
aftermath of Rwanda and Bosnia and the dominance of the US as the hegemon of the 
liberal international order. The findings in chapter 6 presented the challenge of UK 
foreign policy change on human protection as the Theresa May and Boris Johnson 
governments addressed the major structural shift of Brexit and exposed the volatility of 
the UK’s place in the world as being shaped by a combination of domestic governments 
and international structures, including multilateral organisations. These findings show 
that the UK’s commitment to human protection does not exist in a vacuum, but is shaped 
according to these domestic and international push-pull factors, which are only intensified 
in the event of a significant change in the UK’s geopolitical interests, policies, and 
international engagements, such as exiting the EU. The concept of a transitional foreign 
policy is thus an analytically important contribution to research in foreign policy analysis 
and its sub-field of foreign policy change (Hermann, 1990; Carlsnaes, 1993; Gustavsson, 
1999; Welch, 2005; Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2014; Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 
2017; Brazys et al., 2017; Brazys and Panke, 2017; Kaarbo, 2017; Peltner, 2017). This is 
because it combines an analysis of both structures and agency in order to account for 
changes in the UK’s foreign policy on human protection more specifically. 
Beyond the specific conceptualisation and analytical framework, the thesis also 
contributes to research on the role of leadership in foreign policy change, particularly the 
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role of predominant leaders and foreign policy learning (Herman and Herman, 1989; 
Levy, 1994; Stein, 1994; Hermann et al, 2001). An important finding from the qualitative 
analysis of these materials was the role of leaders in initiating and directing sustained 
changes in the UK’s foreign policy on human protection. Chapter 4 showed the 
significance of both Tony Blair and Robin Cook in triggering sustained changes in the 
UK’s commitment to human protection through shifting UK foreign policy towards a 
liberal internationalist outlook and away from isolationism. This leadership evolved in 
several stages, which started with the rhetorical emphasis on human rights, the ethical 
dimension, and Blair’s doctrine of the international community (Blair, 1999a; Cook, 
1997; 1999; 2000b; 2002; Wheeler and Dunne, 1998; Williams, 2002; Gaskarth, 2006; 
Dyson, 2009; Mumford and Selck, 2010; Atkins, 2014). The next stage was UK 
leadership in the implementation of this liberal internationalist foreign policy through the 
interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and Sierra Leone in 2000, as well as policy contributions 
on humanitarian intervention (FCO in Marston, 2001).  
Despite being in Coalition, chapter 5 showed that UK foreign policy was led by 
the Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron and his Foreign Secretary William 
Hague. Both continued to demonstrate similar leadership credentials to Tony Blair and 
Robin Cook in remaining committed to human protection and setting out the UK’s 
willingness to intervene by force to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes, which 
culminated in the military action in Libya in 2011 and attempts to convince parliament of 
the UK’s case for intervention in Syria in 2013. It was during the Theresa May 
administration that the UK took coercive action alongside the US and France in 2018 
without parliamentary approval in order to prevent the humanitarian suffering of the 
Syrian people (Hansard HC Deb., 16 April 2018; FCO, 2018m; 2018n; Prime Minister’s 
Office, 2018). Whilst chapter 6 found that some question the UK’s motivations for 
airstrikes in Syria in 2018 (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2018), the significance of this action was 
both the underlying humanitarian justification which closely followed the same position 
as New Labour on Kosovo in 1999 and the Coalition on Syria in 2013, in addition to 
Theresa May’s bypassing of Parliament which was only informed after the action had 
been taken. Even though this was limited action, it still challenged Parliament’s role in 
authorising force and reasserted the government’s royal prerogative over the use of force.   
These findings thus contributes to the theoretical research in foreign policy 
analysis on the importance of leaders in foreign policy change. In particular, the empirical 
findings in chapters 4 to 7 show that Tony Blair, Robin Cook, David Cameron, William 
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Hague, and Theresa May acted as predominant leaders on human protection in certain 
instances as demonstrated by their willingness to authorise UK military action in crises, 
including Kosovo (1999), Libya (2011), and Syria (2018). In Kosovo and Syria, Tony 
Blair and Theresa May demonstrated their willingness to both lead on humanitarian 
intervention, despite its contestation in international law and without domestic 
parliamentary approval. This provides further evidence to support research on the role of 
leadership in foreign policy analysis, which remains a significant theoretical research 
agenda (Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Hermann and Hagan, 1998; Hermann et al., 2001; 
Aggestam and True, 2021; Aran et al., 2021; Brummer, 2021; Kaarbo, 2021; Wivel and 
Grøn, 2021).  
Chapters 4 and 5 presented another important finding in the analysis of foreign 
policy change. In chapter 4, it was argued that an integral component of New Labour’s 
liberal internationalist foreign policy on human protection was the attempt to distance 
from the failures of both the Labour and Conservative Party in relation to the mass 
atrocities in Rwanda and Bosnia. This was explicit in the rhetoric and actions of both 
Tony Blair and Robin Cook who made direct reference to the inactions of their 
Conservative predecessors when discussing the UK’s contribution to the intervention in 
Kosovo to prevent ethnic cleansing (Cook, 1999; 2000b). This is an important finding 
because it evidences the role of foreign policy learning in both the rhetoric and the actions 
of the central agents of UK foreign policy. It is noteworthy that this approach to foreign 
policy learning continued during the Conservative-led Coalition government where 
chapter 5 revealed David Cameron and William Hague’s attempts to establish clear 
distance from New Labour’s interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which includes 
explicit references to the concept of learning (figure 6).  
This finding contributes to theoretical research on the importance of learning in 
foreign policy change (Levy, 1994; Stein, 1994). Whilst there has been less attention on 
the theoretical and empirical value of studying foreign policy learning since the 1990s, 
the findings in this thesis show that it remains an important element of analysing a state’s 
foreign policy. This research on learning is therefore analytically useful for demonstrating 
the role of agency in foreign policy change, especially as a result of changes in 
governments, foreign policy leadership, and foreign policy doctrines. This equally 
includes the influence of broader structured changes with regards to how the international 
community attempted to learn from the past, such as its failures to protect populations in 




8.1.5 Former ‘great power’ leadership and influence on human protection  
As established throughout this thesis, a transitional foreign policy is shaped by the 
adaptation of successive governments to the UK’s post-war relative hard power decline, 
its position, leadership, and influence within multilateral organisations, and its position 
in the evolving international order. It therefore found that successive governments have 
placed considerable rhetorical and practical efforts into asserting the UK’s global role. 
Chapter 4 showed how Tony Blair and Robin Cook were adamant that the UK will not 
resort to an isolationist role, which was similarly reflected by David Cameron and 
William Hague in the analysis of the Coalition government in chapter 5, and Theresa May 
and Boris Johnson’s time in office in chapter 6. The rhetoric from successive Prime 
Ministers and Foreign Secretaries showed their awareness that the UK’s place in the 
world was changing (Cameron, 2019, p.145). This led to a conscious effort to counter 
notions of the UK’s accelerating post-war hard power decline (Cameron, 2012b; Hague, 
2013a) based on the fact that the post-war liberal international order was increasing 
volatile amid changes in the global balance of power (Hague, 2013a). The Cameron-led 
government thus accepted that the way to address these changes was to promote a 
consistent vision of the UK as an influential power capable of demonstrating leadership 
on the world stage, including on human protection (Blair, 199a; Hague, 2013a; Cameron, 
2019). 
However, it also found that the emergence of Global Britain as a post-Brexit 
vision for reasserting the UK’s global role has so far lacked a coherent policy at the time 
of writing. Rather, this dissertation has found that Global Britain contributes more 
evidence to the idea that the UK’s relative power position in the world is unclear (Foreign 
Affairs Committee, 2018b, p.5; Gifkins et al, 2019b, p.8; Turner, 2019, p.728; Boussebaa, 
2020, p.483; Gilmore, 2020, p.26; Interview1; 3; 14). It was argued in chapter 7 that the 
UK’s role in the world is in a state of flux because it is neither a great power judging by 
its relative post-war decline in its hard power capabilities, but it is also not a middle 
power. This led to the suggestion that the UK’s place in the world is a hybrid of a great 
and middle power status. The idea of the UK as a hybrid great-middle power is that it is 
able to exert international leadership and influence through its membership of the post-
1945 institutions of the liberal international order, while accounting for a relative decline 
in its hard power capabilities.  
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The UK’s commitment to human protection between 1997 and 2020 presents a 
compelling case for greater attention on the role of states like the UK, which have 
undergone a transition away from great power status but do not necessarily reflect the 
position of a middle power. Using the example of the UK’s global soft power leadership 
and influence on human protection through its permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council, its contributions to humanitarian assistance, and its substantial ODA provisions, 
chapter 7 argued the UK is evidence of the important role that states can play on the 
international stage amid a broader reduction in their hard power capabilities.  
However, this dissertation also finds that the UK’s hybrid great-middle power 
status is not necessarily harmonious with its international commitment to human 
protection. In a transitional foreign policy, the UK is constantly grappling with its liberal 
commitment to human protection, whilst on the other hand securing its geopolitical and 
economic interests in order to maintain its hard economic position. This has been 
evidenced especially in the case of Yemen, which revealed a tension in the dual 
commitment to human protection and its broader aspirations to maintain its diplomatic 
and economic relationship with regional actors. Another example is the relationship 
between the UK’s commitment to its economic interests and ODA, which has resulted in 
the government’s decision to make temporary cuts to the latter. Whilst the COVID-19 
pandemic is one aspect of this decision to reduce ODA spending indefinitely, it fails to 
capture the broader historical debates within the UK on the domestic value of contributing 
significant levels of ODA to other countries (Henson et al., 2010, p.3; Seely and Rogers, 
2019, p.8; Honeyman, 2020, p.58; Honeyman and Lightfoot, 2020, p.31). Yet the thesis 
has argued that the UK’s substantial ODA contributions are a niche aspect of its global 
soft power capabilities to lead and influence on human protection amid a relative decline 
in its hard military capabilities.   
These findings are important contributions to three main bodies of literature. The 
first is to research on the role of middle powers and the aspects of the UK’s middle power 
status (Higgott and Cooper, 1990; Chapnick, 1999; Jordaan, 2003; Behringer, 2005; 
Beeson, 2011; Cooper, 2011; Patience, 2014; Robertson, 2017; Karim, 2018; Oosterveld 
and Torossian, 2018; Andersen, 2019; Murray and Brainson, 2019; Paris, 2019). The 
second is to research on the UK’s soft power leadership and influence, especially through 
its membership of the UN Security Council and the significance of its ODA contributions 
(Dee and Smith, 2017; Lightfoot et al., 2017; Ralph and Gifkins, 2017; Gifkins et al., 
2018; Jarvis et al., 2019; Gifkins et al., 2019a; Honeyman, 2020; Honeyman and 
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Lightfoot, 2020). This is a timely contribution in the context of Brexit and reductions in 
the UK’s ODA contributions because both changes have implications for how 
governments define the UK’s place in the world and the nature of its subsequent 
commitment to human protection, especially as a soft power capability. Finally, it 
contributes to research on the UK’s changing power status in international relations in the 
post-war era through the UK’s hybrid great-middle power approach to human protection 
(Morris, 2011; Chalmers, 2015; Hill, 2016).  
 
8.1.6 Revisiting the research hypothesis: The three scenarios of change  
The introduction to this dissertation outlined a hypothesis in order to test three different 
scenarios of UK foreign policy change on human protection in a transitional foreign 
policy. These scenarios were a trading partner, a pragmatic liberal internationalist, and a 
global soft power leader and influencer. Based on these scenarios, this dissertation has 
tested the following hypothesis which assesses whether the UK’s awareness of its 
changing position in the world between 1997 and 2020 led to sustained changes in its 
rhetoric and action towards a strengthened commitment to human protection. This 
proposed that the UK’s commitment to human protection will reflect either scenario two 
or three of a pragmatic internationalist or global soft power leader and influencer as 
opposed to scenario one on prioritising the role of a trading partner.  
 Based on the empirical findings throughout the empirical chapters, this 
dissertation provided evidence in support of the hypothesis between 1997 and 2015. 
During this period, the sustained changes that occurred in a transitional foreign policy 
were consistent with a strengthened commitment to human protection according to 
scenarios one and two. As discussed in section 8.1.2.1 sustained changes in the UK’s 
commitment to human protection were initiated by New Labour in the form of a 
commitment to a liberal internationalist foreign policy and its component parts of human 
rights; a willingness to militarily intervene in order to protect populations from mass 
atrocities even in the absence of an Article 51 or Chapter VII resolution; and a 
commitment to alternative avenues of human protection, including soft power 
contributions of financial support and equipment supplies, alongside the UK’s diplomatic 
leadership and contributions of ODA.  
These aspects were then implemented in the foreign policies of the Conservative-
led Coalition government, which despite the shift to liberal conservatism, maintained an 
underlying commitment to the protection of core liberal values on human protection in 
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UK foreign policy. This was evidenced through the UK’s diplomatic leadership and 
contribution to the intervention in Libya in 2011, its attempts to receive parliamentary 
approval for humanitarian intervention in Syria in 2013, the creation of the International 
Development Act in 2015, and its soft power contributions through financial support and 
humanitarian assistance. This particular commitment to humanitarian intervention was 
similarly continued when the Theresa May government used it as a justification for 
airstrikes in Syria in 2018. This latter emphasis on humanitarian intervention is an 
important feature in support of the pragmatic liberal internationalist approach to human 
protection because it confirmed the UK’s willingness to intervene in spite of the vast 
debates on the legality of humanitarian intervention (Gaskarth, 2014, p.577). The UK’s 
ODA contributions were also evidence of an “aid superpower” in which the UK continued 
to exert its considerable influence in this area of its foreign policy (Gaskarth, 2014, 
p.565).  
However, the findings between 2016 and 2020 provided evidence against the 
hypothesis. This is because there was a combination of all three scenarios in the UK’s 
rhetoric and action on human protection. This is explained through a transitional foreign 
policy in which governments between 2016 and 2020 attempted to adapt to changes in 
the UK’s membership of multilateral organisations following Brexit, in addition to 
grappling with a crisis in the post-war liberal international order following shifts in the 
global balance of power. These challenges were exposed in the UK’s commitment to 
human protection as political elites tried to balance between the UK’s geopolitical and 
economic interests on the one hand, and the underlying liberal commitment to foreign 
policy of successive governments since 1997 on the other. The result was inherent 
tensions in this relationship, particularly in relation to international trade. The UK’s 
response to the crisis in Yemen exposed the relationship between its political and 
economic international relations through it supply of arms to coalition forces, and its 
simultaneous commitment to human protection amid the vast humanitarian suffering in 
the country (Business Innovation and Skills and International Development Committees, 
2016, p.33; Human Rights Council, 2016; 2018b; 2019; House of Lords, 2019, p.19).   
This issue extends beyond the crisis in Yemen to the UK’s other international 
relations, including with superpowers such as China, which at the time of writing is under 
the international spotlight for the alleged atrocities against Uyghurs and other Turkic 
Muslim minorities (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2021a). This places 
the UK in a challenging diplomatic position in the post-Brexit era in which it is balancing 
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between its economic interests in terms of securing trade deals through tough negotiations 
and its commitment to human protection. Whilst this has been an issue countered 
throughout UK foreign policy since at least 1997 (Wickham-Jones, 2000, p.10; Wheeler 
and Dunne, 2014, p.17; Vickers, 2004b, 259; 2011, p.166), the post-Brexit period is 
especially significant because of the need to secure trade agreements alongside the 
broader role crisis in terms of how UK policymakers strategize the type of power the UK 
is going to be in the next decade (Beasley et al, 2018; Oppermann et al, 2020). The results 
of the hypothesis thus add weight to the importance of analysing the UK’s commitment 
to human protection in a transitional foreign policy because of the impact that this 
transition has on the nature of the UK’s commitment to human protection.  
 
8.2 Research methods  
The dissertation has reached these findings through its fully integrated analysis based on 
a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. The purpose of this methodology 
has been to attain a high-degree of analytical and research rigour in order to evidence the 
central arguments, findings, and their significance. To achieve this, the dissertation has 
utilised a triangulation of research methods through combining a fully integrated content 
analysis, elite semi-structured interviews, primary documents and reports, and secondary 
literature.  
The advantage of applying this approach throughout in defence of the thesis is that 
it helped validate the results by cross-examining and comparing material from different 
sources to identify any possible overlap and/or contradictions in the data, which has led 
to some important analytical findings. For instance, based on the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary’s rhetoric on Yemen alone, it would be plausible to argue that it 
contributed significantly to the UN Security Council’s efforts to secure peace and a 
political solution to the civil war. However, combining these findings with the elite semi-
structured interviews and secondary literature presented an alternative perspective which 
suggested that the UK’s approach was more nuanced with regards to its economic 
relationships with coalition forces. This shows the importance of triangulating the 
material in order to identify any anomalies across the data and thus strengthen the 
analytical significance of the findings. The same applies for locating consistencies across 
the data, which help to enhance the validity of the research findings.  
With the research returning 1,055 primary materials on the core thesis themes, a 
fully integrated content analysis was used in order to code specific themes, identify 
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important trends, and present numerical and written data. This approach was based on the 
work of Pashakhanlou (2017), which argues for a fully integrated content analysis 
through a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. The advantage 
of this method is that it enabled a numerical presentation of the data alongside a 
qualitative interpretation of it in order to understand the broader context in which the 
keywords and phrases were being mentioned. The use of NVivo software complemented 
this fully integrated content analysis through providing an important tool to compile such 
as vast dataset and to then code the data in preparation for its qualitative analysis. This in 
turn helped to enhance the reliability of the results through having a clear record of the 
data and establishing a codebook with instructions on how the material was coded (see 
appendix 2).  
This dissertation acknowledges the potential use of alternative research methods, 
such as discourse analysis. Using discourse analysis would have enabled an in-depth 
examination of the manifest and latent content of the material to interrogate the 
construction of language in government speeches, statements, media interviews, and 
government news reports, and examine their implications for foreign policy discourses 
on human protection. However, the purpose of using a fully integrated content analysis 
was to identify the core rhetorical themes in foreign policy speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government news reports, rather than analysing their construction. This 
is in addition to the logistical challenges of conducting a discourse analysis of 1,055 
primary materials as a sole researcher in a short period of time. The fully integrated 
content analysis allowed the dissertation to capture the key research themes in a wealth 
of primary documents in order to address the research aim, objectives, questions, and 
hypothesis.  
 
8.3 Implications and future research  
The findings of this dissertation have several important implications for future research. 
The first is that it draws attention to the challenges facing the UK’s commitment to human 
protection in a transitional foreign policy. Whilst a wealth of research has focused on the 
fragility of the UK’s place in the world amid decades of relative decline, this dissertation 
shows that these changes also have a significant impact on the nature of the UK’s 
commitment to human protection as successive governments grapple with the multitude 
of the UK’s foreign policy interests and liberal values. The issues this dissertation 
addresses are therefore timely in the context of debates over the present and future 
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direction of UK foreign policy following the publication of the Integrated Review, as well 
as debates over the UK’s strategy for its post-Brexit geopolitical interests, policies, and 
international engagements for at least the next decade.  
 The research also has implications for the analysis of UK leadership and influence 
in a transitional foreign policy. It shows that a relative international decline does not mean 
a retreat from human protection, but rather that the UK’s seat on the UN Security Council, 
its contributions to ODA, and its remaining military capacity, are important ways that the 
UK commits to human protection in rhetoric and action. However, the issue in UK foreign 
policy is that the preoccupation of governments with defending the notion of the UK as 
being an important international actor or a Global Britain means that there is limited 
evidence to suggest that UK government agents have come to terms with the idea that the 
UK is no longer a great power. The consistent appeal to humanitarian intervention as a 
legal framework for action is significant for how the UK interprets, and arguably 
challenges, existing international law. Whilst this may well be a form of UK leadership 
on human protection, this is still against the overwhelming international legal opinion. 
This risks the UK contradicting its parallel commitment to the R2P in the pursuit of the 
same principle of humanitarian intervention that the R2P norm attempts to distance from.  
 The research findings and their implications show that there is still important 
further research required in the field of UK foreign policy, international human 
protection, and the role of former great powers in international relations. Some further 
questions and research agendas raised by this research include: how is the self-identity of 
states, in particular powers which have suffered from a post-war hard power decline, 
conditioned by historical experiences and how does this shape foreign policy? How do 
policymakers defend their idea of the UK as a great power? As the UK enters a significant 
period of its post-Brexit foreign policy as it pursues trade relations with other states, how 
can the UK reconcile its trade interests and human rights values? What are the 
implications of the Integrated Review for the UK’s commitment to human protection in 
the next 10 years? In what ways can the UK contribute to addressing the international 
human protection crisis, particularly through its soft power capabilities? Whilst some of 
these questions are speculative at the time of writing, they contribute to important 
emerging domestic and international debates as the Boris Johnson government sets to 
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Appendix 1: Interview subjects  
Code Institution/position Date 
Interview 1 Activist at protection NGO, UK. 21 January 2019 
Interview 2 Director of a human rights protection NGO, UK. 23 January 2019 
Interview 3 Analyst at the FCO, UK. 1 February 2019 
Interview 4 Member of the House of Lords, UK. 1 March 2019 
Interview 5 Activist for protection NGO, UK. 5 March 2019 
Interview 6 Member of Parliament, UK. 18 March 2019 
Interview 7 Director of protection NGO, US. 19 March 2019 
Interview 8 UN Official, US. 11 April 2019 
Interview 9 Analyst for International NGO, US. 3 June 2019 
Interview 10 Analyst at the FCO, UK. 13 June 2019 












Appendix 2: Content analysis code book for chapters 5-7 
 
This codebook was designed according to the fully integrated content analysis of 1,055 
primary materials as outlined in chapter 3 and followed several important stages. The first 
was identifying the data population, which was political communications from elite UK 
government officials between 2010 and 2020. This included the Prime Minister, Foreign 
Secretary, government ministers, officials and diplomats representing the UK at the UN, 
and parliamentarians from both the House of Lords and the House of Commons.
61
 The 
second was establishing the unit of analysis, which was speeches, statements, media 
interviews, government news reports, written reports, policy documents and debates in 
the House of Commons and House of Lords on human protection, the UK’s place in the 
world, and its engagement with specific human protection crises in Libya, Myanmar, 
Syria, and Yemen. The third was selecting the method for coding the data, with NVivo 
being chosen as the most appropriate software. This is because NVivo provides space for 
categorising vast amounts of data, while incorporating a number of tools to guide the 
coding process, such as word frequency searches, keyword searches, and in-text coding.  
Once in NVivo, the coding process followed two cycles. The first searched and 
categorised the codes and sub-codes according to the code hierarchies and non-
hierarchies in part 1 of this section. The second then repeated the coding process in order 
to identify any data which may have been missed during the first cycle and to account for 
any changes in the original coding hierarchies, such as additional sub-codes that were 
identified during the first cycle coding process or after, and thus, did not feature at the 
beginning of the first coding cycle. 
This section is split into two parts. The first outlines the coding hierarchies used 
to categorise the data in the first and second coding cycles for chapters 5-7. The second 
then details the codes and sub-codes in-depth according to their name, description, 
inclusion and exclusion criteria and an example of the code/sub-code as taken from the 
findings of the integrated content analysis.  
 
 
61  Government ministers and representatives include: David Cameron, William Hague, Nick 
Clegg, Philip Hammond, David Lidington, Alistair Burt, Justine Greening, Tobias Ellwood, 
and UK representatives at the UN: Sir Mark Lyall Grant, Jeremy Browne, and Dame Karen 
Pierce (2010-2015). Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Philip Hammond, Jeremy Hunt, Dominic 
Raab, Priti Patel, Penny Mordaunt, and UK representatives at the UN: Jonathan Allen, 




Part 1: Coding hierarchies for chapters 5-7 
 
The following details the coding hierarchies used in chapters 5-7 of the thesis. The top of the hierarchy represents the primary code, whilst 
the additional levels are the sub-codes. Part 2 outlines the selection criteria for the codes used in these hierarchies.  
 
Code hierarchies for chapter 5 
                               












62  This code and sub-codes are used in both chapters 5 and 6. 












National interest Human rights Freedom Democracy
  Hierarchy for figure 7                                                                                     Hierarchy for figure 8                                                                                   
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Hierarchy for figure 11 
 
 








Assad/Asad Chemical Democracy End violence Human rights Transition
Libya (2011)









Hierarchy for figures 15 and 16 
 
 
Non-hierarchical codes for chapter 5 




















Code hierarchy for figure 17 
 





















Code hierarchy for figures 20-21 
 
 




















Code hierarchy for figure 23 
 
Code hierarchy for figure 24 
 
Non-hierarchical codes for chapters 6-7 
Atrocity prevention, responsibility to protect, protection of civilians, humanitarian intervention, leadership, development.  
Myanmar (2016-2017)
Atrocities Democracy Humanitarian Human rights Rohingya
Yemen (2015-2020)
Humanitarian Law Peace Protection of civilians Political solution
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Part 2: Codebook for chapters 5-7 
The following table provides detailed information on each code and sub-code used throughout the integrated content analysis for chapters 5-
7. Some codes appear throughout the chapters, whilst others are specific to sections of the thesis, which is identified under the ‘thesis 
location/figure’ criteria.  
 As outlined in the introduction to this appendix, the materials collected and coded included speeches, statements, media interviews, 
government news reports, and parliamentary debates from 11 May 2010 to 31 December 2020. These sources were gathered from a 
combination of the gov.uk websites, in particular, the Prime Minister’s Office and FCO websites, the online National Archives, and the online 
Hansard database for House of Commons and House of Lords debates. Each code and cub-code includes a description, inclusion criteria, an 





Code/sub-code  Description Inclusion criteria Example Exclusion criteria 
Chapters 





provided by the 
UK to 
humanitarian 
crises between 11 
May 2010 and 6 
May 2015.  
Qualitative references to 
military and non-military 
equipment supplied by the UK 
in foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports, 
between 11 May 2010 and 31 
December 2020. Statements 
must be made by government 
ministers or UK representatives 
at the UN.  
“Our diplomatic team and our 
military advisers have already 
coordinated a range of support, 
including the supply of 1,000 sets of 
body armour, satellite telephones and 
humanitarian aid, including funding 
the evacuation of 4,000 people from 
Misrata and providing 30 metric 
tonnes of medical and emergency 
References that do not 
refer to the provision 
of military and non-
military equipment 
between 11 May 2010 




food supplies to that besieged town.” 




5 and 6 
Action/ 
financial 





crises between 11 
May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
References to financial 
assistance in both numerical and 
non-numerical form in relation 
to humanitarian crises in foreign 
policy speeches, statements, 
media interviews, and 
government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 31 
December 2020.  
“As part of this effort, the UK is 




References that do not 
refer to the provision 
of financial assistance 
between 11 May 2010 
and 31 December 
2020. 
Chapter 5 Influence References to UK 
influence in its 
international 
relations between 
May 2010 and 6 
May 2015 
Direct reference to the concept 
of influence in relation to the 
UK’s international relations in 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
“There is no reason why the rise of 
new economic powers should lead to 
a loss of British influence in the 
world, and neither is there any reason 





influence which are 
not in relation to the 
UK’s international 
relations and/or do not 
fall between 11 May 
2010 and 6 May 2015. 
 
63  Prime Minister’s Office. 2011. Statement between the PM and the Chairman of the Libyan NTC. [Online]. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. Available 
from: [ARCHIVED CONTENT] Statement between the PM and the Chairman of the Libyan NTC - Number 10 (nationalarchives.gov.uk) 
64  Cameron, D. 2013. G20 Summit: Prime Minister news conference. [Online]. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. Available from: G20 Summit: Prime 
Minister news conference - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) 




between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
Chapter 5 Leadership References to 
leadership in UK 
foreign policy 
between 11 May 
2010 and 6 May 
2015. 
Direct reference to leadership 
(including its variations of lead 
and leading) in foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN  
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
“Britain is leading an international 
effort at the United Nations to secure 






which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 
and 6 May 2015 
and/or are not in 
reference to the UK’s 
own leadership in 
foreign policy.  
Chapter 5 Myanmar 
(Burma) 
References to UK 
foreign policy in 
Myanmar 
between 11 May 
2010 and 6 May 
2015 
Direct reference to either 
Myanmar or Burma in foreign 
policy speeches, statements, 
media interviews, and 
government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
“The UK remains committed to the 
people of Burma, and has never 
wavered in its calls for the granting 
of full human rights to all of its 





Myanmar which do 
not fall between 11 
May 2010 and 6 May 
2015. 
Chapter 5 Protection of 
civilians (PoC) 
Reference to the 
protection of 
Direct reference to the 
protection of civilians (including 
“We will also now provide new types 
of non-lethal equipment for the 
References to the PoC 
and its variations 
 
66  Cameron, D. 2013b. 25th anniversary of the Holocaust Educational Trust: Prime Minister’s speech. [Online]. [Accessed: 11 March 2021]. Available 
from: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/25th-anniversary-of-the-holocaust-educational-trust-prime-ministers-speech 




civilians (PoC) in 
the UK’s foreign 
policy between 11 
May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
its variations of ‘protect 
civilians’ ‘civilian protection’, 
and ‘protecting civilians’) in 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
protection of civilians, going beyond 





which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 
and 6 May 2015. 
Chapter 5 Responsibility 
to protect 
(R2P) 
Reference to the 
responsibility to 
protect in UK 
foreign policy 
between 11 May 
2010 and 6 May 
2015. 
Direct reference to the 
responsibility to protect in 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
“They do not share our sense of a 
Responsibility to Protect, or 
readiness to intervene militarily as a 
last resort when human rights are 




References to the R2P 
which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 
and 6 May 2015. 





UK foreign policy 
Direct references to 
humanitarian intervention in UK 
foreign policy beyond the 
immediate cases of Libya and 
“When we talk about humanitarian 
intervention but mean military 
intervention, that puts at risk those 
people who are doing purely 
References to 
humanitarian 
intervention in relation 
to Libya and Syria 
 
68  FCO. 2013. Foreign Secretary Statement to Parliament on Syria. [Online]. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-statement-to-parliament-on-syria 
69  FCO. 2013. Foreign Secretary speech on rejecting decline and renewing Western diplomacy in the 21st century. [Online]. [Accessed: 10 March 




between 11 May 
2010 and 6 May 
2015.   
Syria in foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
humanitarian work” (Hansard HC 
Deb., 26 September 2014).
70
 
and/or do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 







References to the 
lessons of the 
UK’s contribution 
to the 2002 
intervention in 
Afghanistan. 
Direct references to the lessons 
of the UK’s intervention in 
Afghanistan in 2002. This is 
referred to in the past tense in 
UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
“Now there is not one person in this 
hall who will view this challenge 
without reference to the past. 




References to the 
UK’s involvement in 
Afghanistan in the 
present. For example: 
“I have said that our 
combat forces will be 
out of Afghanistan by 
2015” (Cameron, 
2010)
72 and/or which 
do not fall between 11 









learning from the 
past international 
Direct references to learn 
(including its variations of 
‘learning’ and ‘learned) 
“Now of course it is absolutely right 
that we should learn the lessons of 
the past, especially of what happened 
References to 
learn/learning/learned 
which are not 
 
70  Hansard HC Deb. vol.585 col.1281. 26 September 2014 [Online]. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. Available from: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm140926/debtext/140926-0001.htm#1409266000001  
71  Cameron, D. 2014. PM speech at the UN General Assembly 2014. [Online]. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-the-un-general-assembly-2014  













specifically in relation to the 
UK’s past interventions in 
Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq 
(2003) during the New Labour 
government. Sources include 
UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 




mentioned within the 
context of either 
Afghanistan (2001) or 
Iraq (2003). For 
example: “The UK 
does not have reactors 
of the design of those 
in Fukushima and 
neither does it plan 
any. Nor are we in a 
seismically sensitive 
zone. But if there are 
lessons to learn, then 
we will learn them” 
(FCO, 2011b)
74 and/or 
which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 







to the lessons 
learned from the 
UK’s 
Direct references to the lessons 
learned in UK foreign policy in 
relation to the Iraq war in 2003.  
Sources include UK foreign 
“This is a very different situation 




References to the 
UK’s involvement in 
Iraq in the present. For 
example: “The UK is 
 
73  Cameron, D. 2014. PM speech at the UN General Assembly 2014. [Online]. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-the-un-general-assembly-2014  
74  FCO. 2011. "Britain will remain at the forefront of Europe in leading the response to this crisis". [Online]. [Accessed: 7 June 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/britain-will-remain-at-the-forefront-of-europe-in-leading-the-response-to-this-crisis  
75  FCO. 2013. Foreign Secretary calls for strong international response to chemical attack in Syria. [Online]. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. Available 




the Iraq War in 
2003.  
policy speeches, statements, 
media interviews, and 
government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
providing £8.5 million 
for food, medical care, 
shelter and other 
essential support to 
tens of thousands of 
people in need in Syria 
as well as to help 
refugees in Lebanon, 




which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 








to global in 
relation to 
describing the 
UK’s place in the 
world. 
Direct references to the global in 
relation to the UK’s place in the 
world in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 




References which are 
not in relation to the 
UK’s global role, such 
as a ‘global summit’ 
and/or which do not 
fall between 11 May 
2010 and 6 May 2015. 
 
76  FCO. 2012. Foreign Secretary updates Parliament on Syria. [Online]. [Accessed: 7 June 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-updates-parliament-on-syria  











decline in relation 
to the UK’s place 
in the world.  
Direct references to decline in 
relation to the UK’s place in the 
world in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews and government news 
reports by government ministers 
and UK representatives at the 
UN between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 




References to decline 
that are not in relation 
to the UK’s place in 
the world and/or which 
do not fall between 11 










between 11 May 
2010 and 6 May 
2015. 
Direct reference to democracy 
(including the variation of 
‘democratic’) in UK foreign 
policy speeches, statements, 
media interviews, and 
government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
“Our belief in democracy, our values 




References not directly 
related to democracy, 
such as the “human 
rights and democracy 
report” and/or which 
do not fall between 11 
May 2010 and 6 May 
2015. 
 
78  FCO. 2011. Navigating the new world order: The UK and the emerging powers. [Online]. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/navigating-the-new-world-order-the-uk-and-the-emerging-powers--2  
79  FCO. 2011. "Our belief in democracy, our values of tolerance, fairness and justice all compel us to act when others are denied the rights that we 












between 11 May 
2010 and 6 May 
2015. 
Direct references to the UK’s 
freedom in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN  
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
“the strong tradition of this country’s 




References that are not 
directly on freedom 
and/or which do not 
fall between 11 May 








to human rights 
between 11 May 
2010 and 6 May 
2015. 
Direct references to human 
rights in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
“We want an active foreign policy 
that is staunch in its support for 




References which are 
not directly on UK 
foreign policy towards 
human rights, such as 
the Human Rights 
Council and/or which 
do not fall between 11 










to the UK’s 
national interest 
between 11 May 
Direct reference to the national 
interest in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
“So the third key choice that we 
make is to keep our promises to the 
poorest in the world by spending 
0.7% of our Gross National Income 
on aid. I have made the argument 
many times before that this is the 
References which are 
not directly on the 
national interest, such 
as “public interest” 
and/or which do not 
 
80  FCO. 2013. Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict. [Online]. [Accessed: 7 June 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/preventing-sexual-violence-in-conflict  




2010 and 6 May 
2015. 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
right thing to do morally and I’ve 
made the argument that it’s in our 
national interest” (Cameron, 2015).
82
 
fall between 11 May 








relation to the 
2011 crisis in 
Libya. 
Direct references to democracy 
(including the variation of 
‘democratic’) in relation to the 
2011 crisis in Libya in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
“support the building blocks of a 





democracy not in 
relation to the crisis in 
Libya and/or which do 
not fall between 11 





Libya/Freedom References to 
freedom in 
relation to the 
2011 crisis in 
Libya. 
Direct references to freedom in 
relation to the 2011 crisis in 
Libya in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
“Of course there’ll be many jolts and 
bumps along the road but basically 
we helped that country to get rid of 
one of the most brutal dictators of the 
last century and give that country a 
chance of freedom and democracy 
and the things that we take for 
References to freedom 
not in relation to the 
crisis in Libya and/or 
which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 
and 6 May 2015. 
 
82  Cameron, D. 2015. Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2015: Prime Minister’s speech. [Online]. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/lord-mayors-banquet-2015-prime-ministers-speech  




between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015.. 










human rights in 
relation to the 
2011 crisis in 
Libya. 
Direct reference to human rights 
in relation to the 2011 crisis in 
Libya in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
“Today we have signalled that crimes 
will not be condoned, will not go 
unpunished, will not be forgotten and 
this is a warning to anyone 
contemplating the abuse of human 
rights in Libya” (FCO, 2011e).
85
 
References to human 
rights not in relation to 
the 2011 crisis in 
Libya and/or which do 
not fall between 11 








References to the 
responsibility to 
protect in relation 
to the 2011 crisis 
in Libya. 
Direct reference to the 
responsibility to protect in 
relation to the 2011 crisis in 
Libya in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015. 
“In the case of Libya, if we thought 
there was any other way left of 
protecting the lives of those people in 
Benghazi in the middle of March, 
other than passing a UN resolution 
and taking immediate military action, 
then of course we would have done 
something else, but that was the only 
option left to us. And so I would 
argue, from the point of view of 
governments with a responsibility to 
protect the millions of people who 
Direct reference to the 
responsibility to 
protect not in relation 
to the 2011 crisis in 
Libya and/or which do 
not fall between 11 
May 2010 and 6 May 
2015. 
 
84  Prime Minister’s Office. 2011. PM’s speech to service personnel returning from Libya. [Online]. [Accessed: 10 March 2021]. Available from: 
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live in their countries, that sometimes 










References to the 
protection of 
civilians in 
relation to the 
2011 crisis in 
Libya. 
References to the protection of 
civilians (including its variations 
of ‘protect civilians’, ‘civilian 
protection’, and ‘protecting 
civilians’) in relation to the 2011 
crisis in Libya in UK foreign 
policy speeches, statements, 
media interviews, and 
government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 6 
May 2015..  
“And the wider NATO mission 
which is to protect civilians – that 
will continue for as long as it is 




References to the 
protection of civilians 
and its variations not 
in relation to the 2011 
crisis in Libya and/or 
which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 




Syria/Assad Reference to 
President Assad 
in relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 
2014 
Direct references to Assad 
(including the variation of 
‘Asad’) in relation to the crisis 
in Syria between 2011 and 2014 
in UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
“This worsening situation has been 




References to Assad 
and its variation of 
‘Asad’ beyond the 
crisis in Syria between 
2011 and 2014 and/or 
which do not fall 
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and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 31 
December 2014. 
between 11 May 2010 









in relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 
2014 
Direct reference to chemical 
weapons in relation to the crisis 
in Syria between 2011 and 2013 
in UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 31 
December 2014. 
“And let’s not pretend that Syria 
would now be giving up its chemical 
weapons if we and our allies had 






beyond Syria and/or 
which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 









relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 
2014 
Direct references to democracy 
(including its variation of 
democratic) in relation to the 
crisis in Syria between 2011 and 
2014 in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
“The United Kingdom will continue 
to work closely with the Syrian 
political opposition, encouraging 
them to develop their vision for a 
stable, democratic Syria where all 







Syria and/or which do 
not fall between 11 
May 2010 and 31 
December 2014. 
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representatives at the UN 











relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 
2014 
Direct reference to ending 
violence in Syria (including its 
variations of ‘end to violence’, 
‘end to the violence’, and 
‘ending violence) in relation to 
the crisis in Syria between 2011 
and 2014 in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 31 
December 2014. 
“I urge the Syrian government to 
implement rapidly and fully their 
commitments under the six point 
plan. And I call on the opposition to 
take all steps necessary to bring 




Referencing to ending 
violence and its 
variations in general 
beyond Syria and/or 
which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 








human rights in 
relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 
2014. 
Direct references to human 
rights in relation to the crisis in 
Syria between 2011 and 2014 in 
UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
“Our two nations are also determined 
to help hold to account those 
responsible for human rights abuses 
in Syria” (FCO, 2012).
92
 
References to human 
rights in general 
beyond Syria and/or 
which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 
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government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 31 
December 2014. 








transition in the 
context of the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 
2014. 
Direct references to the concept 
of transition in the context of the 
crisis in Syria between 2011 and 
2014 in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 31 
December 2014. 
“President Assad and the Syrian 
regime must heed the call of the 
international community and allow a 
peaceful political transition to resolve 




transition that are not 
referring to the crisis 
in Syria, the removal 
of the Assad regime or 
which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 












relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 
2014. 
Direct references to 
humanitarian intervention in 
relation to the crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 2014 in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
“That is why it is important that we 
have the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, which is set out in the 
Attorney-General’s excellent legal 
advice to the House” (Hansard HC 





intervention in general 
beyond Syria and/or 
which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 
and 31 December 
2014.  
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Reference to the 
protection of 
civilians in 
relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 
2014.  
Direct references to the 
protection of civilians (including 
its variations of ‘civilian 
protection’, ‘protecting 
civilians’, and ‘protect 
civilians’) in relation to the 
crisis in Syria between 2011 and 
2014 in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 31 
December 2014. 
“This is necessary to minimise the 
risks to regional and international 
security; to protect civilians inside 
Syria and to lay the foundations for 
longer-term stability” (FCO, 2012).
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References which are 
referring to the PoC 
and its variations more 
generally and not in 
relation to the crisis in 
Syria between 2011 
and 2014 and/or which 
do not fall between 11 









Reference to the 
responsibility to 
protect in relation 
to the crisis in 
Syria between 
2011 and 2014. 
Direct references to the 
responsibility to protect in 
relation to the crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 2014 in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
“It is clear that the regime is 
shamefully failing in its in 
responsibility to protect its people” 
(FCO, 2011).96 
References which are 
referring to the 
responsibility to 
protect more generally 
and/or do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 
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government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 11 May 2010 and 31 
December 2014. 












relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 
2014 in both the 
House of Lords 
and House of 
Commons. 
References must be made to 
humanitarian intervention by 
members of either the House of 
Lords or House of Commons in 
relation to the crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 2014 
according to Hansard’s online 
records between 11 May 2010 
and 31 December 2014. 
“It is possible, whatever my views 
about non-humanitarian intervention 
at all, that it may have to be prayed in 
aid in the circumstances of Syria if 
parliamentary approval is obtained” 





intervention in either 
the House of Lords or 
House of Commons 
which are not in 
relation to the crisis in 
Syria between 2011 
and 2014 and/or which 
do not fall between 11 
May 2010 and 31 











protect in relation 
to the crisis in 
Syria between 
2011 and 2014 in 
both the House of 
References must be made to the 
responsibility to protect by 
members of either the House of 
Lords or House of Commons in 
relation to the crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 2014 
according to Hansard’s online 
records between 11 May 2010 
and 31 December 2014. 
“I agree with the Attorney-General—
we turn to what was once called 
humanitarian intervention and now is 
called responsibility to protect. It is a 
fundamental of that doctrine that 
every possible political and 
diplomatic alternative will have been 
explored and found not to be 
References to the 
responsibility to 
protect in either the 
House of Lords or 
House of Commons 
which are not in 
relation to the crisis in 
Syria between 2011 
and 2014 and/or which 
 




Lords and House 
of Commons. 




do not fall between 11 










to the protection 
of civilians in 
relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2011 and 
2014 in both the 
House of Lords 
and House of 
Commons. 
References must be made to the 
protection of civilians (including 
its variations of ‘civilian 
protection’, ‘protecting 
civilians’, and ‘protect 
civilians’) by members of either 
the House of Lords or House of 
Commons in relation to the 
crisis in Syria between 2011 and 
2014 according to Hansard’s 
online records between 11 May 
2010 and 31 December 2014. 
“We are also providing technical 
assistance for the protection of 
civilians. That includes advice and 
training on how to maintain security 
in areas no longer controlled by the 
regime, on how to protect civilians 
and minimise the risks to them” 
(Hansard HC Deb., 11 July 2013).
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References to the 
protection of civilians 
and its variations in 
either the House of 
Lords or House of 
Commons which are 
not in relation to the 
crisis in Syria between 
2011 and 2014 and/or 
which do not fall 
between 11 May 2010 
and 31 December 
2014. 





relation to UK 
foreign policy 
between 7 May 
2015 and 31 
December 2020.  
Direct references to the concept 
of atrocity prevention in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
“does the Secretary of State agree 
that the Government would benefit 
from applying a mass atrocity 
prevention lens in order better to 
References to atrocity 
prevention in UK 
foreign policy which 
do not fall between 7 
May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
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between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
focus their policy?” (Hansard HC 
deb., 16 December 2015).
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Chapter 6 Development 
assistance 





between 7 May 
2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
References to the UK’s 
contribution to overseas 
development assistance, 
including its 0.7% commitment 
in UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“0.7% is often spoken about as 
though spending it is the goal. The 





development aid in 
UK foreign policy 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 
and 31 December 
2020. 





UK foreign policy 
between 7 May 
2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
Direct references to 
humanitarian intervention in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“but we cannot allow this report to 
send out the message that under no 
circumstances will the United 
Kingdom be available for 
humanitarian intervention, even 
though we have had a very sharp 
References to 
humanitarian 
intervention in UK 
foreign policy which 
do not fall between 7 
May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
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lesson in its risks.” (Hansard HL 








leadership in UK 
foreign policy 
between 7 May 
2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
Direct reference to leadership 
(including its variations of lead 
and leading) in foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN  
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“Because British leadership is 
already playing a pivotal role in 
meeting so many of the global 
challenges that affect our security 





which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 
and 31 December 
2020. 
Chapter 6 Protection of 
civilians  
Reference to the 
protection of 
civilians (PoC) in 
the UK’s foreign 
policy between 7 
May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
Direct reference to the 
protection of civilians (including 
its variations of ‘protect 
civilians’ ‘civilian protection’, 
and ‘protecting civilians’) in 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
“Therefore, aside from the clear 
moral reasons for doing so, it is 
within its core mandate that this 
Council should act to protect civilian 




References to the PoC 
and its variations 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 
and 31 December 
2020. 
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government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 






to protect  
Reference to the 
responsibility to 
protect in UK 
foreign policy 
between 7 May 
2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
Direct reference to the 
responsibility to protect in 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“I would like to reaffirm at the outset 
the United Kingdom’s commitment 




References to the R2P 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 









democracy in UK 
foreign policy 
between 7 May 
2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
Direct reference to democracy 
(including the variation of 
‘democratic’) in UK foreign 
policy speeches, statements, 
media interviews, and 
government news reports by 
government ministers and 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“Secondly there is a growing threat 
to democracy and democratic values. 
It’s now clear that the spread of 
democracy has slowed, gradually 
come to a halt, in some respects even 
gone into reverse” (FCO, 2018).
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References not directly 
related to democracy, 
such as the “human 
rights and democracy 
report” and/or which 
do not fall between 7 
May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
 
105  Rycroft, M. 2016. "Part of our Responsibility to Protect lies in ensuring that those who seek to harm civilians know that impunity is not an 
option.". [Online]. [Accessed: 27 December 2017]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/part-of-our-responsibility-to-protect-
lies-in-ensuring-that-those-who-seek-to-harm-civilians-know-that-impunity-is-not-an-option  











to freedom in UK 
foreign policy 
between 7 May 
2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
Direct references to the UK’s 
freedom in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN  
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“The war will not end with the fall of 
Aleppo. Asad will never control the 
hearts or minds of those Syrians 




References that are not 
directly on freedom 
and/or which do not 
fall between 7 May 










to human rights in 
UK foreign policy 
between 7 May 
2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
Direct references to human 
rights in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“Promoting and protecting those 
rights, and standing up for the 
inherent dignity of individuals 
around the world, is a fundamental 
part of the British foreign policy. 
Indeed, a foreign policy that does not 




References which are 
not directly on UK 
foreign policy towards 
human rights, such as 
the Human Rights 
Council and/or which 
do not fall between 7 









Reference to the 
UK’s national 
interest in its 
foreign policy 
between 7 May 
Direct reference to the national 
interest in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
“And they look to us, grown-ups, 
people with families, people who 
know about them, people with 
university degrees, to set aside our 
differences and any selfish sense of 
strategic national interest, and to put 
References which are 
not directly on the 
national interest, such 
as “public interest” 
and/or which do not 
fall between 7 May 
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2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 









Syria/Assad References to 
Assad in relation 
to the crisis in 
Syria between 
2015 and 2017. 
Direct references to Assad or 
Asad in relation to the crisis in 
Syria between 2015 and 2017 in 
UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2017. 
“Chemical weapons inflict 
excruciating pain and suffering. The 
Assad regime’s indiscriminate and 
sustained use of them against their 
own people, including children, is 




References to Assad or 
Asad beyond the crisis 
in Syria between 2015-
2017 and/or which do 
not fall between 7 May 









in relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2015 and 
2017. 
Direct references to chemical 
weapons in Syria between 2015 
and 2017 in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
“The UK condemns the use of 
chemical weapons wherever and by 
whomever they are used and we will 
continue to lead international efforts 





chemical weapons in 
Syria beyond the 
immediate timeframe 
of 2015 to 2017 and/or 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 
and 31 December 
2017. 
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Syria/ISIS References to the 
extremist group 
ISIS specifically 
in relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2015 and 
2017. 
References to ISIS (including its 
variations of ISIL, IS, and 
Daesh) between 2015 and 2017 
in UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2017. 
“We have seen how vital drones are 
in the fight against ISIL so with this 
extra money we are doubling our 
fleet of drones” (FCO, 2015).
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References to ISIS and 
its variations which are 
not in the context of 
the Syria crisis and/or 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 








References to the 
protection of 
civilians in 
relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2015 and 
2017. 
References to PoC (including its 
variations of ‘protect civilians’ 
‘civilian protection’, and 
‘protecting civilians’) between 
2015 and 2017 in UK foreign 
policy speeches, statements, 
media interviews, and 
government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2017. 
“So let us call on all parties to the 
conflict to protect civilians, not 
abduct or attack them as they leave” 
(FCO, 2016).113 
References to the PoC 
and its variations 
which are not in the 
context of the Syria 
crisis and/or which do 
not fall between 7 May 
2015 and 31 December 
2017. 
 
112  FCO. 2015b. Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2015: Prime Minister’s speech. [Online]. [Accessed: 27 April 2020]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/lord-mayors-banquet-2015-prime-ministers-speech  







Syria/Russia References to 
Russia’s position 
on the Syria 
crisis, including 
but not exclusive 
to its membership 
of the UN 
Security Council, 
between 2015 and 
2017. 
Direct reference to Russia in the 
context of the crisis in Syria 
between 2015-2017 in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2017. 
“If Russia genuinely believes in the 
commitment we have all just made to 
protect medical workers, then they 
will bring their full influence to bear 
to restrain the Asad regime and bring 




References to Russia 
which are not 
specifically in relation 
to the crisis in Syria 
between 2015-2017 
and/or which do not 
fall between 7 May 








transition in the 
context of the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2015 and 
2017. 
Direct reference to transition in 
the context of the crisis in Syria 
between 2015 and 2017 in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2017. 
“Syria to the negotiating table and to 
a transition away from the Assad 





transition that are not 
referring to the crisis 
in Syria and/or the 
removal of the Assad 
regime between 2015 
and 2017. This is in 
addition to references 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 
and 31 December 
2017. 
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relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2015 and 
2017.  
Direct references to 
humanitarian intervention in 
relation to the crisis in Syria 
between 2015 and 2017 in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2017. 
“Daesh poses no less a threat. For the 
Opposition, the spirit of 
internationalism, humanitarian 
intervention and solidarity with 
people across the world is one of the 
longest and proudest traditions of the 
British left, which is why we must 
not fall into the mindset of 






intervention in general 
beyond Syria and/or 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 
and 31 December 
2017. 
Figure 20 







Reference to the 
protection of 
civilians in 
relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
2015-2017. 
Direct references to the 
protection of civilians (including 
its variations of ‘civilian 
protection’, ‘protecting 
civilians’, and ‘protect 
civilians’) in relation to the 
crisis in Syria between 2015 and 
2017 in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
“So let us call on all parties to the 
conflict to protect civilians, not 




Direct references to 
PoC and its variations 
which are not in 
relation to the crisis in 
Syria between 2015 
and 2017 and/or which 
do not fall between 7 
May 2015 and 31 
December 2017. 
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ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2017. 
Figure 20 






to protect  
Reference to the 
responsibility to 
protect in relation 
to the crisis in 
Syria between 
2015 and 2017. 
Direct references to the 
responsibility to protect in 
relation to the crisis in Syria 
between 2015 and 2017 in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2017. 
“We agree with him that this Council 
should call on all the parties, and 
especially the regime, which has the 
primary responsibility to protect 
Syrians” (FCO, 2016).118 
Direct references to 
responsibility to 
protect which are not 
in relation to the crisis 
in Syria between 2015 
and 2017 and/or which 
do not fall between 7 













relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2015 and 
2017 in both the 
House of Lords 
References must be made to 
humanitarian intervention by 
members of either the House of 
Lords or House of Commons in 
relation to the crisis in Syria 
between 2015 and 2017 
according to Hansard’s online 
“Daesh poses no less a threat. For the 
Opposition, the spirit of 
internationalism, humanitarian 
intervention and solidarity with 
people across the world”.119 
References to 
humanitarian 
intervention in either 
the House of Lords or 
House of Commons 
which are not in 
relation to the crisis in 
Syria between 2015 
 
118  FCO. 2016. "Starving civilians as a method of warfare is inhuman, unacceptable and prohibited under international humanitarian law." [Online]. 
[Accessed: 2 June 2021]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/starving-civilians-as-a-method-of-warfare-is-inhuman-
unacceptable-and-prohibited-under-international-humanitarian-law  




and House of 
Commons. 
records between 7 May 2015 
and 31 December 2017. 
and 2017 and/or which 
do not fall between 7 














protect in relation 
to the crisis in 
Syria between 
2015 and 2017 in 
both the House of 
Lords and House 
of Commons. 
References must be made to the 
responsibility to protect by 
members of either the House of 
Lords or House of Commons in 
relation to the crisis in Syria 
between 2015 and 2017 
according to Hansard’s online 
records between 7 May 2015 
and 31 December 2017. 
“As the direct threat posed by ISIL to 
the UK increases, so too does our 
responsibility to protect our country 
and our citizens. ISIL is extreme and 
must be isolated. We need military 
action, not inaction” (Hansard HC 
Deb., 2 December 2015).
120
 
References to the 
responsibility to 
protect in either the 
House of Lords or 
House of Commons 
which are not in 
relation to the crisis in 
Syria between 2015 
and 2017 and/or which 
do not fall between 7 











to the protection 
of civilians in 
relation to the 
crisis in Syria 
between 2015 and 
2017 in both the 
House of Lords 
References must be made to the 
protection of civilians (including 
its variations of ‘civilian 
protection’, ‘protecting 
civilians’, and ‘protect 
civilians’) by members of either 
the House of Lords or House of 
Commons in relation to the 
crisis in Syria between 2015 and 
“Indeed, our failure to intervene to 
protect civilians left Assad at liberty 
to escalate both the scale and the 
ferocity of his attacks on innocent 
Syrians in a desperate attempt to 
References to the 
protection of civilians 
and its variations in 
either the House of 
Lords or House of 
Commons which are 
not in relation to the 
crisis in Syria between 
2015 and 2017 and/or 
 





and House of 
Commons. 
2017 according to Hansard’s 
online records between 7 May 
2015 and 31 December 2017. 




which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 









in Syria in 2018. 
Direct references to chemical 
weapons in Syria in 2018 in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN in 
2018. 
“Syria’s chemical weapons program 
must be ended and the chemical 
weapons stockpiles destroyed once 




chemical weapons in 












Syria in 2018 
References to humanitarian 
intervention must be in direct 
relation to the crisis in Syria in 
UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
“But something else is necessary to 
enable humanitarian intervention in 
Syria, and that is the military’s 
guaranteeing the safety of aid 
convoys getting into besieged areas. 
It meets the Government’s test” 




Direct references to 
humanitarian 
intervention which are 
not in relation to the 
crisis in Syria in 2018. 
 
121  Hansard HC Deb. Vol.600 cols.135-136, 12 October 2015. [Online]. [Accessed: 25 March 2020]. Available from: 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-0416/debates/92610F86-2B91-4105-
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122  FCO. 2018. Our military action will degrade the Syrian regime's chemical weapons use: statement by Karen Pierce. [Online]. [Accessed: 1 May 
2020]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/our-action-will-degrade-the-syrian-regimes-chemical-weapons-use  













to the national 
interest in Syria in 
2018 
References to the national 
interest must be in direct relation 
to the crisis in Syria in 2018 in 
UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN in 
2018. 
“We must reinstate the global 
consensus that chemical weapons 
cannot be used. This action is 
absolutely in Britain’s national 
interest.” (Prime Minister’s Office, 
2018).124 
Direct references to 
the national interest 
which are not in 
relation to the crisis in 




Syria/legal Direct reference 
to legal in Syria in 
2018 
References to legal must be in 
direct relation to the crisis in 
Syria in 2018 in UK foreign 
policy speeches, statements, 
media interviews, and 
government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN in 
2018. 
“And based on this advice we agreed 
that it was both right and legal to take 
military action, together with our 
closest allies, to alleviate further 
humanitarian suffering by degrading 
the Syrian Regime’s Chemical 
Weapons capability and deterring 
their use.” (Prime Minister’s Office, 
2018).125 
Direct references to 
legal which are not in 
relation to the crisis in 










Direct references to 
humanitarian suffering in the 
context of the use of chemical 
“The action was carried out to 
alleviate further humanitarian 
suffering by degrading the Syrian 
References to 
humanitarian suffering 
not directly in relation 
 
124  Prime Minister’s Office. 2018. PM's press conference statement on Syria: 14 April 2018. [Online]. [Accessed: 2 June 2021]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-press-conference-statement-on-syria-14-april-2013  




regards to use of 
chemical weapons 
in April 2018 in 
Syria.  
weapons in April 2018 in Syria 
in UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN in 
2018. 
Regime’s chemical weapons 




to the use of chemical 











between 2016 and 
2017. 
Direct references to atrocities in 
relation to Myanmar between 
2016 and 2017 in UK foreign 
policy speeches, statements, 
media interviews, and 
government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“What is essential now is that the 
perpetrators of any atrocities are 
brought to justice” (FCO, 2018).127 
Direct references to 
atrocities in relation to 
Myanmar between 
2016 and 2017 and/or 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 











between 2016 and 
2017. 
Direct references to democracy 
and its variation of democratic 
in relation to Myanmar between 
2016 and 2017 in UK foreign 
policy speeches, statements, 
media interviews, and 
government news reports by 
“Burma’s transition to democracy is 
not yet complete but it is worth 
reflecting on just how far Burma has 
come since Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
National League for Democracy 
Direct references to 
democracy and/or 
democratic in relation 
to Myanmar between 
2016 and 2017 and/or 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 
 
126  FCO. 2018e. PM statement on Syria: 16 April 2018. [Online]. [Accessed: 1 May 2020]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-syria-16-april-2018  




government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 














between 2016 and 
2017. 
Direct references to 
humanitarian in relation to 
Myanmar between 2016 and 
2017 in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“The UK has repeatedly called on the 
Burmese security forces to protect all 
civilians and act now to stop the 
violence and allow humanitarian aid 






are not in reference to 
Myanmar between 
2016 and 2017 and/or 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 






Human rights  
References to 
human rights in 
Myanmar 
between 2016 and 
2017. 
Direct references to human 
rights in relation to Myanmar 
between 2016 and 2017 in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
“While Burma has undoubtedly made 
encouraging progress towards 
democracy in the last few years, the 
situation in Rakhine, the terrible 
human rights abuses and violence are 




References to human 
rights which are not in 
reference to Myanmar 
between 2016 and 
2017 and/or which do 
not fall between 7 May 
 
128  FCO. 2016. Foreign Secretary to meet Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma. [Online]. [Accessed: 29 April 2020]. Available from: 
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representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 







References to the 
Rohingya in 
Myanmar 
between 2016 and 
2017.  
Direct references to the 
Rohingya in Myanmar 
specifically in relation to the 
crisis between 2016 and 2017 in 
UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“Aung Sang Suu Kyi is rightly 
regarded as one of the most inspiring 
figures of our age but the treatment 
of the Rohingya is alas besmirching 




References to the 
Rohingya, which are 
not directly in regard 
to the crisis between 
2016 and 2017 and/or 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 










between 2015 and 
2020 
Direct references to 
humanitarian in relation to 
Myanmar between 2015 and 
2020 in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
“The UK is the fourth largest 
humanitarian donor to Yemen, and 
we have increased our funding this 






are not in reference to 
Myanmar and/or 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 
and 31 December 
2020. 
 
131  FCO. 2017e. Foreign Secretary calls for an end to violence in Rakhine. [Online]. [Accessed: 29 April 2020]. Available from: 
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References to law 
in relation to the 
crisis in Yemen 
between 2015 and 
2020.  
Direct references to law in 
relation to the crisis in Yemen 
between 2015 to 2020 in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“That means all parties must uphold 
their obligations under International 
Humanitarian Law” (FCO, 2017).
133
 
Direct references to 
law, which is not in 
direct relation to the 
crisis in Yemen and/or 
which do not fall 
between 7 May 2015 








Reference to the 
protection of 
civilians and its 
variations in 
relation to the 
crisis in Yemen 
2015-2020. 
References to the PoC 
(including its variations of 
civilian protection, protecting 
civilians, and protect civilians) 
in direct relation to the crisis in 
Yemen between 2015-2020 in 
UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
“The UK has repeatedly called on the 
Burmese security forces to protect all 
civilians and act now to stop the 
violence and allow humanitarian aid 




Direct references to 
PoC and its variations 
which are not in 
relation to the crisis in 
Yemen (2015-2020) 
and/or which do not 
fall between 7 May 
2015 and 31 December 
2020. 
 
133  FCO. 2017. "More than 20 million men, women and children risk starving to death in the next six months.". [Online]. [Accessed: 29 April 2020]. 
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representatives at the UN 










in regard to the 
crisis in Yemen 
between 2015 and 
2020. 
Direct references to political 
solution as a means to end the 
crisis in Yemen between 2015 
and 2020 in UK foreign policy 
speeches, statements, media 
interviews, and government 
news reports by government 
ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“Only a political solution can bring 




Direct references to 
political solution 
which are not in 
relation to the crisis in 
Yemen between 2015 
and 2020 and/or which 
do not fall between 7 









peace in relation 
to the crisis in 
Yemen between 
2015 and 2020. 
Direct references to peace in the 
context of the crisis Yemen 
between 2015 and 2020 in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“The group also discussed the 
destabilising effect of Iran on Yemen 
and the wider region, and how to put 
in place confidence-building 
measures following the breakdown of 




Direct references to 
peace, which is not in 
direct relation to the 
crisis in Yemen 
between 2015 and 
2020 and/or which do 
not fall between 7 May 
2015 and 31 December 
2020.  
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https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-on-yemen-peace-talks  







UK’s place in 
the world/ 
Global Britain 




Direct references to Global 
Britain, which appeared in UK 
government rhetoric from 2016 
in UK foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“Global Britain is the margin of 
victory in delivering the Global 
Goals and a more peaceful, 




References to Global 
Britain prior to its 




UK’s place in 
the world/ 
Global role 
References to the 
UK’s global role 
from 2015-2020. 
Direct references to global role 
in UK foreign policy speeches 
between 2015 and 2020 in UK 
foreign policy speeches, 
statements, media interviews, 
and government news reports by 
government ministers and UK 
representatives at the UN 
between 7 May 2015 and 31 
December 2020. 
“We are a global nation – enriching 
global prosperity through centuries of 
trade, through the talents of our 
people and by exchanging learning 




References to global 
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